G.R. No. 149548 (Roxas & Company,
Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform, et al.)
G.R. No. 167505 (Damayan ng Manggagawang
Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW) v.
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Roxas & Company, Inc., et
al.)
G.R. No. 167540 (Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid
sa Hacienda Roxas, Inc. [KAMAHARI], et al. v. Roxas & Company, Inc., et al.)
G.R. No. 167543 (Department of Land
Reform [Formerly Department of Agrarian Reform] v. Roxas & Company, Inc.)
G.R. No. 167845 (Roxas & Company,
Inc. v. Damayan ng Manggagawang Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of
Sugar Workers [DAMBA-NFSW])
G.R. No. 169163 (Damayan ng Manggagawang
Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW) v.
Roxas & Company, Inc.)
G.R. No. 179650 (Damayan ng Manggagawang
Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW) v.
Roxas & Company, Inc.)
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
There
are seven consolidated Petitions before this Court, involving the question of
whether all or certain parcels of land located in Nasugbu, Batangas, are
subject to distribution to farmer-beneficiaries under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The
seven Petitions are broken into three groups depending on their bases and/or
subject matters.
I
A. CARP Exemption of the Three Haciendas based on Presidential
Proclamation No. 1520
G.R. No. 167540
On
After the
People Power Revolution which resulted in the ouster of former President Marcos
on 24 February 1986, a Constitutional Convention drafted, and the people
ratified in a plebiscite held on 2 February 1987, the new Constitution (1987
Constitution). The 1987 Constitution
includes, under Article XIII, the following provisions explicitly mandating the
State to undertake an agrarian reform program:
Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Sec. 5. The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farm-workers, and landowners, as well as cooperatives, and other independent farmers’ organizations to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial, production, marketing, and other support services.
In
compliance with the afore-mentioned constitutional mandate, Congress passed,
and then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law, Republic Act No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), which became
effective on
Roxas &
Company, Inc. (Roxas & Co.) was the registered owner of the following vast
parcels of land located in Nasugbu, Batangas:
|
Hacienda |
Area (hectares) |
Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) |
|
Hacienda Caylaway |
867.9571 |
TCT No. T-44662 TCT No. T-44663 TCT No. T-44664 TCT No. T-44665 |
|
Hacienda Banilad |
1,050 |
TCT No. 924 |
|
Hacienda Palico |
1,024 |
TCT No. 985 |
In a letter
dated
Notices of
land valuation were subsequently issued by the DAR Regional Director fixing the
compensation for Haciendas Banilad and Palico, but Roxas & Co. rejected the
valuation and protested the compulsory acquisition proceedings for its two haciendas.
On
Roxas &
Co. filed with the DAR on
Even during
the pendency of the application for conversion of Roxas & Co., the DAR
already canceled the TCTs of Roxas & Co. and started issuing Certificates
of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) covering the three haciendas to farmer-beneficiaries, including members of Katipunan
ng mga Magbubukid sa Hacienda Roxas, Inc. (KAMAHARI) and Damayan ng
Manggagawang Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers
(DAMBA-NFSW). Among such CLOAs was CLOA No.
6654, issued on
On
The Court
of Appeals, in its Decision dated
Roxas &
Co. filed an appeal with this Court, bearing the title Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, docketed as G.R. No. 127876. In its Decision dated
On
KAMAHARI
and DAMBA-NFSW opposed the application for CARP exemption of Roxas &
Co. KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW argued,
among other things, that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 did not, by itself,
reclassify the three haciendas from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, because said issuance merely directed the
identification and segregation of specific geographic areas in the
Municipalities of Ternate, Maragondon, and Nasugbu, to be developed for tourism
purposes. The Department of Tourism
(DOT) already identified specific areas in Nasugbu to be developed for tourism
purposes and such areas did not include the three haciendas of Roxas
& Co. Even the Municipality
Government of Nasugbu and the barangays where the three haciendas are
located opposed the application for exemption of Roxas & Co.
In an Order
dated
The DAR
Secretary, in its
The
DAR Secretary found, in his Order of 22 October 2001, that DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, series of 1994, did not apply to the case of Roxas & Co. since
there was no express provision in Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 or in any
other documents submitted by Roxas & Co. that the three haciendas in Nasugbu have been
reclassified to nonagricultural use prior to the effectivity of the CARL. The DAR Secretary, therefore, decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein application
for exemption from CARP coverage pursuant to Administrative Order No. 6, Series
of 1994 involving parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-985, T-924, T-44655 (sic), T-44664, and T-44663 located at
Brgys. Caylaway, Palico and Banilad, Nasugbu, Batangas, and with an aggregate
area of 2,930.2948 hectares is hereby DENIED. The DAR field office personnel concerned are
directed to immediately proceed with the coverage and distribution of subject
lands to qualified farmer beneficiaries.[3]
Roxas &
Co. expectedly filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order of the
DAR Secretary.
The DAR
Secretary denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Roxas & Co. in an Order
dated
On 12 August 2002, Roxas & Co. filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72131. Roxas & Co. anchored its Petition on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM ERRED IN FAILING
TO CONCLUDE THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE NON-AGRICULTURAL LANDS, THE SAME HAVING
BEEN CLASSIFIED BY PROCLAMATION NO. 1520 AS PART OF A TOURIST ZONE.
II
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM ERRED IN
NOT EXEMPTING THE SUBJECT LANDS FROM THE COVERAGE OF THE CARL.
The Former Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals, by a vote of three to two, resolved CA-G.R. SP No. 72131 in favor of Roxas & Co.
In the Decision[4]
dated
x x x [t]he Proclamation is clear and free from any
doubt or ambiguity and leaves no room for construction or interpretation as
what [DAR] has done. What is clear is
that Nasugbu, Batangas where [Roxas & Co.]’s property is located was
declared as Tourist Zone under the administration and control of the Philippine
Toursim Authority. When the law speaks
with clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application (Republic v. CA, 299 SCRA 199).
x x x x
Presidential Proclamation 1520 clearly established the
following, in reference to the case at bench.
(a) It declared the area comprising Nasugbu in Batangas as a Tourist
Zone. (underscoring for emphasis)
(b) It placed the said area under the administration and control
of the Philippine Tourism Authority; therefore not subject to CARP.
(c) Since the entire Nasugbu area cannot at one time be
immediately developed for tourism, as intended, there is a need to establish
priorities based on potential tourism value within the Tourist Zone
wherein optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing
facilities where both the government and private sector can concentrate their
efforts and limited resources in order to generate foreign exchange as well as
other tourist receipts at the earliest possible time.
(d) The only area exempted from designation as Tourist Zone is any
duly established military reservation existing within the zone.
It is therefore beyond any cavil of doubt that as
early as 1985, when Proclamation No. 1520 was issued, Nasugbu, Batangas, where
[Roxas & Co.]’s properties are located, has been declared as Tourist Zone
and placed under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism
Authority. Under such circumstances, it
necessarily follows it is exempt from the coverage of CARL and therefore the
Secretary of DAR has no authority over the same.[5]
The majority applied Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)[6] and National Housing Authority (NHA) v. Hon. Allarde[7] as judicial precedents to CA-G.R. SP No. 72131, addressing the contrary view of the DAR in the following manner:
What is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the
gander. To do otherwise would definitely
result in violating the constitutionally guaranteed equal protection
right. In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. DAR,
225 SCRA 278, the Supreme Court in an En banc decision upheld the force and
effect of the exemption of the lands covered by Presidential Proclamation No.
1637 from the CARL. The said
Proclamation declared 20,312 hectares of land located in the municipalities of
Antipolo,
[DAR], however, argues that in both cases, the covered
land areas have technical descriptions while that in Proc. 1520 does not and
therefore the ruling in said cases cannot be made applicable to the
latter. Again, [DAR] conveniently forgot
or did not mention that in both the Natalia and NHA cases, there was necessity
to delineate the Tourist Zone. In
Natalia, the area straddles several municipalities and only portions of said
municipality was (sic) included. In the NHA case, it encompasses several
parcels of land covered by different titles and involved only certain portions
covered by the various titles.
In the case of Proc. 1520, there was no necessity to
survey or make a technical description because it included or declared on
(1) whole municipality as Tourist Zone exempting only a military
reservation, if there is one earlier made (underscoring for emphasis). If both Proclamation 1637 and 843 are given
the force and effect of a law by declaring them beyond the CARL coverage, there
is no reason why Proc. No. 1520 should be treated otherwise. Such is the equal protection of the law
guaranteed by the Constitution.[8]
In
the end, the majority disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 72131 as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
Petition having merit, the Orders issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform
dated October 22, 2001 and July 12, 2002 are hereby SET ASIDE FOR HAVING BEEN
ISSUED WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS AND DECLARING THAT THE PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY
TCT Nos. T-44665, T-44664 and T-44663, all in the name of [Roxas & Co.] and
all situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, particularly those situated in Barangays
Caylaway, Palico and Banilad, as exempt from the coverage of CARP pursuant to
the declaration of Proclamation No. 1520 as Tourist Zone. No Costs.[9]
Court
of Appeals Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, in his Separate Opinion
(Dissenting), believed that Roxas & Co. committed forum shopping by filing
its application for exemption while its previous application for conversion and
complaint for cancellation of CLOAs were still pending with the DAR. Ordinarily, violation of the rule against
forum-shopping shall be a cause for summary dismissal of the petition,
complaint, application or any other initiatory pleading. However, in light of the substantial issues
and subject matter involved in the case, Justice Reyes instead voted for the
remand of the same to DAR for joint determination with the pending related
cases on conversion and cancellation of CLOAs.
Court
of Appeals Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos also dissented from the
majority. While it is true that the
three haciendas of Roxas & Co. are within the tourist zone, Justice
Aliño-Hormachuelos observed in her Dissenting Opinion that there was no
evidence that the said properties have been specified or segregated for having
potential tourism value as required by law.
She thus voted to deny the Petition of Roxas & Co. and affirm the
Orders dated
In
the Resolution[10] dated
Aggrieved,
KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW jointly filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking (1) the nullification, reversal, and setting aside of the
Decision dated 24 November 2003 and Resolution dated 18 March 2005 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131; (2) a declaration that the three haciendas
of Roxas & Co. are within the coverage of the CARL; (3) and a ruling
affirming the Orders dated 22 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the DAR
Secretary which denied, for lack of merit, the application for CARP exemption
of Roxas & Co. in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-084-00.
The Petition was docketed as G.R.
No. 167540, and raffled to the Second Division of the Court.
The
Second Division of the Court directed Roxas & Co. and DAR to file their
respective Comments on the Petition of KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW.
G.R. No. 167543
In
the meantime, DAR filed with this Court a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, similarly praying for the setting aside of the Decision dated 24
November 2003 and Resolution dated 18 March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72131; and the reinstatement of the Orders dated 22 October 2001
and 12 July 2002 of the DAR Secretary in DAR Administrative Case No.
A-9999-084-00. The Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 167543, and raffled to the
Third Division of the Court.
On
27 June 2005, the Second Division of the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No.
167543, assigned to the Third Division, with G.R. No. 167540, pending with the
Second Division, the latter being the lower-numbered case.
Apparently still unaware of the
afore-mentioned Resolution dated 27 June 2005 of the Second Division, the Third
Division issued a Minute Resolution on 20 July 2005 already denying the
Petition in G.R. No. 167543 for the failure of DAR to show that a reversible
error had been committed by the appellate court. DAR accordingly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the denial of its Petition.
G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543 were
finally consolidated and given due course.
During the pendency of these cases, the Sangguniang Bayan and the
Association of Barangay Captains (ABC) of Nasugbu filed their separate
Petitions for Intervention before this Court.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu
averred in its Petition for Intervention that its Chairman and Members, as the
legislators of Nasugbu, stand to benefit or suffer from the results of the
pending cases. The Local Government Code
devolved upon them the important function of determining, on behalf of their
constituents, the appropriate use of the lands of Nasugbu, as would be embodied
in a Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP).
Per the record of the Sangguniang Bayan, the three haciendas of Roxas & Co. in Nasugbu have not been reclassified
to tourism use, consequently, cannot be exempted from CARP coverage. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu further
asserted that it could not perform its function of determining appropriate land
use in Nasugbu, and it would remain inutile insofar as said function was
concerned, unless the Court reverses the assailed judgment of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131 that the entire lands of Nasugbu had been
automatically reclassified by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No.
1520.
In its Petition for Intervention, the
ABC of Nasugbu claimed that majority of its members are CARP beneficiaries
themselves, who are entitled in their own right to intervene in G.R. No. 167540
and No. 167543; and those who are not CARP beneficiaries are still residents of
Nasugbu whose rights may likewise be affected by the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131. In
addition, the barangay captains of
Nasugbu are the local chief executives tasked to help the DAR implement the
CARL at the grassroots level, as well as represent their barangay constituents in voting on land use issues in Nasugbu. As such, they stand to gain or suffer from
the outcome of the two cases before this Court.
The ABC of Nasugbu argued that with the automatic reclassification of
the lands in the entire Nasugbu to tourism use by Presidential Proclamation No.
1520, as the appellate court erroneously and unjustly held, there was
practically nothing more that could be done as regards the land use plan for
the municipality. Necessarily, there
could be no way for the barangay chairmen
to still help DAR as mandated by the Local Government Code since it would
already be legally impossible to implement the CARP in Nasugbu given the
exemption of all lands in said municipality from the program.
