FIRST DIVISION
|
government service insurance system, Petitioner, - versus - the regional trial court of pasig city, branch 71,
cresenciano rabello, jr., Sheriff Iv, rtc-branch 71, pasig city; and eduardo m. santiago, substituted by
his widow, rosario enriquez vda. de Respondents. government service insurance system, Petitioner, - versus – HON.
CELSO LAVIŃA, Presiding Judge, RTC, Pasig City, Branch 71, CRESENCIANO
RABELLO, JR., Sheriff, RTC-71, PASIG CITY, and EDUARDO M. SANTIAGO,
substituted by his widow, ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 175393
G.R.
No. 177731 Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BERSAMIN, and VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. Promulgated: December 18,
2009 |
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
The case now before us stems from two petitions that were consolidated
upon motion of petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). We are well aware of the impact and the
significance of the matters presented here on both parties and after careful
study of the laws and jurisprudence applicable, we now discuss the facts,
issues, and arguments from which we have reached our conclusion. As the final arbiter of all legal questions,
we intend this decision to put an end to this long-drawn litigation.
The first case, docketed as G.R.
No. 175393, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1]
seeking to annul respondent trial court’s Orders dated November 20, 2006 and
September 12, 2006 issued in Civil Case No. 59439 entitled Eduardo M. Santiago, substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez Vda. De
Santiago v. GSIS, and to perpetually restrain respondent sheriff from
enforcing said Orders of respondent trial court.
The second case, docketed as G.R.
No. 177731, is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2]
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which seeks to reverse
and set aside: (1) the Decision[3]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 3, 2006 partially granting the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and affirming with modifications the
assailed Orders of the respondent trial court, in GSIS v. Hon. Celso Lavińa, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court –
Pasig City, Branch 71, Cresenciano Rabello, Jr., Sheriff, RTC-71, Pasig City,
and Eduardo M. Santiago, substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez Vda. De
Santiago, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84079, and (2) the CA Resolution dated
April 27, 2007 denying petitioner’s Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
I.
FACTS OF THE CASE
From September 1956 to October 1957, spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad
Ramos (Zulueta spouses) obtained various loans from GSIS totaling P3,117,000.00
secured by a real estate mortgage on several parcels of land located in Pasig
City and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) Nos. 26105, 37177,
and 50356 (the mother titles) in their name.
Because of the Zulueta spouses’ default, GSIS, on August 14, 1974,
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages dated September 25, 1956, March 6,
1957, April 4, 1957, and October 15, 1957, for P5,229,917.84. Being the highest bidder, GSIS was issued a
certificate of sale by the sheriff.
On November 25, 1975, GSIS consolidated its title over the lots subject
of the foreclosure sale. Subsequently,
GSIS disposed of the foreclosed properties together with lots not covered by
the foreclosure sale.
On March 6, 1980, GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown
Development Corporation, which sale was disapproved by the Office of the
President of the
After GSIS had re-acquired the properties sold to Yorkstown Development
Corporation, it began disposing the foreclosed lots, including the excluded ones. The lots had already been divided by the
Zulueta spouses into smaller lots but GSIS consolidated title on the three
mother titles, because these were what the Zulueta spouses had earlier
mortgaged to it. Under the first
mortgage on September 25, 1956, out of the 199 lots covered by TCT No. 26105,
78 lots (subject lots) were expressly excluded from the mother title’s
mortgage.
On April 7, 1990, Antonio Vic Zulueta (Antonio), the Zulueta spouses’
successor-in-interest, transferred all his rights and interests[5] in the excluded lots to
Eduardo M. Santiago (
On May 7, 1990, Antonio, represented by Santiago, filed an action for
reconveyance of the excluded lots against GSIS in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City (Branch 71), presided over by Hon. Celso Lavińa (respondent
judge), docketed as Civil Case No. 59439
and entitled Eduardo M. Santiago, et al.
v. GSIS. After a court battle
between Antonio and
After trial, respondent judge rendered a Decision[6]
dated December 17, 1997, finding that neither prescription nor laches had set
in. The dispositive portion[7]
of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant:
Ordering defendant to reconvey to plaintiff the
seventy-eight (78) lots released and excluded from the foreclosure sale
including the additional exclusion from the public sale, namely:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
Lots 2, 5, 12 and 15, Block I.
m.
Lots 6, 9 and 11, Block II.
n.
Lots 1, 5, 6, 7, 16 and 23, Block 3.
o.
p.
Lots 5, 12, 13 and 24, Block 5.
q.
Lots 10 and 16, Block 6.
r.
Lots 6 and 15, Block 7.
s.
Lots 13, 24, 28 and 29, Block 8.
t.
Lots 1, 11, 17 and 22, Block 9.
u.
Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Block 10.
v.
Lots 1, 2, 3 and 5 (New), Block 11.
2. Ordering
defendant to pay plaintiff, if the [78] excluded lots could not be reconveyed [,]
the fair market value of each of said lots.
3. Ordering
the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City … to cancel the land titles covering the
excluded lots in the name of defendant or any of its successors-in-interest
including all derivative titles therefrom and to issue new land titles in
plaintiff’s name.
4. Ordering
the Register of Deeds of Pasig City… to cancel the Notices of Lis Pendens
inscribed in TCT No. PT-80342 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; x x x TCT No.
PT-81812 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; and TCT No. PT-84913 under Entry No.
PT-12267/T-23554.
5. Costs of
suit.
Counterclaims filed by defendant, intervenors
Urbano and intervenors Gonzales are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision to the
CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 62309
(the first CA case) which, in a decision dated February 22, 2002, affirmed the
same. GSIS went up to the Supreme Court via
a petition for review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 155206 (the first SC case). The first CA decision was affirmed in toto by the Supreme Court in a
decision dated October 28, 2003, which became final and executory on February
24, 2004.
On April 2, 2004, private respondent filed a motion
before the RTC for execution of its decision.
Opposing the motion, GSIS pointed out that under Sec. 39 of Republic Act
No. 8291, otherwise known as the GSIS Act of 1997, and existing jurisprudence,
its funds and properties were exempt from execution.
On April 27, 2004, respondent judge issued an order
granting the motion for execution and fixing the current fair market value of
the subject lots,[8]
which were ordered reconveyed to private respondent, at P35,000.00 per
square meter, or a total of P1,166,165,000.00 computed on the basis of
an aggregate area of 33,319 square meters.
In arriving at said value, respondent judge explained:
“x x x [The] Court considers the amount of
P35,000.00 per square meter, of all the reconveyed 78 lots, representing the
current fair market value which value is well within the range [P10,000.00 –
P45,000.00 per square meter] established and found by the trial court, affirmed
by the Court of Appeals and has been considered binding and conclusive upon the
Supreme Court per its Decision dated October 28, 2003 which has become final
and executory on February 24, 2004.”[9]
Pursuant to the order of execution, respondent
judge issued a writ of execution[10]
on April 28, 2004. Acting upon said
writ, Sheriff Cresenciano Rabello, Jr. (respondent sheriff), along with private
respondent’s counsel, Atty. Jose Suing (Atty. Suing), went to the GSIS main
office on April 29, 2004 to serve the same and a notice addressed to Atty.
