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JORGE
B. NAVARRA,
Petitioner, - versus - OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SAMUEL NAMANAMA, FELIXBERTO LAZARO and DANILO Respondents. |
G.R. No.
176291 Present: PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December 4, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The petition is one for certiorari.
Far East Network of Integrated Circuit
Subcontractors Corporation (FENICS) leased the premises of Food Terminal, Inc.
(FTI) in Taguig, Metro Manila from 1995
up to 2002.
It appears that before the expiration of the lease
contract or on the night of September 16, 2002, armed elements of the FTI took
over the FTI premises in Taguig, Metro Manila and forced two building
custodians to leave following which the gates were welded, drawing FENICS’
president- herein petitioner Jorge B. Navarra to file before public respondent,
Office of the Ombudsman, a complaint for grave coercion, malicious
mischief, and/or grave threats against herein private respondents Samuel Namanama
(Namanama, head of FTI’s legal department) and Danilo Medina (Medina, FTI’s
Senior Manager) along with Felixberto Lazaro (FTI’s Legal Assistant).
The pertinent portions of petitioner’s affidavit
read:
x x x [On September 16, 2002] Gerry informed
me that our people had already been ejected from our premises and that they
could not re-enter through the welded gates.
Armed FTI policemen were guarding the perimeters and FTI employees had
forcibly opened the doors to our building and had gone inside. x x x
In the morning of September 17, the employees
working in our compound were not allowed to enter the FENICS compound and were
forced to stay outside the gates. xxx I
went to the group of FTI policemen who were positioned near Gate 1 and inquired
from them why they welded our gates and prevented our people from entering our
place of work. They replied that they
were acting on orders from FTI higher-ups.
I inquired on what grounds the FTI management had ordered the take-over
of our compound without a court order.
They replied that FENICS owed unpaid rentals to FTI and that “matagal
nang
Then, I walked to Gate 2 which was not welded
but which was guarded from both the outside and the inside by FTI policemen
without nameplates and FTI employees in civilian clothes. x x x I talked to the
security guards occupying the FENICS guard house inside Gate 2. I asked him if he could allow me to enter
thru Gate 2. He replied that his orders were not to allow anyone to go in,
except FTI personnel. I asked what the
FTI personnel were doing inside. He said
he did not know. I asked him who went
inside. He mentioned the name of Mr.
[Felixberto] Lazaro as the only person he knew because he was the leader of the
group. x x x
x x x x
[At about 2:00 PM, a van] arrived and was
heading towards Gate 2. [The driver was
signaled] to stop and identify himself. x
x x A man got out and he was asked his named.
He identified himself as Danny Medin[a] of FTI Legal Department. [He was asked] why the FENICS premises were
padlocked and repossessed by FTI. Danny
Medin[a] replied that “FENICS owed rentals to FTI.” He was asked what he and the people [with]
him would be doing inside FENICS. Danny
Medin[a] answered that they were taking inventories. I told him that FENICS personnel should be
present to ensure that things would be done correctly. Danny answered that the barangay was with them.[1]
The pertinent portions of the affidavit of petitioner’s
witness Freddie San Juan, a FENICS employee, read:
x x x Nang bandang mga alas 8:30 ng gabi ng
[ika-16 ng Septiyebre 2002], x x x may isang sasakyan ang Fuji Reynolds na
lumalabas sa aming Gate 1 kaya binuksan ng kasama kong si Jun Abalajen ang gate
nang biglang dumating at pumasok sa nakabukas na gate ang maraming taong
naka-uniporme ng FTI police na may dalang mga baril at shotgun at hinarangan
ang L-300 na kasalukuyang minamaneho palabas na sana ng gate.
x x x Pinatigil ang sasakyan at pinalabas ang
driver. Kinuha ang papel ng registration
na pinakita ng driver at hindi na binalik pagkatapos sigawan ang driver na
lisanin na ang lugar. Sinabi ng driver
na may mga kargamento siyang kailangan ihatid sa mga proyekto ng Fuji Reynolds
ngunit siya ay pinilit na pinalabas ng mga armadong FTI police. Mahigit kumulang sa tatlumpo (30) katao
silang lahat.
