Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
|
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE by LCP National
President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY
OF
Petitioners,
- versus - COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY
OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF
LIGAO, CITY
OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY,
CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY
OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY
OF GINGOOG,
CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY
OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN
CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF
VICTORIAS, CITY
OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF Petitioners-In-Intervention. x-------------------------------------------x LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
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|
G.R. No. 176951 Present: PUNO,* C.J., CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,* LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. G.R. No. 177499 G.R. No. 178056 Promulgated: December
21, 2009 |
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D
E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR. J.:
Ratio legis
est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent,[1]
for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within
its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is
not within the statute.[2] Put a bit differently, that which is within
the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the
letter; and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.[3]
Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation
that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.[4]
So as it is
exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a
co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one
principle in mind: the presumption of
constitutionality of statutes.[5]
This presumption finds its roots in the tri-partite system of government and
the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments
of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each other’s acts, and not
to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions.
Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of
statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to
sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest
studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is
infringed.[6]
Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach
of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt
in the mind of the Court.[7]
The consolidated petitions for
prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas[8]
assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,[9] each converting the municipality
covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to
enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites
pursuant to subject laws.
By
Decision[10]
dated November 18, 2008, the Court en
banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16)
cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section
10, Article X and the equal protection clause.
Subsequently,
respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as
one of the issues, the validity of the factual premises not contained in the
pleadings of the parties, let alone established, which became the bases of the
Decision subject of reconsideration.[11]
By Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for
reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration followed in
which respondent LGUs prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE,
respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider its
“Resolution” dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it denies for “lack of merit”
respondents’ “Motion for Reconsideration” dated December 9, 2008 and in lieu
thereof, considering that new and meritorious arguments are raised by
respondents’ “Motion for Reconsideration” dated December 9, 2008 to grant
afore-mentioned “Motion for Reconsideration” dated December 9, 2008 and dismiss
the “Petitions For Prohibition” in the instant case.
Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009,
the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the motion as follows:
By a vote of 6-6,
the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The motion
is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of
31 March 2009.
The
Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited
pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention x
x x filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings shall be
entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. x x x
On May
14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution of
April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents’ “Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
of March 31, 2009” and “Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached ‘Second
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain
Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon.”
Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court
declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry
of judgment made on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking
common cause with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of
the April 28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the
observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected “before the Court
could act on the aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period
counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution.”[12]
Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of the
petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed their respective comments.
The Court will now rule on this incident. But first, we set and underscore some
basic premises:
(1) The
initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice
Leonardo-De Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive
of the matter of the correctness of the factual premises upon which the said
decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on
the motion for reconsideration per the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which
denied the motion on the sole ground that “the basic issues have already been
passed upon” reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the
underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic
issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision;
(2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was precipitated by
the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. This
May 14, 2009 motion––which mainly argued that a tie vote is inadequate to
declare a law unconstitutional––
remains unresolved; and
(3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the
Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall be heard
by the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.
The basic issue tendered in this motion for
reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution boils down to whether or not the
required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only
to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the
motion for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually votes on
the constitutionality of a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case,
would a minute resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration
on the sole stated ground––that the “basic issues have already been passed”––
suffice to hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question?
The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the
Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the initial motion on the sole
ground that “the basic issues had already been passed upon” betrayed an evenly
divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of
November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration of the said decision. But
at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really
counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6
tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the
issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution.
Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote,
should be deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the
validity or invalidity of the laws in question is, on the merits, secured.
It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not
reflect the “majority of the Members” contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII
of the Constitution, which requires that:
All cases
involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, x x x
shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon. (Emphasis added.)
Webster defines “majority” as “a number greater than
half of a total.”[13]
In plain language, this means 50% plus one. In Lambino v. Commission on
Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate opinion,
expressed the view that “a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a
majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value.”[14]
As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art.
VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case
involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether
such determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for
reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice
Ricardo J. Francisco: “x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional
requirement on the concurrence of the ‘majority’ was initially reached in the x
x x ponencia, the same is inconclusive
as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration.”[15]
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on
a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No.
99-1-09- SC, respectively, providing that:
SEC.
