LILY O. ORBASE, G.R. No.
175115
Petitioner,
Present:
|
- versus – OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
and ADORACION MENDOZA-BOLOS, Respondents. |
CARPIO,* J., CORONA, J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., PERALTA, and Promulgated: December 23, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Respondent Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, then Director of the National Library, filed a complaint against petitioner Lily O. Orbase, Assistant Director of the same Office, before the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-99-0198.[3]
The case stemmed from the alleged misrepresentation and/or dishonesty committed by the petitioner when she declared in her bio-data, which was attached to her application for the position of Assistant Director of the National Library dated January 9, 1996, that she was a consultant of the National Library “from March-December 1993 and February 1994 to present” when in fact petitioner merely held the said position for the period covering March 1, 1993 to December 31, 1994.[4]
In her Counter-Affidavit[5]
dated
On
In compliance with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion[8] dated August 19, 1999, adopting all the arguments embodied in her Counter-Affidavit, as well as all the documentary evidence that were already submitted in OMB-0-99-0198. Petitioner also moved to submit the administrative case for resolution based on the evidence on record.
On
However, upon review, the Office of
Legal Affairs, Office of the Ombudsman, in its Memorandum[10]
dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, it is
respectfully recommended that the AAB Decision dated
Petitioner
filed a Memorandum of Appeal[12]
and Supplemental Appeal and/or Reconsideration.[13] She also filed a Motion for Re-Assignment and
to Conduct Preliminary Conference and Hearing,[14] but
they were denied in the Memorandum[15]
dated
Aggrieved, petitioner sought recourse before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 57158, arguing that:
1. the honorable office of the
ombudsman, through its office of the Chief legal counsel, erred in holding that
it had the requisite jurisdiction to act on the complaint against the
petitioner. It is most respectfully submitted
that there was clear error in not holding that petitioner was not within the
scope of applicability of ra 6770.
2. the honorable office of the
ombudsman erred in holding that substantial evidence exists to support the
findings of dishonesty and ignoring other evidence on record negating such
evidence.
3. the honorable office of the
ombudsman erred in denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and IN failing
to give due course to petitioner’s request for re-assignment and the conduct of
a preliminary conference and formal investigation.
4. the honorable office of the
ombudsman erred in imposing the penalty of dismissal for the alleged offense of
dishonesty. It is respectfully submitted
that such penalty was too harsh and disproportionate as to be arbitrary and
oppressive.[16]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.
The assailed Memoranda dated
SO ORDERED.
In denying the petition, the CA ratiocinated that the Office of the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative complaints involving public officers and employees; thus, petitioner’s contention that the Office of the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint cannot be upheld. Also, the CA opined that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charged. Moreover, the appellate court held that contrary to petitioner’s claim, the fact that the complaint was filed three years after the misrepresentation was made cannot bar an investigation or inquiry by the Office of the Ombudsman into the questioned act. Finally, there was no denial of due process, since petitioner was given an opportunity to be heard and, in fact, participated in the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman.[18]
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[19] but
it was denied in a Resolution[20]
dated
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:
I.
whether or not the ombud[s]man and the court of appeals gravely
abuse[d] its discretion in not holding that petitioner’s submission of an
inaccurate bio-data upon her application for the position of assistant director
of the national library is an act outside of the jurisdiction of the ombudsman;
II. whether or not the ombudsman
and the court of appeals gravely abused its discretion In not ruling that the complaint
suffers technical flaws in that it was filed beyond the one year period, and by
a person who had no interest in the complaint;
III. whether or not the
ombu[d]sman and the court of appeals gravely abuse[d] its discretion in holding
that preliminary conference may be dispensed with, contrary to the express
provision of administrative order no. 07 or the rules of the ombudsman and that
a formal hearing is indispensable IN THIS CASE;
IV. Whether or not the ombudsman
and the court of appeals gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in holding that there is sufficient evidence to hold petitioner
guilty of the offenses of dishonesty and falsification.[21]
Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it ruled that the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative case despite the fact that the act complained of was committed before her entry into government service.