Nagtanong kami kung bakit nila ginagawa
iyon. Sinagot lang kami na utos ng mga
Boss nila (at kasama na doon ang isang Attorney Samuel Namanama). Natakot na rin ako dahil sa dami nilang mga
armado, may dalang mga shotgun, at sabay-sabay na nagsisigawan. Pinilit nila kaming pina-alis sabay ang
panakot na may masamang mangyayari sa amin dahil bubuksan at papasukin na nila
ang loob ng aming opisina. x x x Nakita
ko rin na ang kasama kong si Jun Abalajen ay pilit ding pinalabas at pilit pang
kinukuha ang kanyang bisikleta.
Pagkalabas namin, agad ni-welding nila ang
paikot na steel bar sa poste ng aming Gate 1.
x x x
Noong nasa labas kami ng gate dahil
napilitang lumabas at natakot na baka kami ay saktan o barilin, sinabi ko sa
mga FTI police na huwag sanang magkasakitan dahil pareho lang kaming lahat na
ginagampanan ang aming katungkulan.
Nilista ko sa isang papel ang mga pangalan ng ilan sa kanila na may mga
pangalan sa kanilang uniporme. x x x
Habang sinusulat ko ang mga pangalan ng ilan sa kanila, biglang inagaw sa aking
kamay ang aking papel ng isang FTI policeman na walang nameplate o namepatch sa
dibdib. Wala akong magawa dahil bigla
niyang ginawa iyon AT NARINIG KO NA MAY NAGPAPUTOK NG BARIL SA LOOB NG FENICS
COMPOUND. x x x
x x x x
Magdamag kaming nagbantay sa labas. Kinabukasan sa umaga ng ika-17 ng
Septiyembre, dumating ang mga empleyadong pumapasok sa FENICS compound ngunit
sinalubong sila ng mga FTI police x x x.[2]
(Capitalization in the original)
Donato Abalajen, another witness of petitioner,
executed another affidavit substantially corroborating that of Freddie de Juan.[3]
Neither petitioner nor FENICS employees had
thereafter been allowed to enter the FTI premises.
Upon the other hand, private respondents claimed
that, among other things, they acted under the orders of their superiors, and
that FTI was merely exercising its right under a Compromise Agreement forged between
FTI and FENICS wherein FENICS undertook to pay the outstanding obligation
of a previous lessee of FTI, the pertinent portion of which Compromise
Agreement reads:
x x x x
In the event that FENICS shall default in at
least three (3) consecutive monthly amortization payments on its rental
arrearages or one (1) semestral or annual payment of its current rentals, FTI
shall be entitled to rescind the lease contract without need of judicial
action or intervention and all unpaid rentals, including unpaid arrearages
shall automatically be considered due and demandable plus interest of one (1%)
percent per month commencing from due date.[4]
x x x x
(Underscoring supplied)
Private respondents also cited Article 21 of the lease
contract between FTI and FENICS which provides:
It is expressly agreed that if the rent
hereby stipulated shall be unpaid after becoming payable, whether formally
demanded or not, or if any covenant herein contravened shall not be performed
or observed, then in any of said cases, it shall be lawful for the LESSOR to
re-enter the leased premises and the lease shall automatically terminated,
without prejudice, however, to the right of action of the LESSOR with respect
to any covenant herein contained. The
LESSOR shall in such case, be entitled likewise to forfeit improvements on the
leased premises without any obligation to pay the value thereof.[5] (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution of February 22, 2005, Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer Janet Cabigas-Vejerano found probable
cause to hale private respondents into court for grave coercion under
Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code[6]
under the following disquisition:
The strong assertion by the respondents that
FENICS property was voluntarily opened to them cannot stand in the light of the
surrounding circumstances that precipitated the take-over of FENICS
premises. The undeniable facts, to
wit: the circumstance of nighttime, the
overwhelming number of armed respondents as against two (2) caretakers of
FENICS marching at the compound, their failure to notify complainant of the
date of actual repossession, and their lack of any court order authorizing
their action, convince this Office that respondents truly abused their
authority. This notwithstanding any
rightful claim that FTI may have over the subject property. No man is above the law. It is elementary even to some respondents
from the FTI legal department that any such kind of repossession requires a
court order to be implemented by the proper officer of the court, or at the
very least a notice to the party concerned, provisions in their contract
notwithstanding, The purported witness,
a Barangay Tanod, did not even submit his account of what actually
transpired. He would have then attested
to whether FENICS was indeed invited to observe the inventory undertaken. It is unfortunate that respondents, who are
government employees at that, took the matter into their own hands.