Winston F. Garcia, president and general manager of GSIS, demanding payment of
the abovementioned amount of P1,166,165,000.00. On the same date, respondent sheriff and
Atty. Suing served notices of garnishment on GSIS’ banks, namely: Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Land Bank of the
On May 4, 2004, GSIS
filed a motion to quash writ of execution (motion to quash) on the grounds that:
(i) it was exempt from execution under Sec. 39 of Rep. Act No. 8291; (ii) it
was deprived of the opportunity to contest the order of execution since the
writ of execution was served before its receipt of an official copy of said
order; and (iii) the lower court’s valuation of the subject lots at P35,000.00
per square meter was unrealistic, too high and without legal and factual basis.[11]
Private respondent opposed GSIS’ motion to quash,[12]
arguing as follows: (i) that the motion is pro
forma as it merely repeated the grounds discussed in GSIS’ opposition and
supplemental opposition to her motion for execution; (ii) that GSIS was duly
served a copy of the order of execution through its counsel, Atty. Lucio L. Yu,
Jr., who read the same when he met respondent sheriff and Atty. Suing during
their April 29, 2004 visit to the GSIS main office; and (iii) that the lower
court’s determination of the current market value of the subject lots was based
on its findings which were affirmed by the CA and the Supreme Court.[13]
On May 13,
2004, respondent judge issued an Order[14]
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution or
Order for Cancellation of Lis Pendens and the Motion to cancel Notice of Lis
Pendens, with their merits, are both GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Thereafter, on May 21, 2004, petitioner filed
before the CA a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 84079 (the second CA
case), with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to annul the Orders dated April 27, 2004 and May 13,
2004, respectively, and the Writ of Execution dated April 28, 2004, ascribing
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of respondent judge for denying GSIS’ motion to quash. Petitioner alleged that its funds and
properties were exempt from execution.
Petitioner likewise filed a Petition for Mandamus[15]
with prayer for temporary mandatory restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Pasay City dated May 20, 2004. The petition was a special civil action for
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to compel PNB and
DBP (respondent banks) to release the deposit made by petitioner by allowing
petitioner GSIS to withdraw its funds and monies deposited in respondent
banks. The RTC Pasay City, Branch 115,
in Civil Case No. 04-0316 CFM,
issued an Order[16]
dated May 26, 2004 granting the TRO on the ground that pursuant to Rep. Act No.
8291, the funds of GSIS cannot be subject of any garnishment, considering that
GSIS badly needed the money to finance its daily operations. A portion of the RTC Order is quoted below:
“Between whatever right or obligation the banks may
have to retain the deposits and let another party withdraw it and the right of
the depositor GSIS, who acts in behalf of millions of beneficiaries who will
suffer the moment the financial condition of GSIS is compromised, this Court
finds the choice commonsensical.
“Considering that the rights of the GSIS over its
own funds has been firmly established plus the unimaginable scenario of chaos
the country might face the moment the public has learned that the funds of the
only Government Agency tasked to provide social security protection of the
government workers is in jeopardy is almost certain this Court deems it best to
issue a status quo order.
WHEREFORE, respondent PNB and DBP are restrained
from honoring the garnishing of the GSIS funds x x x (faded text in rollo).
On May 31, 2004, RTC Pasay City Branch 115 issued
an Order[17] in
Civil Case No. 04-0316 CFM that provides:
“In compliance with the Ex-parte Request for
Clarification of Order dated 26 May 2004, directing the parties to preserve the
status quo and in … light of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court of Appeals dated May 27, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP. 84079 case entitled
“Government Service Insurance System vs. Hon. Celso Lavińa, et al.”,
restraining the garnishment of the subject deposits, clarification is hereby
made that the status quo contemplated in the Order refers to the condition of
the parties prior to the service of the Notice of Garnishment on the respondent
banks by the Sheriff of the RTC-71 of Pasig City and that the said status quo
Order was never intended to prevent petitioner GSIS from withdrawing the funds
and monies deposited in the respondent banks.
SO ORDERED.”[18]
Meantime, in
its Decision in CA-GR SP No. 84079,
the CA held:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The orders dated April 27,
2004 and May 13, 2004 and writ of execution dated April 28, 2004, all issued by
the regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 71) in Civil Case No. 59439
entitled “Eduardo M. Santiago, etc., vs. Government Service Insurance System”,
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in (i) that said orders
and writ shall be for the satisfaction of the decision dated December 17, 1997
rendered in said case to the extent of the sum of P399,828,000.99; and (ii)
that said court is directed to immediately conduct a hearing for the purpose of
determining the fair market value of the subject lots as of April 29, 2004 and,
upon such determination, issue an order of execution and the corresponding writ
for the unsatisfied portion of the decision, if any.
The motion for reconsideration of our resolution
dated July 27, 2004 and motion to allow immediate partial execution filed by
respondent Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago are PARTIALLY GRANTED in that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued by this Court is PARTIALLY
LIFTED, such that execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 59439 for the
amount of P399,828,000.00 may immediately proceed while the writ of preliminary
injunction against the execution of the rest of the judgment award is made PERMANENT subject to the disposition in
the preceding paragraph.
For lack of merit, the motion to cite GSIS and
others for direct contempt is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[19]
On August 15, 2006, petitioner filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration[20] of the Decision dated August 3, 2006 on the main ground that it should
not be deprived of what it alleged was the “main mode of satisfying the
judgment, i.e., reconveyance.” Petitioner attached as Annex “A” a Memorandum[21]
entitled “Status of 78 Lots Covered by Writ of Execution in Civil Case No.
59439 xxx as annotated in TCT No. 23554 of the Registry of Deeds, Pasig City,”
which states that “the total number of lots adjudged is only 76 not 78 and the
total area should not be 33,319 [sq. m.] but only 32,534 [sq. m.].”
The respondent trial court issued an Order[22]
dated November 20, 2006 denying the
petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Urgent Motion to Quash
Order of Delivery of Money,[23]and
the Manifestation to Set Case for Presentation of Rebuttal Evidence[24]
dated October 19, 2006.[25]
On November 24, 2006, petitioner GSIS filed with respondent trial court a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion for Inhibition[26]
“on the ground, among others, that respondent judge’s undue and passionate
haste in executing the final judgment, and related acts, reveal clearly his
bias towards private respondent Santiago.”