7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. – Where the court en banc is
equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case
shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is
reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in
appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and
on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC
– x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En
Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En
Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who actually took part in the
deliberation of the motion.
If
the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.
But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2),
Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted provisions ought to be applied
in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases “shall be
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted
thereon.” To repeat, the last vote on
the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the
April 28, 2009 Resolution––a 6-6 deadlock.
On the
postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008
Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the precipitate[16]
entry of judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for reconsideration
did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court
is inclined to take another hard look at the underlying decision. Without
belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the
procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has
the power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would be served
thereby.[17] In the performance of their duties, courts
should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest
injustice. Rules of procedure are only
tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by
a rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with public
interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.[18] Time and again, this Court has suspended its
own rules or excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the
higher interests of justice so require.[19]
While perhaps not on all fours with the case,
because it involved a purely business transaction, what the Court said in Chuidian
v. Sandiganbayan[20]
is most apropos:
To
reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and
other cases, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied
with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very
rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules, inclusive of the
one-motion rule, can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court has already declared to be final. The peculiarities of this case
impel us to do so now.
The Court,
by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs’ motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009 motion to consider
the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision
unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration.
This brings
us to the substantive aspect of the case.
The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief
During the 11th Congress,[21]
fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the House of Representatives.[22]
Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The
twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted upon.
Later developments saw the introduction
in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 2157[23] to amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA)
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed amendment sought to increase the
income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million
average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income.
In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was
signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June 30, 2001. As thus amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now provides that
“[a] municipality x x x may be converted into a component city if it has a
[certified] locally generated average annual income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million]
for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices.”
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the
Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July 2001 House (H.)
Joint Resolution No. 29[24]
which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement
prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were
not acted upon during the previous Congress.
The 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint
Resolution No. 29.
Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which
saw the House of Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H.
Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval.
The Senate, however, again failed to approve
the joint resolution. During the Senate
session held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that
passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption
from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For
this reason, he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of
individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and
then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action.[25]
Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures was a provision
exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100 million income requirement.
As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress
had approved the individual cityhood bills, all of which eventually lapsed into
law on various dates. Each
cityhood law directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval, to
hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion.
As earlier stated, the instant
petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection
clause. The wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities, the petitioners
bemoan, will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set
aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the LGC of 1991.[26]
Petitioners-in-intervention, LPC members themselves,
would later seek leave and be allowed to intervene.
Aside
from their basic plea to strike down as unconstitutional the cityhood laws in
question, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention collectively pray that an
order issue enjoining the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites in the affected
areas. An alternative prayer would urge the Court to restrain the poll body
from proclaiming the plebiscite results.
On July 24, 2007, the Court en
banc resolved to consolidate the petitions and the
petitions-in-intervention. On March 11, 2008, it heard the parties in oral
arguments.
In
the main, the issues to which all others must yield pivot on whether or not the
cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal
protection clause.
In the November 18, 2008 Decision
granting the petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, for the Court, resolved the
twin posers in the affirmative and accordingly declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional,
deviating as they do from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion
prescribed by the LGC of 1991. In so
doing, the ponencia veritably agreed
with the petitioners that the Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language,
requires that all the criteria for the creation of a city shall be embodied and
written in the LGC, and not in any other law.
After a circumspect reflection, the
Court is disposed to reconsider.
Petitioners’ threshold posture,
characterized by a strained interpretation of the Constitution, if accorded
cogency, would veritably curtail and cripple Congress’ valid exercise of its
authority to create political subdivisions.
By
constitutional
design[27]
and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political
subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character.[28]
But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create,
divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province,
city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case, Sema v.
CIMELEC.[29] The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec.
10, nonetheless provides for the creation of LGUs, thus:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied.)
As may be
noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of
political subdivisions “in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code,” subject to the approval of the voters
in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators
of viability, i.e., area,
population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as
amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these
indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other
statute. Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing
their point, they conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent
LGUs from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the
Constitution.
Petitioners’
posture does not persuade.
The
supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision.
Save for the use of the term “barrio” in lieu of “barangay,”
“may
be” instead of “shall,” the change of the phrase
“unit
or units” to “political unit” and the addition
of the modifier “directly” to the word “affected,” the aforesaid
provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973
Constitution, which reads:
Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (Emphasis supplied.)