Under Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) the crime of Grave Coercion in “imposed upon any person who, without any
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats, or intimidation,
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.”
On the other hand, Grave Threats under Article
282, RPC, is imposed upon “any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of
any wrong amounting to a crime.”
x x x x
While it may be true that FTI had the right
to collect payment for the outstanding obligation of the company complainant
represents, the immediate actual and imminent force employed by the respondents
to compel complainants caretakers to leave their posts at FENICS, and to
prevent complainant as President of FENICS as well as all other officers and
employees of FENICS from entering the compound, truly amount to coercion.
Notably, the presence of conspiracy in the
present case is clear as it is founded on a firm basis by sizing up the
concerted action of all the respondents who have common criminal design and
purpose, which is to repossess the FENICS compound, and they in fact succeeded.[7] (Citation omitted)
The Ombudsman, on recommendation of Over-all Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., dismissed petitioner’s complaint,
however, by Order of
In dismissing
the complaint, public respondent held:
Records show that respondent Namanama sent
several demand letters to Mr. Jorge Navarra, the herein complainant, reminding
the latter of their indebtedness to FTI and at the same time warning him that
in case of non-payment, FTI would resort to a more drastic action.
In the same token, [in] the Compromise
Agreement entered into between the FTI and FENICS there is a proviso which
states:
8.
In the event that FENICS shall default in at
least three (3) consecutive monthly amortization payments on its rental
arrearages or one (1) semestral or annual payment of its current rentals, FTI
shall be entitled to rescind the lease contracts without need of judicial
action or intervention and all unpaid rentals…”
In like manner, respondent Lazaro made
mention that not only FENICS refused to comply with the terms agreed upon in
its Compromise Agreement with FTI but also subleased a portion of the leased
premises without approval of FTI.
On their entering FENICS premises, respondent
Lorenzo [sic] argued that they only
exercised their authority to re-enter the premises because FENICS refused to
pay its rentals and due to its blatant violations of the terms and conditions
of their Contract of Lease.
Indeed, while respondent may have acted in
such a way, the same could be said to have been done in good faith and
without any intention of doing harm
against their adversaries.
From the narrations given by the parties to
this case, it has been established that FENICS had been indebted to FTI in an
aggregate sum of more than P35M and the check it paid the latter even bounced;
[a]lso FENICS even subleased its leased premises in violation of its contract
of lease. Thus, the long delay in its
payment of its obligation to FTI could also be said to have caused the latter
undue injury. To resort to court at
that time could even prolong the situation inasmuch as court processes nowadays
are also delayed. Hence, in order to protect
FTI’s interest, respondents herein have to resort to some extraordinary
measures as what was done under the circumstances.[9]
x x x x
In like manner, and except for his bare
allegations/arguments, complainant-movant failed to substantiate his claims. For one, why did he sign the Compromise
Agreement if the same is a mere draft considering that in the agreement, it has
been specifically mentioned that FENICS had agreed to pay P12,551,841.82 to
FTI? Logic would dictate that no one
could ever affix his signature on a document, more particularly that which
would create an obligation on his part, if FENICS has not been indebted to FTI.
