Republic of the
Supreme Court
|
RAMON B. FORMANTES, Petitioner, - versus - Respondent. |
G.R. No. 170661 Present: CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: December 4, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
Before
this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1]
and the Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 57528, which affirmed with
modification the Resolutions rendered by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Second Division, dated October 19, 1999[3]
and December 21, 1999,[4]
respectively, in NLRC NCR CA 010480-96.
Petitioner
Ramon B. Formantes was employed as a medical representative by respondent
Duncan Pharmaceuticals, Phils., Inc. on
On
Thereafter,
Biscaro tried to induce petitioner to resign, which the latter refused. Petitioner's salary was then withheld from
him. He was not allowed to attend the
meetings and activities of the company. His subordinates no longer reported to
him and the company directed one of its district managers to take over his
position and functions without prior notice to him. Due to the foregoing, petitioner was
constrained to file a case for illegal suspension, constructive dismissal,
payment of salaries, allowances, moral and exemplary damages on
On
On
On
In the meantime, Executive Labor Arbiter (LA) Norma C.
Olegario rendered a decision[12]
dated P1,000.00.
Dissatisfied
with the Labor Arbiter's finding, petitioner appealed to the NLRC, on grounds
of grave abuse of discretion; serious errors of law; and serious errors in the
findings of facts, which, if not corrected, would cause irreparable damage to
petitioner. Petitioner alleged that the
LA erred in ruling that he was legally dismissed for sexual abuse, when the
charge against him stated in the termination letter was insubordination.
The
NLRC, Second Division, in its Resolution[13]
dated
Undaunted,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA,
alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion and acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter that petitioner's
dismissal from employment was justified on a ground not alleged in the notice
of termination and not established by substantial evidence. Petitioner further
alleged that the NLRC erred in not holding that petitioner was constructively
dismissed by the respondent.
The
CA, in its Decision dated P1,000.00 to P5,000.00.
Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated
THE JUDGMENT RENDERED
[BY] THE NLRC [IS] NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND OF LACK OF DUE PROCESS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS
UNKNOWINGLY DEPRIVED OF COMPETENT LEGAL ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS IT TURNED OUT
THAT THE “COUNSEL” WHO REPRESENTED HIM WAS LATER FOUND NOT TO BE A MEMBER OF
THE BAR AS [HE REPRESENTED HIMSELF TO
BE].
THE COURT A QUO
GROSSLY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED BY THE RESPONDENT COMPANY.
THE COURT A QUO
GROSSLY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT AND HAS DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION
OF THE NLRC THAT PETITIONER'S DISMISSAL FROM EMPLOYMENT WAS JUSTIFIED ON
ANOTHER GROUND NOT ALLEGED IN THE NOTICE OF TERMINATION AND WAS NOT ESTABLISHED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.[15]
On the
alleged deprivation of due process, petitioner alleged that he was not duly
represented by a competent counsel, as Rogelio Bacolor, who represented him in
the proceedings before the NLRC, was not a member of the bar, thereby depriving
him of his right to due process. Hence, he prayed that the case be remanded to
the LA for further proceedings.
We are
not persuaded.
Records
will show that aside from Mr. Bacolor, petitioner was represented by other
lawyers at the commencement of the action before the NLRC and during the
proceedings before the NLRC and the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner
was duly represented by Atty. Jannette B. Ines in the filing of the Complaint,[16]
the Position Paper,[17]
and the Reply[18]
before the LA. He was also represented by the same Atty. Ines during the
initial stage of the hearing before the NLRC.[19]
Further, although Mr. Bacolor appeared in the several stages of the hearing
before the LA and filed petitioner's memorandum of appeal, he also retained the
services of Guererro and Turgano Law Office, as collaborating counsel. Atty. Arnel Alambra of said law office filed a
Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal[20]
and Reply[21]
to the respondent's answer to the Supplemental Memorandum of Appeal in
petitioner's behalf. Thereafter, upon denial of the appeal by the NLRC,
petitioner's motion for reconsideration[22]
was filed by Arnold V. Guerrero Law Offices, together with its battery of
lawyers, which includes Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero, Atty. Ma. Josefa C. Pinza,
Atty. Carmencita M. Chua and Atty. Ma. Loralie C. Cruz. Petitioner was also represented by said law
office in the proceedings before the CA, more particularly during the filing of
the Petition for Certiorari[23]
under Rule 65, the Reply[24]
and the Memorandum.[25]
Upon denial of the petition before the CA, petitioner was also represented by
another law office in the name of Argue Law Office, which filed the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration and the present petition before this
court.