Roxas & Co. opposed the two
Petitions for Intervention, contending that the parties intending to intervene
had no legal interest in G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543. The judgment on appeal before the Court does
not deal with land use plans and zoning ordinances issued and implemented by LGUs
pursuant to the Local Government Code; instead, it involves laws that are
enforced by the DOT, through the PTA (for Presidential Proclamation No. 1520,
implementing Presidential Decree No. 564[11])
and the DAR (CARL). The intervention of
the Sangguniang Bayan and ABC of Nasugbu was already prohibited at this stage,
and would only prejudicially and unduly delay the proceedings. They are not indispensable parties and their
interest should be the subject of separate proceedings.
After further exchange of pleadings
among the parties in G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543, they were finally directed
by this Court to submit their respective Memoranda.
B. CARP Exemption of Certain Lots in Hacienda Palico, based on
Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982
G.R. No. 149548
On
Roxas & Co., through a letter
dated
The DAR Secretary took into
consideration the following pieces of evidence submitted by Roxas & Co. in
support of the latter’s application for exemption:
1.
Certification
dated February 11, 1998 issued by the HLRB (sic)
stating that Lot Nos. 21, 32, 28, and 34, and portions of Lot Nos. 31 and 24
are within the industrial zone based on the approved Zoning Ordinance of the
Municipality per HSRC Resolution No. R-123 dated
2.
Certification
dated
3.
Certification
dated
4.
Certification
dated May 27, 1997 issued by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
stating that Lot Nos. 31, 24, 21 and 28 are not within the service area of any
existing National Irrigation System and Communal Irrigation System of NIA and
not within the area programmed for irrigation with firm funding commitment; and
5.
Certification
dated September 11, 1997 issued by the [Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO)] of Nasugbu, Batangas stating that DAR Lot No. 31, and portions of DAR
Lot Nos. 24 and 21 are residential areas, Lot Nos. 32, 28, and 34 and remaining
portions of DAR Lot No. 21 are vacant, and 1/3 of the remaining portion of DAR
Lot No. 24 has occupants. The same
certification states that the subject parcels of land are covered by a CLOA.
Per Ocular Inspection conducted by the
CLUPPI-2 OCI team, the prevailing land use of DAR Lot No. 31 and portions of
DAR Lot Nos. 21 and 24 is (sic)
residential. The rest of the lots are
vacant and covered mostly by grass and shrubs.
Most of the occupants of DAR Lot Nos. 31, 21, and 24 are workers of the
Don Pedro Azucarera located south of the property. Irrigation canals were noted in DAR Lot Nos.
32 and 34.[13]
The DAR Secretary, in an Order dated
Initially, CLUPPI-2 based their evaluation on
the lot nos. as appearing in CLOA [No.] 6654.
However, for purposes of clarity and to ensure that the area applied for
exemption is indeed part of TCT No. T-60034, CLUPPI-2 sought to clarify with
[Roxas & Co.] the origin of TCT No. T-60034. In a letter dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, an exemption clearance
for the subject parcels of land covered by CLOA No. 6654 having an area of
51.5472 hectares and situated at Brgys. Cogunan and Lumbagan, Nasugbu Batangas
is hereby DENIED.[14]
The
DAR Secretary likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Roxas & Co.
in another Order dated
The DAR Secretary ratiocinated that
CLOA No. 6654 was still valid and existing, except only as to the three parcels
of land subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 36299.[15] This being the case, Roxas & Co. could
not file the application for exemption of the six lots in question since the
owners thereof were already the farmer-beneficiaries to whom CLOA No. 6654 was
issued.
The DAR Secretary also remained
steadfast in his earlier finding that the exact identity of the six lots
subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 cannot be satisfactorily
ascertained from the evidence submitted by Roxas & Co.:
Records also indicate that [Roxas & Co.]
merely submitted the following Transfer Certificate of Titles (sic) registered under the name of Roxas
Y Cia:
|
TCT No. |
Lot No. |
Area (ha) |
|
60019 |
125-A |
0.5324 |
|
60020 |
125-B |
0.2209 |
|
60021 |
125-C |
0.2237 |
|
60022 |
125-D |
1.1960 |
|
60023 |
125-E |
1.4106 |
|
|
Total |
3.5836 |
The
landholdings covered by the aforesaid titles do not correspond to the
Certification dated
Furthermore,
we also note the discrepancies between the certifications issued by HLURB and
the Municipal Planning Development Coordinator as to the area of the specific
lots.
|
Lot No. |
Area per HLURB |
Area per MPDC |
|
21 |
17.6113 |
17.6113 |
|
24 |
6.8088 |
16.8385 |
|
28 |
7.2333 |
7.2333 |
|
31 |
0.777 |
|
|
32 |
1.286 |
15.7902 |
|
34 |
0.6273 |
1.286 |
|
Total |
34.3437 |
58.7593 |
With
such discrepancy, which appears to be the result of inability to identify
specifically the landholdings, it would not be possible for us to grant the
exemption clearance applied for.[16]
Roxas & Co. filed with the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 63146.
The observations of the Court of
Appeals in its Decision[17]
dated
We agree with the DAR that the submission,
among others, of the certified true copies of titles of the land subject of the
application is necessary in order to ascertain the identity of the owner and of
the property applied for exemption.
In
the instant case, a perusal of the documents before us shows that there is no
indication that the said TCTs refer to the same properties applied for
exemption by [Roxas & Co.] It is
true that the certifications issued by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB), Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator
(OMPDC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, and the National Irrigation Administration (NIA),
Region IV refer, among others, to DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24, 28, 31, 32 and 34 (Annexes “E”, “F”, “G” and “N”, pp. 55-57 and
98, Rollo). But these certifications
contain nothing to show that these lots are the same as Lots 125-A, 125-B,
125-C, 125-D and 125-E covered by TCT Nos. 60019, 60020, 60021, 60022 and
60023, respectively. While [Roxas &
Co.] claims that DAR Lot Nos. 21, 24 and 31 correspond to the aforementioned
TCTs submitted to the DAR no evidence was presented to substantiate such
allegation.
Moreover,
[Roxas & Co.] failed to submit TCT 634 (sic)
which it claims covers DAR Lot Nos. 28, 32 and 24 (TSN, April 24, 2001, pp. 43-44).
It
is settled that mere allegation is not evidence and the party who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it (Intestate
Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban vs. Court of Appeals, 265
SCRA 735, 754).[18]
The
Court of Appeals noted the following discrepancies in the zoning classification
of the land in Brgys. Cogunan and Lumbangan where the six lots subject of the
application for exemption are supposedly located:
[Roxas & Co.] also claims that subject
properties are located at Barangay Cogunan and Lumbangan and that these
properties are part of the zone classified as Industrial under Municipal
Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982 of the
The appellate court discerned finally
that while Roxas & Co. claimed that the total area of the six lots subject
of its application for exemption was 51.5472 hectares, the certifications of
HLURB and OMPDC showed that it was only 49.5066 hectares. In comparison, the aggregate area of the
lands covered by TCTs No. 60019 to No. 60023 was 3.5836 hectares. Roxas & Co. was unable to explain these
discrepancies.
Hence, the Court of Appeals
prescribed that until and unless Roxas & Co. identifies, with certainty,
the six lots applied for exemption by showing their exact location and area;
and adduces proof sufficient to show that the properties referred to by the
TCTs submitted in evidence and the certifications issued by the HLURB, NIA, and
the OMPDC of Nasugbu, are identical, the denial by DAR of the application for
exemption of Roxas & Co. must be upheld.
Yet, unlike the DAR Secretary, the
appellate court still recognized the right of Roxas & Co. to submit
additional evidence in support of the latter’s application for exemption for
the six lots, thus:
However, this does not operate to divest
[Roxas & Co.] of its right to present additional evidence before the DAR to
substantiate its claim that the subject lots are indeed exempt from the
coverage of RA 6657.
Meanwhile, in view of the Supreme Court
ruling in Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (supra) recognizing the
rights of the farmer-beneficiaries to possess and till the lands awarded them
under CLOA 6654, respondent DAR may proceed to install farmer-beneficiaries in
the lands subject of the present dispute, without prejudice to a final
determination of [Roxas & Co.]’s right over subject properties.[20]
The dispositive portion of the
WHEREFORE, herein petition is DENIED DUE COURSE without prejudice to [Roxas & Co.] adducing
additional evidence before the DAR for the ascertainment of the identity, exact
location and areas of the lands subject of the application for exemption.[21]
The Motion for Reconsideration of
Roxas & Co. was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution[22]
dated
In its Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 149548, Roxas & Co. argues before this Court that:
THE ACT OF THE RESPONDENT DAR IN
DISPOSSESSING [ROXAS & CO.] FROM ITS LAND, AND ORDERING THE INSTALLATION OF
ALLEGED FARMER BENEFICIARIES THEREON IS NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY
IN ORDERING THE INSTALLATION OF FARMER BENEFICIARIES UPON [ROXAS & CO.]’S
PROPERTY NOTWITHSTANDING THE NULLITY OF THE DAR’S ACTUATIONS[;][23]
and seeks the following from the
Court:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, [Roxas
& Co.] prays that a Temporary Restraining Order be immediately issued and
thereafter a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued upon such terms
and conditions as the Honorable Court may see fit to impose; and that after
proceedings duly taken[,]the REVERSAL and SETTING ASIDE of the Decision of the
Hon. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 63146 be ordered, insofar as the same
allows the respondent DAR to allow installation of farmer-beneficiaries on the
land in dispute and insofar as CLOA 6654 is not nullified with respect to the
land in dispute; and thereafter that the Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be
then made permanent.
Such other relief as may be just and
equitable under the premises is also prayed for.[24]
DAMBA-NFSW filed a Motion to cite
Roxas & Co. in contempt and for the dismissal of the latter’s Petition on
the ground of forum-shopping, contending that the six lots sought to be
exempted herein were also the subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 82225 (G.R. No.
179650).
G.R. No. 179650
As
previously narrated herein, after the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
dated 30 May 2001 and Resolution dated 21 August 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63146,
Roxas & Co. filed before this Court a Petition for Review, docketed as G.R.
No. 149548, challenging the supposed premature installation of the
farmer-beneficiaries to Lots No. 21, No. 24, No. 28, No. 31, No. 32 and No. 34,
situated in Brgys. Cogunan and Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, while awaiting
resolution by the DAR of the application of Roxas & Co. for exemption of
the six lots in question.
At
the same time, Roxas & Co. sought the re-opening by DAR of the proceedings
in DAR Administrative Case No.
A-9999-142-97, so that Roxas & Co. could adduce additional evidence to
substantiate the latter’s application for CARP exemption of the same six lots,
plus Lot No. 36. The DAR Secretary
granted the request of Roxas & Co., and conducted further proceedings in
DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 for the reception of the latter’s
additional evidence.
On
According to the DAR Secretary, Roxas
& Co. was able to establish the identity of all seven lots based on the
following evidence:
Records show that subject properties were
originally registered under TCT No. T-985.
This is shown in the Certification dated
x x x x
C E R T I F I C A
T I O N
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This
is to certify that Lot No. 125 of Psd-04016141 (OLT) under TCT No. 49946 is a
transfer from TCT-985. Further, it is
certified that
x x x x
In a letter dated
TCT No. T-59946 (Lot No. 125) was
subsequently subdivided into various lots including the following:
|
NEW
TCT NO. |
LOT
NO. |
AREA
(in has.) |
|
T-60019 |
125-A |
0.5324 |
|
T-60020 |
125-B |
0.2209 |
|
T-60021 |
125-C |
0.0237 |
|
T-60022 |
125-D |
1.1960 |
|
T-60023 |
125-E |
1.4106 |
|
T-60034 |
125-N |
839.5059 |
A
scrutiny of TCT Nos. T-60019, T-60020, T-60021, T-60022, T-60023 and T-60034
shows that they are transfers from TCT No. T-59946. Furthermore, a Certification dated 6
September 2001 issued by Dante G.
Ramirez, Deputy Register of Deeds I, Nasugbu, Batangas, states that the mother
title of TCT Nos. T-60019, T-60020, T-60021, T-60022, T-60023 and T-60034 is
TCT No. T-985 registered in the name of Roxas Y Cia.
On
x x x x
C E R T I F I C A
T I O N
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This
is to certify that as per verification with available records in this office,
the parcels of land situated in Barangay Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas,
identified below as DAR lot Numbers used to be covered by the following
Transfer Certificate of Title issued by the Registry of Deeds in Nasugbu,
Batangas, to wit:
|
|
Areas (has.) |
TCT Nos. |
|
31 |
0.7770 |
T-60019 T-60020 T-60021 |
|
34 |
1.2860 |
T-60034 |
|
32 |
15.7902 |
T-60034 |
|
28 |
7.2333 |
T-60034 |
|
24 |
5.6128 1.1960 |
T-60034 T-60034 |
|
21 |
17.6113 1.4106 |
T-60034 T-60034 |
|
36 |
0.6300 |
T-60034 |
This is to certify further that the
above-mentioned lots are now all covered and portions of CLOA No. 6654.[25]
Now as to whether the seven lots are
exempted from CARP coverage, the DAR Secretary answered in the affirmative,
analyzing the available evidence as follows:
In the case at hand, the Certification dated
However, we note that the Certification dated
19 September 1996 issued by Zoning Administrator Reynaldo H. Garcia with
respect to DAR Lot No. 36 only indicates an area of 0.6273 hectares as having
been reclassified as part of Industrial Zone pursuant to the Comprehensive
Zoning Regulation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved by
HSRC pursuant to Resolution No. R-123 dated
This Office finds proper compliance by the
[Roxas & Co.] with the requirements for exemption clearance under DAR AO 6
(1994).[26]
As a last note, the DAR Secretary
differentiated the present application of Roxas & Co. for exemption of the
seven lots in Hacienda Palico, from the application of the same corporation for
exemption of the entire Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico in DAR Administrative
Case No. A-9999-084-00 (G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543). The DAR Secretary, in an Order dated
x x x the grounds for exemption invoked in
the present case and the [DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-084-00] cited
above are not the same. The present case
involves an application for exemption on the ground that the properties
enumerated herein were classified in 1982 for industrial use by the
Accordingly,
the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Application for Exemption Clearance from CARP coverage filed by Roxas &
Company, Inc., involving seven (7) parcels of land identified as DAR Lots Nos.
