Republic of the
Supreme Court
THE PEOPLE OF THE
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G.R. No. 172372
Present: Carpio, J., Chairperson,
leonardo-de castro,
BRION, DEL
CASTILLO, and abad, JJ. Promulgated: December 4, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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We review in
this appeal the
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The
prosecution charged the appellant before the RTC of the crime of rape under
three separate Informations that read:
Criminal Case No. 8538
That on or about the 18th day of June, 1995, in the morning thereof, at Barangay Pook ni Banal, Municipality of San Pascual, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge with the said [AAA] who is below twelve (12) years old, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[3]
Criminal
Case No. 8539
That sometime in the first week of July 1995, in the morning thereof, at Barangay Pook ni Banal, Municipality of San Pascual, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge with the said [AAA], who is below twelve (12) years old, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[4]
Criminal
Case No. 8540
That on or about the 30th day of March, 1996, at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, at Barangay Pook ni Banal, Municipality of San Pascual, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge with the said [AAA], who is a twelve (12) year old minor, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[5]
The appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charges laid.[6] The prosecution presented the following
witnesses in the trial on the merits that followed: Dr. Rosalina Caraan-Mendoza (Dr. Mendoza); Donna Catapang (Donna); and AAA. The appellant took the witness stand for the
defense.
Dr. Mendoza,
the Municipal Health Officer of San Pascual, Batangas, testified that she
conducted a medical examination of AAA on
MEDICO-LEGAL CERTIFICATE
x x x x
- External genitalia – normal looking with 2 points of skin abrasions noted over the lower third of the (L) labia majora.
- Labia majora gaping
- (+) defloration of the hymen, with edges rounded noncoaptible hymenal border and edges retracted compatible with healed lacerations
x x x
- Positive for presence of sperm cells[8]
Dr. Mendoza stated that she conducted a physical examination
of AAA at the request of the police,[9]
and that the healed laceration on AAA’s private part was the result of previous
sexual intercourse.[10]
Donna, a
medical technologist at the
AAA declared
on the witness stand that she was born on
AAA likewise recalled
that during the first week of July 1995, the appellant again “raped” her in the
bathroom. According to AAA, the appellant first removed her shirt and pants,
but she cried and pushed him. The appellant inserted his penis into her vagina
after removing her panty.[16]
The appellant threatened to kill her if she reported the incident to her
parents. Thereafter, the appellant went
to the field.[17]
AAA further
testified that at around
On cross
examination, AAA stated that she knew the appellant prior to
The appellant
presented a different version of the events and claimed that AAA had been his
sweetheart since
The RTC
convicted the appellant of two (2) counts of statutory rape in its decision of
WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the court finds the accused Romar Teodoro y Vallejo in Criminal Case No. 8538 and Criminal Case No. 8539
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and he is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty, in each case, of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the complainant [AAA]
in the amount of P50,000.00 or a total of P100,000.00, and to pay the
cost.
The accused, however, is acquitted in Criminal Case No. 8540, as this Court finds him innocent of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.[28]
The records of this case were
originally transmitted to this Court on appeal. Pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo,[29]
we endorsed the case and the records to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.
The CA, in its decision dated
The CA likewise believed AAA’s
testimony which it found credible. It held that the court may convict the
accused based solely on the victim’s testimony provided it is credible, natural
and convincing.
In his brief,[30]
the appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him of two (2)
counts of statutory rape despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He claimed that the victim’s testimony was full of
inconsistencies. He likewise contended
that the Information in Criminal Case No. 8539 was defective for failure to
state the exact date of the commission of the crime.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny
the appeal for lack of merit, but we modify the amount of the awarded
indemnities.
Sufficiency of
Prosecution Evidence
Rape is
defined and penalized under Article 335[31] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,[32]
which provides:
ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age
or is demented.
x x x x
Rape
under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory
rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing
rape. What the law punishes in statutory
rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12)
years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence
of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the
age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place.[33]
The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on
account of her tender years; the child’s consent is immaterial because of her
presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.[34]
AAA, while recounting her unfortunate
ordeal, positively identified the appellant as the perpetrator of the
ATTY. EUGENIO MENDOZA:
Q: Do you know the accused in this case in the person of Romar Teodoro y Vallejo alias Boyet?
[AAA]:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If he is present in court, will you be able to point to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Please do so.
(Witness pointing to a man and when asked of
his name identified
himself as Romar Teodoro).
x x x
Q: On
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that?