In
fine, petitioner was fully represented by a barrage of competent lawyers. Thus,
he cannot claim that he was deprived of due process of law.
In Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[26]
this Court held that:
There is no question that the “essence of due process
is a hearing before conviction and before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal” but due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in
all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. The essence of due process is
to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of one’s defense. “To
be heard” does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments
or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Further,
in Fernandez v. National Labor Relations Commission,[27]
respondents failed to attend the hearing on the scheduled cross examination of
the petitioner's witness. Due to the foregoing, the LA deemed the case
submitted for resolution. Respondents claimed denial of due process due to non-reception
of its evidence. On appeal, the NLRC vacated the LA's Order and remanded the
case for further proceedings. The issue is whether the failure to attend
hearings before the LA is a waiver of the right to present evidence. This court
held that:
Private respondents were able to file
their respective position papers and the documents in support thereof, and all
these were duly considered by the labor arbiter. Indeed, the
requirements of due process are satisfied where the parties are given the
opportunity to submit position papers. In any event, Respondent NLRC and the
labor arbiter are authorized under the Labor
Code to decide a case on the basis of the position papers and documents
submitted. The holding of an adversarial trial depends on the discretion of the
labor arbiter, and the parties cannot demand it as a matter
of right. In other words, the filing of position papers and
supporting documents fulfilled the requirements of due process. Therefore,
there was no denial of this right because private respondents were given the
opportunity to present their side.
Taken
altogether, although petitioner, during some parts of the trial proceedings
before the LA was not represented by a member of the bar, he was given
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence to support his
arguments, through the medium of pleadings filed in the labor tribunals. He was
also able to present his version of the Magat incident during his direct
examination conducted by his lawyer Atty. Jannette Inez.[28]
Thus, he cannot claim that he was denied due process.
On the issue of petitioner's dismissal
on another ground not alleged in the notice of termination, petitioner argued
that the LA's justification for his dismissal on the ground of sexual abuse is
not proper, as said ground is not alleged in the notice of termination. The
notice of termination stated that petitioner was dismissed due to failure to
report to the office; failure to submit reports; and failure to file written
explanations despite repeated instructions and notices.
The
argument is not meritorious.
In Rubberworld
(Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC,[29]
we held that:
It
is now axiomatic that if just cause for termination of employment actually
exists and is established by substantial evidence in the course of the
proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, the fact that the employer failed, prior
to such termination, to accord to the discharged employee the right of formal
notice of the charge or charges against him and a right to ventilate his side
with respect thereto, will not operate to eradicate said just cause so as to
impose on the employer the obligation of reinstating the employee and otherwise
granting him such other concomitant relief as is appropriate in the premises. x
x x
Although
petitioner was dismissed from work by the respondent on the ground of
insubordination, this Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that the ground
of sexual abuse committed against petitioner's subordinate actually exists and
was established by substantial evidence before the LA.
When petitioner filed the complaint
for constructive dismissal on
The LA would be rendered inutile if
she would just seal her lips after finding that a just cause for dismissal
exists merely because the said ground was not stated in the notice of
termination.
Contrary
to petitioner's allegation, We hold that there exists substantial evidence to
support the ground for his dismissal.
The findings of facts of quasi-judicial
agencies, which have acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to
their jurisdiction, are accorded by this Court not only respect but even
finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial,
not preponderance, of evidence is necessary. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides
that in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may
be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.[30]
After a meticulous review of the
records, We find that the Decision of the LA, as affirmed by the NLRC and the
CA, is supported by substantial evidence. The LA arrived at her decision after
a careful consideration of all the facts and evidence on record.
The LA
anchored her decision upon the Sworn Statement[31]
given by Cynthia Magat to the Mangaldan
Police Station, dated
x x x x
06.Q. - You
have stated that you were attempted (sic) by you boss, MR. RAMON B. FORMANTES,
to sexually abuse you, will you relate briefly how the incident took place?