Subsequently, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,
docketed as G.R. No. 175393 (the second SC case), with prayer for a TRO
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, claiming that the questioned Orders
and the Order of Delivery of Money were issued and enforced with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or in excess of
jurisdiction, in the absence of factual and legal bases; and that petitioner had
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except the
present petition, to protect its interest against the enforcement of the
subject Orders.[27]
This Court issued a Resolution[28] dated December 13, 2006 dismissing the Petition in G.R. No. 175393 for: (a) being a wrong mode
of appeal; and (b) violating the rule on forum shopping. On March 12, 2007, this Court issued another
Resolution[29]
denying with finality petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the earlier
Resolution dated December 13, 2006. The
Court said:
“It is rather obvious that petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration pending with the CA and its present Petition, while ostensibly
directed at different orders of the RTC, are actually aimed at only one
objective: to thwart implementation of the modified April 28, 2004 Writ of
Execution. Such simultaneous recourse to
two remedies at different fora for a single objective is plain forum
shopping. Forum shopping exists not only
when a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another, but also where the elements of litis pendentia are present, i.e., regardless of which party will prevail, the
result of one action will be determinative of that of the other action. Specifically, if we give due course to the
present Petition, our proceedings would have to take precedence over the
resolution by the CA of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Our decision would also bind the CA On the
issue of the April 28, 2004 Writ of Execution.
There is also the possibility that if the CA Proceeds to resolve
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, its resolution will preempt our action
on the present Petition. Either way, one
court will be pitted against the other in an appalling scheme petitioner should
not get away with.
Having declared the present Petition improper for
forum shopping, petitioner’s request that it be treated as a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is
not feasible.
WHEREFORE,
the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED with finality.
SO
ORDERED.[30]
On March 28, 2007, however, petitioner filed a
Motion for Leave to File and For Admission of Second Motion for Reconsideration
with Prayer to Set Case for Oral Arguments.
On April 4, 2007, this Court
issued a Resolution[31] granting petitioner’s Motion and
setting aside the Resolution dated December 13, 2006; reinstating the petition;
requiring respondents therein to comment on the petition; and resolving to
issue a TRO[32]
enjoining respondents therein, their representatives or assigns, and/or any
person acting for and in their behalf, from enforcing the Orders dated November
20, 2006 and September 12, 2006 of respondent trial court and the Order of
Delivery of Money dated September 14, 2006 of respondent Sheriff in Civil Case
No. 59439 of the RTC, Branch 71, Pasig City.
This Court resolved to refer the petition in G.R.
No. 175393 to the Court En Banc for disposition;
however, on June 19, 2007, the Court resolved to return the case to the Third
Division.[33]
On April 27, 2007, the CA denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 84079. Hence, GSIS filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 177731 (the
third SC case).
II.
THEORY OF PETITIONER
In G.R. No. 177731, petitioner alleges that the CA committed a manifest
reversible error:
1.
In ordering the respondent trial court to proceed
with the second option of requiring the petitioner GSIS to pay private
respondent for the value of the lots initially pegged at P12,000.00
without affording petitioner GSIS the opportunity to show compliance with the
first option of reconveyance of the lots;
2.
In ignoring the exemption from execution of the
funds and assets of petitioner GSIS under Section 39 of Section 1 of the GSIS
Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8291); and
3.
In holding that petitioner GSIS is barred by estoppel from invoking the prior sale,
reconveyance and segregation of lots and double enumeration of two lots,
because these allegedly delve into the correctness of respondent trial court’s
decision.[34]
In its MEMORANDUM,[35] petitioner
summarizes the issues involved in this case as follows:
I. Whether
it is grave abuse of discretion or gross reversible error for the respondent
trial court to ignore or modify the judgment of the Supreme Court.
A.
Whether there has been actual or constructive
compliance with the judgment directing the reconveyance of the 78 lots which
are the subject matter of this case.
B.
Whether in the absence of denial by the private
respondent of the fact of reconveyance to the buyers of private respondent’s
assignor of the lots in question, petitioner GSIS should be deemed to have
satisfied the decision under the first option of reconveyance. Otherwise, there would be unjust enrichment
and double indemnification.
C.
Whether the respondent trial court acted with
obvious partiality toward the private respondent.
II. Whether
it is tenable that when a literal and blind execution of a judgment shall
result in grievous error and injustice, the judgment should be executed in a
faithful manner that harmonizes with truth and equity. If necessary to avoid distortions, falsehood,
and marked injustice, whether the Supreme Court may even reverse and set aside
its earlier judgment.
A. Whether a
party litigant is necessarily bound by the mistakes or grave negligence of its
former counsel and officials or employees.
III. Whether
the respondent trial court committed reversible error when it ruled on the
issue of prescription
IV. Whether it
is state policy that GSIS funds are exempt from garnishment. Whether just claims of litigants should be
decided in a way that does not conflict with such public policy.[36]
In
claiming that “execution should harmonize with truth and equity,”[37]
petitioner avers that finality of judgment is a principle needed in the
administration of justice; however, in cases where gross injustice shall result
from insistence on the principle, it has to be disregarded. Petitioner further avers that the present
litigation is one such case. Petitioner
alleges that the principle of law that the sacred principle of justice should
not be sacrificed at the altar of technicalities has remained unchanged up to
the present, and claims that it has been reiterated from time to time by this
Honorable Court.
Petitioner
argues that “substantive merit, not technicalities, should be considered by
this honorable Court.”[38] Under the November 20, 2006 Order of the
respondent trial court, the sale by Jose Zulueta of the subject lots to his buyers
may no longer be raised at this time, but petitioner urges this Court to hold
otherwise. Petitioner likewise contends
that a “final judgment may be modified or reversed,”[39]
and cites cases where this Court allegedly ruled so. Petitioner argues that where there is
deviation from a final judgment, as in the present case, and non-reopening will
result in gross injustice to the petitioner and unjust enrichment to the
respondent, the wrong decision can still be reconsidered and reversed.
Petitioner
likewise alleges that it is not bound by the negligence of its lawyers, and
claims that it is not true that it failed to raise the defense of previous
reconveyance as the records of this case would easily bear out that petitioner
mentioned during the proceedings held in the respondent trial court that there
had already been reconveyance. Petitioner
submits that any negligence of its former lawyers in not including the fact of
reconveyance in their Answer or in not capitalizing upon it throughout the
trial proceedings should not prejudice the interests of the 1,500,000 GSIS
members and pensioners.
Petitioner
reiterates its argument that “even if correct, the claim for reconveyance has
prescribed.”[40] Lastly, regarding the alleged “ethical
dimensions” of the case, petitioner argues: “One Billion Pesos shortens the
actuarial life of the GSIS by one full year.
The amount represents the cash dividends of 621 policy holders for one
and a half years.”[41] Even though private respondent’s lawyers are
highlighting her advanced age and failing health, petitioner points out that
she had already agreed to pay 54% of the net benefits from the case to three of
her lawyers. Petitioner quotes the September
12, 2006 Order of the
Petitioner
likewise claims that under Sec. 39 of Rep. Act No. 8291, the GSIS Act of 1997, its
funds are exempt from taxes, legal processes, liens, attachments, garnishments,
and executions, and such exemption is a state policy based on the Constitution
under its social justice provisions.
