SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
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BIENVENIDO DIÑO and RENATO COMPARATIVO, Petitioners - versus - PABLO OLIVAREZ, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 170447 Present: CHICO-NAZARIO, J., Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, PERALTA, and VILLARAMA,* JJ. Promulgated: December 4, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Motion for
Reconsideration[1] of
Our Decision[2] filed
by respondent Pablo Olivarez
In Our decision dated
We
disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the instant appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
In order to fully understand our resolution of the instant
motion, we quote the factual antecedents as narrated in our decision:
Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo Olivarez. Based on the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor of Parañaque, two Informations were filed before the RTC on 29 September 2004 charging respondent Pablo Olivarez with Violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code x x x.
x x x x
The
arraignment of the respondent was initially set on
On
In
a letter dated
On
Before
Judge Madrona could act on the motion to quash, Assistant Prosecutor
Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor, filed on
On
On
On
On
On
On
On
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to APPROVE and ADOPT the recommendation of the Law Department as follows:
1. To revoke the deputation of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque to investigate and prosecute election offense cases insofar as I.S. Nos. 04-2608 and 04-2774, entitled “Renato Comparativo vs. Remedios Malabiran and Pablo Olivarez” and “Bienvenido et. al. vs. Sally Rose Saraos, et. al.,” respectively, are concerned; and
2. To direct the Law Department to handle the prosecution of these cases and file the appropriate Motion and Manifestation before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, to hold in abeyance further proceedings on Criminal Case Nos. 1104 and 1105 until the Commission has acted on the appeal of respondents.
Let the Law Department implement this Resolution.
Thus, the Law Department of the COMELEC moved (1) that the RTC hold in abeyance further proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105 until the COMELEC has acted on respondent’s appeal; and (2) to revoke the authority of the city prosecutor of Parañaque to prosecute the case, designating therein the lawyers from the Law Department of the COMELEC to prosecute Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105.
On
UPON
THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the petition at bench must be, as it
hereby is, GRANTED. The impugned Orders of the public respondent
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of Branch 274,
In finding that the public prosecutor of Parañaque, in filing the Amended
Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), we said that the public prosecutor’s delegated authority
to prosecute the case was not yet revoked when said amended informations were
filed on 28 October 2004, since the authority was revoked only on 4 April 2005
when COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 was issued.
We explained that the letter from the COMELEC Law Department dated 11
October 2004, which directed the public prosecutor to transmit the entire
records of the case by the fastest means available and to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution (finding of probable cause to
charge respondent with Violation of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of
Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code) until final resolution of
respondent’s appeal therefrom by the COMELEC En Banc did not revoke said
delegated authority. We added that the
filing of the amended informations was not made in defiance of the instructions
dated
As regards Judge Madrona, we ruled he did not abuse his
discretion when he issued the Orders dated
We
further ruled that pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 116 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the arraignment of respondent cannot be suspended
indefinitely, for the reviewing authority has at most 60 days within which to
decide the appeal. The arraignment of
respondent was initially scheduled on
Respondent
anchors his motion for reconsideration on two grounds, to wit:
a. The Honorable Court, with due respect, is incorrect in finding that the public prosecutor (of Paranaque City) did not exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC when they filed the subject Amended Informations against herein Respondent; and
x x x x
b. The Honorable Court, with due respect, incorrectly ruled that Judge Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Paranaque City, acted, in accordance with law when he admitted the two (2) Amended Informations and dismissed the Respondent’s Motion to Quash, as the ground stated therein – the informations charged more than one offense – could no longer be sustained, and ordered the arrest of the Respondent due to his alleged failure to be present for his arraignment and for the confiscation of his cash bond (at page 11 of the Assailed Decision).[5]
On
the first ground, respondent argues that this Court erred in not construing the
directive of the COMELEC to the public prosecutor of Parañaque City -- to
transmit the entire records of the case to the COMELEC Law Department by the
fastest means available and to suspend further implementation of the questioned
resolution until final resolution of the appeal by the COMELEC En Banc -- as not a revocation of the
public prosecutor’s delegated authority.
He further argues that the intention to revoke the delegated authority
given to the public prosecutor is crystal clear. The order directing the transmission of the
entire records deprives the public prosecutor of the means and bases to
prosecute the criminal cases. He adds
that the directive to suspend further implementation of the questioned
resolution until final resolution of the appeal by the COMELEC En Banc is an express or, at the very
least, an implied indication of revocation of the delegated authority inasmuch
as the public prosecutor has been prevented, warned and stripped of any
authority and control over the prosecution of the criminal cases. In not construing the mandatory directive as
a revocation of the delegated authority, respondent argues that this Court
violated the Pro Reo Doctrine[6]
and the Rule of Lenity.[7] Since the COMELEC directive is capable of two
interpretations, respondent argues that we should have adopted the
interpretation that is favorable to him.
Moreover,
respondent maintains that since the Court liberally applied the rules when it
did not dismiss petitioners’ defective petition, it should likewise apply the
liberal and relaxed interpretation of the COMELEC directive in favor of respondent
by finding that the COMELEC directive revoked the delegated authority of the
public prosecutor. By filing the amended
informations, despite receipt of the COMELEC directive issued on
On
the second ground, respondent argues that we erred in ruling that the court a quo acted in accordance with law when
he admitted the two amended informations and dismissed his motion to quash and
ordered his arrest and confiscation of his cash bond. In support thereof, he contends that since the
trial court had knowledge of the COMELEC directive dated
Moreover, respondent contends that
Section 11, Rule 116 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply to this
case, because the application thereof presupposes a resolution issued by a
public prosecutor who has the authority to prosecute. Since the public prosecutor has been deprived
of its delegated authority by virtue of the
The resolution of the instant motion
boils down to whether the city prosecutor defied the order or directive of the
COMELEC when it filed the amended informations.
After giving the records of the case
and the arguments adduced by respondent a second hard look, we grant the
motion.
The Constitution, particularly
Article IX, Section 20, empowers the COMELEC to investigate and, when
appropriate, prosecute election cases.[8]
Under Section 265 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the
exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to prosecute the same. The COMELEC may avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Section 265 reads:
Section 265. Prosecution.—The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure details the continuing delegation of authority to other
prosecuting arms of the government, which authority the COMELEC may revoke or
withdraw anytime in the proper exercise of its judgment. It provides:
Section 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to Other Prosecution Arms of the Government.—The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are hereby given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the Commission or its duly authorized representative and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn any time by the Commission whenever in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the Commission, promote the common good, or when it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the Commission.
Furthermore, Section 10 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure gives the COMELEC the power to motu proprio revise,
modify and reverse the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor and/or
provincial/city prosecutors. Said
section reads:
Section 10. Appeals from the Action of the State Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal.—Appeals from the resolution of the State Prosecutor or Provincial or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution of investigating officers may be made only to the Commission within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution of said officials, provided, however that this shall not divest the Commission of its power to motu proprio review, revise, modify or reverse the resolution of the chief state prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors. The decision of the Commission on said appeals shall be immediately executory and final.
From the foregoing, it is clear that
the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their
respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the
Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving
election offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn
anytime by the COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment
such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the
process to promote the common good, or where it believes that successful
prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of
the COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act
in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of its resolutions,
directives or orders in relation to election cases that such prosecutors are
deputized to investigate and prosecute.[9] Being mere deputies, provincial and city
prosecutors, acting on behalf of the COMELEC, must proceed within the lawful
scope of their delegated authority.
In
our assailed decision, we ruled that the letter dated
In
this connection, you are hereby directed to transmit the entire records of the
case to the Law Department, Commission on Elections, Intramuros,
did not revoke the continuing
authority granted to the City Prosecutor of Parañaque, for it was COMELEC
Resolution No. 7457 issued on
We
stand by our ruling that it was COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 that revoked the
deputation of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque.
However, when the COMELEC Law Department directed the City Prosecutor of
Parañaque to transmit the entire records of the case to the Law Department,
Commission on Elections, Intramuros, Manila, by the fastest means available and
to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final
resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En
Banc, it had the effect of SUSPENDING THE AUTHORITY of the
City Prosecutor to prosecute the case. This
was what we did not consider in our decision.
We overlooked the fact that the order issued by the COMELEC Law
Department was with the authority of the COMELEC En Banc. In other words, it
was as if the COMELEC En Banc was the
one that ordered the public prosecutor to transmit the entire records and to suspend
further implementation of the questioned resolution until it finally resolves
the appeal. As contained in the letter
of the COMELEC Law Department, an appeal has been filed before the COMELEC and has
yet to be resolved. Since the COMELEC
has already taken cognizance of the
appeal, and the public prosecutor has been directed to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution until final resolution of said
appeal, it was but proper for the City Prosecutor of Parañaque to have held in
abeyance any action until after the resolution of the appeal by the COMELEC En Banc.
This suspension of delegated authority was made permanent and this
delegated authority was revoked upon issuance of COMELEC Resolution No.
7457 because of the City Prosecutor’s willful disobedience of the order of the
COMELEC En Banc, through the COMELEC
Law Department, to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution
until final resolution of said appeal by the COMELEC En Banc.
It
cannot also be disputed that the COMELEC Law Department has the authority to
direct, nay, order the public prosecutor to suspend further implementation of
the questioned resolution until final resolution of said appeal, for it is
speaking on behalf of the COMELEC. The
COMELEC Law Department, without any doubt, is authorized to do this as shown by
the pleadings it has filed before the trial court. If the COMELEC Law Department is not
authorized to issue any directive/order or to file the pleadings on behalf of
the COMELEC, the COMELEC En Banc
itself would have said so. This, the
COMELEC En Banc did not do.
The records are likewise bereft of
any evidence showing that the City Prosecutor of Parañaque doubted such
authority. It knew that the COMELEC Law
Department could make such an order, but the public prosecutor opted to
disregard the same and still filed the Amended Informations contrary to the order
to hold the proceedings in abeyance until a final resolution of said appeal was
made by the COMELEC En Banc.