A: I was abused, sir.
Q: By “pinagsamantalahan,” what do you mean?
A: I was raped, sir, by him.
Q: When you refer to the pronoun him, to whom are you referring?
A: Romar Teodoro, sir.
Q: Where
in particular were you raped and/or abused by Romar Teodoro on the 18th
day of June 1995 in the morning thereof?
A: In our bathroom, sir.
x x x x
Q: According to you, you were abused and/or raped in your bathroom by Romar Teodoro, tell us how were you raped by Romar Teodoro?
A: He kissed me and took off my clothes.
x x x
Q: Where did he kiss you?
A: On my face, sir.
Q: Where else?
A: On my neck, sir.
x x x
Q: According to you he removed your dress, was he able to remove your T-shirt?
A: No, sir.
Q: How about your pants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the pants you were wearing then was removed, were you still wearing anything?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What is it?
A: My panty, sir.
Q: How about that panty, was that likewise removed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the pants and the panty were removed by Romar Teodoro, what did he do to you, if any?
A: He also took off his pants, sir.
Q: And after he took off his pants, what did he do, if any?
A: He inserted his penis in my vagina, sir.
Q: What were you doing when he was then to insert his penis into your vagina?
A: I was pushing him, sir.
Q: Did you tell him anything at that time?
A: None, sir.
Q: How about Romar Teodoro, did he tell you anything at that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did he tell you?
A: He told me not to tell it to my parents because he will kill me sir.
Q: Other than pushing him away, what else did you do, if you did any?
A: I was struggling, sir.
x x x
Q: By
the way, according to you he was able to insert his penis [in] your vagina,
will you please tell us what did you feel, if any, at that time?
A: “Masakit po.” It was painful, sir.
x x x[35] [Emphasis supplied]
AAA likewise positively identified
the appellant as the one who raped her during the first week of July 1995. Her
testimony dated
ATTY. EUGENIO MENDOZA:
Q: x x x My question to you is, if as testified to by you, you were raped on
June 18, 1995, will you please tell us again as to when was the second time
that you were raped by herein accused Romar Teodoro?
[AAA]:
A: First week of July, sir.
Q: What year?
A: 1995, sir.
Q: Whereat?
A: Inside our house, sir.
Q: Which particular portion of your house?
A: Inside the bathroom, sir.
Q: What time was it on the first week of July, 1995 when you were raped by Romar Teodoro?
A:
Q: And what was done to you by Romar Teodoro on that date and time?
A: He raped me, sir.
Q: Will
you please narrate before the Honorable Court how you were raped by Romar
Teodoro on the first week of July, 1995 at around
A: He removed my clothes, sir.
Q: What clothes were you then wearing at that time?
A: T-shirt, sir.
Q: What else?
A: Short pants, sir.
x x x
Q: While Romar Teodoro was then in the act of removing your short pants, what were you doing then?
A: I was pushing him, sir.
Q: Will you please tell us if other than pushing you did anything else?
A: I was crying, sir.
Q: Why were you crying at the time?
A: Because he was raping me, sir.
Q: Was he able to remove your short pants?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After the short pants, was there anything else that you were wearing then at the time?
A: Yes, sir, my panties, sir.
Q: How about the panties, what happened to the same?
A: He also removed my panties, sir.
x x x
Q: After the removal of the same wearing apparel, what happened next?
A:
His penis was inserted to [sic]
my vagina, sir.
x x x[36] [Emphasis ours]
We view this testimony to be clear, convincing and credible considering especially the corroboration it received from the medico-legal report and testimony of Dr. Mendoza. We additionally do not see from the records any indication that AAA’s testimony should be seen in a suspicious light. We emphasize that the appellant had been staying in the victim’s house for more or less 3 years; he dined with AAA’s family and slept with her brothers. There is no plausible reason why AAA would falsely testify against the appellant, imputing on him a crime as grave as rape if the sexual incident did not happen. We have held time and again that the testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature, as in this case, deserve full credence considering that no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and subject herself to a public trial if she had not been motivated by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.[37]
The prosecution positively
established the elements of rape required under Article 335. First,
the appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim on
Second, the prosecution established
AAA’s minority during the trial through the presentation of her birth
certificate showing that she was born on
What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation, and physical evidence of injury are immaterial; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child’s consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern evil from good.
