Republic of
the Philippines
Supreme
Court
Manila
|
GOVERNOR
ORLANDO A. FUA, JR.,* IN REPRESENTATION OF THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT OF SIQUIJOR and ALL ITS OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES Petitioners, -
versus – THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT and ELIZABETH
S. ZOSA, DIRECTOR IV, LEGAL AND ADJUDICATION OFFICE-LOCAL COMMISSION OF
AUDIT, QUEZON CTY, PHILIPPINES, Respondents. |
G.R. No.
175803 Present: Puno, C.J., CARPIO, CORONA,
CARPIO
MORALES, chico-nazario, velasco, jr., nachura, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December
4, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves
the Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, praying that the Decision[1]
of the Commission on Audit (COA) dated October 19, 2006, denying petitioner's
appeal, be declared null and void.
The undisputed
facts, as gathered from the records, are as follows.
On November
14, 2003, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of the Province of Siquijor adopted Resolution No. 2003-247 segregating the sum
of P8,600,000.00 as payment for the grant of extra Christmas bonus at P20,000.00
each to all its officials and employees.
On the same date, corresponding
Appropriation Ordinance No. 029 was passed.
Thereafter,
Resolution No. 2003-239 was adopted requesting President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
for an authority to the Provincial Government of Siquijor to grant such
bonus. On even date, petitioner wrote a
letter to the President reiterating said request. On said letter, the President then wrote a
marginal note reading, NO OBJECTION.
The provincial
government, relying on the aforementioned resolutions and the President’s
marginal note, then proceeded to release the extra Christmas bonus to its
officials and employees. However, a
post-audit was conducted by Ms. Eufemia C. Jaugan, Audit Team Leader (ATL),
Province of Siquijor, and thereafter, she issued Audit Observation Memorandum
(AOM) Nos. 2004-011 and 2004-022, dated June 28, 2004 and October 27, 2004,
respectively. In AOM Nos. 2004-011 and
2004-022, Ms. Jaugan questioned the legality of the payment of said bonuses,
citing Section 4.1 of Budget Circular No. 2003-7 dated December 5, 2003,
limiting the grant of Extra Christmas Bonus to P5,000.00, and Section
325 (a) of the Local Government Code imposing a 55% limitation on Personal
Services expenditures.
AOM Nos.
2004-011 and 2004-022 were then reviewed by Atty. Roy L. Ursal, Regional
Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Sector, Commission on Audit Region
VII. Atty. Ursal disallowed the payments
and issued Notices of Disallowance Nos. 2004-001-100 (2003) L3-05-164-00-018-A
and 2004-002-100 (2003) L3-05-164-00-019-A, both dated October 28, 2005 in the
total amount of P6,345,000.00 on the following grounds:
1.
Violation of
item 8.0 of Budget Circular No. 2002-A dated November 28, 2002 on the
prohibition of any increase in compensation not in accordance with the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) and the grant of other additional incentives,
bonuses, cash gifts and similar benefits outside of those authorized in said
Circular and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6686, without the prior approval of the
President. The President’s marginal note
of “No
Objection” cannot be considered an approval.
2.
Based on the
computation submitted by the Provincial Budget Officer for the Province of
Siquijor, Personal Services of the local government unit has exceeded the
limitation for Budget Year 2003.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration dated October
28, 2005, but in the 1st Indorsement dated February 1, 2006, the
same was denied by the Regional Cluster Director.
From said denial, petitioner appealed to the Commission on
Audit-Legal and Adjudication Office
(COA-LAO-Local), headed by respondent Director IV, Elizabeth S. Zosa. Petitioner raised the issues of (1) whether
the President’s marginal note of No Objection on the letter-request of
Gov. Orlando B. Fua to
grant extra Christmas bonus to the provincial government’s employees should be
a ground to lift the disallowance, and (2) whether the Province, in granting
the extra Christmas bonus, has complied with the 55% Personal Service
limitation under Section 325 of the Local Government Code.
