THE EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF G.R. No. 178606
rep. by
VICTOR D. ANANAYO,
Convention
Secretary,
Petitioner, Present:
Carpio, J., Chairperson,
Carpio Morales, *
- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,
Del Castillo, and
Abad, JJ.
THE DISTRICT ENGINEER,
ENGINEERING DISTRICT,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC Promulgated:
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
[MPED-DPWH],
Respondent. December 15, 2009
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ABAD, J.:
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Episcopal Diocese of Northern
Philippines or EDNP, a religious corporation, constructed a church building for
its congregation on a lot in Lengey, Barangay
Poblacion, Sabangan,
Sometime in 2005, a certain Tomas
Paredes (Paredes) told members of petitioner EDNP that the Office of the
District Engineer of the Mountain Province Engineering District, Department of
Public Works and Highways (MPED-DPWH) was going to build a multi-purpose
gymnasium on the lot of the church. EDNP
objected. After negotiations with
Paredes, the parties agreed to have the gymnasium built instead on an area outside
the church lot.
Later in October 2005, however,
several men entered the church compound and began digging holes for the gym’s
foundation. In a letter, petitioner EDNP
appealed to private contractor Felipe Moises (Moises) not to proceed with the
construction. It sent a separate letter
to respondent District Engineer Leonardo Leyaley of MPED-DPWH, also requesting
him to stop the construction. But it
continued unabated, forcing EDNP to file a complaint for forcible entry with
prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bauko and Sabangan against
respondent District Engineer Leyaley and Moises in Civil Case 329.
During the initial hearing for the
issuance of a TRO, defendant Moises told the court that he was not the real
contractor of the project but some other persons whom he named.[2] As a consequence of this revelation,
petitioner EDNP amended its complaint to include the persons mentioned.
In their respective answers, the defendants
contested the amended complaint in that it failed to show any cause of action
against them, and alleged that the property in question did not belong to
EDNP. They also argued that injunction
will not lie against government projects.
The defendants, however, would not categorically state nor admit that
the construction was in fact based on any contract with the government.
Respondent District Engineer, the
other defendants with him, and their counsels, did not show up at the
preliminary conference set on April 27, 2006 despite notice. They submitted no explanation. Still, petitioner EDNP asked the court to
allow the defendants to file their position papers. Consequently, the MCTC issued a preliminary
conference order on the same date, terminating the preliminary conference and
directing all parties to submit their respective position papers together with
their evidence.
On
Moises appealed the decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bontoc,
Yet again, respondent District
Engineer appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
96849. On
And while the OSG filed a position
paper for the District Engineer, the MCTC, said the CA, failed to consider
it. Additionally, no valid judgment
could be rendered in the case for failure of the plaintiff to implead the
people of Barangay Poblacion who were
indispensable parties in the ejectment suit, the gym being intended for their
use. Petitioner EDNP filed a motion for
reconsideration of its decision but the CA denied it.[3]
Issues Presented
The petition presents two issues:
1. Whether
or not the MCTC denied respondent District Engineer’s right to due process when
no copy of the order requiring him to file his position papers with the MCTC
was sent to his counsel, the OSG; and
2. Whether
or not the people of Barangay
Poblacion, Sabangan,
The Court’s Rulings
One. The record shows that the MCTC addressed a
copy of the order requiring the parties to file their position papers to
respondent District Engineer personally rather than to the OSG[4]
and that it was his co-defendant Moises who acknowledged receipt of such copy
on behalf of the District Engineer. It
was this circumstance that prompted the CA to rule that no valid service of the
order was made on the District Engineer.
Still, the OSG in fact filed a
position paper dated May 18, 2006 on behalf of respondent District
Engineer. This shows that someone
notified the OSG before that date of the need for it to file a position paper
for its client. Apparently, it took the
OSG 11 days by mail to file such paper for the MCTC received it only on May 29,
2006,[5]
the day before the MCTC promulgated its decision. The CA inferred from this that the MCTC
failed to consider that position paper when it decided the case, resulting in
the denial of the District Engineer’s right to be heard on his defense.[6]
Although it is not known when the OSG
received notice that it needed to file a position paper in the case, the fact
remains that it received actual notice.
As petitioner EDNP correctly pointed out, lack of formal notice cannot
prevail against the fact of actual notice.[7]
Besides, the OSG neither complained
that it did not get formal notice to file a position paper nor did it ask that
it be given more time to prepare and file one.
Rather, it took the risk of taking time to file its position paper. As it happened, the MCTC received the OSG’s
position paper just the day before the court came out with its decision. The OSG had no right to expect the MCTC to
wait forever for its position paper.
What is more, respondent District
Engineer had no right to complain of the denial of his right to be heard in his
defense. He did not appear despite
notice during the preliminary conference in the case nor bothered to explain
why he did not do so. To be strict about
it, he forfeited by such omission his right to submit a position paper. Indeed, by his default, the rules entitled
petitioner EDNP to a judgment based on the complaint.[8]
But, precisely to avoid any possible
technical problem in the issuance of such kind of judgment, EDNP itself pleaded
with the MCTC to allow the District Engineer and the other defendants the
chance to file their position papers.