It bears
notice, however, that the “code” similarly referred to in
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is
consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create
political units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating
political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of
requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of
viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable reason why the
Constitution employs the clause “in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code” is to lay stress that it is Congress
alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria. The eminent
constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on
Constitutional Law, specifically on the subject provision, explains:
Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the power to create, divide, merge, dissolve, or change the boundaries of municipal corporations. The extent to which the executive may share in this power was obscured by Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan.[30] Pelaez v. Auditor General subsequently clarified the Cardona case when the Supreme Court said that “the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.”[31] Pelaez, however, conceded that “the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature-involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities.”[32] Pelaez was silent about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations. But since division in effect creates a new municipality, and both dissolution and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be inferred that these acts are also legislative in nature.
Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973 Constitution, goes further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x x subject to “criteria established in the local government code,” thereby declaring these actions properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries “subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”[33] x x x (Emphasis added.)
It remains
to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any
specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991.[34] Be it noted that at the time of the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still
in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to
isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have
actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the
enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3[35]
of the Constitution.
Consistent
with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws
or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said verifiable
criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local
government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as
possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a
codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of
indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the
same. In this case, the amendatory RA
9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of
amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically
exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier
mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the
already codified indicators.
Petitioners’ theory that Congress must provide the criteria
solely in the LGC and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For
if we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying
the new and increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of
unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not question
the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument
for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.
As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood
laws, validly decreased the income criterion vis-à-vis the respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being
unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by reverting to the
PhP 20 million
threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject
respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression
in the following uniform provision of the cityhood laws:
Exemption from
Republic Act No. 9009. – The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
In any
event, petitioners’ constitutional objection would still be untenable even if
we were to assume purely ex hypothesi
the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a
municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among other things, the
income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the
conversion is invalid. We shall explain.
Looking at
the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the
Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered
by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws, which merely
carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the “criteria
established in the Local Government Code,” pursuant to Sec. 10, Art.
X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now
proceed to discuss this exemption angle.[36]
Among the
criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the
heading “Requisites for Creation.” The section sets the minimum income
qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual income “of at least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years” as
a minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by
the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that “[a] municipality or cluster
of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average
annual income, x x x of at least twenty
million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices x x x.” RA 9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further
increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million,
thus:
Section 450. Requisites
for Creation. – (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One
Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following
requisites:
x x x x
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
The legislative intent is not at
all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis[37]
or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and
lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.[38]
To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent
or the spirit of the law is the law itself,[39]
resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.[40]
It is in this respect that the history
of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable therefrom assume
relevancy in discovering legislative intent.[41]
The rationale
behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 can
reasonably be deduced from Senator Pimentel’s sponsorship speech on S. Bill No.
2157. Of particular significance is his statement regarding the basis for the
proposed increase from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million in the income
requirement for municipalities wanting to be converted into cities, viz:
Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend the [LGC]. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the [LGC] was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion x x x. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities.
It is for that reason, Mr.
President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial
requirement, which, under the [LGC], is fixed at P20 million, be raised
to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the right to be
converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced from
locally generated funds.
Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was
being deliberated upon, of the pendency of several bills on cityhood, wherein
the applying municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-income
threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the
ensuing excerpts from the floor exchange between then Senate President Franklin
Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the
income threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to
municipalities that have pending cityhood bills, thus:
THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x x x
THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending
bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a number of
municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard.
We would like to know the view of
the sponsor: Assuming that this bill
becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill to
those bills which are pending for consideration?
SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be
fair to make this bill x x x [if] approved, retroact to the bills that
are pending in the Senate for conversion from municipalities to cities.
THE
PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate
language crafted to reflect that view?
Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that this bill
becomes a law x x x that it will apply to those bills which are already
approved by the House under the old version of the [LGC] and are now pending in
the Senate? The Chair does not know if
we can craft a language which will limit the application to those which are not
yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy
that the Chamber will adopt?
SENATOR PIMENTEL.
Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that
provision because what we are saying here will form part of the interpretation
of this bill. Besides, if there is no
retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would have any retroactive
effect.