(Italics in the original, underscoring supplied.)
Hence, the present petition for review, petitioner
arguing as follows:
All the elements of Grave Coercion were
extant.
That
a person prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that
he compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong. – In this case, Private Respondents
prevented Petitioner and his employees from entering their own premises. They had also compelled Petitioner’s
caretakers to leave the premises against their will.
That
the prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force
or such display of force as would produce intimidation and control of the will
of the offended party. – In
this case, when Private Respondents entered the FENICS compound in the evening,
they had a contingent of about 20-30 armed personnel as against Petitioner’s
two (2) caretakers. They forced their way into the gates, threatened the
caretakers and a driver, admittedly destroyed one padlock and welded the gates
to prevent entry.
That the person that restrained the will and
liberty of another had not the authority of law or the right to do so (that the
restraint shall not be made under authority of law or in the exercise of a
lawful right.) – In this case, the possessor of the FENICS compound exhibited
its opposition to any takeover. Certainly,
Private Respondents had no right to enter the compound and evict the occupants
against their will. They had no court
order to evict the existing occupants.[10] (Italics in the original)
The Court finds for petitioner.
Ordinarily, the Court does not interfere with the
Ombudsman’s determination of whether probable cause exists, except when the
Ombudsman commits grave abuse of discretion.[11]
“Probable cause” is defined as “such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.”[12]
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements
must be established:
1)
that a person is prevented by another from doing something not
prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right
or wrong; 2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence,
threats, or intimidation; and 3) that the person who restrains the will and
liberty of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint
is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right.[13]
In the case at bar, the affidavits of petitioner and
his witnesses prima facie show that
the elements of grave coercion are present.
Whether FENICS is indebted to FTI is immaterial. It is elementary that in no case may
possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is
a possessor who objects thereto, and that he who believes that he has an action
or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of
the competent court if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.[14]
In United
States v. Mena,[15]
the Court, affirming the conviction of therein respondent for coaccion under Article 497 of the old
Penal Code, rejected the defense that he owned the carabaos which he forced therein
complaining witness to release. It held:
The defendant was not clothed with any
judicial or administrative authority, and it is a maxim of the law that no
man is authorized to take the law into his own hands and enforce his
rights with threats of violence, except in certain well-defined cases,
where one acts in the necessary defense
of one’s life, liberty, or property, against unlawful aggression, and
manifestly the defendant can not successfully maintain that his action was
taken in defense of life, liberty or
property. The carabaos were in the
possession of the complaining witness for the purpose of turning them over to
the justice of the peace; the defendant denied the right of the complaining
witness to this possession and claimed the absolute right to possession in
himself; but in forcibly depriving the complaining witness of possession
of the carabaos the defendant was not acting in defense of his right to the
possession of the carabaos from unlawful aggression, but rather asserting his
right to take the possession from another, and thus he himself became the
aggressor.[16]
Private respondents Namanama and Medina cite the ruling
in University of the Philippines v. de
los Angeles[17]
in which this Court, noting therein petitioner’s right to rescind the contract
– subject of the case, held:
x x x [T]he law definitely does not require
that the contracting party who believes itself injured must first file suit and
wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial steps to protect its
interest. Otherwise, the party injured
by the other’s breach will have to passively sit and watch its damages
accumulate during the pendency of the suit until the final judgment of
rescission is rendered when the law itself requires that he should exercise due
diligence to minimize its own damages.[18]
Private respondents’
citation of the above-said ruling is misplaced.
Unlike in the present case, that case did not allege an act by which
therein petitioner employed violence, threats, or intimidation to compel
therein respondent to relinquish possession of the premises subject of the
agreement.
As to good
faith and lack of “any intention of doing harm against their adversaries” which
public respondent ascribes to private respondents, these are matters of defense
which are better ventilated during the trial than during the preliminary
investigation.[19]
In fine,
public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
petitioner’s complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Ombudsman dated
SO
ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice