Republic of
the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
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EVELYN S. CABUNGCAL, |
G.R. No. 160367 |
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ELVIRA J. CANLAS, |
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MARIANITA A. BULANAN, |
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REMEDIOS S. DE JESUS, and |
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NUNILON J. MABINI, |
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Petitioners, |
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- versus - |
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SONIA R. LORENZO,
in her capacity |
Present: |
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as Municipal
Mayor of |
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Nueva Ecija, CECILIO
DE GUZMAN, |
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Vice Mayor, CESARIO
LOPEZ, JR., |
CARPIO,* J., Chairperson, |
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EMILIO PACSON, BONIFACIO |
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** |
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BRION, |
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OCAMPO, MARIO CRUZ, |
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PRISCILA REYES, ROLANDO |
ABAD, JJ. |
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ESQUIVEL, and CRISENCIANO |
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CABLAO in their capacity as members of |
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the Sangguniang Bayan of |
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Nueva Ecija, and EDUARDO N. |
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JOSON IV, Vice
Governor, BELLA |
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AURORA A. DULAY,
BENJAMIN V. |
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MORALES,
CHRISTOPHER L. |
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VILLAREAL, JOSE
T. |
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MUNDO, SOLITA C.
SANTOS, |
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RENATO C. TOMAS,
JOSE |
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BERNARDO V.
YANGO, IRENEO S. |
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DE LEON,
NATHANIEL B. BOTE, |
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RUDY J. DE LEON,
RODOLFO M. |
Promulgated: |
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December 18, 2009 |
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and JOSE FRANCIS
STEVEN M. DIZON, |
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in their capacity
as members of the |
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Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province |
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of Nueva Ecija, |
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Respondents. |
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D E C I S I O N
As a rule, judicial
intervention is allowed only after exhaustion of administrative remedies. This principle goes hand-in-hand with the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which precludes courts from resolving, in the
first instance, controversies falling under the jurisdiction of administrative
agencies. Courts recognize that administrative
agencies are better equipped to settle factual issues within their specific
field of expertise because of their special skills and technical knowledge. For this reason, a premature invocation of
the court’s judicial power is often struck down, unless it can be shown that
the case falls under any of the applicable exceptions.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court are the March 20, 2003 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissing petitioners’ petition for lack of merit and its October 6, 2003 Resolution[3] denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
On
Thereafter, on
On December 21,
2001, the Municipal Mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, herein respondent Sonia
R. Lorenzo, issued a memorandum[8]
informing all employees of the municipal government that, pursuant to the
reorganization, all positions were deemed vacant and that all employees must
file their respective applications for the newly created positions listed in
the approved staffing pattern on or before January 10, 2002. Otherwise, they would not be considered for
any of the newly created positions.
Proceedings
before the Court of Appeals
Instead of submitting
their respective applications, petitioners, on
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Name |
Position |
Salary Grade |
Date of employment |
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Evelyn S. Cabungcal |
Dentist II |
16 |
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Elvira J. Canlas |
Nurse III |
16 |
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Marianita A. Bulanan |
Midwife III |
11 |
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Remedios S. De Jesus |
Dental Aide |
4 |
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Nunilon J. Mabini |
Sanitation Inspector I |
6 |
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Respondents
Sonia R. Lorenzo, Cecilio De Guzman, Cesario Lopez, Jr., Emilio Pacson,
Bonifacio Caceres, Jr., Napoleon Ocampo, Mario Cruz, Priscila Reyes, Rolando
Esquivel, and Crisenciano Cablao were sued in their capacity as Mayor, as Vice
Mayor, and as members of the Sangguniang Bayan respectively, of
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. On the other
hand, respondents Eduardo N. Joson IV, Bella Aurora A. Dulay, Benjamin V.
Morales, Christopher L. Villareal, Jose T. Del Mundo, Solita C. Santos, Renato
C. Tomas, Jose Bernardo V. Yango, Ireneo S. De Leon, Nathaniel B. Bote, Rudy J.
De Leon, Rodolfo M. Lopez, Ma. Lourdes C. Lahom, and Jose Francis Steven M.
Dizon were sued in their capacity as Vice Governor and as members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, respectively.