THE
PRESIDENT. So the understanding is
that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be affected.
SENATOR
PIMENTEL. These will not be
affected, Mr. President.[42] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
What the foregoing Pimental-Drilon exchange eloquently indicates are the following complementary legislative intentions: (1) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP 100 million that S. Bill No. 2159 proposes; and (2) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned.
Given the foregoing perspective, it is
not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of
the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent
of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not only do the congressional records bear
the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the income
requirement of PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its intention to exempt express in the challenged cityhood
laws.
Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature.[43] In fact, any interpretation that runs counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.[44] Torres v. Limjap could not have been more precise:
The intent of a Statute is the Law. – If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is x x x the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature x x x.[45] (Emphasis supplied.)
As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.[46] Consequently, to him who would assert the unconstitutionality of a statute belongs the burden of proving otherwise. Laws will only be declared invalid if a conflict with the Constitution is beyond reasonable doubt.[47] Unfortunately for petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention, they failed to discharge their heavy burden.
It is
contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the covering joint
resolution were undertaken in the 11th and/or the 12th
Congress. Accordingly, so the argument goes, such deliberations, more
particularly those on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain
municipalities, are without significance and would not qualify as extrinsic
aids in construing the cityhood laws that were passed during the 13th Congress, Congress not
being a continuing body.
The argument is specious and glosses over the reality that the cityhood bills––which were already being deliberated upon even perhaps before the conception of RA 9009––were again being considered during the 13th Congress after being tossed around in the two previous Congresses. And specific reference to the cityhood bills was also made during the deliberations on RA 9009. At the end of the day, it is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing legislative body. What is important is that the debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.[48] And of course the earlier cited Drilon-Pimentel exchange on whether or not the 16 municipalities in question would be covered by RA 9009 is another vital link to the historical chain of the cityhood bills. This and other proceedings on the bills are spread in the Congressional journals, which cannot be conveniently reduced to pure rhetoric without meaning whatsoever, on the simplistic and non-sequitur pretext that Congress is not a continuing body and that unfinished business in either chamber is deemed terminated at the end of the term of Congress.
This brings us to the challenge to the
constitutionality of cityhood laws on equal protection grounds.
To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by
granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of
exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1,
Art. III of the Constitution, which in part provides that no person
shall “be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
Petitioners’
challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal protection clause
proscribes undue favor as well as hostile discrimination. Hence, a law need not
operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III
of the Constitution.
The equal
protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due
process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against the requirements
of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1,
Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against
any undue discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on
the basis of the due process clause. But if a particular challenged act
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut
it down is the equal protection clause.[49]
This constitutional protection extends to all persons, natural or artificial,
within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs
herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is
concerned.[50]
In the proceedings
at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal
protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by
virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCP’s claim that the IRA of
its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion
into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the
ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part
of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their
property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the
municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the
cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this
point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status
as a political unit, but not its property as such.
As a matter of settled legal principle,
the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality.
It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or
obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state
from recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and
classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to
classify,[51]
necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be
reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
apply equally to all members of the same class.[52] The Court finds that all these requisites
have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the
equal protection clause.
As things stand, the favorable
treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests
on substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only
to the erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the stringent income
requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other
municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note that respondent
LGUs had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009. There lies part
of the tipping difference. And years before the enactment of the amendatory RA
9009, respondents LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for
cityhood under the LGC
of 1991. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their
conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. As aptly observed by then
Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his speech sponsoring H. Joint
Resolution No. 1, or the cityhood bills, respondent LGUs saw themselves
confronted with the “changing of the rules in the middle of the
game.” Some excerpts of
Senator Lim’s sponsorship speech:
x x x [D]uring the Eleventh Congress,
fifty-seven (57) municipalities applied for city status, confident that each
has met the requisites for conversion under Section 450 of the [LGC],
particularly the income threshold of P20 million. Of the 57 that filed, thirty-two (32) were
enacted into law; x x x while the rest – twenty-four (24) in all – failed to
pass through Congress. Shortly before
the long recess of Congress in February 2001, to give way to the May elections
x x x, Senate Bill No. 2157, which eventually became [RA] 9009, was passed into
law, effectively raising the income requirement for creation of cities to a
whooping P100 million x x x. Much as the proponents of the 24 cityhood
bills then pending struggled to beat the effectivity of the law on June 30,
2001, events that then unfolded were swift and overwhelming that Congress just
did not have the time to act on the measures.