Petitioner insists that the administrative case should have been dismissed in the first instance. She contends that the case was barred by prescription as provided in Section 20 (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, since the case was filed three years after the alleged act was committed. Additionally, petitioner assails the personality of the then Director of the National Library, Adoracion Mendoza-Bolos, to file the administrative case against her arguing that she has no personal interest in the subject matter of the complaint. Petitioner also maintains that there was a denial of her right to due process when the Office of the Ombudsman did not conduct a preliminary conference and formal investigation in the administrative case. Finally, petitioner contends that the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove the charge of dishonesty against her.
The petition is bereft of merit.
R.A. No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing R.A. No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.[22] Thus, Section 21 thereof provides:
SEC. 21. Officials Subject to
Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.
― The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet,
local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only
by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.[23]
At the time of the filing of the case against petitioner, she was the Assistant Director of the National Library; as such, as an appointive employee of the government, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman to take cognizance of the action against the petitioner was beyond contestation.
Moreover, petitioner’s claim that the Ombudsman does not have jurisdiction over the action, since the act complained of was committed before her entering government service, cannot be sustained. Section 46 (18), Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
SEC. 46. Discipline:
General Provisions. – x x x
(b)
The following
shall be grounds for disciplinary action:
x x x x
(18)
Disgraceful,
immoral or dishonest conduct prior to
entering the service.[24]
From the foregoing, even if the dishonest act was committed by the employee prior to entering government service, such act is still a ground for disciplinary action.
It is noteworthy that the subject of the administrative case against petitioner was her act of supplying false information in her bio-data regarding her qualifications when she was applying for the position of Assistant Director of the National Library. In her bio-data, petitioner made it appear that she was a consultant of the National Library “from March-December 1993 and February 1994 to present.” This false misrepresentation was one of the main factors why the then Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, Ricardo T. Gloria, recommended petitioner to then President Fidel V. Ramos for appointment to the position of Assistant Director of the National Library. Secretary Gloria heavily relied on this misrepresentation of petitioner as shown in his sworn affidavit.[25] This misrepresentation was made by petitioner for the purpose of giving herself undue advantage over other qualified applicants, thus, ensuring her appointment to the position of Assistant Director. Were it not for this act of supplying false information, the then Secretary Gloria would not have recommended petitioner for appointment. As aptly found by the Office of Legal Affairs, Office of the Ombudsman, to wit:
The disputed bio-data of respondent clearly indicates
that she was the “Consultant of the
National Library from March-December 1993 and February 1994 – to present.” Her bio-data containing the said information
was apparently relied upon by the then Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports Ricardo T. Gloria as the latter’s recommendation letter to then Pres.
Fidel V. Ramos stated that “Miss Orbase
is presently a Consultant in the National Library. x x
x Enclosed is Miss Orbase’s
bio-data and other related documents for reference.” Then Secretary Gloria’s reliance upon the
said bio-data was bolstered by Secretary Gloria’s Affidavit dated March 4, 1999
(Record, p. 23) stating that “I
recommended Ms. Orbase for appointment and she was, in fact, thereafter
appointed as Assistant Director in the National Library because I was made to
believe by Ms. Orbase herself that she was then the ‘present’ Consultant in the
National Library.” However,
respondent Orbase’s misrepresentation was belied by the Certification dated
Likewise, there is also no basis in petitioner’s claim of prescription. Petitioner insists that Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed one year after the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. The provision reads:
SEC. 20. Exceptions.
– The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if
it believes that:
x x x
x
(5)
The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of.[27]
In Office of the Ombudsman v. De Sahagun,[28] the
Court held that the period stated in Section 20
(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription
of the offense, but to the discretion given to the Office of the Ombudsman on whether it would
investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word “may” in the provision is
construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
It is, therefore, discretionary upon the
Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation of a complaint filed
before it even if it was filed one year after the occurrence of the act or
omission complained of. Thus, while the
complaint herein was filed three years after the occurrence of the act imputed
to petitioner, it was within the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to
act, to proceed with and conduct an investigation of the subject complaint.