21, 24, 28, 31, 32, 34 and 36 (portion only with an area of 0.6273 hectares),
covered by TCT Nos. T-60019, T-600020, T-60021, T-60022, T-60023 and T-60034
with an aggregate are of 51.5445 hectares located at Brgys. Bilaran, Lumbangan,
Cogonan and Reparo, Nasugbu, Batangas, is hereby GRANTED, subject to the
following conditions:
1. The
farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be maintained in their
peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until
a final determination by the concerned Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
has been made on the amount of disturbance compensation due and entitlement of
such farmer-occupants thereto;
2. No
development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of land until the
appropriate disturbance compensation has been paid to the
farmer-occupants. Proof of payment of
disturbance compensation shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days
from such payment; and
3. The
cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer-beneficiaries shall be subject to
a separate proceeding before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of
Batangas.
The Order dated
When its Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by the DAR Secretary in an Order dated 12 December 2003, DAMBA-NFSW
filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 82225.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision[29]
dated
Even on the merits, the Court of
Appeals found the Petition of DAMBA-NFSW dismissible.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the
DAR Secretary that Roxas & Co. did not commit forum-shopping in filing two
applications for exemptions: (1) DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97,
involving the seven lots in Hacienda Palico; and (2) DAR Administrative
Case No. A-9999-084-00, involving the entire Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and
Palico, since the two cases were based on different sets of facts and
laws.
The
appellate court further held that DAMBA-NFSW was not denied due process when
DAR heard DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97, the application of Roxas & Co.
for exemption of the seven lots in Hacienda Palico, without notice to
DAMBA-NFSW. The procedural defect, if
any, was cured by the filing by DAMBA-NFSW of numerous pleadings after the
issuance by the DAR Secretary of his Order dated
The Court of Appeals refused to
disturb the findings of the DAR Secretary that the seven lots were already
non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL on
Given the foregoing premises, the
Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition of DAMBA-NFSW.
The appellate court subsequently
denied the Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW in a Resolution dated
Now DAMBA-NFSW comes before this
Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 179650. DAMBA-NFSW
grounds its Petition on the following assignment of errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS THIRD DIVISION
COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT ROXAS & CO.
INC. AS HAVING VIOLATED THE RULE AGAINST FORUM-SHOPPING IN FILING A PETITION
FOR REVIEW WITH THE SUPREME COURT SECOND DIVISION [G.R. NO. 149548], AS WELL AS
IN FILING A PETITION TO RE-OPEN ITS EARLIER PETITION FOR CARP EXEMPTION ON
SUBJECT 51.54-HECTARE PROPERTY, ON THE BASIS OF THE SAME RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 63146; And
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONSIDERING MERE CERTIFICATIONS ISSUED
BY THE CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES
ON GRANTING CARP EXEMPTION CLEARANCE ON SUBJECT PROPERTY, BASED (sic) DAR AO 06, S. 1994, PER DOJ
OPINION, S. 1990, WITHOUT SUBMITTING THE MUNICIPAL COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN
DELINEATING SUBJECT PROPERTY AS HAVING BEEN RECLASSIFIED INTO NON-AGRICULTURAL
USE.[30]
DAMBA-NFSW
prays for the Court to reverse and set aside the 31 October 2006 Decision and
16 August 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82225; as
well as to summarily dismiss the Petition for Review of Roxas & Co. in G.R.
No. 149548, pending before another division of the Court, on the ground of
forum-shopping.
After
Roxas & Co. had filed its Comment to the Petition, DAMBA-NFSW was directed
to file its Reply.
G.R. No. 167505
On 29 September 1997, Roxas & Co.
filed with the DAR an application for
exemption from CARP coverage of nine lots, identified as Lots No. 20, No. 13 (portion), No. 37,
No. 19-B, No. 45, No. 47, No. 48-1, No. 48-2, and No. 49, located in Brgys.
Cogonan and Biliran, Nasugbu, Batangas, with an aggregate area of 45.977
hectares. All nine lots were part of
Hacienda Palico, covered by TCT No. T-985.
This application for exemption was docketed as DAR Administrative
Case No. A-9999-008-98.
However, the DAR had previously
placed Hacienda Palico, by compulsory acquisition, under the CARP, and as early
as 1993, distributed CLOAs over the same to farmer-beneficiaries. About 15 hectares of the lots subject of DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 is covered by CLOA No.
6654 issued collectively to members of DAMBA-NFSW; while the rest is covered by
individual CLOAs issued to members of KAMAHARI.
In support of its application for
exemption in DAR Administrative Case
No. A-9999-008-98, Roxas & Co. submitted the following documents:
1. Letter-application
dated
2. Secretary’s
Certificate dated September 2002 executed by Mariano M. Ampil III, Corporate
Secretary of Roxas & Company, Inc., indicating a Board Resolution
authorizing him to represent the corporation in its applications for exemption
with the DAR. The same Board Resolution
revoked the authorization previously granted to the Sierra Management &
Resources Corporation to represent the applicant corporation;
3. Photocopy
of TCT No. 985 and its corresponding Tax Declaration No. 0401;
4.
Location
and vicinity maps of subject landholdings;
5.
Certification
dated 10 July 1997 issued by Reynaldo Garcia, Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (MPDC) and Zoning Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas,
stating that the subject parcels of land are within the Urban Core Zone as
specified in Zone A. VII of Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982,
approved by the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), now the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), under Resolution No. 123, Series of
1983, dated 4 May 1983;
6.
Two (2)
Certifications both dated 31 August 1998, issued by Alfredo Tan II, Director,
HLURB, Region IV, stating that the subject parcels of land appear to be within
the Residential Cluster Area as specified in Zone VII of Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, approved under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series
of 1983, dated 4 May 1983;
7.
Letter
dated
x
x x x
Art. V. Sec. 3, paragraph A VII or Zone Boundaries
of the Zoning Ordinance of Nasugbu describes Neighborhood Units as settlements
clusters/areas in the different barangays outside of the Poblacion specifically
Brgys. Lu(m)bangan, Wawa, Lo(oc), Aga and Bilaran.
In the formulation of the Comprehensive
Development Plan, the abovementioned barangays emerged as Nodal Growth
Barangays, thus, they were highlighted in the Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance. They were classified under Urban Core Zone but categorized further
as settlement clusters outside of the Poblacion. The urban core zone proper is the Poblacion
and its expansion areas while the neighborhood residential areas will be the
urbanized areas in the barangays by the end of the planning period which is
year 2000.
x x x” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
8.
Two (2)
Certifications both dated 8 September 1997 issued by Rolando T. Bonrostro,
Regional Irrigation Manager, National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Region
IV, stating that the subject parcels of land are not irrigated, not irrigable
and not covered by an irrigation project with firm funding commitment;
9.
Certification
dated 18 January 1999 issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, stating that the subject parcels of
land are not covered by Operation Land Transfer but are covered by Collective
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) issued to twenty-three (23)
farmer-beneficiaries, more or less;
10.
Certification
dated 10 September 2001, issued by Manuel J. Limjoco, Jr., MARO of Nasugbu,
Batangas, stating that there was failure to reach an amicable settlement on the
amount of disturbance compensation to be paid by Roxas & Company, Inc., to
the CLOA holders of subject landholdings; and
11.
Photocopy
of a Petition to fix disturbance compensation filed by Roxas & Company,
Inc., duly received on
The CLUPPI-2 OCI Team submitted its
Investigation Report, stating that:
a. Lot
Nos. 20, 13 portion, 37 and 19-B with an aggregate area of 30.9025 hectares
located at Brgy. Cogonan are mostly planted to sugarcane. Irrigation canals were noted adjacent to said
lots. However, said irrigation canals
serve the adjoining OLT-covered areas and not the subject parcels of land;
b. Lot
Nos. 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2 with an aggregate area of 15.0746 hectares
located at Brgy. Bilaran are also planted to sugarcane and are situated along
the
c. The
dominant uses of the adjacent areas are residential, institutional and
agricultural.[32]
After consideration of the evidence
submitted by Roxas & Co. and the Investigation Report of the CLUPPI-2 OCI
Team, the DAR Secretary issued an Order
dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Application of
Exemption Clearance from CARP coverage filed by Roxas & Company, Inc.,
involving nine (9) parcels of land identified as Lots Nos. 20, 13 (portion),
37, 19-B, 45, 47, 49, 48-1 and 48-2, which are portions of a landholding
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 985, with an aggregate area
of 45.9771 hectares located at Barangays Cogonan and Bilaran, Nasugbu,
Batangas, is hereby GRANTED, subject
to the following conditions:
1. The
farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be maintained in their
peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until
a final determination has been made on the amount of disturbance compensation
due and entitlement of such farmer-occupants thereto by the PARAD of Batangas;
2. No
development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of land until the
appropriate disturbance compensation has been paid to the farmer-occupants who
are determined by the PARAD to be entitled thereto. Proof of payment of disturbance compensation
shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days from such payment; and
3. The
cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer-beneficiaries shall be subject of
a separate proceeding before the PARAD of Batangas.
DAMBA-NFSW filed with the DAR
Secretary a Motion for Reconsideration of the 6 November 2002 Order, based on the following assertions: (1)
the lack of notice to DAMBA-NFSW was in violation of its right to due process,
thereby rendering the assailed Order null and void; (2) the application for
exemption of Roxas & Co. was in violation of the anti-forum shopping rule
considering its pending application for exemption of the entire Hacienda Palico
and two other haciendas; and (3) the
grant of the application for CARP exemption of the nine lots were contrary to
law and jurisprudence.
In an Order dated
DAMBA-NFSW received on
The Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision[33] on
The Court of Appeals also pointed out
that assuming arguendo that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper
procedural remedy for the case at bar, DAMBA-NFSW still lost the said remedy
due to the delayed filing of its Petition.
In its Motion for Extension of Time, DAMBA-NFSW requested for 15 more
days or until
Even if the Court of Appeals was to
brush aside the procedural infirmities of the Petition, it found that the
Orders dated
The Motion for Reconsideration of
DAMBA-NFSW was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
DAMBA-NFSW twice moved for extension
of time within which to file its Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court: first, for 15 days; and second, for another 10 days.
DAMBA-NFSW filed its Petition for
Review with this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 167505, on
DAMBA-NFSW prayed in its Petition
that the Court render judgment that (1) nullifies, reverses, and sets aside the
Decision dated 20 December 2004 and Resolution dated 7 March 2005 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82226, as well as the Orders dated 6 November 2002
and 12 December 2003 of the DAR Secretary in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98; and (2) declares the nine lots
in dispute to be within CARP coverage and denies the application for
CARP exemption of Roxas & Co. for the same properties.
However, in a Resolution dated
DAMBA-NFSW filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the
In its Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW, Roxas
&
Meanwhile,
in its Comment to the Petition of DAMBA-NFSW, Roxas &
In
both of its Comments, Roxas & Co. prayed for the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration of DAMBA-NSFW of the
C. Petitions for Partial and Complete
Cancellation of CLOA No. 6654
G.R. No. 167845
As previously recounted herein, CLOA
No. 6654 was issued by the DAR on
|
Lot
No. |
TCT
No. |
Location |
Area (hectares) |
|
125-K |
TCT No. T-60028 |
Brgy. Biliran |
27.414 |
|
125-M |
TCT No. T-60032 |
Sitio Sagbat, Brgy. Lumbangan |
37.8648 |
|
125-L |
TCT No. T-60033 |
Sitio Lumang Bayan, Brgy. Lumbangan |
37.8648 |
|
|
Total |
103.1436 |
|
In separate letters dated
In a letter-decision dated
Roxas & Co. sought
reconsideration of the foregoing letter-decision of the DAR Secretary in a
letter dated
Roxas & Co. then filed with the
Court of Appeals on 27 January 1995 a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 36299.
The Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision[34] in
CA-G.R. SP No. 36299 on
The Court of Appeals brushed aside
the argument of the DAR Secretary and officials that certain portions of the
three lots in dispute were still being used for agricultural purposes. What mattered was that the three lots had
already been reclassified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the
CARL.
The Court of Appeals further found
merit in the contention of Roxas & Co. that the latter was deprived of due
process because; (1) the DAR failed to identify with certainty the land subject
of the compulsory acquisition, thereby preventing Roxas & Co. from
disputing the issuance of CLOA No. 6654 and from determining the valuation of
the land covered by said certificate; and (2) the DAR violated its own
procedural guidelines by distributing the land covered by CLOA No. 6654 even
before Roxas & Co. received payment of compensation for its property.