Petitioners
sought to prohibit respondents from implementing the reorganization of the
municipal government of
While the case
was pending, respondent Mayor Sonia R. Lorenzo issued a letter terminating the
services of those who did not re-apply as well as those who were not selected for
the new positions effective
On
Going through the arguments of the parties, we
find respondents’ contentions to be more in line with existing laws and
jurisprudence. It cannot be denied that
indeed, petitioners’ severance from employment is a sad tale to tell; however,
petitioners’ allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondents particularly Mayor Lorenzo, can hardly be justified. The assailed acts of respondents are clearly
authorized under Section 76 of the Local Government Code of 1991 as quoted
above.
x x x x
Culled from the records of the case, the
reorganization of the municipal government of San Isidro yielded an
organization structure suitable for a 4th class municipality, which
created savings in an estimated amount of more or less Four Million pesos (P4,000,000.00), which can be used for implementation of other
local projects for delivery of basic services and additional benefits for its
employees. As shown by the respondents,
the original plantilla x x x of one hundred and thirty one (131) [positions] has
been trimmed down to eighty-eight (88) [positions] under the new staffing
pattern. Thus, We find plausible the [claim]
of respondents about budgetary [savings], comparing the old with new staffing
pattern, in that:
Prior to the reorganization, this LGU had a budget appropriation of P18,322,933.00
for personal services [including enterprise workers] leaving a measly sum of [sic]
P4,127,703.00 as revolving fund for the whole year. With the advent of the new staffing pattern,
more tha[n] P7,000,000.00 can be channeled by this LGU for its plans and
programs. Under Section 325 of the Local Government Code, LGU’s are limited by
law to appropriate only forty five percent [45%] in case of first to third
class LGU’s or fifty five percent [55%] in case of fourth to fifth class
municipalities of their annual income for personal services. The LGU of San Isidro being a fourth class
municipality has certainly exceeded the 55% appropriation limit under the Local
Government Code because for the year 2000 alone, [P16,787,961.00, or
roughly 78% of its annual income of P22,450,636.00, have already been
allocated to personal services. That
certainly is] way above the ceiling allowed by Section 325 of the Local
Government Code.
x x x x
Verily, there was no bad faith on the part of
respondents when they chose to follow the recommendations of the management
committee, [to create] a new staffing pattern [thereby generating savings] to
provide more basic services [and] livelihood projects x x x.
x x x x
Valid reasons had been shown by respondents which
support the reorganization of the municipal government of
We must point out that good faith is
presumed. It is incumbent upon the
petitioners to prove that the reorganization being implemented in the
Finally,
respondents were correct when they stated that the extraordinary writ of
mandamus is not applicable in this case because the act being sought by
petitioners to be done is discretionary and not a ministerial duty. In other words, mandamus lies only to compel
the performance, x x x of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance
of a discretionary duty. Since grave
abuse of discretion is not evident in this case, the exceptional remedy of
mandamus is unavailable. x x x
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing and finding that
the assailed Resolution No. 27 dated July 9, 2001 and Resolution No. 80 dated
November 12, 2001 were not issued by respondents with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the instant appeal [sic] is DENIED DUE COURSE and, accordingly, DISMISSED for lack of merit. The validity of the assailed
resolutions, being in accordance with
law and jurisprudence, is UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration[13] which was denied by the CA
in its
Hence, petitioners availed of this recourse.
Petitioners’ Arguments
Petitioners contend that the March 20, 2003 Decision and October 6, 2003
Resolution of the CA were not in accordance with Republic Act (RA) No. 6656,
otherwise known as “An Act to Protect the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization”,
specifically Section 2[14] thereof and RA 7305, otherwise known as the “Magna Carta of Health
Workers”.
Respondents’ Argument
Respondents, for their part, argue that petitioners’ separation from
service was a result of a valid reorganization done in accordance with law and
in good faith.
Both parties filed their memoranda.[15] Thereafter, in a Resolution[16] dated
Issues
1)
Whether petitioners’ automatic
resort to the Court of Appeals is proper.
2)
Whether the case falls under
the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Our Ruling
Petitioners’
recourse should have been with the Civil Service Commission and not with the
Court of Appeals
Section 2 (1)
and Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution provide that:
Section 2. (1) The
civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
Section 3. The
Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government,
shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the
civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all
human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and
institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability. It
shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on its
personnel programs.