The abuse of authority by the City
Prosecutor of Parañaque was aptly explained by the Court of Appeals:
In the case at bench, public respondent city prosecutor clearly exceeded his authority as a COMELEC-designated prosecutor when he amended the two informations. For there is hardly any doubt or question that public respondent city prosecutor had already been duly advised and informed of the directive of the COMELEC days before he filed the amended informations. But instead of filing a motion to suspend proceedings and hold abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioner and to defer the latter’s arraignment until after the appeal shall have been resolved, public respondent city prosecutor took it upon himself to substitute his own judgment or discretion for that of the COMELEC, by proceeding with the prosecution of the criminal cases. Such act was a clear defiance of a direct and explicit order of the COMELEC, which was to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until the final resolution of said appeal by the COMELEC En Banc. Indubitably, there was, on the part of the public respondent city prosecutor, inordinate, if not indecent, haste in the filing of the amended informations, thereby depriving petitioner of due process.
x x x However,
despite the clear and categorical directive of the COMELEC to transmit or
elevate the records of the case by the ‘fastest means available,’ the public
respondent city prosecutor took his time to forward the records of the
case. In fact, it was only on
Quite irremissibly, his defiance of the order of the COMELEC, by itself, more than sufficed to warrant the revocation of the authority delegated to him.
Considering that it was patently beyond his powers or authority to do such act, the amended informations are deemed scraps of papers, which have been stripped bare of their legal effect whatsoever.[10]
In filing the Amended Informations
despite the order to hold the proceedings in abeyance until final resolution of
said appeal, the City Prosecutor of Parañaque clearly exceeded the legal limit
of its delegated authority. As a deputy
of the COMELEC, the public prosecutor acted on its own and wantonly defied the
COMELEC’s directives/orders. For that
reason, we rule that any action made by the City Prosecutor of Parañaque
in relation to the two criminal cases subsequent to the issuance of the COMELEC
order dated 11 October 2004, like the filing of the amended informations and
the amended informations themselves, is declared VOID and of NO EFFECT.
The next query to be answered is: Did
the trial court judge commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he admitted the amended informations despite full
knowledge that the COMELEC had ordered the City Prosecutor of Parañaque to suspend
further implementation of the questioned resolution until final resolution of the
appeal before it?
We rule that he did.
As ruled above, all actions of the City
Prosecutor of Parañaque after the COMELEC’s issuance of the order to transmit
the entire records and to suspend all further proceedings until it has finally
resolved the appeal before it, are void and of no effect. Consequently, the amended informations filed
before the trial court are nothing but mere scraps of paper that have no value,
for the same were filed sans lawful authority.
As early as 14 December 2004, through
respondent’s “Opposition to the Admission of the Amended Informations,” the
trial court judge knew that the COMELEC had directed the City Prosecutor of
Parañaque to transmit the entire records of the case to the COMELEC by the
fastest means available and to suspend further implementation of the questioned
resolution until final resolution of respondent’s appeal. He knew that the City Prosecutor no longer
had any authority to amend the original informations. Despite this, the trial court judge still
admitted the amended informations. In
doing so, the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
excess of jurisdiction.
We are not unmindful of the settled jurisprudence
that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case as to its dismissal, or conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on
the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge of
what to do with the case before it.[11] Under the circumstances obtaining in this
case, we hold that this settled jurisprudence does not apply in this case. The trial court’s knowledge that the filing
of the amended informations was done by the public prosecutor in excess of his
delegated authority no longer gives him the discretion as to whether or not
accept the amended informations. The
only option the trial court had was not to admit the amended informations as a
sign of deference and respect to the COMELEC, which already had taken
cognizance of respondent’s appeal. This,
the trial court did not choose. It insisted
on admitting the amended informations, which were patent nullities for being
filed contrary to the directives of the COMELEC. Necessarily, all actions and rulings of the
trial court arising from these amended informations must likewise be invalid
and of no effect.
As it stands, since there are no
amended informations to speak of, the trial court has no basis for denying
respondent’s motion to quash. Consequently,
there can be no arraignment on the amended informations. In view of this, there can be no basis for
ordering the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of his cash bond.
For having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the trial
court’s orders -- dated 12 January 2005 denying the Motion to Quash and
admitting the amended information; 9 March 2005 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion to Quash, admitting the amended
informations, and ordering the arrest of the respondent and the confiscation of
his cash bond; and 31 March 2005 denying respondent’s Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and/or to lift the Order of Arrest -- are declared void and of
no effect.
WHEREFORE, the
instant motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Pablo Olivarez is GRANTED, and our assailed decision
dated
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice Chairperson |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
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ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
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MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* In lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago.
[1] Rollo, pp. 150-164.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] In Dubio Pro Reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.
[7] A court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.
[8] Commission on Elections v. Español, 463 Phil. 240, 252-253 (2003).
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 24-25.
[11] Viudez
II v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152889,