The fallo of the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby GRANTED and the challenged
letter-decision dated July 13, 1994, and the order dated December 20, 1994 of
the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as well as the collective
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 6654 issued by the same
respondent on October 15, 1993 over the three (3) parcels of land herein
involved, are hereby NULLIFIED, VACATED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement
as to costs.[35]
The foregoing Decision became final
and executory, and entry of judgment was made on
Subsequently, relying on the Decision
dated
It must be noted though that the
Decision dated 2 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299
stated that the land area of Lot No. 125-L, covered by TCT No. T-60033, was
37.8648 hectares; while the Petition in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No.
R-401-005-2001 alleged that the land area of the same lot was slightly smaller
at 36.9796 hectares. Consequently, the
total land area of the three lots subject of DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to
No. R-401-005-2001 was averred to be 102.2614 hectares.
DAMBA-NFSW, on one hand, and the MARO
and Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), on the other, separately sought
the dismissal of DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001. They argued that the applications for partial
cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 contravened the Decision dated 17 December 1999
of this Court in Roxas & Co. v. Court
of Appeals, nullifying the acquisition proceedings of DAR over the three haciendas of Roxas & Co. for failure
of DAR to observe due process therein, and remanding the case to the DAR for
proper acquisition proceedings and determination of the application of Roxas
and Co. for conversion of the three haciendas. They emphasized that this Court refrained
from nullifying the CLOAs issued by the DAR, which included CLOA No. 6654, to
give DAR the chance to correct itself.
DAMBA-NFSW and the MARO and PARO also
invited the attention of the PARAD to DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97
(G.R. No. 149548 and No. 179650), the application for CARP exemption filed by
Roxas & Co. with the DAR, covering Lots No. 21, No. 24, No. 26, No. 31, No.
32, and No. 34, located in Brgys. Cogonan and Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas,
with an aggregate area of 51.5472 hectares.
They claimed that these six lots are superimposed over Lot No. 125-K,
Lot No. 125-M, and Lot No. 125-L, subject of DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to
No. R-401-005-2001, because of a defective subdivision survey. The DAR Secretary denied the application for
CARP exemption of Roxas & Co. in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97,
precisely because the latter was unable to establish with certainty the
identity of the six lots subject of said application. The appeal of Roxas &
Co. of the denial of its application for exemption of the six lots in DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97 was then pending before the Court of
Appeals, and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63146.[36]
On
The PARAD differentiated between Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals from
DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001; and explained why the
Decision dated 17 December 1999 of this Court in the former case did not bar
the applications for partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 in the latter, to
wit:
Admittedly, while both cases have but one
common essential which is the irregularly generated collective CLOAs, one among
which is CLOA No. 6654, however, the causes of action pursued by the suitor and
the subject matter, albeit referred to generally as Hacienda Palico, are
totally different, separate and distinct when taken in particular. [Roxas & Co.] in the instant petitions is
not seeking the cancellation of CLOA 6654 on the ground of lack of due process
but on the basis of a previous finding by the appellate Court, being a
competent authority, that three parcels of land which were included in CLOA
6654 are actually outside the scope of CARP and on its judicial pronouncement
declaring them exempt/excluded therefrom for which very reason, the appellate
Court ordered CLOA 6654 “nullified, set aside and vacated” in respect of the
said lots. The Supreme Court decision,
upon the other hand, ruled for the nullification of the acquisition proceedings for lack of due process and
remanding the matter in controversy to the DAR for proper acquisition
proceedings and determination of [Roxas & Co.]’s application for conversion
in strict accord with the law and its implementing guidelines and procedures
but sustaining the CLOAs already issued in order to give DAR the chance or
opportunity to correct itself and for the meantime maintaining the subject
properties under the stewardship of the actual tillers or cultivators who shall
hold the same in trust for the true landowner.
By unmistakable implication, what is contemplated by the Supreme Court
decision are those lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture (Sec. 4, R.A.
6657) and such lands although devoted to agricultural activity are negotiable
for conversion (DAR Adm. No. 07, Series of 1997) by reason of their natural
features and/or characteristics but not lands which have already been
previously classified for non-agricultural uses (DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of
1990 in relation to Sec. 3, (c) (sic)
and judicially declared excluded or exempt from CARP coverage as in the case of
the three lots in question. Moreover,
the subject parcels of land are not and have never been in the actual
possession, much less under the cultivation, of any member of [DAMBA-NFSW],
hence, not being held by any of them in trust for the lawful landowner. Conversely, in any event that there be found
any occupant on the exempted premises under claim of any right under existing
agrarian laws – the same laws shall warrant his dispossession thereof. In fine, the parcels of land in question
being beyond the scope of the CARP are outside the contemplation of the Supreme
Court decision. Hence, the said decision
should not be made to operate against the cancellation of CLOA 6654 in so far
as the three parcels of land in question are concerned which have previously
been authorized by competent authority in a judgment that is final and
executory.[37]
Under DAR Administrative Order No. 2,
series of 1994, CLOAs, whether distributed or not, may be cancelled by order of
the PARAD or Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) having jurisdiction
over the property in accordance with DARAB rules and procedures. Among the recognized grounds for cancellation
of CLOAs is that the land covered by the same has been found exempt/excluded
from CARP coverage by the DAR Secretary or his authorized representative. Given the final and executory Decision dated
2 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, declaring Lots
No. 125-K, No. 125-M, and No. 125-L exempt from CARP coverage, the PARAD wrote
“there is nothing more left to be done by this Adjudicator than the ministerial
duty to enforce the Court of Appeals judgment x x x by way of a final order of
implementation or execution.”[38]
Even though not a party in CA-G.R. SP
No. 36299, the PARAD still deemed DAMBA-NFSW bound by the final and executory
judgment of the Court of Appeals in said case for the following reasons:
x x x As to the parties bound by the decision
sought to be enforced, while [DAMBA-NFSW] and its members appear not to be
parties in the Court of Appeals case and that as a general rule, the decision
in said case shall only issued against the DAR, by its Secretary, being the
direct party to the action, nonetheless, said judgment shall extend to them
being privies to the [DAR] which is the source or origin of whatever rights or
entitlements they now claim under CLOA 6654 insofar as the three (3) parcels of
land are concerned and against whom the decision is deemed binding although
they are not literally parties to the said action (St. Dominic Corporation vs.
IAC, 151 SCRA 577, Cabreros v. Tiro, 66 SCRA 400).[39]
Lastly, the PARAD addressed the
possibility that the three lots held to be exempt from CARP coverage by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299 may include portions of lots subject
of other applications for exemption:
In this respect, the Board takes into view
[Roxas & Co.]’s pending application for exemption of certain lots covered by
the same CLOA portions of which are said to be overlapping the lots already
declared exempt considering the fact that the Board had issued a status quo
order pendente lite over the exempted
area which might indeed include portions of the lots treated in the pending
application for exemption. It must be
recalled, however, that the legal duty of defining the true identity and
delineating the metes and bounds of the lots, other than those specifically
identified and declared as the ones excluded from CARP coverage by virtue of
the Court of Appeals decision, as well as competence to determine whether the
same are similarly exempt from CARP coverage belong to the exclusive
prerogative of the DAR Secretary and his duly authorized representatives. Nonetheless, for purposes of obtaining the
desired results, it is considered judicious that a relocation survey be
recommended at the instance of any interested party to be plotted on the
approved subdivision survey Psd-04-046912. L.R.C. Record No. 102. Meanwhile, as an ancillary relief to be
included in the order of cancellation, the status quo order shall continue to
operate with full force and effect over the area encompassed by Lots 125-K,
125-L and 125-M as delineated by their respective technical descriptions as appearing
in the approved subdivision survey plan, Psd-04-04-046912, L.R.C. Record No.
102 and as contained and stated in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-60028,
T-60033 and T-60032, respectively, in order to protect the said premises from
undue invasions by illegal entrees.[40]
The PARAD decreed at the end of the
Joint Order dated
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, let Order hereby jointly issue:
1. Directing
the Register of Deeds [of] Batangas, Nasugbu Office, to effect the partial
cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. CLOA-6654, CLOA No. 00158566
of the Registry of Deeds [of] Batangas (Nasugbu) insofar as the same covers
2. Making
the status quo order permanent over the area/lots described in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-60028, T-60033 and T-60032 without prejudice,
however, to [Roxas & Co.]’s lawful exercise of its right of absolute
ownership and its incidents over the parcels of land in question.
No pronouncement as to other relief.[41]
DAMBA-NFSW alleged that on
On
DAMBA-NFSW received on
In an Order dated
1) The
decision dated
2) The
motion for reconsideration was filed on
3) The
denial of the motion for reconsideration was received by [DAMBA-NFSW] counsel
on
4) The
notice of appeal was filed by [DAMBA-NFSW] counsel on
The PARAD, thus, dismissed the Notice
of Appeal of DAMBA-NFSW.
DAMBA-NFSW filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the dismissal of its Notice of Appeal, but the PARAD denied
the same in an Order dated 22 May 2002, stating that the lack of knowledge of
DARAB rules “cannot be considered excusable neglect nor as compelling reason to
reconsider the order of dismissal of the appeal.”[44]
DAMBA-NFSW then filed with the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72198.
DAMBA-NFSW attributed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of the
PARAD, in not giving due course to the former’s Notice of Appeal. DAMBA-NFSW maintained that it had filed its
Motion for Reconsideration on
A) WHETHER
OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT PARAD OF BATANGAS HAS JURISDICTION TO GIVE DUE
COURSE TO [ROXAS & CO.]’S PETITION TO CANCEL CLOA NO. 6654 THE SAME ISSUE
HAVING BEEN THOROUGHLY PASSED UPON AND SPECIFICALLY RESOLVED BY THE SUPREME
COURT EN BANC IN A CASE INVOLVING THE SAME PARTIES AND INVOLVING THE ENTIRE
LANDHOLDINGS OF [ROXAS & CO.] INCLUDING THE LANDHOLDINGS SUBJECT MATTER OF
THE INSTANT PETITION, ORDERING THAT THE SAME SHOULD NOT BE CANCELLED;
B) WHETHER
OR NOT [ROXAS & CO.] IS NOT ENGAGED IN FORUM SHOPPING IN BRINGING THE
PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CLOA 6654 WITH PUBLIC RESPONDENT PARAD OF BATANGAS
WHEN THE PRAYER IS THE SAME AS ITS PETITION EARLIER FILED ON MAY 15, 2000 WITH
THE OFFICE OF THE DAR SECRETARY SEEKING TO EXEMPT FROM CARP COVERAGE SUBJECT
LANDHOLDINGS, AND THAT IF GRANTED TO EFFECT A CANCELLATON OF CLOA No. 6654 AND
OTHER CLOA’S COVERING ITS OTHER LANDHOLDINGS IN NASUGBU, BATANGAS. IN FACT, THE OFFICE OF THE DAR SECRETARY HAS
RULED WITH FINALITY ON [ROXAS & CO.]’S PETITION FOR CARP EXEMPTION, DENYING
THE SAME FOR LACK OF MERIT AND ORDERS THE ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS OR NOTICE OF
COVERAGE TO PROCEED. HOW THEN CAN THE
CLOA’S OF SUBJECT LANDHOLDINGS BE CANCELLED, EXCEPT THROUGH [ROXAS & CO.]’S
PENCHANT OF BRINGING SUITS IN VIOLATION OF ANTI-FORUM SHOPPING RULE AS IN THE
INSTANT CASE; AND
C) WHETHER
OR NOT [ROXAS & CO.] CAN CAUSE FOR THE CANCELLATION OF CLOA NO. 6654
COVERING THE THREE PARCELS OF LANDHOLDINGS (103.1436 HECTARES) ON THE BASIS OF
ALLEGED DECISION COURT OF APPEALS THIRD DIVISION EARLIER ISSUED BETWEEEN THE
SAME PARTIES AND SAME ISSUES WHICH RESULTED FROM A VOID PROCEEDINGS FOR
VIOLATING THE ANTI-FORUM SHOPPING RULE AND THE ILLEGAL ACT OF DAR LITIGATION
OFFICER IN CONNIVANCE WITH [ROXAS & CO.] IN NOT APPEALING THE CASE TO THE
SUPREME COURT, AND PRIMARILY IN THE LIGHT
OF THE SUPREME COURT EN BANC DECISION WHICH DECLARED THAT CLOA NO. 6654 CANNOT
BE CANCELLED AS THE CASE HAS YET TO BE REMANDED TO THE DAR FOR PROPER
ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS, AND THE FACT THAT THE OFFICE OF THE DAR SECRETARY HAS
ALREADY ORDERED FOR THE ISSUANCE OF NOTICE OF COVERAGE ON ALL PRIVATE
RESPONDENT’S LANDHOLDINGS IN NASUGBU, BATANGAS.[45]
DAMBA-NFSW prayed that: (1) a
temporary restraining order (TRO) be immediately issued to enjoin the PARAD
from implementing the Orders dated 19 February 2002 and 22 May 2002; and (2)
after due proceedings, the assailed PARAD Orders be annulled and a new Order be
issued commanding the PARAD to transmit the records in DARAB Cases No.
R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 to the DARAB for the appeal of DAMBA-NFSW.