Lastly,
petitioner asks that this Court revisit the ruling in Rubia v. GSIS, [43]
which held that the GSIS exemption from execution is not absolute. Petitioner makes the following averments
regarding this issue:
Rubia distinguishes between GSIS funds to pay for
benefits and funds intended for investments.
There is no such distinction. All
funds including those invested and the income derived from them are funds used
to pay benefits. GSIS never views its
income from investments as “profits”.
All income goes to benefit payments, if not current, then for the future
when the billions now paid annually will multiply several times because most of
the 1,200,000 current members and the employees succeeding them will have
retired.
The amount involved in Rubia is relatively
nominal. But when unlawful or
unjustified claims like the Billion Peso garnishment in this case comes up, the
true meaning and correct interpretation of the GSIS Charter become imperative.
x x x
GSIS respectfully submits that the trust funds
under its stewardship have the same public character as funds of regular
departments, bureaus, and offices of the Government. GSIS is not in business, in the commercial
meaning of the word. GSIS tries to make
its trust fund earn in order to meet the heavy demands and requirements of the
future. In the same way as funds needed
to construct school buildings or to buy tanks, helicopters, and other defense
equipment may not be garnished to pay debts of the Department of Education and
Culture or the Department of National Defense, so should funds intended for
pensions of public servants, their death compensation or disability benefits be
freed from the perils of execution and garnishment. Or defraudation as in this case.
x x x
The law provides for the exemption of GSIS funds
from court processes, execution, garnishment, and other levies. It does not follow that parties with
legitimate grievances cannot have any means of redress. The law provides for the handling of claims
against regular departments, bureaus, and offices. The exemption of GSIS from court processes
means that the same procedure for regular government offices should apply to
it. Having removed regular procedures
like attachment and garnishment, the law provides the mode of redress against
exempt agencies and institutions for persons filing cases against GSIS.
x x x
Clearly, the forcible execution of the final
judgment in this Santiago case will no doubt violate Section 39 of Section 1 of
R.A. No. 8291 and the State policy relative to the preservation and maintenance
of the actuarial solvency of the funds of petitioner GSIS.[44]
III.
THEORY OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT
In her Consolidated Memorandum (in G.R. No.
175393) and Comment (in G.R. No. 177731) (With Motion Ad Cautelam For Leave To File),[45]
private respondent avers that:
44. The issues tackled here can be divided into four
(4) groups. The First Group, those which
have been already laid to rest by the finality of judgment of the RTC, 1st
CA Decision and the 1st SC Decision but which petitioner GSIS is
reviving in the current incidents of these proceedings. The Second Group consist of those raised
in the Petition in GR No. 175393 (2nd SC Case). The Third Group are those raised in
Petition in GR No. 177731 (3rd SC Case). The Fourth Group comprises the issue of
“Reconveyance” and related matters.
45. The issues are therefore the following:
45.
A. FIRST
GROUP OF ISSUES
I. Whether or not there is forum shopping and
therefore the petitions should already be dismissed;
II. Whether or not, the subject case having
become final and executory, the instant two petitions should be dismissed;
III. Whether or not Prescription or Laches has set
in;
IV. Whether or not petitioner GSIS funds or
properties are exempt from execution;
Violation
of other Rules
45. B. SECOND
GROUP OF ISSUES (Raised in G.R. No. 175393, 2nd SC Case)
V.
Whether or not the RTC Order dated 12 September 2006 sought to be
reconsidered was, in fact, prematurely issued;
VI.
Whether or not respondent RTC deviated from the final and executory
judgment when it effectively ruled that the judgment against the petitioner
GSIS should be satisfied through the alternative and secondary mode (i.e.,
payment of the fair market value of the 78 lots, computed at P12,000.00 per
square meter) without according the petitioner GSIS the primary mode of
satisfying the same judgment (i.e., reconveyance of the said lots);
VII.
Whether or not in the absence of denial by the private respondent’s
lawyers, with the actual reconveyance to the latter of some 59 out of 78 lots
in question, the petitioner GSIS should be deemed to have satisfied the
judgment to the extent of the same approximately fifty nine (59) lots;
otherwise, there would be a clear case of unjust enrichment and double
indeminification;
VIII. Whether or not [the] Honorable Presiding
Judge of the respondent RTC acted with obvious partiality toward respondent;
and
IX.
This Honorable Court, in G.R. No. 140393, entitled “Dela Merced vs.
GSIS, et al” having also decreed the reconveyance of the lots to Dela Merced,
which include at least one (1) of the subject 78 lots, the physical
impossibility of the petitioner GSIS reconveying a singular lot to two
different parties has to be clarified;
45. C. THIRD
GROUP OF ISSUES (raised in G.R. No. 177731, 3rd SC Case). [Whether or not the Court of Appeals
committed the following manifest reversible errors:]
X.
[In] ordering respondent trial court to proceed with the second option
of requiring the petitioner GSIS to pay the private [respondent] for the value
of the lots initially pegged at P12,000.00 without affording petitioner GSIS
the opportunity to show compliance with the first option of reconveyance of the
lots;
XI.
[In] ignoring the exemption from execution of the funds and assets of
petitioner GSIS under Section 39 and Section 1 of the GSIS Act of 1997 (R.A.
No. 8291); and
XII.
In holding that petitioner GSIS is barred by estoppel from invoking the
prior sale reconveyance and segregation of lots and double enumeration of two
lots, because these allegedly delve into the correctness of respondent trial
court’s decision.
45. D. FOURTH
GROUP OF ISSUES (“Reconveyance” and related issues)
XIII. GR No. 177731 (3rd SC Case) is not
a petition for review – it is actually a camouflaged petition for re-opening of
the case.
XIV.
“Reconveyance” was introduced progressively in a creeping manner – from
none or nothing to a bare allegation and now to a complete “defense”. Hence, it should be dismissed for being
unreliable.
XV.
“Reconveyance” is no longer just a matter of defeating the
execution. GR No. 177731 as made, is a
matter of defense to be introduced in the RTC.
XVI.
GSIS is not even consistent of how many lots have been “reconveyed”.
XVII. “Reconveyance” has not been proved as fact,
as petitioner GSIS would want to impress.
XVIII. The Honorable Court should not refer the case
back to the RCT for the “… conduct of a
hearing to determine the actual number of lots which have already been
transferred or reconveyed”.[46]
Private
respondent claims that the issues expressly raised in G.R. No. 177731 were
already tackled in G.R. No. 175393, and that the issue that GSIS was barred by
estoppel from invoking the prior sale reconveyance and segregation of lots and
double enumeration of two lots was already raised in the second CA case as well
as the first and second SC cases.
Private respondent also claims that all these prove that this Court had
been right in dismissing the petition for forum shopping.
Private
respondent notes that the body of the third SC Case (G.R. No. 177731), which
should discuss matters taken up in the CA decision under review, actually
contains an introduction of “new matters regarding the so-called prior
‘reconveyance’ allegedly made by GSIS to Zulueta”[47] that
were not raised in the questioned CA decision.