Some of these intervening events were x x x
the impeachment of President Estrada
x x x and the May 2001 elections.
The imposition of a much higher income
requirement for the creation of a city x x x was unfair; like any sport –
changing the rules in the middle of the game.
Undaunted, they came back during the [12th]
Congress x x x. They filed House Joint
Resolution No. 29 seeking exemption from the higher income requirement of RA
9009. For the
second time, [however], time ran out from them.
For many of the municipalities whose
Cityhood Bills are now under consideration, this year, at the closing days of
the [13th] Congress, marks their ninth year appealing for fairness and justice. x x x
I, for one, share their view that fairness
dictates that they should be given a legal remedy by which they could be
allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city
status using the criteria set forth under the [LGC] prior to its amendment by
RA 9009. Hence, when House Joint
Resolution No. 1 reached the Senate x x x I immediately set the public hearing x
x x. On July 25, 2006, I filed Committee
Report No. 84 x x x. On September 6, I delivered the sponsorship x x x.
x x x By November 14, the measure had
reverted to the period of individual amendments. This was when the then acting majority
leader, x x x informed the Body that Senator Pimentel and the proponents of
House Joint Resolution No. 1 have agreed to the proposal of the Minority Leader
for the House to first approve the individual Cityhood Bills of the qualified
municipalities, along with the provision exempting each of them from the higher
income requirement of RA 9009. x x x This led to the certification issued by the
proponents short-listing fourteen (14) municipalities deemed to be qualified
for city-status.
Acting on the suggestion of Senator
Pimentel, the proponents lost no time in working for the approval by the House
of Representatives of their individual Cityhood Bills, each containing a
provision of exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day of last year,
December 21, the House transmitted to the Senate the Cityhood Bills of twelve
out of the 14 pre-qualified municipalities.
Your Committee immediately conducted the public hearing x x x.
The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x x x.
In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under
consideration will have the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1
because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher income requirement
of RA 9009. The proponents are invoking
the exemption on the basis of justice
and fairness.
Each
of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for conversion into a component
city based on the old requirements set forth under Section 450 of the [LGC],
prior to its amendment by RA 9009, namely: x x x[53]
(Emphasis supplied.)
In hindsight, the peculiar conditions, as depicted in
Senator Lim’s speech, which respondent LGUs found themselves in were
unsettling. They were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 009.
Because of events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form
of RA 9009 supervened. Now, then, to impose on them the much higher income
requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed “unfair,”
to borrow from Senator Lim. Thus, the
imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by
which they would be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary
qualifications for city status, using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991
prior to its amendment by RA 9009.
Truly, the peculiar conditions of respondent LGUs, which are actual and
real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative classification.
To be sure, courts, regardless of
doubts they might be entertaining, cannot question the wisdom of the congressional
classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the
classification.[54] By the same token, they do not sit to
determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically
chosen to extend. That is its
prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make distinctions and
classifications among persons is, to reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by
the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis.
The
classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The
exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million income
requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the
amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the exemption was unquestionably
designed to insure that fairness and justice would be accorded respondent
LGUs. Let it be noted that what were
then the cityhood bills covering respondent LGUs were part and parcel of the
original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11th Congress, 33 of those
became laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the
challenged cityhood laws were not acted upon due, inter alia, to the impeachment of then President Estrada, the
related jueteng scandal
investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted
impeachment.
While the equal protection
guarantee frowns upon the creation of a privileged class without justification,
inherent in the equality clause is the exhortation for the Legislature to pass
laws promoting equality or reducing existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a
real sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the
respondent LGUs. These laws positively promoted the equality and eliminated the
inequality, doubtless unintended, between respondent municipalities and the thirty-three
(33) other municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th
Congress. Respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities, which had
already been elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the
old Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 during the 11th Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33
other former municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions. There is, thus, no rhyme or reason why an
exemption from the PhP 100 million requirement cannot be given to respondent
LGUs. Indeed, to deny respondent
LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the 33 other municipalities
when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is tantamount to denying the
former the protective mantle of the equal protection clause. In effect, petitioners and
petitioners-in-intervention are creating an absurd
situation in which an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution is remedied by another violation of the same clause.