In its Decision[46]
dated
The Court of Appeals conceded that
under Section 12 of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, DAMBA-NFSW belatedly
filed its Notice of Appeal:
x x x Hence, assuming that [DAMBA-NFSW]
timely filed its motion for reconsideration, the period to file an appeal had
already lapsed considering that the filing of a motion for reconsideration only
suspends the running of the period within which the appeal must be perfected,
and in case of denial of the motion for reconsideration, the movant only has
the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution
of denial. In this case, [DAMBA-NFSW]
had already exhausted the fifteen day period for appeal when it filed its
motion for reconsideration, on the last day of the prescribed period. At the most, [DAMBA-NFSW] only had one (1)
day from receipt of a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration,
within which to perfect its appeal, i.e.,
excluding the day of receipt and including the next day.[47]
While it is also true that the
perfection of appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional, and failure to do so renders the questioned
judgment final and executory; the Court of Appeals recounted jurisprudence
where the rules on the period of appeal were relaxed in favor of the
disposition of cases on the merits. The
appellate court ratiocinated that:
x x x [t]o deny [DAMBA-NFSW]’s appeal with
the PARAD will not only affect their right over the parcel of land subject of
this petition with an area of 103.1436 hectares, but also that of the whole
area covered by CLOA No. 6654 since the PARAD rendered a Joint Resolution of
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [DAMBA-NFSW] with regard to [Roxas & Co.]’s application for partial and
total cancellation of the CLOA in DARAB Cases No. R-0401-003 to 005-2001 and
R-0401-239-2001. There is a pressing
need for an extensive discussion of the issues as raised by both parties as the
matter of canceling CLOA No. 6654 is of utmost importance, involving as it does
the probable displacement of hundreds of farmer-beneficiaries and their
families. This certainly justifies the
relaxation of the rules on the period for appeal in order to afford herein
petitioners their remedy of appeal, lest it be forgotten that the rules of
procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice. The merits of [DAMBA-NFSW]’s
appeal before the PARAD deserve[s] a full ventilation of the issues involved,
to serve the ends of justice and prevent a grave misconduct thereof.[48]
The dispositive portion of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is GRANTED. The Order of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Batangas dated 19 February 2002,
dismissing [DAMBA-NFSW]’s Notice of Appeal and the Order [dated] 22 May 2002,
denying [DAMBA-NFSW]’s Motion for Reconsideration of the earlier order are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The PARAD
of Batangas is ORDERED to give due course to [DAMBA-NFSW]’s appeal in DARAB
Case No. R-0401-003 up to 005-2001.[49]
The Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of Roxas & Co. in a Resolution dated
Thereafter, Roxas & Co. filed
with this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 167845. According to Roxas & Co., the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in granting the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus of DAMBA-NFSW,
notwithstanding that:
I.
THE PARAD’S DENIAL OF DAMBA’S NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE 1994 DARAB RULES.
II.
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR A LOST
APPEAL. THE REMEDY OF APPEAL WAS
AVAILABLE BUT WAS LOST THROUGH DAMBA’S OWN FAULT.
III.
THE ALLOWANCE OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL, WHICH WAS FILED OUT OF
TIME, IS NOT A MINISTERIAL DUTY. HENCE,
THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE.
IV.
DAMBA FAILED TO ADVANCE JUSTIFIABLE REASONS WHY MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL RULES ON APPEAL SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.
V.
THE FINAL AND EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA GR
SP NO. 36299, WHICH ANNULLED CLOA NO. 6654 INSOFAR AS IT COVERS THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES, SHOWS THAT DAMBA’S APPEAL IS UNMERITORIOUS.
Roxas & Co. is asking
the Court to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
The Petition was given due course and
the parties have already submitted their Memoranda.
G.R. No. 169163
On 26 January 2001, Roxas & Co.
filed before the PARAD a Petition for Cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, docketed
as DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001. To recall, CLOA No. 6654 covered a total land
area of 513.9863 hectares, all located in Hacienda Palico. Roxas & Co. was seeking the cancellation
of CLOA No. 6654 as to the rest of the parcels of land still covered thereby
after excluding the 102.2614 hectares, which corresponded to the three lots
already subject of DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001. In other words, Roxas & Co. was petitioning
for the total or complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654.
Roxas & Co. basically grounded
its Petition for the total or complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 on the
alleged nullity of the subdivision survey of the lots covered by CLOA No. 6654,
due to technical defects in the conduct of said survey, which only surfaced
after the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, ordered the exemption from
CARP coverage of the three lots included in CLOA No. 6654. When Hacienda Palico was compulsorily placed
under the CARP, a segregation and subdivision survey was conducted by Engr.
Miguel V. Pangilinan (Pangilinan) on 22 April to
In its Decision dated
By and large, the assailed CLOA falls
squarely within contemplation of DAR Adm. Order No. 02, Series of 1994. The same was issued on October 15, 1993 and
is well within the ten year restrictive period; that just compensation for the
properties thereby covered has not as yet been paid the landowner, that the
same was generated on the basis of an erroneous survey where the lots therein
described are not capable of physical distinction and accurate delineation
having been plotted with reference to an already extinct survey plan, thusly,
depriving the said CLOA of any tangible basis or material content; hence,
devoid of legal existence. In fact, the
Supreme Court even found the property being acquired not properly segregated
and delineated and non-compliant with the statutory requirement under Sec. 16
of RA 6657 that the property/ies acquired shall be identified.
This Board, with due respect to the Supreme
Court’s ruling to save the CLOAs is of the humble opinion that their
preservation will only serve a purpose if and when their contents and efficacy
are confirmed with exactitude by the results of the new acquisition proceedings
to be undertaken by the DAR in respect of the proper delineation and/or
description of the landholdings and the propriety of their coverage under the
CARP. However, in the case of CLOA 6654,
based on the evidence on record the lands that would eventually be found proper
for final coverage under the CARP will not be as described in the said title:
Firstly, by reason of the exclusion of the exempted area; Secondly, due to
technical errors in the identification and plotting of the lots resulting in a
false subdivision survey. CLOA 6654, for
these reasons, now, serves no legal purpose.
Furthermore, considering that the remaining
410.8327-hectares of land covered by CLOA 6654 have yet to pass under the
proper acquisition and/or conversion proceedings as ordered by the Supreme
Court then no title has as yet been acquired by the DAR over the said
properties and, consequently, no proprietary rights to extend to the
[DAMBA-NFSW members] under the CLOA which, as yet does not evidence any title ,
or create any right in favor of the [DAMBA-NFSW members], hence, is devoid of
any legal efficacy and effectively non-existing. For practical reasons, to cancel CLOA 6654
will pave the way for a smooth, unobstructed and expeditious re-processing of
the compulsory acquisition by erasing all traces of past irregularities,
technical errors and lapses of procedure and taking off from a fresh
start. Moreover, the cancellation of the
subject CLOA shall be without adverse effect to the continuous possession and
cultivation of the tillers in place who shall hold the landholdings meanwhile
in trust for [Roxas & Co.] as the true landowner in complete accord with
the ruling of the Supreme Court.
The decretal portion of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Finding and declaring the issuance of
CLOA 6654 not in accordance with the mandate of Sec. 16, RA 6657 thereby
effectively circumventing the implementation of the CARP;
2. Finding CLOA 6654 to be fictitious/null
and void having been generated on the basis of a subdivision survey which was
plotted on a survey plan which has already been previously cancelled,
superseded and extinct, accordingly,
3. Ordering the cancellation of CLOA 6654,
as prayed for by [Roxas & Co.], without prejudice, however, to the
execution of the proper subdivision survey for purposes of delineating
accurately the boundaries of the properties subject of acquisition proceedings
for purposes of determining their coverage under the CARP or their
negotiability for conversion and/or exclusion from the Program.
No pronouncement as to
other relief.
After receiving a copy of the
foregoing PARAD judgment on
DAMBA-NFSW contended in its Motion
for Reconsideration that: (1) Roxas & Co. violated the rule against
forum-shopping in filing before the PARAD the instant Petition for cancellation
of CLOA No. 6654, even when Roxas & Co. already made a similar request,
which was denied by the Court en banc,
in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals,
despite the procedural lapses committed by the DAR in the acquisition
proceedings; (2) the PARAD committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in arrogating to herself the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary over applications for CARP exemption or land
conversion; and (3) even assuming for the sake of argument that the subdivision
plan, used as basis for CLOA No. 6654, was erroneous, the parties had relied on
the same in good faith, and the farmer-beneficiaries should not be made to
suffer for the procedural lapse of the DAR.
As has been previously narrated under
G.R. No. 167845, the PARAD issued on
The PARAD, in an Order dated
1) The
decision dated
2)
The
motion for reconsideration was filed on
3)
The
denial of the motion for reconsideration was received by appellant counsel on
4)
The
notice of appeal was filed by appellant counsel on
Consequently, the PARAD dismissed the
Notice of Appeal of DAMBA-NFSW.
DAMBA-NFSW filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal of its
Notice of Appeal, but said Motion was denied by the PARAD in an Order dated
DAMBA-NFSW subsequently filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75952. DAMBA-NFSW presented in this Petition
substantially the same averments and arguments as those in its Petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72198, with a closely identical prayer that sought: (1) the
immediate issuance of a TRO to enjoin the PARAD from implementing the Orders
dated 27 February 2002 and 26 July 2002; and (2) after due proceedings, the
nullification of the assailed PARAD Orders and the issuance of a new Order
commanding the PARAD to transmit the records in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 to
the DARAB for the appeal of DAMBA-NFSW.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision[50]
dated
In a Resolution dated
In this Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 169163, DAMBA-NFSW asserts that it had no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy from the PARAD Orders dated 27 February 2002 and 26 July 2002, except the filing before the Court of Appeals of a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the PARAD is not one of the grounds recognized in the
1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure for filing an appeal before the DARAB. Granting arguendo
that the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 75952 was prematurely filed, still, the
Court of Appeals should have relaxed the application of procedural rules in
view of the exceptional circumstances of the case.
DAMBA-NFSW prays that the
Court reverse, annul, and set aside the 28 February 2005 Decision and 3 August
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75952; and direct the
PARAD to give due course to the Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal of
DAMBA-NFSW.
In a Resolution dated
All seven Petitions, i.e.,
G.R. No. 167540, No. 167543, No. 149548, No. 179650, No. 167505, No. 167845,
and No. 169163, being related, were eventually consolidated for uniformity and
consistency of rulings. They were
referred to the Court en banc and set
for oral arguments on
Other
than filing their Petitions for Intervention, the Sangguniang Bayan and ABC of
Nasugbu, no longer participated in the proceedings before this Court, despite
due notice. They did not appear during
the oral arguments or submitted their Memoranda. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion
to allow or disallow the intervention of a third party to the suit, should
choose the latter, it being evident in the non-participation of the Sangguniang
Bayan and ABC of Nasugbu that they are no longer interested to pursue their
Petitions-in-Intervention in G.R. No. 167540 and No. 167543.
II
ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION
The fundamental issues to be resolved
by this Court are the following:
(1) Whether
all parcels of land located in the municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas, had been
reclassified for non-agricultural uses by virtue of Presidential Proclamation
No. 1520, thus, exempting the same, including Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and
Palico, owned by Roxas & Co., from CARP coverage;
(2) Whether
certain parcels of land located in Hacienda Palico, Nasugbu, Batangas, owned by
Roxas & Co., had been reclassified for non-agricultural uses by virtue of
the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, thus, exempting
the same from CARP coverage;
(3) Whether
Roxas & Co. can seek the cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 despite the 17
December 1999 Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127873, Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals; and if said issue is answered
in the affirmative, whether the appeal to the DARAB by DAMBA-NFSW of the
partial and complete cancellations of CLOA No. 6654 ordered by the PARAD should
be given due course; and
(4) Whether
Roxas &
III
THE RULING OF THIS COURT
A. CARP Exemption of the Three Haciendas
based on Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 (G.R. No.
167540 and No. 167543)
In DAR Administrative Case
No. A-9999-084-00, Roxas &
CARL, in
general, covers all public and private agricultural lands. Section 3(c) of the CARL defines an
agricultural land as land devoted to agricultural activity[51]
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial
land.
The
approval or disapproval of the conversion of agricultural lands for
non-agricultural uses shall be subject to the exclusive authority of the DAR.[52] However, according to DOJ Opinion No. 44,
series of 1990, the DAR may only exercise its authority to approve conversion
of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses from the date of effectivity of
the CARL on
Roxas &
Co. claims that their three haciendas, located in Nasugbu, Batangas, are
exempt from CARP coverage because prior to the effectivity of the CARL on 15
June 1988, the whole Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas, together with the
Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite, were declared a tourist
zone and, thus, reclassified for non-agricultural uses by virtue of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, issued on 28 November 1975. In other words, Roxas & Co. asserts that
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 automatically reclassified all the lands in
the three Municipalities for non-agricultural uses, with the only exception of
military reservations within the zone.
On the
other hand, KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW, together with the DAR, aver that there has
been no automatic reclassification of the entire Nasugbu by Presidential
Proclamation No. 1520. The PTA still
needs to identify the specific areas within the municipalities that will be
developed for tourism purposes.
I agree
with Roxas & Co.
A careful
scrutiny of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 reveals that the declaration of
the three Municipalities as a tourist zone consequentially translates to the
classification of all lands therein to tourism and, therefore, non-agricultural
uses.
The full
text of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 is presented below:
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 1520
DECLARING
THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND
WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas have potential tourism value after being developed into resort complexes for the foreign and domestic market; and
WHEREAS, it is necessary to conduct the necessary studies and to segregate specific geographic areas for concentrated efforts of both the government and private sectors in developing their tourism potential;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby declare the area comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a tourist zone under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) pursuant to Section 5 (D) of P.D. 564.