Private
respondent alleges that forum shopping is clearly present here. As the CA finally resolved the pending Motion
for Reconsideration filed by petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 84079 by denying/
dismissing it, GSIS filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari of said CA
decision to this Court (G.R. No. 177731), and then moved for consolidation of that case with G.R. No.
175393 because the issues were the same.
Private respondent contends that “[there] is no
controversy at all that the RTC Decision has become final and executory.”[48] She states that “the doctrine of finality of
judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound
practice – once judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party
should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party,” citing Quelnan v. VHF Philippines.[49]
Regarding
the issue of prescription or laches, private respondent argues that it should
no longer be looked into again in this instance, as it had already been laid to
rest when the RTC Decision, affirmed by both the CA and this Court, had become final
and executory. In fact, private
respondent points out that the issue of prescription or laches had been
admitted by petitioner and was not raised in the petition itself, but was only
raised again in the latter’s Memorandum of Arguments in the second SC
Case. This issue had thus been laid to
rest when the decision in the first SC case became final and executory. As held in CA-G.R. CV No. 62309 dated
February 22, 2002:
Neither is defendant-appellee guilty of
laches. We agree with the ruling of the
lower court that plaintiff and her predecessors cannot be held guilty of
laches. There is no evidence that they
actually slept on their rights. Lawful
owners have a right to demand the return of property at anytime as long as
possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated (Quevada vs. Glorioso, 294 SCRA 608). Besides, the essential elements of laches are
not present in this case, especially a delay in asserting plaintiff’s right.
Anent petitioner’s contention that the CA decision dissolving the
TRO/injunction is not immediately executory, private respondent argues, among
others, that the CA decision categorically called for its immediate
implementation, and the RTC, being an inferior court, was not free to entertain
a contrary view, until and unless the CA reverses itself.
As regards petitioner’s claim that the RTC deviated from the final
judgment sought to be executed when it failed to accord GSIS the “primary mode
of satisfying the same judgment (i.e., reconveyance of the said lots),” private
respondent counters, the alleged “primary” mode of execution had already been
rendered impossible by petitioner’s own acts, as found by the branch sheriff
who attempted to execute on the subject real properties.
Private respondent points out that “it was GSIS itself claiming in
October 11, 1996 yet (when the case was still being tried at the RTC) that it
could no longer return the titles back to the then plaintiff” and that
“although it had all the records even then, [petitioner] did not claim that it
had already returned 58 lots to the plaintiff (as it is claiming now).”[50] Since it had already known fully well that it
could not actually reconvey, it was thus “sophisticated misrepresentation” for
petitioner to insist that reconveyance should first be effected and then claim
that it had already been accomplished through some alleged dispositions even
prior to the filing of the case.
With regard to
petitioner’s allegation that there had already been partial execution of the
RTC decision by prior reconveyance, private respondent argues that the alleged
sale by Zulueta is a matter of defense that could no longer be brought up at
the execution stage. Private respondent
contends that petitioner’s allegation is preposterous, as reconveyance in
satisfaction of the RTC decision is against reason and the natural order of
things, for the past cannot come after the future, and execution cannot come
before judgment or the filing of the case in the RTC.
Private respondent avers that petitioner, in reality, wants to re-open an
“immutable final and executory decision of the courts,” under a form of new
trial not found in the Rules of Court, which if allowed would trivialize or
even destroy other core procedural principles, which, due to their importance,
actually overlap considerations for attainment of substantial justice.[51] Private respondent points out that
petitioner’s claims of previous reconveyance of subject properties to the
former plaintiff’s predecessor or his assignees are mere conjectures and broad
allegation of facts, for while it says it has returned many lots to the old
Zulueta or his assignees, it has not identified said lots, stated how many were
supposed to have been reconveyed, or presented the deed of conveyances it
alleged to have executed. These indefinite
claims before this Court, which is not a trier of facts, cannot legally and
rightfully be the basis for this Court to lend its extraordinary power in a
petition for certiorari to review, modify or annul the RTC’s Orders.
Private respondent submits that “the tentativeness of [the] GSIS claims,
together with the said violation of the rule against forum shopping, should
prompt the Honorable Court to dismiss the petition.”[52] Petitioner uses an internal memorandum, which
has no probative value, to bolster its claim of reconveyance. Said document was introduced for the first
time in the second petition to this Court, and being a private document, it needs
to be authenticated in court by a competent witness in order to be considered
by the courts as evidence. Since this
Court is not a trier of facts, it cannot for the first time consider evidence
without the lower court having passed its judgment on it.
With regard to petitioner’s contention that respondent judge acted with
obvious partiality towards private respondent, the latter argues that the acts
being questioned were all within the power of the RTC to do and were
appropriate and proper for the occasion, but they happened to be adverse
rulings in resolving issues raised by GSIS.
Anent petitioner’s contention that “at least one” of the subject lots
was involved in Dela Merced v. GSIS, et
al.,[53]
thus making it physically impossible for GSIS to reconvey the same lot to two
different parties, private respondent alleges that GSIS is not sure as to the
identity of the alleged Dela Merced lot vis-ŕ-vis the subject lots, and a mere
conjecture cannot possibly be the basis for this Court to make the
extraordinary order for the de facto
re-opening of a final and executory judgment.[54]
As to the fourth group of issues involving reconveyance and its related
issues, private respondent avers that a major portion of the petition in G.R.
No. 177731 (the third SC case) is devoted to a new statement of facts
“enumerating, detailing and discussing the alleged incidents of ‘reconveyance’,”
which were narrated as if they were part of the records of the case, when in
truth they were never mentioned, discussed, introduced, much less proved in the
four cases filed prior to this case.
Private respondent further avers that a petition for review, by its very
name and nature, “deals with what has been taken up in the court a quo.”[55]
Private respondent reiterates that the issue of “previous reconveyance” was
only mentioned after the RTC decision, the first CA case, and the first SC case,
respectively, had already become final and executory. This Court had thus been made to accept and
appreciate allegations of facts directly introduced to it by petitioner GSIS. The alleged reconveyance may have been
testified to in the RTC, but it was not put in issue in the proceedings and on
appeal. This “prior reconveyance” of the
subject lots to Zulueta was a matter of defense (not execution) that should
have been presented in the trial court.[56]
Private respondent contends that contrary to petitioner’s claim,
documents from the Register of Deeds[57] show
that it was GSIS, and not Zulueta, which had conveyed the lots to third
parties.
Finally, private respondent avers that while petitioner says that the
purpose of the referral back to the RTC is to make the mechanical act of
determining the actual number of lots already reconveyed, it really will entail
the presentation of evidence that indeed such lots were sold, transferred, or
assigned by Zulueta himself, which in effect, would mean re-opening the case
itself, a course of action that is incongruous to the finality of the decision,
which has been admitted by the GSIS.
