THIRD DIVISION
|
YSS
EMPLOYEES Petitioner, - versus - YSS LABORATORIES, INC., Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 155125 Present: Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: December
4, 2009 |
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for
Review on Certiorari filed by
petitioner YSS Employees Union (YSSEU) – Philippine Transport and General
Workers Organization seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
dated
YSS
Laboratories is a domestic corporation engaged in the pharmaceutical
business. YSSEU is a duly registered
labor organization and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank and file employees of YSS Laboratories.
In order to arrest escalating business
losses, YSS Laboratories implemented a retrenchment program which affected 11
employees[4]
purportedly chosen in accordance with the reasonable standards established by
the company. Of the 11 employees sought
to be retrenched, nine were officers and members of YSSEU.[5] Initially, these employees were given the
option to avail themselves of the early retirement program of the company.[6] When no one opted to retire early, YSS
Laboratories exercised its option to terminate the services of its employees as
allegedly authorized under Article 283[7]
of the Labor Code. Thus, copies of the
Notices of Termination were filed with DOLE on
In order to forge a compromise, a
number of conciliation proceedings were conducted by the NCMB-NCR, but these
efforts proved futile since the parties’ stance was unbending.
This
prompted the Secretary of Labor to finally intervene in order to put an end to
a prolonged labor dispute. Underscoring
the government’s policy of preserving economic gains and employment levels, the
Secretary of Labor deemed that the continuation of the labor dispute was
inimical to national interest. Thus, in
an Order dated
CONSIDERING THESE PREMISES, this Office hereby
certifies the labor dispute at [YSS Laboratories] to the [NLRC] for compulsory
arbitration, pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor [Code], as amended.
All striking workers are hereby directed to return to
work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and for the
Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment
prior to the strike.
The parties are further directed to cease and desist
from committing any act which might further worsen the situation.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to
the NLRC for its appropriate action.[9]
YSS Laboratories, however, refused to
fully comply with the directive of the Secretary of Labor. In its Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[10]
YSS Laboratories argued that nine union officers and members who were
previously terminated from service pursuant to a valid retrenchment should be
excluded from the operation of the return-to-work order. It also asserted that the union officers[11]
who participated in the purported illegal strike should likewise not be allowed
to be back to their employment for they were deemed to have already lost their
employment status.
YSSEU, for
its part, moved that YSS Laboratories be cited for contempt for refusing to
admit the 18 workers back to work. In
addition, YSSEU prayed for the award of backwages in favor of these employees
who were not permitted by YSS Laboratories to return to their respective stations
despite the Secretary of Labor’s directive. [12]
Acting on
the aforesaid motions, the Secretary of Labor, on 9 June 2001, granted the
motion of YSSEU and thus issued an Order[13]
directing YSS Laboratories to immediately accept back to work the nine retrenched
employees and the nine union officers who initiated the alleged illegal strike
pending determination of the validity of the retrenchment and illegal strike
cases. Should actual physical
reinstatement be no longer possible, YSS Laboratories was ordered to reinstate
the striking workers in the company’s payroll.
The decretal portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, [YSS Laboratories] is directed to
immediately accept back to work the nine (9) retrenched employees and the nine
(9) union officers and members against whom an illegal strike case has been
filed, by the NLRC, pending determination of the validity of the retrenchment
and illegal strike cases. In case the actual
and physical reinstatement is not feasible, [YSS Laboratories] is directed to
effect payroll reinstatement with the workers’ salaries payable every two (2)
weeks effective from the [YSS Laboratories’] receipt of this Order.[14]
Unyielding,
YSS Laboratories brought a Petition for Certiorari[15]
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, seeking to
annul the certification order and the return-to-work order issued by the
Secretary of Labor. While recognizing
the wide latitude afforded by law to the Secretary of Labor to issue Assumption
of Jurisdiction and Certification Orders, YSS Laboratories claimed that the
issuance of the 11 May 2001 and 9 June 2001 Orders was tainted with utter grave
abuse of discretion and patent bias in favor of YSSEU. Again, YSS Laboratories asseverated that the
nine employees who were previously dismissed from employment should be excluded
from the coverage of the return-to-work order since they were lawfully
retrenched by the company.
