FIRST DIVISION
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY (formerly ASIANBANK
CORPORATION),
Petitioner, - versus - BA FINANCE
CORPORATION and MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., Respondents. |
G.R. No. 179952 Present: PUNO, C.J.,
Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated:
December 4, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Lamberto Bitanga (Bitanga) obtained from respondent BA Finance
Corporation (BA Finance) a P329,280[1]
loan to secure which, he mortgaged his car to respondent BA Finance.[2]
The mortgage contained the following stipulation:
The MORTGAGOR covenants and agrees that he/it will cause
the property(ies) hereinabove mortgaged to be insured against loss or
damage by accident, theft and fire for a period of one year from date hereof
with an insurance company or companies acceptable to the MORTGAGEE in an amount
not less than the outstanding balance of
mortgage obligations and that he/it will make all loss, if any, under
such policy or policies, payable to
the MORTGAGEE or its assigns as its interest may appear x x x.[3] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Bitanga thus had the
mortgaged car insured by respondent Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan
Insurance)[4]
which issued a policy stipulating that, inter
alia,
Loss, if any shall be payable
to BA FINANCE CORP. as its interest may appear. It is hereby expressly understood that this
policy or any renewal thereof, shall not be cancelled without prior
notification and conformity by BA FINANCE CORPORATION.[5] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The car was stolen. On
Bitanga’s claim, Malayan Insurance issued a check payable to the order of “B.A.
Finance Corporation and Lamberto Bitanga” for P224,500, drawn
against China Banking Corporation (China Bank).
The check was crossed with the notation “For Deposit Payees’
Account Only.”[6]
Without the indorsement or authority of his co-payee BA Finance,
Bitanga deposited the check to his account with the Asianbank Corporation
(Asianbank), now merged with herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank). Bitanga subsequently withdrew the entire
proceeds of the check.
In the meantime, Bitanga’s loan became past due, but despite
demands, he failed to settle it.
BA Finance eventually learned of the loss of the car and of
Malayan Insurance’s issuance of a crossed check payable to it and Bitanga, and
of Bitanga’s depositing it in his account at Asianbank and withdrawing the entire
proceeds thereof.
BA Finance thereupon demanded the payment of the value of the
check from Asianbank[7]
but to no avail, prompting it to file a complaint before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of
In its Answer with Counterclaim,[9]
Asianbank alleged that BA Finance “instituted [the] complaint in bad faith to
coerce [it] into paying the whole amount of the CHECK knowing fully well that
its rightful claim, if any, is against Malayan [Insurance].”[10]
Asianbank thereafter filed a cross-claim against Bitanga,[11]
alleging that he fraudulently induced its personnel to release to him the full
amount of the check; and that on being later informed that the entire amount of
the check did not belong to Bitanga, it took steps to get in touch with him but
he had changed residence without leaving any forwarding address.[12]
And Asianbank filed a third-party complaint against Malayan
Insurance,[13]
alleging that Malayan Insurance was grossly negligent in issuing the check
payable to both Bitanga and BA Finance and delivering it to Bitanga without the
consent of BA Finance.[14]
Bitanga was declared in default in Asianbank’s cross-claim.[15]
Branch 137 of the Makati RTC, finding that Malayan Insurance was
not privy to the contract between BA Finance and Bitanga, and noting the claim
of Malayan Insurance that it is its policy to issue checks to both the insured
and the financing company, held that Malayan Insurance cannot be faulted for
negligence for issuing the check payable to both BA Finance and Bitanga.
The trial court, holding that Asianbank was negligent in allowing
Bitanga to deposit the check to his account and to withdraw the proceeds
thereof, without his co-payee BA Finance having either indorsed it or
authorized him to indorse it in its behalf,[16]
found Asianbank and Bitanga jointly and severally liable to BA Finance following
Section 41 of the Negotiable Instruments Law and Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals.[17]
Thus the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendants Asian Bank Corporation and Lamberto Bitanga:
1)
To pay plaintiff
jointly and severally the sum of P224,500.00 with interest thereon at the rate
of 12% from
2)
To pay plaintiff the
sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P20,000.00 as actual damages;
P30,000.00 as attorney’s fee; and
3)
To pay the costs of
suit.