Private respondent prays that this Court render judgment in her favor by
ordering as follows:
a. Dismissing
the instant petitions for violation of the rule against forum shopping and/or
for lack of merit;
b. In GR No.
175393, declaring the assailed RTC Order dated 12 September 2006 and the
assailed RTC Order dated 20 November 2006 valid in so far as the same refer to
the execution or garnishment of funds up to the extent of P399,828,000 (but the
allocation of said amount to the plaintiff and the attorneys claiming
attorney’s fees or the entitlement of all or any of the latter to attorney’s
fees is left to the lower court/s to determine);
c. Ordering
the RTC to immediately implement and enforce the order or writ of execution
and/or notice of garnishment; and
d. Ordering
the RTC to conduct proceedings to determine the market value of the subject 78
lots and thereafter execute or cause the execution of the remaining unsatisfied
portion of the decision.[58]
IV.
DISCUSSION
The doctrine
of finality of judgments accepts of exceptions only under certain circumstances, as we have held in Spouses Gomez v. Correa,
et al.,[59]:
It is settled that when a final
judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time.
The only recognized exceptions
are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc
entries in which case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the
judgment is void. None of these has been shown to be present to justify the
"modification" of the judgment. Parenthetically, the modification was
made not by the same court (CFI of Pasig) that rendered the judgment.
None of the
exceptional circumstances to this doctrine exist in this case. The modification that would result should the
petition be granted would not involve merely clerical errors, but would entail
presentation of alleged newly-discovered evidence that should have been raised
as affirmative defenses during trial. Moreover,
the judgment involved herein has been upheld, and not declared void, by this
Court. As correctly cited by private
respondent, we have made the following pronouncements regarding this doctrine:
xxx Public
policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors,
judgment of courts should become final at some definite date. The Court frowns
upon frivolous appeals and any dilatory maneuver calculated to defeat or
frustrate the ends of justice and fair play (Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals)[60].
xxx Once
a decision is final and executory, it can no longer be attacked by any party or
be modified directly or indirectly, even by the Court (Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Court of Appeals)[61].
xxx To once again re-open that issue through a different avenue
would defeat the existence of our courts as final arbiters of legal
controversies. Having attained finality, the decision is beyond review or
modification even by this Court (Toledo-Banaga v. Court of Appeals) [62].
Nothing is more settled
in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable
and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the
land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy
the finality of the resolution of his case. The
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors,
the judgments or orders of courts must become final at some definite time fixed
by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations, thus setting to naught
the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the
rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by setting justiciable
controversies with finality (Gallardo-Corro
v. Gallardo)[63].
What
petitioner seeks to do is for this Court to now hold that there had already
been reconveyance, conducted through various transactions, of the subject
properties even before the
commencement of the case with the RTC, and, in effect, for us to nullify a
final and executory judgment that had been passed upon by the RTC, the CA, and
this Court in the first SC case. This we
cannot do; not with the submissions presented to us by petitioner; not during
the execution stage of the proceedings; not even under the veiled threat that
in failing to grant the petition, we will be deciding against the fate of the
GSIS funds that exist for the service of government employees who deserve to be
favored in law under the principles of social justice and equity.
Being government
employees ourselves, we understand the need to preserve the actuarial solvency
of the GSIS, especially at this time when, right after the series of calamities
that have severely affected the country, GSIS needs to release funds for the
various loan applications being made nationwide. Petitioner had already been subjected to much
criticism caused by the delay in the processing and releasing of the loan
proceeds due to glitches in its computer system and the sheer volume of
applications. The Court, in dismissing
this petition, is aware of the predicament that petitioner finds itself in at
this time, however, justice requires us to look at both sides and at the entirety
of the case now before us. In doing so,
we recognize that rights of private citizens had already arisen and we uphold
such rights.
Even if petitioner claims that it recognizes the
finality of the RTC decision, as affirmed by both the CA and this Court, and that
it only wants that the execution be conducted properly, to grant the petition would
be to negate the factual findings of the RTC and to render useless the
conclusions reached in the three levels of the judiciary on the reconveyance of
the subject properties.
Regarding the alleged exemption of the funds and
properties of GSIS, we quote with approval pertinent portions of the Decision
of the CA dated August 3, 2006 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 84079:
The petition and pending incidents hinge on the principal
issue of whether the exemption from execution and garnishment of the funds and
properties of GSIS under Sec. 39 of Rep. Act No. 8291 may be invoked to quash
the writ of execution issued pursuant to the final and executory judgment
against it. We rule in the negative.
In Rubia vs.
GSIS (432 SCRA 529), the Supreme Court ruled that the exemption from
execution enjoyed by GSIS under Sec. 39 of Rep. Act No. 8291 is not
absolute. The Rubia case stemmed from an action for specific performance and
damages filed by Marino E. Rubia (or “Rubia”) seeking refund of his overpayment
on his housing loan with GSIS. The RTC
of Laguna (San Pedro, Branch 93) ruled in favor of Rubia. The decision having become final and, upon
Rubia’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of execution, on the strength of which
the sheriff served a notice of garnishment against the account of GSIS with
LBP. GSIS filed a motion to quash the
writ of execution but it was denied.
Thus, GSIS’ funds with LBP, to the extent of the amount of the judgment
award in favor of Rubia, were garnished and turned over to him in satisfaction
of the writ of execution. On the matter
of GSIS’ exemption from execution, the Supreme Court ratiocinated, thus:
In so far as Section 39 of the GSIS charter exempts
the GSIS from execution, suffice it to say that such exemption is not absolute
and does not encompass all the GSIS funds. By way of illustration and as may be
gleaned from the Implementing Rules and Regulation of the
GSIS Act of 1997, one exemption refers to social security benefits and other
benefits of GSIS members under Republic Act No. 8291 in connection with
financial obligations of the members to other parties. The pertinent GSIS Rule
provides:
Rule XV. Funds of the GSIS
Section 15.7 Exemption of Benefits of Members from
Tax, Attachment, Execution, Levy or other Legal Processes. — The social
security benefits and other benefits of GSIS members under R.A. 8291 shall be
exempt from tax, attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other processes
issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative bodies in
connection with all financial obligations of the member, including his
pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise
or performance of his official functions or duties or incurred in connection
with his position or work, as well as COA disallowances. Monetary liability in
favor of the GSIS, however, may be deducted from the benefits of the member. x
x x
The processual exemption of the GSIS funds and
properties under Section 39 of the GSIS Charter, in our view, should be read
consistently with its avowed principal purpose: to maintain actuarial solvency
of the GSIS in the protection of assets which are to be used to finance the
retirement, disability and life insurance benefits of its members. Clearly, the
exemption should be limited to the purposes and objects covered. Any
interpretation that would give it an expansive construction to exempt all GSIS
assets from legal processes absolutely would be unwarranted.