Additionally, contrary to petitioner’s contention, respondent Bolos, who was then the Director of the National Library, had the personality to file the complaint against her in the exercise of the former’s authority to discipline employees under her office. Section 30, Chapter VI, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, is clear on this matter, to wit:
SEC 30. Authority
to Appoint and Discipline. – The head of bureau or office shall appoint
personnel to all positions in his bureau or office, in accordance with
law. In the case of the line bureau or
office, the head shall also appoint the second level personnel of the regional
offices, unless such power has been delegated.
He shall have the authority to
discipline employees in accordance with the Civil Service Law.[29]
Anent petitioner’s contention that she was denied due process, this too is devoid of merit. The CA correctly concluded that petitioner’s right to due process was not violated. Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments.[30] Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, filing charges against the person and giving reasonable opportunity to the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.[31] The essence of due process is simply to be heard; or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[32]
Petitioner actively participated in the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. She was given every opportunity to submit various pleadings and documents in support of her claim, which she, in fact, did through her counter-affidavit and documentary evidence, manifestation and motion, memorandum on appeal, etc. In her Manifestation and Motion,[33] petitioner moved and submitted the case for resolution based on the arguments and evidentiary records that were submitted before the Ombudsman. These were all duly acted upon by the Ombudsman. Petitioner was given all the opportunity to present her side. Due process was, therefore, properly observed.
Finally, the issue of whether or not there was substantial proof to establish the charge of dishonesty against the petitioner.
A perusal of the pleading and documentary evidence that were submitted reveals that the charge of dishonesty was substantially established. In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.[34] As aptly found by the CA:
In the case at bar, petitioner was accused and found
guilty of dishonesty through her act of submitting a bio-data which “enhanced”
her qualifications by attaching the phrase “to present” to her work experience
as a consultant to the National Library thereby making it appear that she still
held the same position when she applied for the position of Assistant Director
in 1996. She, however, insists that she
cannot be held liable for such act on account of the findings of the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) that the said bio-data was unsigned
while her “application letter x x x made no mention about the said consultancy
service.” It bears to note that the
subject bio-data is not extant on the records of this case. Instead, the Court noted that the copy
attached herein bore the initials and signature of petitioner dated
Based on the foregoing, this Court finds no reversible
error committed by the Office of the Ombudsman in holding that substantial evidence
exists to support the conclusion that petitioner is guilty of dishonesty as
charged.[35]
Dishonesty has been defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[36] Based on the foregoing, this misleading act of petitioner clearly constitutes dishonesty. Under Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty is classified as a grave offense punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. Thus, as provided by law, no other penalty is imposable against the petitioner but dismissal.
The settled rule is that factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies, when adopted and confirmed by the CA, and if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by this Court.[37] After evaluating the totality of evidence on record, this Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman and the CA.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO
C.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Raffle dated December 14, 2009.
** Additional member per Special Order No. 805 dated December 4, 2009.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, with Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid, concurring; rollo, pp. 41-49.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, p. 27.
[4] Rollo, p. 9.
[5] Records, pp. 32-33.
[6]
[7] Rollo, pp. 63-67.
[8] CA rollo, pp. 106-107.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Records, pp. 216-219.
[16] Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[17]
[18]
[19] CA
rollo, pp. 248-260.
[20]
[21] Rollo, p. 23.
[22] Estarija v. Ranada, G.R. No. 159314,
[23] Emphasis ours.
[24] Emphasis ours.
[25] Records, p. 23.
[26] CA rollo, pp. 20-21.
[27] Emphasis ours.
[28] G.R.
No. 167982,
[29] Emphasis supplied.
[30] Libres v. National Labor Relations Commission, 367 Phil. 181, 190 (1999).
[31] Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
166780,
[32] Libres v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 30.
[33] CA rollo, pp. 106-107.
[34] Office of the Ombudsman v. Fernando J.
Beltran, G.R. No. 168039,
[35] Rollo, pp. 12-16.
[36] Ampong v. Civil Service Commission, CSC-Regional Office No. 11, G.R. No. 167916, August 26, 2008, 563 SCRA 293, 307.
[37] Binay
v. Odeña, G.R. No. 163683,