A.
- That we have a meeting at
about
07.Q. - Upon
reaching you apartment at Anolid, Mangaldan, what happened, if any?
A.
- We entered the apartment
and then while I was looking for the papers needed, he asked permission to see
the apartment and so I showed him the lower portion. And then he asked again and wished to go
upstairs, so I consented since he is [an] outstanding friend and my boss
without any malice to him and we went upstairs.
08.Q. - Then,
what happened, if any, when you were already upstairs of the apartment?
A.
- That he went inside my
room looking at my things. When I told
him we better go downstairs since it is not proper got (sic) us to stay there
because I am alone, he suddenly opened my closet without my permission. I closed the closet and as I persuading (sic)
him to go downstairs, he started teasing me and holding my hands saying “Cheng,
na-e-excite yata ako sa iyo.” I resisted
his touch and told him not to tease me that way. Then finally, we went downstairs and I
started again to look for the papers I needed.
As I was looking at my things, he suddenly went upstairs so I ran after
him. I caught up with him at the door of
my room. Then, he said, “Cheng, galing
ako sa La Union pagod ako, pwede bang magpahinga? Since I trusted him and he is
like a brother to me, I said yes. I
turned on the electric fan and TV set and I went downstairs. Since it was hot, I decided to buy coke,
after which I went upstairs with the coke and my MBS reports. When I entered the room, he was already
wearing only his “kamiseta” since he said it was hot. I was trying to give him a shirt but he said
he was comfortable that way. I gave him
the coke and I asked him how to do my MBS reports. He taught me and after that when I decided to
do my reports downstairs, he stopped and suddenly embraced me from behind and
pulled me down to the bed.
09.Q. - And
when you fell down on the bed, what did Mr. Ramon Formantes do, if any?
A. - Then,
he said “Cheng, na-mimiss lang kita at ang barkada natin, palambing
naman.” I said that was not my idea of
“lambing” and I resisted him. As I was
getting up, he then pulled me again to the bed, this time he pinned me to the
bed, he went on top of me and was asking for a kiss. He said, “Cheng isang kiss lang titigil na
ako.” I was shocked. And then he was trying to get in between my legs, but I kept on kicking him with my left
leg. He was trying to get my mouth, but
I kept on banging my face on the bed. By
then, my face was full of his saliva, as he started kissing the right side of
my face down to the neck. He then held
my left buttock and held my lower jaw with his left hand. He squeezed my left buttock and started to
put his tongue in my mouth. By now, I
could not shout since he was kissing my mouth, but before he got my mouth I
told him, “Monching, don't do this to me, you are my friend.” He said “I'm also your boss.” Since I was kicking him and pushing him, I
was finally able to get away from him.
When I stood up, I asked him “Bakit mo nagawa ito sa akin, kaibigan
kita.” He said, “Cheng, I'm sorry. Nadala
lang ako.” He told me not to tell this
to Art, my counterpart in
The same Sworn Statement further provides
that:
10.Q. - Was there any more incident that
transpired after the one you have just related?
A - Yes, sir. On
The
evidence on record sufficiently supports the finding of sexual abuse against
petitioner. In addition to her sworn
statement to the police, she sufficiently narrated petitioner's attempt to
sexually abuse her in her handwritten letter[32]
dated
It may be trite to point out that the
findings of a trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight,
given the clear advantage of a trial judge over an appellate justice in the
appreciation of testimonial evidence.[34]
The LA, being in the position to observe
the demeanor of both the petitioner and Ms. Magat during their testimony, gave
more credence to the testimony[35]
of Ms. Magat. On the other hand, aside from his self-serving
testimony, petitioner was not able to sufficiently contradict the charge of
sexual abuse against him. Moreover, the courts usually give credence to the testimony of a
woman who is a victim of sexual assault, because normally no woman would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public
trial and testify on the details of her ordeal if it be not to condemn an
injustice.[36]
In Villarama
v. National Labor Relations Commission,[37]
wherein a managerial employee committed sexual harassment against his
subordinate, the Court held that sexual harassment is a valid cause for
separation from service.