The irony is not lost to the Court.
Then too the non-retroactive
effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application only to conditions existing at
the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all time, as long as the contemplated conditions
obtain. To be more precise, the
legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to exclude
would-be-cities from the PhP 100 million criterion would hold sway, as long as
the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before the effectivity of RA 9009
and the concerned municipality
qualifies for conversion into a city under the original version of Sec. 450 of
the LGC of 1991.
Viewed in
its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an
application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights,
but a mere declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance with the
non-retroactive effect of RA 9009.
Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption
clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills
before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC
of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million. It is hard
to imagine, however, if there are still municipalities out there belonging in
context to the same class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs. Municipalities that
cannot claim to belong to the same class as the 16 cannot seek refuge in the
cityhood laws. The former have to comply with the PhP 100 million income
requirement imposed by RA 9009.
A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the creating, but challenged, cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Other resulting events need not be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine provides another reason for upholding the constitutionality of the cityhood laws in question.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby abandons and sets aside the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject of reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main arguments in support of this disposition, the Court hereby declares the following:
(1)
Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to
apply to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In
other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from
the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009;
(2)
The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450
of the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income
requirement;
(3)
The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or
resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th
Congress. It is really immaterial if
Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and deliberations during the 11th
and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference inasmuch
as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were
being considered during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back on
the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if
the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice.
(4) The exemption accorded the 16
municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long
before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other
municipalities aiming for cityhood. On
top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted
under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC.
And to stress the obvious, the
cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners have not
overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question.
WHEREFORE,
respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their “Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by
Declaring Instead that Respondents’
‘Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009’ and
‘Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved and
to Conduct Further Proceedings,” dated May 14, 2009,
and their second Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The
June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The entry of
judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and
petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely
Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407,
9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
WE
CONCUR:
(No part)
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(No part)
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES ANTONIO EDUARDO
B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
(No part)
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[2] People v. Purisima, Nos. L-42050-66,
L-46229-32, L-46313-16 & L-46997, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 542; Villanueva v. City of
[3] Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259; Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra; U.S. v. Co Chico, 14 Phil. 128 (1909).
[4] Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legal and Collection, G.R. No. 170735, December 17, 2007, 540 SCRA 456, 472; citing Escosura v. San Miguel Brewery, Inc., 114 Phil. 225 (1962).
[5] Cocunut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 47; citing Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 52; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925) and other cases.
[7] Cawalig v. COMELEC, id. Peralta v. COMELEC, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 & L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30.
[9] The
sixteen (16) cityhood laws are the following:
1. R.A. 9389,
otherwise known as “An Act converting
the Municipality of Baybay in the Province of Leyte into a component city to be
known as City of Baybay.” Lapsed
into law on March 15, 2007;
2. R.A. 9390 -
as “An Act converting the municipality
of Bogo in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be known as City of
Bogo.” Lapsed into law on March 15,
2007;
3. R.A. 9391 - “An
Act converting the Municipality of Catbalogan in the Province of Western Samar
into a component city to be known as the City of Catbalogan.” Lapsed into law on March 15, 2007;
4. R.A. 9392 - “An Act converting the Municipality of
Tandag in the Province of Surigao del Sur into a component city to be known as
City of Tandag.” Lapsed into law on
March 15, 2007;
5. R.A. 9394 - “An
Act converting the Municipality of Borongan in the Province of Eastern Samar
into a component city to be known as City of Borongan.” Lapsed into law on March 16, 2007;
6. R.A. 9398 - “An Act converting the
7. R.A. 9393 - “An Act converting the Municipality of
Lamitan in the Province of Basilan into
a component city to be known as City of Lamitan.” Lapsed into law on March 15, 2007;
8. R.A. 9404 - “An
Act converting the Municipality of Tabuk in the Province of Kalinga into a
component city to be known as City of Tabuk.”