Corollary
thereto, Section 4 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, states that:
Section
4. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. — The Civil Service Commission shall hear and
decide administrative cases instituted by, or brought before it, directly or on
appeal, including contested appointments, and shall review decisions and
actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
or by law, the Civil Service Commission
shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and
suspension of all officers
and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the
conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the
foregoing provisions, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, has jurisdiction over disputes involving the removal and separation
of all employees of government branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters. Simply put, it is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the
civil service.[17]
In this case,
petitioners are former local government employees whose services were
terminated due to the reorganization of the municipal government under Resolution
Nos. 27 and 80 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Even the laws
upon which petitioners anchor their claim vest jurisdiction upon the CSC. Under RA 6656 and RA 7305, which were cited by
the petitioners in their petition, it is the CSC which determines whether an
employee’s dismissal or separation from office was carried out in violation of
the law or without due process. Accordingly,
it is also the CSC which has the power to reinstate or reappoint an unlawfully
dismissed or terminated employee. Quoted hereunder are Section 9 of RA 6656 and
Section 8 of RA 7305:
SECTION
9. All officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service
Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act,
shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed as the case may be without loss of
seniority and shall be entitled to full pay for the period of separation. Unless
also separated for cause, all officers and employees, who have been separated
pursuant to reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate
separation pay and retirement and other benefits under existing laws within
ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or from
the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be:
Provided, That application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon
has been made by the corresponding department or agency. Those who are not
entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in the amount
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation
pay and retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings
of the department or agency concerned. (Emphasis supplied)
x
x x x
SECTION
8. Security of Tenure. — In case of
regular employment of public health workers, their services shall not be
terminated except for cause provided by law and after due process: Provided,
That if a public health worker is found
by the Civil Service Commission to be unjustly dismissed from work, he/she
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
his/her back wages with twelve percent (12%) interest computed from the time
his/her compensation was withheld from him/her up to the time of reinstatement.
(Emphasis supplied)
All told, we hold
that it is the CSC which has jurisdiction over appeals from personnel actions
taken by respondents against petitioners as a result of reorganization. Consequently, petitioners’ resort to the CA
was premature. The jurisdiction lies
with the CSC and not with the appellate court.
The case does not fall under any of the exceptions to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies
The rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to
decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the
courts.[18]
This, however, is not an ironclad rule as
it admits of exceptions,[19]
viz:
1. when there is a violation
of due process;
2. when the issue involved is
purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on
the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable
injury;
6. when the respondent is a
department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion
of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is
a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners’ filing of a petition for
mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that the remedies of
mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20] Moreover, being extraordinary remedies, resort
may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of
procedure are powerless to afford relief.[21]
Thus, instead of immediately filing a petition with the CA, petitioners should
have first brought the matter to the CSC which has primary jurisdiction over
the case.[22] Thus, we find that the CA
correctly dismissed the petition but not the grounds cited in support
thereof. The CA should have dismissed
the petition for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.[23]
Considering our above findings, we find no cogent reason to resolve the
other issues raised by the petitioners in their petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The March 20, 2003 Decision of the Court
of Appeals dismissing the petition and its October 6, 2003 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration are AFFIRMED but on the ground that
petitioners failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 775 dated
** Additional
member per Special Order No. 776 dated
[1] Rollo,
pp. 3–20.
[2]
[3]
[4] CA rollo,
p. 44.
[5]
[6] Rollo,
pp. 45–48.
[7] CA rollo,
pp. 34 – 35.
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo,
p. 6.
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] SECTION
2. No officer or employee in the
career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice
and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant or there is
a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the
exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service
Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be
considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of
reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an
aggrieved party:
(a) Where there is a
significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of
the department or agency concerned;
(b) Where an office is
abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
(c) Where incumbents are
replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit;
(d) Where there is a
reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same function as the original
offices;
(e) Where the removal
violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
[15] Rollo,
pp. 92–110 and 116–139.
[16]
[17] Pangasinan State University v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 162321, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 92, 98.
[18] Republic of the Phils. v. Express
Telecommunication Co., Inc., 424
Phil. 372, 399 (2002).
[19] Buston-Arendain v. Gil, G.R. No. 172585,
[20] Sections
2 & 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[21] ACWS,
Ltd. v. Dumlao, 440 Phil. 787, 803 (2002).
[22] See Pan v. Peña, G.R. No. 174244,
[23] See Casimina v. Legaspi, G.R. No. 147530,