Furthermore, the declared policy of the State in
Section 39 of the GSIS Charter granting GSIS an exemption from tax, lien,
attachment, levy, execution, and other legal processes should be read together
with the grant of power to the GSIS to invest its "excess funds"
under Section 36 of the same Act. Under Section 36, the GSIS is granted the
ancillary power to invest in business and other ventures for the benefit of the
employees, by using its excess funds for investment purposes. In the exercise
of such function and power, the GSIS is allowed to assume a character similar
to a private corporation. Thus, it may sue and be sued, as also, explicitly
granted by its charter. Needless to say, where proper, under Section 36, the
GSIS may be held liable for the contracts it has entered into in the course of
its business investments. For GSIS cannot claim a special immunity from
liability in regard to its business ventures under said Section. Nor can it
deny contracting parties, in our view, the right of redress and the enforcement
of a claim, particularly as it arises from a purely contractual relationship,
of a private character between an individual and the GSIS.
In the instant case, the final and executory
judgment arose from loans extended by GSIS to private respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest in the course of its business and secured by a
mortgage. As in Rubia, GSIS’ relationship with private respondent’s
predecessors-in-interest is purely private and contractual in nature. As such, GSIS cannot claim immunity from the
enforcement of the final and executory judgment against it.[64]
Petitioner
is asking this Court to reverse our findings in Rubia, supra, and as a
result, rule that the immunity granted to it by Rep. Act No. 8291 is
absolute. We see no reason to depart
from the conclusions reached in said
case. In fact, all the more should GSIS
not be allowed to hide behind such immunity in this case, where its obligation
arises not just from a simple business transaction, but from its utter failure
to return properties that it had wrongfully foreclosed. As we have held in the first SC case, G.R. No. 155206:
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the trial court and the CA. The petitioner is not an ordinary mortgagee. It is a government financial institution and, like banks, is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered lands.[65]
Petitioner
questions the manner in which execution was conducted in this case, and insists
that reconveyance should be the “primary mode” and then payment only a “secondary
mode.” We do not agree. We quote with approval the discussion of the
second CA decision, where the court held:
x x x [There] is no need for respondent judge to
first issue a writ of execution for the reconveyance of the subject lots. Such recourse would merely be an exercise in
futility because as shown in the Sheriff’s Partial Report dated May 3, 2004 x x
x, reconveyance was not possible as of April 29, 2004 since the subject lots
were no longer registered in the name of GSIS.
To quote said partial report:
“That considering the seventy eight (78) excluded
lots were already sold by the GSIS to third party buyers as stated and attested
by Mr. Manuel Ibabao, GSIS Acquired Asset Officer IV, in his submission and
presentation of List of Lots Excluded from Foreclosure to the Honorable Court
and was marked as Exhibit 3, dated October 11, 1996, reconveyance of GSIS of
said lots to the plaintiff is no longer possible; as verified and confirmed by
the undersigned during his levy on said lots on April 29, 2004 together with
Sheriff Marcial Estrellado, subject excluded lots are not only titled to
individual buyers in good faith but they have also constructed their houses and
buildings there and having [resided] therein for so many years with some other
lots being sold and resold to other new buyers; for purposes of
attaching/levying subject excluded lots now would be impossible and ineffective
because the owners are in actual possession of their lots they being buyers in
good faith with corresponding possession of titles to it. Reconveyance of the seventy eight (78)
excluded lots mentioned in paragraph 1 (a to v) of the Decision dated December
17, 1997 is very impossible so that on paragraph 2, garnishment is resorted
to.”
Nevertheless, We find merit in GSIS’ claim that the
valuation of the subject lots at P35,000.00 per square meter has no factual and
legal basis. While said valuation falls
within the P10,000.00 to P45,000.00 range as the estimated market value of said
properties per testimony of Eduardo M. Santiago, as alluded to by the RTC, it
did not “set out in its decision the facts which had been proved and its
conclusions culled therefrom” (People vs. Lizada, 396 SCRA 62). Indeed, “(t)rial courts should not merely
reproduce the respective testimonies of witnesses of both parties and come out
with its decretal conclusion” (People vs. Lizada, supra).
Besides, the fair market value of the subject lots
cannot be a mere ballpark figure. There
should be some factual and legal basis for arriving at a reasonable valuation
of the lots. Admittedly, the price range
mentioned in the final and executory judgment against GSIS is too wide and
encompassing that further analysis is necessary to establish with more exactitude
the fair market value of the subject lots.
GSIS asserts that respondent sheriff committed
grave abuse of discretion in serving the writ of execution prior to its receipt
of an official copy of the order of execution, thereby depriving it of an opportunity
to contest said order. Contrary to its
claim, GSIS was given the opportunity to question the order of execution as, in
fact, it filed an opposition and supplemental opposition to private
respondent’s motion for execution in the court below. Even supposing that GSIS was denied the
opportunity to move for reconsideration of the order of execution, this was
subsequently cured when it filed the motion to quash where it raised its
objections to the issuance of the order and writ of execution.
x x x
Since GSIS did not deny the facts stated in the
sheriff’s partial report, We accord the same full faith and credit in keeping
with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
GSIS further contends that instead of immediately
serving the notices of garnishment on its banks, respondent sheriff should have
effected the reconveyance of the subject lots to private respondent. As earlier discussed, respondent sheriff
already made a determination in his partial report dated May 3, 2004 that
reconveyance of the subject properties was no longer possible. Hence, he properly acted in proceeding to
enforce the payment of the fair market value of the subject lots.
x x x
Based on GSIS’ own appraisal of lands in San
Antonio Vilalge as of December 18, 2003, the reasonable value of the subject
lots ranged from P12,000.00 to P15,000.00 per square meter depending on the
street where a particular lot is located (Annex “R”, petition). Since GSIS itself has admitted that the
reasonable value of the subject lost, which have an aggregate area of 33,319
square meters, was at least P12,000.00 per square meter or a total value of
P399,828,000.00, partial execution may now proceed on the basis of said
valuation. Any difference between the
P12,000.00 per square meter valuation and the fair market value of the subject
lots as of April 29, 2004, as may be finally determined by the court a quo, can be recovered later. It is the fair market value of the subject
lots as of April 29, 2004 which must be reckoned for purposes of enforcing the
judgment in question because it was on that date that it was ascertained that
reconveyance of those lots was no longer possible.
This is as it should be in order to afford private
respondent partial satisfaction of the judgment which she and her
predecessors-in-interest have long sought.
As found in said judgment, private respondent and her privies have been
deprived of ownership and enjoyment of the subject lots since November 1975. To add insult to injury, it took them almost fourteen
years to obtain a final and executory judgment against GSIS.
On the other hand, the quantity (78 lots) and area
(33,319 square meters) of the lots adjudged to be reconveyed cannot be
reduced. It is settled that final and executory judgment is immutable and
cannot be altered except for correction of clerical errors or making of nunc pro tunc entries (Mayon Estate
Corporation vs. Altrua, 440 SCRA 377).