As
a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethic. He
failed to live up to this higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed
to his moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against
his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of
trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of every employer to
protect its employees from over sexed superiors.
As a
manager, petitioner enjoyed the full trust and confidence of respondent and his
subordinates. By committing sexual abuse against his subordinate, he clearly
demonstrated his lack of fitness to continue working as a managerial employee
and deserves the punishment of dismissal from the service.
Aside from the findings of sexual
abuse, petitioner is also guilty of insubordination. Records show that after
filing a case for constructive dismissal on
We now
come to the issue of constructive dismissal.
Constructive
dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain
by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no
option but to forego with his continued employment.[40]
In the
case at bar, petitioner, while still employed with the respondent, was
compelled to resign and forced to go on leave. He was not allowed to
participate in the activities of the company. His salary was no longer remitted
to him. His subordinates were directed
not to report to him and the company
directed one of its district managers to take over his position and do his functions
without prior notice to him.
These
discriminatory acts were calculated to make petitioner feel that he is no
longer welcome nor needed in respondent company − short of sending him an
actual notice of termination. We, therefore, hold that respondent
constructively dismissed petitioner from the service.
Despite this, however, it is
impractical and unjust to reinstate petitioner, as there was a just cause for
his dismissal from the service.
Thus, we hold the dismissal as valid,
but we find that there was non-compliance with the twin procedural requirements
of notice and hearing for a lawful dismissal.
Well
settled is the dictum that the twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due
process in the dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule in our
jurisdiction that the employer must furnish the employee with two written
notices before the termination of employment can be affected: (a) the first
apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal
is sought; and (b) the second informs the employee of the employer’s decision
to dismiss him.[41]
The barrage of letters[42]
sent to petitioner, starting from a letter dated
Since the dismissal, although for a
valid cause, was done without due process of law, the employer should indemnify
the employee with nominal damages. In Agabon v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[43] we found that the
dismissal of the employees therein was for valid and just cause because their
abandonment of their work was firmly established. Nonetheless, the
employer therein was held liable, because it was proven that it did not comply
with the twin procedural requirements of notice and hearing for a
legal dismissal. However, in lieu of payment of backwages,
we ordered the employer to pay indemnity to the
dismissed employees in the form of nominal damages, thus:
The violation of the petitioners’ right to statutory
due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the
form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. x x x. We believe this form of damages
would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due
process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or
recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor
Code and its Implementing Rules.[44]
Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff that has been
violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.[45]
Thus, for respondent's violation of petitioner's statutory rights, respondent
is sanctioned to pay petitioner nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 57528 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the sanction imposed on respondent for non-compliance with statutory due
process is increased from P5,000.00 to P30,000.00.
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Edgardo P. Cruz., concurring; rollo, pp. 66-82.
[2]
[3] Rollo, pp. 169-176.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[13] Penned by Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay, with Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan, concurring, id. at 169-176.
[14] Rollo, p. 205.
[15]
[16] Records, pp. 1-4.
[17]
[18]
[19] TSN,
[20] Rollo, pp. 151-162.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26] G.R. No.
168498,
[27] 349 Phil. 65, 88-89 (1998).
(Emphasis ours.)
[28] TSN,
[29] G.R. No. 72779,
[30] Manuel B. Japzon v. Commission
on Elections and Jaime S. Ty, G.R.
No. 180088,
[31] Records, pp. 96-99.
[32] Records, pp. 90-95.
[33]
[34] People v. Gomez, 345 Phil. 195, 203 (1997).
[35] TSN,
[36] Supra note 34, at 204.
[37] G.R. No. 106341,
[38] TSN,
[39] Records, p. 100.
[40] Arnulfo
O. Endico v.
[41] Pono v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 118860,
[42] Rollo, pp. 463-471.
[43] 485 Phil. 248 (2004).
[44]
[45] Celebes Japan Foods
Corporation, represented by Kanemitsu Yamaoka and Cesar Romero, v. Susan Yermo, et al., Orson Mamalis, Bai Annie
Alano, Michie Alfanta, Ginalyn Panilagao, Annalie Ayag, Jocelyn Agton, Jose
Jurie Surigao, Gilda Serrano, Joy Remarga, Erick Tac-An and Jenne Carlos,
G.R. No. 175855,