On October 19, 2006, the
COA-LAO-Local issued a Decision affirming the Regional Cluster Director’s
Notice of Disallowance, the dispositive portion of which reads thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein
appeal is hereby denied for lack of merit and the disallowance is affirmed in
the total amount of P6,345,000.00.[2]
Aggrieved by the foregoing Decision of the COA-LAO-Local, petitioner
filed the present petition alleging that:
THE
COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING FOR THE DISALLOWANCE OF P6,345,000.00
PURSUANT TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 88 AND DISREGARDING THE CONSENT OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE GIVING OF EXTRA BONUS.[3]
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that the petition should
not be given due course because of petitioner’s failure to observe the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.[4] Moreover, respondents emphasized that the
marginal note allegedly written by the President stating No Objection had never been authenticated and was effectively
revoked by Budget Circular No. 2003-7 and Administrative Circular No. 88,
limiting extra cash-gift to all government and local government personnel to P5,000.00
only.[5]
Petitioner counters that the present case should be deemed
an exception to the above-mentioned general rule, because the issue raised here
is a purely legal one.[6]
The petition
is doomed to fail.
The 1997 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the COA states, thus:
RULE VI
APPEAL FROM DIRECTOR TO
COMMISSION PROPER
Section 1. Who
May Appeal and Where to Appeal. – The party aggrieved by a final order
or decision of the Director may appeal to the Commission Proper.
RULE
XI
JUDICIAL
REVIEW
Section 1. Petition
for Certiorari. – Any decision, order or resolution of the Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof
in the manner provided by law, the Rules of Court and these Rules.
Clearly, by immediately filing
the present petition for certiorari,
petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him. The hornbook doctrine, reiterated in Joseph Peter Sison, et al. v. Rogelio Tablang, etc.,[7]
is as follows:
The general rule is that
before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail
himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The
issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such
administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due
deliberation.
x x x x
x
x x The non-observance of the doctrine results
in the petition having no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. In this case, the necessary consequence of
the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is obvious: the disallowance as
ruled by the LAO-C has now become final and executory.[8]
There
is nothing in this case to convince us that it should be considered as an exception to the aforementioned general
rule. The issue presented is not a
purely legal one. The Commission
Proper, which is the tribunal possessing special knowledge,
experience and tools to determine technical and intricate matters of fact
involved in the conduct of the audit, would
still be the best body to determine whether the marginal note of No Objection
on petitioner’s letter-request to the President is indeed authentic and
tantamount to the required approval.
In addition, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
provides that the remedy of certiorari
may only be availed of if “there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
In Badillo v. Court of Appeals,[9]
it was held that:
x x x “the special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse.” It lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[10]
It was
absolutely necessary for petitioner to allege in the petition, and adduce
evidence to prove, that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.[11] Thus,
since petitioner could have appealed the Decision of the Director
to the Commission Proper under the 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, he is definitely not entitled to a writ
of certiorari, because there was some
other speedy and adequate remedy available to him.
Petitioner
having failed to pursue an appeal with the Commission Proper, the Decision issued by the COA-LAO-Local has
become final and executory. In Peña v. Government Service Insurance System,[12]
the
Court held that:
x
x x it is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer
be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even
by the highest court of the land. Just as the losing party has the right to file
an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[13]
x
x x x
The rule on finality of
decisions, orders or resolutions of a judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative body is “not a question of
technicality but of substance and merit,” the underlying consideration
therefore, being the protection of the substantive rights of the winning
party. Nothing is more settled in law
than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
of the land.[14]
Consequently, the
Decision of the COA-LAO-Local can no longer be altered or modified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
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LUCAS
P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice |
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ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice Associate
Justice
CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court. REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
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* By virtue of the Court’s Resolution dated December 11, 2007, the original petitioner, Orlando B. Fua, was substituted by Orlando A. Fua, Jr., the incumbent Governor of the Province of Siquijor.
[1] Penned by Elizabeth S. Zosa, Director IV, Legal and Adjudication Office–Local, Commission on Audit; rollo, pp. 23-25.
[2] Rollo, p. 25.
[3] Id. at 10.
[4] Id. at 42-43.
[5] Id. at 44-46.
[6] Id. at 58.
[7] G.R. No. 177011, June 5, 2009.
[8] Emphasis ours.
[9] G.R. No. 131903, June 26, 2008, 555 SCAR 435.
[10] Id. at 451.
[11] Abides v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
174373, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 268, 284.
[12] G.R. No. 159520, September 19, 2006, 502 SCAR 383.
[13] Id. at 396-397.
[14] Id. at 403-404. (Emphasis ours).