On
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Petition is GRANTED;
and the two (2) assailed Orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor in
NCMB-NCR-NS-03-086-01/0S-AJ-0006-2001 are hereby SET ASIDE for being NULL
and VOID.[16]
Similarly ill-fated was YSSEU’s motion for reconsideration
which was denied through the Court of Appeals’ Resolution issued on
YSSEU is now before this Court assailing the aforementioned
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
appellate court erred in reversing the Orders of the Secretary of Labor.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CERTIFYING THE LABOR DISPUTE TO THE NLRC FOR
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RETRENCHED EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE
EXCLUDED FROM THE OPERATION OF THE RETURN TO WORK ORDER.
While this
Court prefers to rule on the issue of the validity of the retrenchment program
as well as on the questions on the legality or illegality of the strike, and on
the individual liabilities of the strikers, if any, we cannot put an end to
this protracted labor dispute, however, without preempting the NLRC in the
disposition of these issues and thereby transgressing the elementary doctrine
of primary jurisdiction.[18] The pivotal issue in this petition centers on
whether or not the retrenched employees should be excluded from the coverage of
the return-to-work-order.
.
YSSEU maintains that once a labor
dispute is certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, the employer
should readily admit all striking
employees under the status quo ante. It argues that the primary reason why the
strike was conducted in the first place was to protest the implementation of
the retrenchment program, which clearly discriminated against union officers
and members. It bears to stress that out
of the 11 employees affected by retrenchment, four are union officers and five
are union members.
YSS Laboratories, on the other hand, insists that those employees who
were already separated from service due to a valid retrenchment should not be
readmitted back to work anymore. It
avers that the retrenched employees were chosen after a thorough evaluation of
their work performance, including their frequencies of absence and tardiness,
and their respective lengths of service, rendering YSSEU’s claims of discrimination
and union busting, preposterous.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Orders dated 11 May 2001 and 9 June 2001 of the Secretary of Labor, certifying the labor dispute involving the
herein parties to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and enjoining YSSEU to
return to work and YSS Laboratories to admit them under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike, were issued pursuant to Article 263(g)
of the Labor Code. Said provision
reads:
Art. 263. Strikes,
picketing, and lockouts.
x x x x
(g) When, in his opinion,
there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in
an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify
the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have
the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or
lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before
the strike or lockout. The Secretary
of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law
enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with
such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. (Emphasis supplied.)
After martial law was lifted and democracy was restored, the assumption
of jurisdiction in Art. 263(g) has now been viewed as an exercise of the police
power of the State with the aim of promoting the common good[19]:
[I]t must be noted that
Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have been enacted pursuant to the
police power of the State, which has been defined as the power inherent in a
government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order,
safety, health, morals and general welfare of society. The police power, together with the power of
eminent domain and the power of taxation, is an inherent power of government
and does not need to be expressly conferred by the Constitution. x x x.[20]
The grant of these plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor makes it
incumbent upon him to bring about soonest, a fair and just solution to the
differences between the employer and the employees, so that the damage such
labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may be minimized as much
as possible, if not totally averted, by avoiding stoppage of work or any lag in
the activities of the industry or the possibility of those contingencies that might
cause detriment to the national interest.[21]
In order to effectively achieve such end, the assumption or certification
order shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout. Moreover,
if one has already taken place, all striking workers shall immediately return
to work, and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit
all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout.[22]
YSS Laboratories’ vigorous insistence on the exclusion of the retrenched
employees from the coverage of the return-to-work order seriously impairs the
authority of the Secretary of Labor to forestall a labor dispute that he deems
inimical to the national economy. The
Secretary of Labor is afforded plenary and broad powers, and is granted great
breadth of discretion to adopt the most reasonable and expeditious way of writing finis to the labor dispute.[23]
Accordingly, when the Secretary of Labor directed YSS Laboratories to
accept all the striking workers back to work, the Secretary did not exceed his
jurisdiction, or gravely abuse the same.