The PTA shall identify well-defined geographic areas within the zone with potential tourism value, wherein optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as well as existing facilities and concentration of efforts and limited resources of both government and private sector may be affected and realized in order to generate foreign exchange as well as other tourist receipts.
Any duly established military reservation existing within the zone shall be excluded from this proclamation.
All proclamation, decrees or executive orders inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked or modified accordingly.
Right after the enacting clause[54] is the very purpose of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, as it is also stated in its title: the declaration by former President Marcos of “the area comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas Province as a tourist zone under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).”
There is no mistaking the
plain and clear intent of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. It declares the whole of the Municipalities
of Maragondon and
There is
nothing in Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 to support the position of
KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW, and DAR, that the tourist zone should be limited to the
specific areas within the three Municipalities identified by the PTA to have
potential tourism value. In such a case,
there could not just be one tourism zone, but several tourism zones. Even a cursory reading of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1520 readily reveals that it never used the plural term
“tourism zones.” Notice should also be
given to the fact that according to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, PTA is to
identify “well-defined geographic areas within
the zone;” which connotes that the well-defined geographic areas, which PTA
must identify, is different from, and are actually smaller areas that are
supposed to be part of, the tourist zone.
What is the sense
of first declaring the larger area as a tourist zone, and only thereafter
identifying certain well-defined areas with potential tourism value within the
zone?
The only rationale behind
the directive in the fourth paragraph of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520,
for PTA to identify such well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism
value, is explained in the very same paragraph.
It is so that the “optimum use of natural assets and attractions, as
well as existing facilities and concentration of efforts and limited resources
of both government and private sector may be affected and realized in order to
generate foreign exchange as well as other tourist receipts.” Otherwise and more simply stated, PTA is to
identify the well-defined geographic areas where the facilities, efforts, and
limited resources of the Government and the private sector may be concentrated,
focused, and optimized, so as to generate profit from tourism. These areas will only enjoy priority, but it
does not mean that all other areas in Maragondon,
Basic is the rule of statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the Court is left with no alternative but to apply the same according to its clear language. There cannot be any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unambiguous language of the law. This Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Where a requirement or condition is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the judiciary. It must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.[55]
The reference of KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW, and DAR to the “Whereas clauses” or the preamble of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 does little to support their case. First, the preamble is not an essential part of a statute. Hence, where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. Nor can a preamble be used as basis for giving a statute a meaning not apparent on its face.[56] It neither enlarges nor confers powers.[57] Second, the preamble is not really inconsistent with the body of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. The certain geographic areas with potential tourism value which needed to be segregated, according to the preamble; are the same well-defined geographic areas with potential tourism value that the PTA must identify, per the directive in the body of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. And, there is still nothing in the preamble to establish that the intent of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 is to make only such geographic areas, rather than the whole of the three Municipalities, the tourist zone.
Furthermore, Presidential
Proclamation No. 1520 has only one express exclusion from its coverage, i.e., duly established military
reservation existing within the zone.
Such a military reservation is to remain as such and not to be developed
for tourism purposes. This also means
that the rest of the lands in Maragondon,
A closer scrutiny of the
Letter of Instructions No. 352, issued by former President Marcos on
Letter of Instructions
No. 352 fully reads:
TO: All Concerned
The Director of Lands shall survey and
prepare a technical description of the tourist zone, which survey and technical description shall be
considered an integral part of Proclamation No. 1520 dated
The Philippine Tourism Authority shall formulate a development plan, in coordination with the Department of Tourism and other government agencies and the local governments exercising political jurisdiction, or preparing sectoral plans, over the area; formulate and implement zoning regulations, including building codes and other restrictions as may be necessary within a tourist zone to control its orderly development; and enforce adherence to the approved zone development plan, subject to the penalties provided in Sec. 39 of P.D. 564.
The Philippine Tourism Authority shall submit the zone development plan through the Department of Tourism and the National Economic & Development Authority to the President for review and approval before the same is enforced and/or implemented.
Department Heads and heads of Government-owned and controlled corporations, Government agencies and instrumentalities directed to cooperate with and assist the Philippine Tourism Authority in making comprehensive technical, financial, market, socio-economic, regional development and other studies of the Tourist Zone within the limits of their capability and authority. (Emphases ours.)
The very first sentence of the first
paragraph of Letter of Instructions No. 352 mandates the Director of Lands to
survey and prepare a technical description of the tourist zone, which it
specifically identified as the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu Tourist Zone. It must be stressed that the directive here
is addressed to the Director of Lands, not the PTA; and it is to survey and
prepare a technical description of the whole zone, not just well-defined
geographical areas within the zone with potential tourism value.
What the second and third paragraphs
of Letter of Instructions No. 352 essentially require the PTA to do is to
formulate and submit a zone development plan.
The zone, which such development plan shall cover, is none other than
the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu Tourist Zone, consistent with the first
paragraph of the said letter of instructions.
The fourth paragraph of Letter of
Instructions No. 352 affirms the authority and control of the PTA over the
entire tourist zone, explicitly directing “Department Heads and heads of
Government-owned and controlled corporations, Government agencies and
instrumentalities” to cooperate with and assist the PTA in the development of
the zone.
Letter of Instructions No.
352 is obviously concerned with the development of the whole Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu
Tourist Zone, there being no mention at all of well-defined geographic areas
with potential tourism value. The
identification and segregation of such geographic areas – which shall be the
priority, but not the only, areas for tourism development – can already be
included by the PTA in the zone development plan which it is required by Letter
of Instructions No. 352 to prepare and submit to the President, through the
DOT.
The clear and unambiguous
words of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, establish that the entire
Municipalities of Maragondon,
Closely similar to the
circumstances of the present Petitions are the cases of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[59]
and NHA v. Allarde.[60] In Natalia
Realty, Inc. v. DAR, Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, which was issued
on
KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW and
DAR attempt to bring the Petitions at bar out of the ambit of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde by arguing that Presidential
Proclamations No. 1637 and No. 843 identified the parcels of land in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde, respectively, by their
technical descriptions; and in contrast, Presidential Proclamation No. 1520
generally declares the Municipalities of Maragondon, Ternate, and Cavite, as a
tourist zone, leaving it to the PTA to identify and delineate the specific
areas with potential tourism value.
The foregoing argument is
hardly persuasive.
Yet again, a more
thorough review of the two judicial precedents will disclose that only
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 in Natalia
Realty, Inc. v. DAR strictly provided a technical description of the
parcels of land it added to the townsite reservation. The technical description in Presidential
Proclamation No. 843 in NHA v. Allarde
covers the entire Tala Estate, but the parcels of land subject matter of the
case, which were reserved for housing and resettlement sites, were described no
more particularly than the “remaining five hundred ninety eight (598) hectares”
after prior allocation of the other areas of the Estate for the leprosarium and
settlement site of the hansenites and their families, National Housing
Corporation plant, civic center, and welfare projects of the Department of
Social Welfare. Indeed, Presidential
Proclamation No. 843 includes a statement that the “[m]ore precise identities
of the parcels of land allocated above will be made after a final survey shall
have been completed, x x x”
More importantly, Letter of Instructions No. 352, in
furtherance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, mandates the Director of
Lands to survey and prepare the technical description of the
Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu Tourist Zone, “which survey and technical description shall be considered an integral part of
Proclamation No. 1520 dated
Failure of the Director of Lands to
provide the technical description of the Maragondon-Ternate-Nasugbu Tourist
Zone should not affect the effectivity of Presidential Proclamation No.
1520. Letter of Instructions No. 352
only said that the technical description of the Tourist Zone shall form part of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, but it did not say that the lack of the
former shall suspend the effectivity of the latter. And even
absent the technical description of the tourist zone, it is undisputed that it
includes the whole
KAMAHARI, DAMBA-NFSW, and
DAR, in addition, call attention to the definition of reclassification as the
act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural
uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial.[61] They contend that the lands involved in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde were reserved for
specific non-agricultural uses, unlike in Presidential Proclamation No. 1520
which merely declared the three Municipalities a tourist zone.
KAMAHARI,
DAMBA-NFSW, and DAR fail to understand that the essential point in
reclassification is that agricultural lands are henceforth to be specifically
utilized for non-agricultural uses,
regardless of whether such uses be residential, industrial, or commercial. When parcels of land are declared to be in a
tourist zone, they are already specially devoted to tourism purposes, which
unmistakably constitute non-agricultural, rather than agricultural, uses.
Lands
devoted to agricultural
uses are subject to CARP, and owners of such lands need to consider the rights
of tenants, farmers, and farmworkers.
These are burdens not imposed upon owners of lands devoted to
non-agricultural uses. As these cases
demonstrate, the existence of agricultural lands are incompatible with tourism
development, for it limits and delays the latter, which may ultimately
discourage investors; thus, defeating the purpose for establishing a tourist
zone.
Now as to whether
particular parcels of land within the tourist zone are to be used as
residential, industrial, or commercial (but still in furtherance of tourism
purposes), it can be subsequently determined under the zone development plan
which, according to Letter of Instructions No.
352, the PTA must formulate in coordination with the DOT, LGUs, and
other government agencies.
While Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR and NHA v. Allarde may be applied as
judicial precedents in this case, the same cannot be said for DAR v. Franco.[62]
DAR v. Franco involved Presidential Proclamation No. 2052 that
declares as a tourist zone the Barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and Sirao,
including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of
The Court pronounced in DAR v. Franco that:
A separate opinion cannot be a proper subject of an
appeal. More so in this case where what was appealed in the
appellate court was a one-sentence handwritten note of a DARAB member. It is
not even the opinion of the DARAB but is merely the personal view of a DARAB
member. The appellate court should have dismissed the petition which
appealed not the DARAB decision itself but a mere note of a DARAB member which
is not part of the DARAB decision. As held in Bernas v. Court of Appeals, “courts of justice have no
jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue and that a judgment
going outside the issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the
parties were not heard is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and
invalid.”
Indeed, the ruling of the appellate court that private petitioners have
no right to disturbance compensation because they have not proven that they are
tenants of Franco’s land went beyond the DARAB decision being appealed. The
determination of entitlement to disturbance compensation is still premature at
this stage since this case originally involved only the issue of nullity of the
Provisional Lease Rental Orders. Further, it is the DAR that can best
determine and identify the legitimate tenants who have a right to disturbance
compensation.
The Court then proceeded to mention that the DAR
Secretary issued an Order on 30 August 1994, finding that “the specific intent
of Proclamation No. 2052 is the identification of areas for tourism with the
implication that the other areas within the proclamation but no longer
necessary for tourism development as determined by the PTA, in this case, could
be transferred for agrarian reform purposes to the DAR.” After mention of the DAR Secretary’s Order,
the Court wrote:
Thus, the
DAR Regional Office VII, in coordination with the Philippine Tourism Authority,
has to determine precisely which areas are for tourism development and excluded
from the
Apparently, the Court, in
the first sentence in the afore-quoted paragraph from Franco, was not making a ruling, but only taking note of the
contents of the
An obiter dictum has been defined as an
opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary
to the decision of the case before it.
It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision
upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally,
and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily
involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of
illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.[63]
The DAR objects to the
mention by Roxas & Co. of the neighboring hacienda in Nasugbu, owned
by the Group Developers and Financiers, Inc. (GDFI), which has not been
subjected to CARP and is already being developed into a resort complex. The DAR explains that Roxas & Co. cannot
claim unequal protection of the law since it is not similarly situated as
GDFI. The hacienda of GDFI was
covered by an application for conversion, not exemption, and it was approved by
the DAR Secretary way back on
Still, the case of GDFI
was not only brought up to support the argument that Presidential Proclamation
No. 1520 already reclassified all agricultural lands in Nasugbu to
non-agricultural uses; but also to hold the DAR to its finding that the hacienda
of GDFI is unsuitable for agricultural purposes because of soil and topographical characteristics.[64] If such is the condition of the hacienda
of GDFI, then how far different can it be from those of the adjoining Haciendas
Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico of Roxas & Co.? Nevertheless, the actual condition of the
three haciendas is already immaterial in light of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1520, which declared the whole of Nasugbu part of a tourist
zone, consequently, reclassifying all agricultural lands therein, whether
actually suited for agriculture or not, to non-agricultural uses.
There is no dispute that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 has the force and effect of law, since "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the former President (Ferdinand E. Marcos) are part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and effective, unless modified, revoked or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the President."[65]
It cannot be said that the CARL repealed Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, whether expressly or impliedly.
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 is not among the laws expressly repealed by the CARL in the latter’s Section 76:
Section 76. Repealing Clause. – Section 35 of
Republic Act No. 3844, Presidential Decree No. 316, the last two paragraphs of
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, Presidential Decree No. 1038, and all
other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, issuances or
parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.
Neither can it be said that the CARL impliedly
repealed Presidential Proclamation No. 1520.
As a rule, repeal by implication is frowned upon, unless there is clear
showing that the later statute is so inconsistent and repugnant to the existing
law that they cannot be reconciled and made to stand together.[66] The CARL is not inconsistent with or
repugnant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520. In truth, there is no point at which the two
laws pertain to the same thing for them to be in conflict with each other. Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 was issued
on
Irrefragably, a finding
that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, in declaring the whole of Nasugbu part
of a tourist zone, had also reclassified all of the agricultural lands therein
to non-agricultural uses, will have significant impact on the resolution of the
other five Petitions at bar.
B. CARP Exemption of Certain
Lots in Hacienda Palico, based on Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4,
series of 1982 (G.R. No. 149548, No. 179650, and No.