Since the District Engineer did in fact file such a position paper with
the MCTC through the OSG, it will be utterly inequitable to allow him to
complain that he had not been given the opportunity to be heard on his defense.
Also, the mere fact that the MCTC
decision made no mention of respondent District Engineer’s position paper does
not mean that the court did not consider what that paper stated. Besides, the District Engineer’s position
paper merely reiterated the allegations and defenses he raised in his answer[9] to
the complaint, which the MCTC considered in its decision.[10] Indeed, the MCTC dismissed the forcible entry
case against respondent District Engineer for lack of cause of action.
Two. The CA upheld respondent District Engineer’s
view that the MCTC should have considered the inhabitants of Barangay Poblacion indispensable parties
to the ejectment case since the land belonged to them and since it was for
their benefit that the gym was to be built.
But, ownership of the land is not the
issue in forcible entry actions. The
issue in such actions is who among the parties has prior possession de facto.[11] While the trial court may have to determine
the issue of ownership, such determination is only provisional, to ascertain
who among the parties has a better right of possession.[12]
Here, the MCTC resolved the issue of
ownership, ruling that the lot on which the gym was being built belonged to
petitioner EDNP. The latter’s evidence
clearly shows how it came to possess the lot in question. It acquired the land through a deed of
donation that Pedro Compalas Aglipay executed in favor of EDNP’s
predecessor-in-interest, the Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society of the
Protestant Episcopal Church in the
Petitioner EDNP has long declared the
land in its name for tax purposes. And
it continued to use the land from 1960 to the time the suit was filed, as
evidenced by the baptismal records it kept, its register of activities, as well
as the affidavits of witnesses. While
the property was admittedly also being used as a public playground, a market
place, and a parking lot, this did not make the people of Barangay Poblacion the owners of the land. Besides such additional uses are not
inconsistent with EDNP’s claim of ownership since the Episcopal Church in the
The claim that the people of Barangay Poblacion owned the land was
based on a deed of donation that a certain Bishop Pedro Compalas Aglipay of the
Respondent District Engineer alleges
that Pedro Compalas Aglipay from whom EDNP derives its title was merely a
caretaker of the property for the IFI. EDNP
admits that Pedro Compalas Aglipay was indeed the caretaker of the property,
but points out that it was his name that appeared on the tax declaration which
originally covered the property. EDNP,
however, denies the existence of any Bishop of the
Unfortunately for respondent District
Engineer, the evidence adduced by his co-defendants contradicts his stand that
the lot was donated to the people of Barangay
Poblacion. There is evidence that as
early as 1963 some members of the IFI in Sabangan wrote their supreme bishop,
the Obispo Maximo, protesting the
donation that Pedro Compalas Aglipay made in petitioner EDNP’s favor.[13] Obispo Maximo did not, however, take any
action on such protest. On the contrary,
two succeeding Obispo Maximo of the
IFI, Rev. Tito E. Pasco and Rev. Godofredo J. David, recognized and affirmed
such donation.[14] It was moreover a proposition supported by
the existence of a concordat of full communion between the two churches and the
fact that the IFI entrusted EDNP with jurisdiction over its members in
Sabangan.
Respondent District Engineer invokes the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case 787 that the people of Barangay Poblacion owned the lot in question. But the case was for quieting of title that
petitioner EDNP filed in court. The RTC
dismissed the action based on EDNP’s failure to implead the people of Barangay Poblacion as indispensable
parties whom the court believed had a valid claim to the property in
dispute. Not being a party to that
action, the people of Barangay
Poblacion cannot claim that they should be deemed to have obtained a judgment
of ownership of the land in their favor.
Petitioner EDNP was entitled to a
judgment in its favor in the forcible entry case because of uncontested
evidence that Moises and the men he engaged entered the land by strategy and
stealth or force. What is more, the
defendants did not adduce evidence that they entered the land on behalf and by
authority of the people of Barangay
Poblacion and on a claim that the latter owned the property. Respondent District Engineer did not present
any document, official or otherwise, that showed that the local government had
an interest in the construction of the gym.
On the other hand, petitioner EDNP presented Resolution 2006-38 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sabangan dated
Unfortunately, the defendants
succeeded in constructing the gym and demolishing petitioner EDNP’s church
building. Still, this does not prevent
the Court from ruling that the defendants forcibly entered the lot and seized
possession of it from EDNP, entitling the latter to recover possession. This is of course without prejudice to any further
action for the determination in a proper case of the true ownership of the
land.
WHEREFORE, the
court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision
dated February 20, 2007 and Resolution dated June 28, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 96849, and REINSTATES
the Decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bauko and Sabangan in
Civil Case 329 in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of
the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special Order No. 807 dated December 7, 2009.
[1] Records, p. 231.
[2]
[3] Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[4] Records, p. 186.
[5]
[6] CA rollo, p. 487.
[7]
[8] Pursuant to Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, and Section 7 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
[9] Records, pp. 89-103.
[10]
[11] Perez v. Falcatan, G.R. No. 139536, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 21, 31.
[12] Rules of Court, Rule 70, Section 16.
[13] Exhibits 8 and 9 for the private respondents. Records, pp. 323-325.
[14]
[15]