Asianbank’s and Bitanga’s [sic] counterclaims are dismissed.
The third party complaint of defendant/third party
plaintiff against third-party defendant Malayan Insurance, Co., Inc. is hereby
dismissed. Asianbank is ordered to pay
Malayan attorney’s fee of P50,000.00 and a per appearance fee of P500.00.
On the cross-claim of defendant Asianbank, co-defendant
Lamberto Bitanga is ordered to pay the former the amounts the latter is ordered
to pay the plaintiff in Nos. 1, 2 and 3 above-mentioned.
SO ORDERED.[18]
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Before the Court of
Appeals, Asianbank, in its Appellant’s Brief, submitted the following issues
for consideration:
3.01.1.1
Whether BA Finance
has a cause of action against Asianbank.
3.01.1.2
Assuming that BA
Finance has a valid cause of action, may it claim from Asianbank more than
one-half of the value of the check considering that it is a mere co-payee
or joint payee of the check?
3.01.1.3
Whether BA Finance
is liable to Asianbank for actual and exemplary damages for wrongfully bringing the case to court.
3.01.1.4
Whether Malayan is
liable to Asianbank for reimbursement of
any sum of money which this Honorable Court may award to BA Finance in this
case.[19] (underscoring
supplied)
And it proffered the
following arguments:
A. BA Finance has no cause of action against
Asianbank as it has no legal right and title to the check considering that the check
was not delivered to BA Finance.
Hence, BA Finance is not a holder thereof under the Negotiable
Instruments Law.
B. Asianbank, as collecting bank, is not liable
to BA Finance as there was no privity of contract between them.
C.
Asianbank, as collecting bank, is not liable to BA Finance, considering
that, as the intermediary between the payee and the drawee Chinabank, it merely
acted on the instructions of drawee Chinabank to pay the amount of the check to
Bitanga, hence, the consequent damage to BA Finance was due to the
negligence of Chinabank.
D. Malayan’s act of issuing and delivering
the check solely to Bitanga in violation of the “loss payee” clause in the
Policy, is the proximate cause of the alleged damage to BA Finance.
E. Assuming Asianbank is liable, BA Finance
can claim only his proportionate interest on the check as it is a joint payee
thereof.
F. Bitanga alone is liable for the amount to
BA Finance on the ground of unjust enrichment or solutio indebiti.
G. BA Finance is liable to pay Asianbank
actual and exemplary damages.[20] (underscoring
supplied)
The appellate court,
“summarizing” the errors attributed to the trial court by Asianbank to be
“whether…BA Finance has a cause of action against [it] even if the subject
check had not been delivered to…BA Finance by the issuer itself,” held in the
affirmative and accordingly affirmed the trial court’s decision but deleted the
award of P20,000 as actual damages.[21]
Hence, the present
Petition for Review on Certiorari[22]
filed by Metrobank (hereafter petitioner) to which Asianbank was, as earlier
stated, merged, faulting the appellate court
I.
x x x in applying the case of Associated Bank v. Court
of Appeals, in the absence of factual similarity and of the legal
relationships necessary for the application of the desirable shortcut rule. x x
x
II.
x x x in not finding that x x x the general rule that
the payee has no cause of action against the collecting bank absent
delivery to him must be applied.
III.
x x x in finding that all the elements of a cause of
action by BA Finance Corporation against Asianbank Corporation are present.
IV.
x x x in finding that Article 1208 of the Civil Code is not
applicable.