167505)
Prior to the filing of
its application for exemption of the three haciendas from CARP Coverage
based on Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, Roxas & Co. had already filed
applications for exemption of certain lots, all located within Hacienda Palico:
(1) DAR Administrative Case
No. A-9999-142-97 covered six lots, with an aggregate
area of 51.54 hectares, now the subject of both G.R. No. 149548 and No. 179650;
and (2) DAR Administrative Case
No. A-9999-008-98 covered nine lots, with an
aggregate area of 45.977 hectares, now the subject of G.R. No. 167505. Roxas & Co. filed the applications under
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, based on the claim that said
lots have been reclassified to non-agricultural uses by virtue of Nasugbu
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, enacted by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu
on 18 April 1982, and approved by the HSRC, now HLURB, under Resolution No. 123,
dated 4 May 1983.
The Petitions of
DAMBA-NFSW in G.R. No. 179650 and No. 167505 separately assail the grant by the
DAR Secretary of the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co. in DAR
Administrative Cases No.
A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98,
respectively, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Without
directly challenging the validity of Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance, No. 4,
series of 1982, which admittedly enjoys the presumption of validity, DAMBA-NFSW
disputes instead the grant of the two applications for exemption on the ground
that the provisions of said Municipal Zoning Ordinance were “too vague” to
support the claim of Roxas & Co. that its lots are within the
non-agricultural zones. DAMBA-NFSW also
points out that since the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of
1982, failed to specify the area size covered by the residential, industrial,
and commercial zones, it is difficult to determine whether the lots of Roxas
& Co. could actually be found therein.
DAMBA-NFSW finally questions the lack of notice to its members of the
filing by Roxas & Co. of the applications for exemption in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98.
I reiterate my stance in G.R. No.
167540 and No. 167543 that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, issued on
The lots involved in G.R. No. 179650
and No. 167505, being undisputedly located within Hacienda Palico in Nasugbu,
were already reclassified to non-agricultural uses by Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 upon its issuance on
That a court will not sit for the
purpose of trying moot cases and spend its time in deciding questions the
resolution of which can not in any way affect the rights of the person or
persons presenting them is well settled. Where the issues have become
moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the
resolution of the same of no practical use or value.[68]
As for the Petition of
Roxas & Co. in G.R. No. 149548, its resolution relies on the outcome of the
Petitions in G.R. No. 167845 and No. 169163, involving the partial and complete
cancellations of CLOA No. 6654.
To recall, the Court of
Appeals, in its 30 May 2001 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 63146, did not divest
Roxas & Co. of the latter’s right to present additional evidence before the
DAR in support of its claim in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-142-97, that the six lots in Hacienda Palico, with an aggregate
area of 51.54 hectares, are exempt from CARP coverage pursuant to the Nasugbu
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982. At the same time, in view of the ruling of
this Court in Roxas & Co. v. Court of
Appeals, recognizing the rights of farmer-beneficiaries to possess and till
the parcels of land awarded to them under CLOA No. 6654, the appellate court
allowed the DAR to proceed with installing the farmer-beneficiaries on the six
lots, without prejudice to the final determination of the right of Roxas &
Co. over the said properties. Thus, in
its Petition in G.R. No. 149548, Roxas & Co. is appealing the alleged
premature installation of the farmer-beneficiaries on the six lots.
Vital herein is the
ruling of the Court in Roxas & Co. v.
Court of Appeals, wherein it refused to short-circuit the administrative
process and did not nullify the CLOAs issued to the farmer-beneficiaries. It gave the DAR a chance to correct its
procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. The Court took note that since 1993 until the
present, the farmer-beneficiaries have been cultivating their lands; and it
goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive
these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. The Court, though, also stated that the
farmer-beneficiaries should hold the property in trust for the rightful owner
of the land.
Stated otherwise, the
Court, in Roxas & Co. v. Court of
Appeals, left the matter of cancellation of the CLOAs issued to
farmer-beneficiaries to the determination by the DAR in the proper
administrative proceedings. Unless and
until such CLOAs are cancelled, the farmer-beneficiaries have a right to the
possession of the parcels of land covered by said certificates.
The six lots subject of
G.R. No. 149548 (as well as G.R. No. 179650) are covered by CLOA No. 6654. As a result, the question of the right of the
farmer-beneficiaries to the possession of said six lots in G.R. No. 149548 is
inextricably entwined with the issues on the partial and complete cancellations
of CLOA No. 6654 raised in G.R. No. 167845 and No. 169163.
C. Petitions for Partial and Complete
Cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 (G.R. No. 167845 and
No. 169163)
DAMBA-NFSW maintains that the petitions of Roxas & Co.
in DARAB Cases No.
R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 and No.
401-239-2001, for the partial and complete
cancellations, respectively, of CLOA No. 6654, are in violation of the ruling
of the Court in Roxas & Co. v. Court
of Appeals that the issued CLOAs “cannot and should not be cancelled.” It anchors its argument on the penultimate
paragraph in the
Finally, we stress that the
failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the
acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the
CLOA’s already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the
administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to
correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda
Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993.92 Since
then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands.93 It
goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive
these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the
property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.
DAMBA-NFSW evidently misunderstood the afore-quoted
paragraph in Roxas & Co. v. Court of
Appeals. There is nothing therein
categorically prohibiting the cancellation of the CLOAs issued to the
farmer-beneficiaries. What the Court
plainly said was that despite its finding that the DAR failed to comply with
due process in the acquisition proceedings, the Court still had no power to
nullify the CLOAs because such matter lies within the primary jurisdiction of
the DAR. Thus, the DARAB, which has
exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for cancellation of CLOAs,
cannot be precluded from acting on and granting such petitions filed by Roxas
& Co.
The farmer-beneficiaries did not acquire vested rights over
the lands covered by their CLOAs, by virtue of Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals. The Court only recognized in said case their
rights to continue to possess and till the parcels of land covered by their
CLOAs until the DAR has undertaken proper acquisition proceedings. But the Court, in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, did not (1) guarantee the success of the acquisition proceedings
over all the lands covered by the CLOAs; (2) affirm the validity of the CLOAs
and the absolute right of the farmer-beneficiaries thereunder; nor (3) discount
the possibility that in the course of the acquisition proceedings, the DAR
would decide to exempt all or certain parcels of land from CARP coverage,
cancel some or all of the CLOAs, or disqualify some or all of the
farmer-beneficiaries. The Court merely
left all of these matters to the determination of the DAR, which has primary
jurisdiction over the same.
In her
The
reglementary periods for the filing of a motion for reconsideration and the
succeeding appeal are governed by Section 12 of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, which stated:
Section 12.
Motion for Reconsideration. –
Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the order, resolution or
decision of the Board or Adjudicator, a party may file a motion for
reconsideration of such order or decision , together with proof of service of
one (1) copy thereof upon the adverse party.
Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed a party which
shall be based on the ground that: (a) the findings of fact in the said
decision, order or resolution was not supported by substantial evidence, or (b)
the conclusions stated therein are against the law or jurisprudence.
The
filing of a motion for reconsideration shall suspend the running of the period
within (which) the appeal must be perfected.
If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the
right of perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal,
reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If
the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to
perfect his appeal.
DAMBA-NFSW
received both the 21 May 2001 Joint Order in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to
No. R-401-005-2001 and
Even conceding that the said Motions
for Reconsideration were filed on
In Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,[69]
this Court declared that:
The filing of a notice of appeal is no idle ceremony. Its office is to elevate the case on appeal to DARAB without which appellate jurisdiction is not conferred. Neither PARAD nor DARAB is permitted to enlarge the constricted manner by which an appeal is perfected. Liberal construction of DARAB rules is unavailable to produce the effect of a perfected appeal.
Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal as required by the Rules had the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory. This doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice (Filcon Manufacturing Corp. v. NLRC, 199 SCRA 814). And nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable (Nuñal v. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 26; Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 250). Failure to meet the requirements of an appeal deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain any appeal. This principle applies to judgments of courts and of quasi-judicial agencies (Vega v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 89 SCRA 140).
Since the decision of the PARAD had become final and executory, the same could no longer be altered, much less, reversed by the DARAB. Hence, the DARAB had no appellate jurisdiction over the petitioner’s appeal. A substantial modification of a decision of a quasi-judicial agency which had become final and executory is utterly void.
The
counsel for DAMBA-NFSW admits that she had misread the rules on the
reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal
before the DARAB, but she pleads for the relaxation of technical rules so as to
prevent the miscarriage of justice for the hundreds of farmer-beneficiaries of
CLOA No. 6654 and their families.
While it may be acknowledged that
there are exceptional circumstances warranting the acceptance of the appeal
despite its late filing,[70]
none exists at the case at bar. Quite
beyond cavil, the delay incurred by the counsel of DAMBA-NFSW in filing the
Notice of Appeal, totaling 14 days, was simply inexcusable. This Court had already held that “(a)n
erroneous application of the law or rules is not excusable error.”[71]
There is also little merit
to the appeals of DAMBA-NFSW in both DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No.
R-401-005-2001 (G.R. No. 167845) and DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 (G.R. No. 169163) as to warrant being given due course,
despite their belated filing.
DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No.
R-401-005-2001, in particular, involve the applications for partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 as regards three
lots. The basis for said application is
the final and executory Decision
dated 2 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, which
adjudged the three lots to be exempt from CARP coverage, having been
reclassified by the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982,
to residential use, and which should have been excluded from CLOA No.
6654.
Nothing is more
settled in law than that when a final judgment is executory, it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and
regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court
rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The doctrine is founded on considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments must become final at some definite point in time.[72]
Litigation must
at some time be terminated, even at the risk of occasional errors. Public policy dictates that once a judgment
becomes final, executory and unappealable, the prevailing party should not be
denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party. Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a
judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable
controversies with finality.[73]
Apparent from the foregoing are the
two-fold purposes for the doctrine of the immutability and inalterability of a
final judgment: first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice
and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business;
and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Obviously, the first purpose is in line with
the dictum that justice delayed is justice denied. But said dictum presupposes
that the court properly appreciates the facts and the applicable law to arrive
at a judicious decision. The end should
always be the meting out of justice. As
to the second purpose, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant
must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. It must be adjudicated properly and
seasonably to better serve the ends of justice and to place everything in
proper perspective. In the process, the possibility that errors may be
committed in the rendition of a decision cannot be discounted.[74]
The only recognized exceptions to the foregoing doctrine are the
corrections of clerical errors or the making of the so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no
prejudice to any party, and, where the judgment is void.[75] Void judgments may be classified into two
groups: those rendered by a court without jurisdiction to do so and those
obtained by fraud or collusion.[76] None of these exceptions can be applied to
the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
36299.
It can be said herein that the
questions relating to the exemption of the three lots from CARP coverage and
their exclusion from CLOA No. 6654 had been settled with finality by the Court
of Appeals in its
On the other hand, in DARAB Case No.
401-239-2001, the PARAD ordered the complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654
after finding technical defects in the subdivision survey used for the said
certificate, which rendered the survey null.
These technical defects became apparent only after the Court of Appeals,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, ordered the exemption from CARP coverage of the three
lots and their exclusion from CLOA No. 6654.
When Hacienda Palico was compulsorily
placed under the CARP, a segregation and subdivision survey was conducted by
Engr. Miguel V. Pangilinan (Pangilinan) on 22 April to
Moreover, my resolution of the Petitions in G.R. No. 167540
and No. 167543 already renders nugatory the giving of due course to the appeals
of DAMBA-NFSW to the DARAB of the partial and complete cancellations of CLOA
No. 6654 by the PARAD.
As previously established herein, Haciendas Caylaway,
Banilad, and Palico are exempt from CARP coverage, under DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, series of 1994, since Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 had
already declared the whole of Nasugbu as part of a tourist zone and
reclassified all agricultural lands therein to non-agricultural uses, long
before the effectivity of the CARL.
Being exempt from CARP coverage, no CLOAs could have been validly issued
by the DAR to farmer-beneficiaries over the parcels of land in the three haciendas. Even if the appeals of DAMBA-NFSW in DARAB Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No.
R-401-005-2001 (G.R. No. 167845) and DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 (G.R. No. 169163) are given due course before the DARAB, the
inescapable fate of CLOA No. 6654 is its complete cancellation because the land
it covers is actually exempt from CARP coverage.
With the complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, on the
basis that the parcels of land covered thereby are exempt from CARP coverage,
then there is no more legal obstacle to Roxas & Co., as the rightful owner,
from recovering title and possession to the said properties, including the six
lots subject of G.R. No. 149548, from the farmer-beneficiaries who have
possessed and tilled the same only in trust (save only for the payment of
appropriate disturbance compensation, as will be subsequently discussed
herein). Hence, the Petition of Roxas
& Co. in G.R. No. 149548 – seeking an injunction against the installation
by the DAR of the farmer-beneficiaries on the six lots until CLOA No. 6654
covering the said properties is cancelled – has been rendered moot and
academic.
D. Forum Shopping
All throughout the seven
Petitions presently before this Court, there is the repeated allegation by
DAMBA-NFSW that Roxas & Co. committed forum-shopping by the institution of
several cases before the DAR Secretary, DARAB, and the courts.
There is forum-shopping
when as a result of an adverse decision in one forum or, it may be added, in
anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum
through means other than appeal or certiorari,
raising identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Forum-shopping exists when two or more
actions involve the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances; and
raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Yet another indication is when the elements
of litis pendencia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.