It is significant at this point to point out that grave abuse of
discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. Thus, an act may be considered as committed in
grave abuse of discretion when the same is performed in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.[24] In the case at bar, there is no showing that
the assailed orders were issued in an arbitrary or despotic manner. The Orders dated
Plainly, Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code was meant
to make both the Secretary (or the various regional directors) and the labor
arbiters share jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions. Otherwise, the Secretary would not be able to
effectively and efficiently dispose of the primary dispute. To hold the contrary may even lead to the
absurd and undesirable result wherein the Secretary and the labor arbiter
concerned may have diametrically opposed rulings. As we have said, “(i)t is fundamental that a
statute is to be read in a manner that would breathe life into it, rather than
defeat it.
By harping on the validity of the retrenchment
and on the exclusion of the retrenched employees from the coverage of the
return-to-work order, YSS Laboratories undermines the underlying principle embodied
in Article 263(g) of the Labor Code on the settlement of labor disputes -- that
assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to be
strictly complied with by the parties, even during the pendency of any petition
questioning their validity. Regardless
therefore of its motives, or of the validity of its claims, YSS Laboratories
must readmit all striking employees and give them back their respective
jobs. Accepting back the workers in this
case is not a matter of option, but of obligation mandated by law for YSS
Laboratories to faithfully comply with. Its
compulsory character is mandated, not to cater to a narrow segment of society,
or to favor labor at the expense of management, but to serve the greater
interest of society by maintaining the economic equilibrium.
Instructive is the ruling of
this Court in Philippine
Airlines Employees Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.[26]:
The very nature of a return-to-work
order issued in a certified case lends itself to no other construction. The certification attests to the urgency of
the matter, affecting as it does an industry indispensable to the national
interest. The order is issued in the
exercise of the court’s compulsory power of arbitration, and therefore must be
obeyed until set aside. x x x.
Certainly, the determination
of who among the strikers could be admitted back to work cannot be made to
depend upon the discretion of employer, lest we strip the certification or
assumption-of-jurisdiction orders of the coercive power that is necessary for attaining
their laudable objective. The
return-to-work order does
not interfere with the management’s prerogative, but merely regulates it when,
in the exercise of such right, national interests will be affected. The rights granted by the Constitution are
not absolute. They are still subject to
control and limitation to ensure that they are not exercised arbitrarily. The interests of both the employers and
employees are intended to be protected and not one of them is given undue
preference.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate
Justice |
|
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Andres B. Reyes Jr. with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Amelita Tolentino, concurring; rollo, pp. 63-78.
[2] Rollo, pp. 198-201.
[3]
[4] Resie Santos, Edwin Perona, Rogelio Salmorin, Joselina Victoria, Dominador Monterola, Jacqueline Tubale, Loreto Esteves, Jetner Argamaso, Teofilo Pagaduan, Jr., Bernardita Mesias and Alexander Reig. (Rollo, pp. 107-128.)
[5] Joselina Victoria – Secretary, Edwin Perona – Auditor, Rogelio Salmorin –P.R.O., Teofilo Pagaduan Jr., - Board Member, Resie Santos, Dominador Monterola, Jacqueline Tubale, Loreto Esteves, Jetner Argamaso – Members.
[6] NLRC Records, Vol. I, p. 75.
[7] ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. – The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the [Department] of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.”
[8] NLRC Records, Vol. I, pp. 1413-144.
[9] Rollo, pp. 200-201.
[10]
[11] Noel Gaelon – President, Mariozaldy Racelis – Vice-President, Perlina Cada – Treasurer, Enrique Perona, Gerson Niebla, Medardo Suaiso, Hernan Mecasero, Homer Rada and Prescilla Godoy – Board Members.
[12] Rollo, pp. 222-225.
[13]
[14]
[15] CA rollo, pp. 1-69.
[16] Rollo, p. 78.
[17]
[18] Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction states when the courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question that is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. (See Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 132477, 31 August 2005, 468 SCRA 471, 483-484.)
[19] Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Acting Secretary of Labor Brillantes, 364 Phil. 402, 409 (1999).
[20] Philtread
Workers
[21] Telefunken
Semiconductors Employees
[22] Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc.-Unlicensed Crews Employees Union-Associated Labor Unions (Tasli-Alu) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145428, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 610, 618.
[23] Telefunken
Semiconductors Employees
[24] Philtread
Workers
[25] G.R. Nos. 92981-83,
[26] 148 Phil. 386, 392 (1971).