Indeed, if we are to keep and sustain the people’s
faith in the judicial system, We must ensure that those who have won their
cases on the merits will obtain the relief they patiently sought. Otherwise, our courts might as well be
decision mills churning out judgments which are nothing more than Pyrrhic victories
for the prevailing parties.
The dispositive portion of the questioned CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
orders dated April 27, 2004 and May 13, 2004 and writ of execution dated April
28, 2004, all issued by the regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Branch 71) in
Civil Case No. 59439 entitled “Eduardo M. Santiago, etc., vs. Government
Service Insurance System”, are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS in (i) that said
orders and writ shall be for the satisfaction of the decision dated December
17, 1997 rendered in said case to the extent of the sum of P399,828,000.99; and
(ii) that said court is directed to immediately conduct a hearing for the
purpose of determining the fair market value of the subject lots as of April
29, 2004 and, upon such determination, issue an order of execution and the
corresponding writ for the unsatisfied portion of the decision, if any.
The
motion for reconsideration of our resolution dated July 27, 2004 and motion to
allow immediate partial execution filed by respondent Rosario Enriquez Vda. de
Santiago are PARTIALLY GRANTED in
that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is PARTIALLY LIFTED, such that execution
of the decision in Civil Case No. 59439 for the amount of P399,828,000.00 may
immediately proceed while the writ of preliminary injunction against the
execution of the rest of the judgment award is made PERMANENT subject to the disposition in the preceding paragraph.
For lack of merit, the motion to cite GSIS and
others for direct contempt is DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.[66]
Since
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision, the CA
issued a Resolution in CA-G.R. SP NO.
84079[67] and held:
The asserted sale, reconveyance and segregation of
lots, as well as the alleged double-enumeration of two lots (Lot 7, Block 2 and
It is too late for petitioner to seek modification
of the trial court’s decision which has already become final and
executory. All that is needed to be done
is to carry out the terms and conditions of said decision. This is consistent with the doctrine of
finality of judgments (Clavano, Inc. vs. Housing and Land Use Regulatory board,
378 SCRA 172).
Consequently, no new and cogent reason as presented
in the motion for reconsideration which would warrant reconsideration of Our
decision.
On the other hand, Sec. 37, Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides that an attorney shall have a lien “upon all judgments
for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments,
which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time
when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered
upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, x x x. As the judgment
involved in this case was rendered by the
WHEREFORE,
for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration and notice of charging
lien and motion for recording of charging lien are DENIED.
SO
ORDERED.
It has
not escaped our notice that petitioner deliberately filed two cases, herein consolidated,
involving the same parties and issues, in its desperate attempt to stay the
execution of the judgment against it. Petitioner should be reminded that our
rules on forum shopping are meant to prevent the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issues.[68] Petitioner is admonished from bending the
rules of procedure to suit its purposes.
Obedience to the rules promulgated by this Court to ensure the efficient
administration of justice must be the norm, and not the exception.
Lastly, on petitioner’s contention
that it should not be bound by the failure of its former lawyers to timely
raise the affirmative defense of reconveyance, we are not convinced. Clients are bound by
the mistakes, negligence and omission of their counsel. While in exceptional circumstances, clients
may be excused from the failure of counsel, the
grounds raised in the present case do not persuade this Court to consider it as
an exception to the rule. Indeed, as we
have held in Romago, Inc. v. Siemens Building Technologies, Inc.:[69]
Public interest demands an end to every litigation and a
belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the
administration of justice. To reverse the CA Decision denying petitioner's
petition for relief from judgment would put a
premium on the negligence of petitioner's former counsel and encourage endless
litigation. If the negligence of counsel is generally admitted as a
justification for opening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long
as a new counsel can be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel
had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. We, therefore,
write finis to this litigation. [70]
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the consolidated petitions docketed as G.R. Nos. 175393 and 177731 are hereby DISMISSED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 3, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84079 and Resolution
dated April 27, 2007 modifying the Orders
by respondent judge dated November 20, 2006 and September 12, 2006 issued in Civil Case No. 59439 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
MARTIN
S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate
Justice
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 177731, pp. 3-55.
[2]
[3]
[4] On July 2, 1980, TCT No. 23552 was issued canceling TCT No. 21926; TCT No. 23553 cancelled TCT No. 21925; and TCT No. 23554 cancelling TCT No. 21924, all in the name of GSIS.
[5]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 177731, p. 119.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] GSIS attached an internal Memorandum (Annex
“A”) dated December 18, 2003 to its Motion to Quash, with subject “Appraisal of Property” (San Antonio
Village), and provides:
2. Valuation
2.1 Pricing
The
evaluation of the prices of lot (sic)
was made on the basis of the zonal valuation costs prepared by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue as certified by [the] Revenue District Officer of Pasig City,
Metro Manila to insure viability, subject to the prevailing conditions.
2.2
Prevailing
prices at Malvar [
For
Amber, Araneta, Atienza, Capinpin, [L]im, Lukban, [and] Segundo [
[Per our]
own appraisal, the price is reasonable and may therefore be adopted.
Remarks:
Appraisal was
based on the street where the lots are situated for reasons of (sic) property lots [were] not listed on
the appraisal request.
[12]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 177731, p. 194.
[13] Petitioner GSIS filed a Reply to the
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Quash Writ of Execution; rollo, G.R. No. 175393, pp. 198-209.
[14]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 177731, p. 73.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
Supra note 16.
[19]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 177731, pp. 86-87.
[20]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 175393, pp. 224-237.
[21]
[22]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 177731, pp. 451-465.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 175393, p. 11.
[28]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 175393, p. 270.
[29]
[30]
[31]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 177731, pp. 472-473.
[32]
[33]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 175393, p. 410.
[34]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 177731, p. 44.
[35] Rollo, G.R. No. 175393, pp. 605-670.
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
G.R. No. 151439, June 21, 2004, 432
SCRA 529.
[44] Rollo, G.R. No. 175393, pp. 649-650.
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
[49] G.R. No. 138500, September 16, 2005, 470 SCRA 73.
[50] Rollo, G.R. No. 175393, p. 889.
[51]
[52]
[53] G.R. No. 140393, September 11, 2001, 365 SCRA 1.
[54] Rollo, G.R. No. 175393, p. 900.
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59] G.R.
No. 153923, October 2, 2009.
[60] G.R. No. 81524, February 4, 2000, 324 SCRA 714, 726.
[61] G.R. No. 120739, July 20, 2000, 336 SCRA 258, 265.
[62] G.R. No. 127941, January 28, 1999, 302 SCRA 331, 341.
[63] G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001, 350 SCRA 568, 578. Emphasis ours.
[64]
Rollo,
G.R. No. 177731, pp. 79-81.
[65] GSIS
v.
[66] Rollo, G.R. No. 177731, pp. 81-87.
[67]
[68] Collantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169604, March 6, 2007, 517 SCRA 561, 568.
[69] G.R. No. 181969, October 2,
2009.
[70] Ibid.