The Appellant’s
Defenses
In
his defense, the appellant invoked denial. He denied raping the victim on
It is settled
that denial is an inherently weak defense. It cannot prevail over positive identification,
unless supported by strong evidence of lack of guilt. In the context of this case, the appellant’s
mere denial, unsupported by any other evidence, cannot overcome the
child-victim’s positive declaration on the identity and involvement of the
appellant in the crime attributed to him.[39]
The appellant further argues that the
Information in Criminal Case No. 8539 is defective because it failed to state
the exact date of the commission of the crime.
The contention
lacks merit.
An
information, under Section 6, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, is deemed sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. Section 11 of the same Rule also provides that
it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date
the offense was committed, except when the date of commission is a material
element of the offense. The offense may
thus be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the
actual date of its commission. At the minimum, an indictment must contain all
the essential elements of the offense charged to enable the accused to properly
meet the charge and duly prepare for his defense.[40]
In the
present case, the Information in Criminal Case No. 8539 states that the offense was committed
“in the first week of July 1995”; it
likewise alleged that the victim was “below
12 years old” at the time of the incident. These allegations sufficiently
informed the appellant that he was being charged of rape of a child who was
below 12 years of age. Afforded adequate opportunity to prepare his defense, he
cannot now complain that he was deprived of his
right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
We
have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is
not an essential element of the crime.[41]
It is not necessary to state the precise
time when the offense was committed except when time is a
material ingredient of the offense. In
statutory rape, time is not an essential element except to
prove that the victim was a minor below twelve years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense. Given the victim’s established date of birth, she
was definitely short of 12 years under the allegations of the Information and
on the basis of the evidence adduced.
Moreover, objections relating to the
form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time on
appeal. If the appellant had found the Information insufficient, he should have
moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for him to be
properly informed of the exact date of
the alleged rape, or for the quashal of the Information, on
the ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form. Failing to pursue either remedy, he is deemed
to have waived objection to any formal defect in the Information.[42]
The Proper Penalty
The applicable provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, covering the crime of rape is Article 335 which provides:
ARTICLE 335. When
and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
x x x x
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age
or is demented.
The crime of
rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x x
The lower courts, therefore, are
correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua on the appellant.
Proper Indemnity
The award of civil indemnity to the
rape victim is mandatory when rape is found to have been
committed. Thus, this Court affirms the
award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity based on prevailing
jurisprudence.[43]
The award of moral damages also finds
full justification in this case. Moral damages are awarded to rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of rape on the
assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the experience she
underwent.[44] Pursuant to current rules, we award P50,000.00
as moral damages to AAA.[45]
In addition, we award
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00.[46]
The award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2229 of the Civil
Code to set a public
example and serve as deterrent against elders who abuse and corrupt the youth.[47]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the P50,000.00 and P30,000.00 as moral damages and
exemplary damages, respectively, for each count of statutory rape.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson |
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TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO Associate
Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas (separated from the service), and concurred in by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.; rollo, pp. 3-12.
[2] Penned by Judge Romeo F. Barza; CA rollo, pp. 24-30.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Records, pp. 38-39.
[7] TSN,
[8] Records, p. 3.
[9] TSN,
[10]
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13] TSN,
[14]
[15]
[16] TSN,
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] TSN,
[22]
[23]
[24] TSN,
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] CA rollo, p. 71.
[29] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[30] CA rollo, pp. 44-64.
[31] The crimes subject of Criminal Case No. 8538 and Criminal Case No. 8539 were committed in 1995, or before Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, was repealed by Republic Act No. 835 (the Anti-Rape Law of 1997).
[32] Amended by Republic Act No. 7659, entitled An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Heinous Crimes Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Laws, and for Other Purposes, which took effect on December 31, 1993.
[33] People v. Pancho, 462 Phil. 193 (2003).
[34] People
v. Natan, G.R. No. 181086,
[35] TSN,
[36] TSN,
[37] People v. Malones, 469 Phil. 301 (2004).
[38] G.R. No. 182057,
[39] Supra note 38.
[40] People
v. Canares, G.R. No. 174065,
[41] People v. Ching, G.R. No. 177150, November 22, 2007, 538 SCRA 117; People v. Jalbuena, G.R. No. 171163, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 500; People v. Invencion, 446 Phil. 775 (2003).
[42] See People
v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008,
[43] See People
v. Begino, G.R. No. 181246,
[44] People
v. Nieto, G.R. No. 177756,
[45] Supra note 38.
[46] See People
v. Sia, G.R. No. 174059,
[47] See People
v. Tormis, G.R. No. 183456,