V.
x x x in awarding of exemplary damages even in the
absence of moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages and a finding
of fact that Asianbank acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
x x x x
VII.
x x x in dismissing Asianbank’s counterclaim and Third
Party complaint [against Malayan Insurance].[23] (italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Petitioner proffers the following arguments against the
application of Associated Bank v. CA to
the case:
x x x [T]he rule established in the Associated Bank case has provided a speedier remedy for the payee
to recover from erring collecting banks despite the absence of delivery of the
negotiable instrument. However, the
application of the rule demands careful consideration of the factual settings
and issues raised in the case x x x.
One of the relevant circumstances raised in Associated Bank is the existence of
forgery or unauthorized indorsement. x x x
x x x x
In the case at bar, Bitanga is authorized to indorse the
check as the drawer names him as one of the payees. Moreover, his signature is not a forgery
nor has he or anyone forged the signature of the representative of BA Finance
Corporation. No unauthorized
indorsement appears on the check.
x x x x
Absent the indispensable fact of forgery or unauthorized
indorsement, the desirable shortcut rule cannot be applied,[24] (underscoring supplied)
The petition fails.
Section 41 of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:
Where an instrument is payable to the order of two or
more payees or indorsees who are not partners, all must indorse unless the one indorsing has authority to
indorse for the others. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Bitanga alone endorsed the crossed check, and petitioner allowed
the deposit and release of the proceeds thereof, despite the absence of
authority of Bitanga’s co-payee BA Finance to endorse it on its behalf.[25]
Denying any irregularity in accepting the check, petitioner maintains
that it followed normal banking procedure.
The testimony of Imelda Cruz, Asianbank’s then accounting head, shows
otherwise, however, viz:
Q Now,
could you be familiar with a particular policy of the bank with respect to
checks with joined (sic) payees?
A Yes,
sir.
Q And
what would be the particular policy of the bank regarding this
transaction?
A The
bank policy and procedure regarding the joint checks. Once it is deposited to a single account, we
are not accepting joint checks for
single account, depositing to a single account (sic).
Q What
happened to the bank employee who allowed this particular transaction to occur?
A Once
the branch personnel, the bank personnel (sic) accepted it, he is liable.
Q What
do you mean by the branch personnel being held liable?
A Because
since (sic) the bank policy, we are not supposed
to accept joint checks to a [single] account, so we mean that personnel would
be held liable in the sense that (sic) once it is withdrawn or encashed, it
will not be allowed.
Q In
your experience, have you encountered any bank employee who was subjected to
disciplinary action by not following bank policies?
A The
one that happened in that case, since I really don’t know who that personnel
is, he is no longer connected with the bank.
Q What
about in general, do you know of any disciplinary action, Madam witness?
A Since
there’s a negligence on the part of the bank personnel, it will be a ground for
his separation [from] the bank.[26] (emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)
Admittedly,
petitioner dismissed the employee who allowed the deposit of the check in
Bitanga’s account.
Petitioner’s argument that since
there was neither forgery, nor unauthorized indorsement because Bitanga was a
co-payee in the subject check, the dictum in Associated Bank v. CA does not
apply in the present case fails. The payment of an instrument over a missing
indorsement is the equivalent of payment on a forged indorsement[27]
or an unauthorized indorsement in itself in the case of joint payees.[28]
Clearly, petitioner, through its employee, was negligent when it allowed
the deposit of the crossed check, despite the lone endorsement of Bitanga,
ostensibly ignoring the fact that the check did not, it bears repeating, carry
the indorsement of BA Finance.[29]
As has been repeatedly emphasized,
the banking business is imbued with public interest such that the highest
degree of diligence and highest standards of integrity and performance are
expected of banks in order to maintain the trust and confidence of the public
in general in the banking sector.[30]
Undoubtedly,
BA Finance has a cause of action against petitioner.
Is petitioner liable to BA
Finance for the full value of the
check?