Lapsed into law on March 23, 2007;
9. R.A. 9405 - “An Act converting the Municipality of
Bayugan in the Province of Agusan del Sur into a component city to be known as
City of Bayugan.” Lapsed into law on
March 23, 2007;
10. R.A. 9407 -
“An Act converting the
11. R.A. 9408 -
“An Act converting the
12. R.A. 9409 - “An
Act converting the Municipality of Guihulngan in the Province of Negros
Oriental into a component city to be known as City of Guihulngan.” Lapsed into law on March 24, 2007;
13. R.A. 9434 -
“An Act converting the
14. R.A. 9436 -
“An Act converting the
Municipality of Carcar in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be
known as City of Carcar.” Lapsed into
law on April 15, 2007;
15. R.A. 9435 -
“An Act converting the Municipality of
El Salvador in the Province of Misamis Oriental into a component city to be
known as City of El Salvador.”
Lapsed into law on April 12, 2007; and
16. R.A. 9491 - “An Act converting the Municipality of Naga in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be known as City of Naga.” Lapsed into law on July 15, 2007.
[11] Rollo (G.R. No. 178056), p. 2845. As alleged, the Court assumed that each of the cities existing when the cityhood bills were enacted had an income of PhP 100 million or more.
[16] Sec. 10, Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides that “If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments.”
[23] Entitled “An Act Amending Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, Otherwise Known as The Local Government Code of 1991, by Increasing the Average Annual Income Requirement for a Municipality or Cluster of Barangays to be Converted into a Component City.”
[24] Entitled
“Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain
Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress Before June 30, 2001 from the Coverage of [RA] 9009.” Annex
“A,” Memorandum of Petitioners.
[25] Journal, Senate 13th Congress, 59th Session, pp. 1238-40, cited in Justice Reyes’ Dissent, p. 37.
[26] Sec. 285 of the 1991 LGC provides: Allocation to Local Government Units. — The share of [LGUs] in the [IRA] shall be allocated in the following manner:
(a) Provinces — Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities — Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities — Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays — Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population — Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area — Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing — Twenty-five percent (25%)
x x x x
[27] Both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain provisions on the creation of LGUs and
both specifically provides that the creation shall be in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code.
[28] Torralba v.
[35] Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization x x x allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
[36] Discussed in some detail in retired Justice Ruben T. Reyes’ dissent from the original Decision.
[37] Whenever possible, the words in a statute must be given their ordinary meaning. See La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1; citing Francisco, Jr. v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng Mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., G.R. Nos. 160261-63 & 160277, November 10, 2003, 415 SCRA 44.
[38] Solid Homes v Tan, G.R. Nos. 145156-57, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 137; Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines, G.R. No. 158540, August 3, 2005, 465 SCRA 532.
[39] Senarillos v. Hermosisima, 100 Phil. 501
(1956); Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil.
141 (1931); Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil.
953 (1916);
[42] See Justice Reyes’ Dissent promulgated on November 18, 2008; citing II Record, Senate, 13th Congress, pp. 167-168. This is confirmed by the Journal of the Senate on January 29, 2007, p. 1240, which contains the following entry:
REMARKS OF SENATOR PIMENTEL
“Expressing his support for the sentiment of Senator Lim, Senator
Pimentel stated that the local government units applying for cityhood are
requesting to be exempted from the income requirement because when this was
raised by RA 9009, the bills on conversion to cityhood were already pending in
the House x x x. He recalled that during the deliberation on said law, when
Senate President Drilon asked him if there were pending bills on the creation
of cities, he replied that there were three, only to find out later on that
there were, in fact, a number of cityhood bills pending in the House x x x. He asked Senator Lim to be more patient and
to allow Senators Roxas and Recto to interpellate on the bills the following
day.”
[45] Torres v. Limjap, supra note 39; citing Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Vol. II, pp. 693-695.
[46] Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 US 312, 113 S.
Ct. 2637, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257 (1993); Abbas v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
Nos. 89651 & 89965, November 10, 1989, 179 SCRA 287; Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1972, 46 SCRA 734; Yu Cong Eng v.
[47] Peralta v. Commission on Elections, Nos. L-47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791 & L-47827, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30; citing Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall. 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional Law 56 (3rd ed., 1942).
[48] Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 28508, July 7, 1989, 175 SCRA 149; cited in Coconut Oil Refiners Association v. Torres, supra.