Petitioner, at all events, argue that its liability to BA Finance should
only be one-half of the amount covered by the check as there is no indication
in the check that Bitanga and BA Finance are solidary creditors to thus make
them presumptively joint creditors under Articles 1207 and 1208 of the Civil
Code which respectively provide:
Art. 1207. The
concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the
same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to
demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance
with the prestations. There is a
solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the
law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
Art. 1208. If from
the law, or the nature or wording of the obligations to which the preceding
article refers to the contrary does not appear, the credit or debt shall be
presumed to be divided into as many equal shares as there are creditors or
debtors, the debts or credits being considered distinct from one another,
subject to the Rules of Court governing the multiplicity of suits.
Petitioner’s argument is
flawed.
The provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law and underlying jurisprudential teachings on the
black-letter law provide definitive justification for petitioner’s full liability on the value of the check.
To be sure, a collecting
bank, Asianbank in this case, where a check is deposited and which indorses the
check upon presentment with the drawee bank, is an indorser.[31] This is because in indorsing a check to the
drawee bank, a collecting bank stamps the back of the check with the phrase
“all prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed”[32]
and, for all intents and purposes, treats the check as a negotiable instrument,
hence, assumes the warranty of an indorser.[33] Without Asianbank’s warranty, the drawee bank
(China Bank in this case) would not have paid the value of the subject check.
Petitioner, as the
collecting bank or last indorser, generally suffers the loss because it has the
duty to ascertain the genuineness of all prior indorsements considering that
the act of presenting the check for payment to the drawee is an assertion that
the party making the presentment has done its duty to ascertain the genuineness
of prior indorsements.[34]
Accordingly, one who credits
the proceeds of a check to the account of the indorsing payee is liable in
conversion to the non-indorsing payee for the entire amount of the check.[35]
It bears noting that in
petitioner’s cross-claim against Bitanga, the trial court ordered Bitanga to return to
petitioner the entire value of the check ─ P224,500.00 ─ with
interest as well as damages and cost of suit.
Petitioner never questioned this aspect of the trial court’s disposition,
yet it now prays for the modification of its liability to BA Finance to only
one-half of said amount. To pander to
petitioner’s supplication would certainly amount to unjust enrichment at BA
Finance’s expense. Petitioner’s
remedy—which is the reimbursement for the full
amount of the check from the perpetrator of the irregularity — lies with
Bitanga.
Articles 1207 and 1208 of
the Civil Code cannot be applied to the present case as these are completely
irrelevant. The drawer, Malayan
Insurance in this case, issued the check to answer for an underlying contractual
obligation (payment of insurance proceeds).
The obligation is merely reflected in the instrument and whether the
payees would jointly share in the proceeds or not is beside the point.
Moreover, granting
petitioner’s appeal for partial liability would run counter to the existing
principles on the liabilities of parties on negotiable instruments,
particularly on Section 68 of the Negotiable Instruments Law which instructs
that joint payees who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and severally.[36] Recall that when the maker dishonors the
instrument, the holder thereof can turn to those secondarily liable — the
indorser — for recovery.[37] And since the law explicitly mandates a solidary
liability on the part of the joint
payees who indorse
the instrument, the holder
thereof (assuming the check was further
negotiated) can turn to either Bitanga or BA Finance for full recompense.
Respecting petitioner’s challenge to the award
by the appellate court of exemplary damages to BA Finance, the same fails.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that no moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages were awarded by the trial court,[38]
the RTC did in fact award compensatory or actual damages of P224,500,
the value of the check, plus interest thereon.
Petitioner argues,
however, that assuming arguendo that
compensatory damages had been awarded, the same contravened Article 2232 of the
Civil Code which provides that in contracts or quasi-contracts, the court may
award exemplary damages only if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Since, so petitioner concludes, there was no finding that it acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner,[39]
it is not liable for exemplary damages.
The argument fails. To reiterate, petitioner’s liability is based
not on contract or quasi-contract but on quasi-delict
since there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties.[40] Article
2231 of the Civil Code, which provides that in quasi-delict, exemplary
damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence, thus
applies. For “gross negligence” implies
a want or absence of or failure to exercise even slight care or diligence, or
the entire absence of care,[41] evincing a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.[42]
x x x The law allows the grant of exemplary damages to set
an example for the public good. The
business of a bank is affected with public interest; thus it makes a sworn
profession of diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable
service. For this reason, the bank
should guard against in injury attributable to negligence or bad faith on its
part. The award of exemplary damages is proper as a warning
to [the petitioner] and all concerned not to recklessly disregard their
obligation to exercise the highest and strictest diligence in serving their
depositors.[43] (Italics and underscoring supplied)
As for the dismissal by the appellate court of petitioner’s third-party
complaint against Malayan Insurance, the same is well-taken. Petitioner based its third-party complaint on
Malayan Insurance’s alleged gross negligence in issuing the check payable to
both BA Finance and Bitanga, despite the stipulation in the mortgage and in the
insurance policy that liability for loss shall be payable to BA Finance.[44] Malayan Insurance countered, however, that it
x x x paid the amount of P224,500 to ‘BA Finance
Corporation and Lamberto Bitanga’ in compliance with the decision in the
case of “Lamberto Bitanga versus Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., Civil Case No.
88-2802, RTC-Makati Br. 132, and affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court [3rd
Division], G.R. no. 101964, April 8, 1992 x x x.[45] (underscoring supplied)
It is noted that Malayan
Insurance, which stated that it was a matter of company policy to issue checks
in the name of the insured and the financing company, presented a witness to
rebut its supposed negligence. [46] Perforce, it thus wrote a crossed
check with joint payees so as to serve warning that the check was issued for
a definite purpose.[47] Petitioner never ever disputed these
assertions.
The
Court takes exception, however, to the appellate court’s affirmance of the trial
court’s grant of legal interest of 12% per annum on the value of the check. For the obligation in this case did not arise
out of a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credit. While Article 1980 of the Civil Code provides
that:
Fixed savings, and current deposits of money in banks and
similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple
loan,
said
provision does not find application in this case since the nature of the
relationship between BA Finance and petitioner is one of agency whereby petitioner, as collecting bank, is to collect for BA
Finance the corresponding proceeds from the check.[48] Not being a loan or forbearance of money, the
interest should be 6% per annum computed from the date of extrajudicial demand
on September 25, 1992 until finality of judgment; and 12% per annum from
finality of judgment until payment, conformably with Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[49]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated May 18, 2007 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that the rate
of interest on the judgment
obligation of P224,500 should be 6% per annum, computed from the time of
extrajudicial demand on September 25, 1992 until its full payment before
finality of judgment; thereafter, if the amount adjudged remains unpaid, the
interest rate shall be 12% per annum computed
from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until fully satisfied.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Exhibit
“A,” records, pp. 210-211.
[2] Exhibit
“B,” id. at 212-215.
[3]
[4] Exhibit
“D,” id. at 217.
[5] Exhibit
“D-1,” ibid.
[6] Exhibit
“F,” id. at 219.
[7] Exhibits
“H,” id. at 221-222.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] G.R. No.
89802,
[18] Records,
p. 307.
[19] CA rollo, pp. 39-40.
[20]
[21] Decision
of
[22] Rollo, pp. 10-57.
[23]
[24]
[25] TSN,
Q Thereafter
what happened next, if you know?
A Upon
further verification, we were informed by Malayan Insurance Company that in
deed a check, a cross check was issued to BA Finance Corporation and Lamberto
Bitanga and the check was delivered to Lamberto Bitanga.
Q So,
after the said check was delivered to Mr. Lamberto Bitanga, do you have any
knowledge Mr. witness, if you know, what happened to the check?
A Yes,
sir, the check was deposited into the personal account of Mr. Lamberto Bitanga
only, with Asian Savings Bank without the knowledge and endorsement of the
joint payee of the said check, which is the plaintiff here, BA Finance.
x x x x
We
immediately send a formal letter communication to Asian Bank in order to
discuss the possibility of reimbursement of banking on the premise that our
check was irregular accepted for deposit into the personal account of Lamberto
Bitanga without our endorsement.
[26] TSN,
[27] Kelly
v. Central Bank and Trust Co. (Colo App), 794 P2d 1037, 12 UCCRS2d 1089; Humberto
Decorators, Inc. v. Plaza Nat’l Bank, 180 NJ Super 170, 434 A2d 618, 32
UCCRS 494; Vide: 11 Am Jur 2d, Bills and Notes, §224, at p. 557.
[28] Beyer v. First Nat’l Bank, 188
[29] Gempesaw
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92244,
[30] Philippine
Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121413, January 29, 2001, 350 SCRA 446.
[31] Associated
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 677, 697 (1996).
[32] Section 17 of the Philippine Clearing House Corporation Rules states that: “BANK GUARANTEE. All checks cleared through the PCHC shall bear the guarantee affixed thereto by the Presenting Bank/Branch which shall read as follows: ‘Cleared thru the Philippine Clearing House Corporation. All prior endorsements and/or lack of endorsement guaranteed.’”
[33] Banco de Oro v. Equitable Banking Corp.,
241 Phil. 187, 196-197 (1988).
[34] Sections
65 and 66 of the Negotiable Instruments Law state that:
Sec. 65. –Every person negotiating an instrument by delivery
or by a qualified indorsement warrants:
(a)
That the instrument is
genuine and in all respects what it purports to be;
(b)
That he has good title
to it;
(c)
That all prior parties
had capacity to contract;
(d)
That he has no
knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of the instrument or
render it valueless.
But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the warranty
extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee.
The provisions of subdivision (c) of this section do not
apply to a person negotiating public or corporation securities other than bills
and notes.
Sec. 66. Liability of general indorser. –Every indorser who
indorses without qualification, warrants to all subsequent holders in due
course:
(a) The
matters and things mentioned in subdivisions (a), (b), and (c) of the next
preceding section; and
(b)
That the instrument
is, at the time of his indorsement, valid and subsisting;
And in addition, he engages that, on due presentment, it
shall be accepted or paid, or both, as the case may be, according to its tenor,
and that if it be dishonored and the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly
taken, he will pay the amount thereof to the holder, or to any subsequent
indorser who may be compelled to pay it.
[35] Vide Peoples Nat. Bank v. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 39 Md. App.
614, 386 A.2d 1254, 24 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 362 (1978); Middle States Leasing Corp. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 62 A.D.2d 273,
404 N.Y.S.2d 846, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1215 (1st Dep't 1978); Vide
11 Am Jur 2d, Bills and Notes, §225, at p. 557.
[36] Sec. 68. Order in which indorsers are liable. — As respect one another, indorsers are liable prima facie in the order in which they indorse; but evidence is admissible to show that, as between or among themselves, they have agreed otherwise. Joint payees or joint indorsees who indorse are deemed to indorse jointly and severally.
[37] Section 66 of the NIL, supra note 35.
[38] Rollo, pp. 46-47.
[39]
[40] Article
2176 of the Civil Code states: “Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
[41] Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 150171,
[42] Ibid.
[43] BPI Family Bank v.
[44] Vide
records, p. 82; rollo, p. 50.
[45]
[46] Testimony
of Michael Yap, Malayan Insurance’s first vice president.
[47] Vide Bataan Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 93048, March 3, 1994, 230 SCRA 643, 648-649, where the Court held that
crossing of checks should put the holder on inquiry and upon him or her
devolves the duty to ascertain the indorser’s title to the check or the nature
of his possession. Failing in this
respect, the holder is declared guilty of gross negligence amounting to legal
absence of good faith, contrary to Section 52 (c) of the Negotiable Instruments
Law. (Underscoring supplied)
[48] Jai Alai Corp. of the Phils. v.
BPI, G.R. No. L-29432,
[49] G.R. No.
97412,