The test is whether in the two or more pending cases there is an
identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of action, and (c) reliefs
sought.
After a meticulous study
of the all the instant Petitions, I find that there has been no forum-shopping
on the part of Roxas & Co., there being substantial differences in the
cases it instituted. For the sake of
brevity, I have summed up, in table form, the various cases filed by Roxas
& Co. as regards its landholdings in Nasugbu:
|
Case |
Original Forum |
Subject Matter |
Nature |
|
CA-G.R. SP No.
32484 (Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals) |
Court
of Appeals |
Haciendas
Caylaway, Banilad, Palico |
Petition
for Prohibition and Mandamus, seeking to prevent the DAR from further
proceedings to acquire the three haciendas and compel the DAR to
approve its application for conversion |
|
DAR Admin. Case
No. A-9999-084-00 (G.R.
No. 167540) |
DAR
Regional Office |
Haciendas
Caylaway, Banilad, Palico |
Application
for exemption from CARP coverage based on Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 |
|
DAR Admin. Case
No. A-9999-142-97 (G.R.
No. 149548 and No. 179650) |
DAR
Regional Office |
Six
lots, measuring 51.5472 hectares, part of Hacienda Palico |
Application
for exemption from CARP coverage based on Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance
No. 4, series of 1982 |
|
G.R.
No. 149548 |
Supreme
Court |
Six
lots, measuring 51.5472 hectares, part of Hacienda Palico |
Petition
for Review assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
63146 allowing DAR to install the farmer-beneficiaries on the six lots, while
Roxas & Co. is presenting additional evidence in DAR Admin. Case No. A-9999-142-97 |
|
DAR Admin. Case No. A-9999-008-98. (G.R.
No. 167505) |
DAR
Regional Office |
Nine
lots, measuring 45.977 hectares, part of Hacienda Palico |
Application
for exemption from CARP coverage based on Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance
No. 4, series of 1982 |
|
Unable
to determine docket no. from the records (CA-G.R.
SP No. 36299) |
DAR
Regional Office |
Three
lots, measuring 103.1436, part of Hacienda Palico and covered by CLOA No.
6654 |
Protest
seeking the exclusion of the three lots from CLOA No. 6654, citing the
exemption thereof from CARP Coverage by virtue of Nasugbu Municipal Zoning
Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982 |
|
DARAB Cases No.
R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 (G.R. No. 167845) |
DARAB |
Three
lots, subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 36299, covered by CLOA No. 6654 |
Petition
for partial cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, insofar as the three lots are
concerned, given the final and executory judgment of the Court of appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 36299 declaring said property exempt from CARP coverage |
|
DARAB Case No.
401-239-2001 (G.R.
No. 169163) |
DARAB |
The
remaining 410.8327 hectares,
covered by CLOA No. 6654 |
Petition
for total or complete cancellation of CLOA No. 6654 for being null and void
given the technical defects
in the survey plan on which said certificate was based |
There is no basis then for the Court to dismiss any of the
foregoing cases on the ground of forum-shopping by Roxas & Co.
It is worthy to note that the
seemingly repetitive filing of administrative cases by Roxas & Co. may
actually be due to its strict compliance with DAR rules. Even though they may involve the very same
landholdings, applications for exemption from CARP coverage and petitions for
cancellation of CLOAs fall within the jurisdictions of separate DAR offices:
the Office of the DAR Secretary for the former, and the DARAB for the
latter.
The DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction
over all matters involving the administrative implementation of the CARL and
other agrarian reform laws, and what would later be referred to as Agrarian Law
Implementation (ALI) cases.[77] Applications for exemptions fall under such
cases. According to DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, series of 1994, applications for exemptions shall be filed with
the DAR Regional Office where the subject parcel of land is located, but only
the DAR Secretary shall sign the Order granting or denying the exemption.
On the other hand, petitions for
cancellation of issued CLOAs are considered agrarian reform disputes,[78]
since they relate to terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landlord to agrarian reform beneficiaries, the exclusive original jurisdiction
over which is vested with the DARAB.[79] DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of
1994, provides that the land with issued CLOAs found to be exempt from CARP
coverage may be cancelled only upon the application of the landowner with the
DARAB.
The foregoing distinction
was the reason why the DAR Secretary included in the dispositive of his Orders
dated
E. Supervening Events
The DAR, in its
Memorandum, brought to the attention of this Court the following supervening
events which transpired during the pendency of the present Petitions:
First, the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Nasugbu, Batangas has completed the formulation of its Comprehensive Land Use
Plan and Municipal Zoning Ordinance of 2002 which was approved by the HLURB in
2005.
Based on the aforestated
documents, the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator/Zoning
Administrator of Nasugbu, Batangas certified that Roxas’ properties are within
the “Inland Mixed-Use District” of the Comprehensive Land Use Plan.
Second, in Executive Order No.
647 dated
Section 2. Creation of a Special Tourism Zone. – Areas
included in the Nasugbu Tourism Development Plan prepared by the
Third, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nasugbu caused the preparation and approved the Nasugbu Tourism Development
Plan which covered thirty-one (31) out of the total forty-two (42) barangays in
the
x x x x
At present, Congress has enacted
Republic Act No. 9593, otherwise known as “The Tourism Act of 2009.” It provides that “tourism enterprise zones”
shall only be designated after a development plan is approved by Tourism
Infrastructure and Enterprise Zone Authority (TIEZA) formerly Philippine
Tourism Authority and the local government unit concerned through a
resolution. It likewise declared that
the lands identified as part of a tourism zone shall qualify for exemption from
coverage of RA 6557 of the Agrarian Reform Law.
Now the Court is faced
with the question of what is the effect of the afore-mentioned supervening
events to the Petitions at bar?
I answer, none.
The Applications for
Exemption of Roxas & Co. had been filed pursuant to DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, series of 1994, which implements DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of
1990. According to said administrative
order, the DAR may only exercise its authority to approve conversion of
agricultural land to non-agricultural uses from the date of effectivity of the
CARL on
Since all the supervening
events recited by the DAR in its Memorandum took place after
F. Final Considerations
KAMAHARI and
DAMBA-NFSW submits that for the Court to rule that Presidential Proclamation
No. 1520, in declaring Maragondon,
(a) Proclamation No. 1653 (issued
(b) Proclamation No. 1801 (issued on November 10, 1070 [sic]) declared the whole islands,
coves and peninsula – including Camiguin,
Puerto Princesa, Siquijor, Panglao Islan in Bohol – as tourist zones
because of these areas’ natural beauty and potentials for aquatic spots (sic),
tourism, and the interest of marine life preservation.
(c) Proclamation No. 2052 (issued on January 30, 1981), declared four
whole barangay of Sibugay, Malubog,
Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu and the
municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete in the Province of Cebu as tourist
zones because “certain areas” within the zone have potential tourism value
after being developed into resort complexes for the foreign and domestic
market;
(d) Proclamation No. 2067 (issued on March 11, 1981), declared the whole province of Bataan as a tourist
zone because there is a need to establish an export processing zone in
Mariveles, as one would find Dambanang Kagitingan therein, and because Bataan
has “untapped scenic and beautiful spots with tourism potential”; and
(e) Republic
Act No. 8022 (May 25, 1995) declared the municipalities of Boac, Buenavist (sic)
and Torrijos in the
KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW alleged that the DAR had already
issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries thousands of CLOAs covering
parcels of land in the afore-mentioned tourist zones, which would have to be
cancelled.
Firstly, while I
am aware of the previously-issued CLOAs and the upheaval my position on
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 may cause on the CARP, these must not sway
the Court to depart from the plain and obvious meaning of said presidential
proclamation. As one authority on
statutory construction so satisfactorily explained:
Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no
choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. Where the law is clear and free from doubt or
ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. Thus, where what is not clearly provided in
the law is read into the law by construction because it is more logical and
wise, it would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom
of the law, which is judicial legislation.
For whether a statute is wise or expedient is not for the courts to
determine. Courts must administer the
law, not as they think it ought to be but as they find it and without regard to
consequences.[81]
Secondly, to be
entitled to exemption from CARP coverage under DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
series of 1994, the agricultural lands should have been reclassified to
non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL on
Thirdly,
petitions for cancellation of CLOAs are governed by DAR Administrative Order
No. 2, series of 1994. The scope of said
administrative order is defined as follows:
II. Scope
These rules shall apply to
the Registered CLOAs from the time and date of issuance thereof by the DAR up
to the tenth year, when the legal restriction on its conveyance or alienation
of the recipient ARB ends in accordance with Sec. 27, R.A. No. 6657. However, if the ARB concerned has not yet
fully paid the cost of the land or his obligations pertaining to the land in
the case of public lands, beyond the tenth year from the issuance of the CLOA,
then these rules shall continue to apply.
However, if the land has been
acquired under P.D. No. 27 or E.O. No. 228, ownership may be transferred after
full payment of amortization by the ARB.
Insofar as they are applicable,
these rules shall likewise cover patents, EPs and CLOAs issued to settlers in
resettlement areas under the administration or disposition of the Department of
Agrarian Reform.
Based on the foregoing,
no petition for cancellation of CLOA may be filed anymore if 10 years have already passed from the
date of issuance of said certificate by the DAR, unless the beneficiary has not
yet fully paid the cost of the land or the obligations pertaining to the land,
in case of public land. The reason
behind this rule is that the beneficiary may already legally convey or alienate
the land to another person after the expiration of the 10-year period of
restriction, reckoned from the date of issuance of the CLOA covering said
property.
And fourthly, bona fide tenants of the parcels of land
are not to be left empty-handed.
According to Section 36(1) of Republic Act No. 3844,[82]
as amended by Republic Act No. 6389[83]:
Section
36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions – An agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized
by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it
is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years.
The reliance of Roxas & Co. on Bacaling v. Muya[84]
in support of its assertion that farmer-beneficiaries cannot claim disturbance
compensation for lots that are not and have never been available for agrarian
reform, is unavailing. In Bacaling v. Muya, there is an express
finding by the Court that there was no valid agricultural leasehold
relationship.[85] Respondents therein are not agricultural
tenants, and are not entitled to the benefits accorded by agrarian law, among
which, was disturbance compensation.
It is clear in Alarcon
v. Court of Appeals[86]
that agricultural tenants who are dispossessed because of the reclassification
of the landholding is entitled to disturbance compensation. Also, in DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
series of 1994, under which Roxas & Co. filed its application for CARP
exemption, lists among the requirements “[p]roof of payment of disturbance
compensation if the area is being occupied by farmers, x x x” Therefore, Roxas & Co. cannot escape
payment of disturbance compensation to its agricultural tenants who shall be
dispossessed by the reclassification of the three haciendas to
non-agricultural uses; and it cannot claim that it is offering to pay said
tenants disturbance compensation out of pure liberality.
The proposed compensation and accommodation packages of
Roxas & Co. are presented below:
The “beneficiaries” will be
grouped according to: (A) former
tenants, shareholders and leaseholders of ROXAS; (B) Original CLOA holders/awardees who have no contractual
relationship with ROXAS but were merely installed by the DAR in the ROXAS
landholdings; and (C) illegal
settlers and speculators who, without any CLOA, surreptitiously entered and
occupied the subject landholdings and/or may have been assignees of the
original CLOA awardees.
GROUP A
For Group A, disturbance compensation shall be paid to qualified
beneficiaries in accordance with Section 36(1) of R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A.
6389. Group A members shall not be asked
to surrender possession of their awarded lot until and unless disturbance
compensation, in accordance with law, has been paid to them.
Moreover, those who have built
improvements within the residential clusters shall be allowed to own the
lot, not exceeding 100 square meters, upon which the improvement was built, at no cost to them. Any area in excess of 100 square meters shall
be surrendered to ROXAS immediately, subject to the preceding paragraph. Group A members who are within the
residential clusters are given an option to stay at the residential clusters or
to relocate in the relocation areas.
For Group A members who have
built improvements on areas outside the residential clusters, they shall
be permitted to stay on their home lots (but not exceeding 100 square meters)
until a relocation site chosen by ROXAS has been selected and utilities for
basic services (right of way, water and electricity) are ready for their use
and each shall be entitled to one lot, not exceeding 100 square meters, at no cost to them. Any area in excess of 100 square meters shall
be surrendered to ROXAS immediately, subject to the payment of disturbance
compensation as discussed above.
Each barangay where ROXAS has
landholdings shall have one relocation site in proportion to the number of
Group A members residing thereat. This
is to minimize, as much as possible, dislocation on the part of the Group A
members. Areas in the relocation site
shall be uniform. ROXAS reserves the
right to cluster the barangay relocation areas to contiguous and accessible
sites according to the demands of the development in these areas.
Furthermore, the Roxas Gargollo
Foundation, in cooperation with the Technical Skills and Development Authority,
shall conduct a series of livelihood and training programs for the benefit of
Group A members.
GROUP B
Group B members are not entitled to
disturbance or whatever kind of compensation.
For
Group B members who have built improvements within the residential clusters,
they shall be allowed to buy in installment the lot upon which the improvement
was built, but not exceeding 100 square meters, at prevailing market
value. Any area in excess of 100 square
meters shall be surrendered immediately to ROXAS.
For
those who have built improvements on areas outside the residential clusters,
they shall be permitted to stay on their home lots (but not exceeding 100
square meters) until a relocation site chosen by ROXAS has been selected and
utilities for basic services (right of way, water and electricity) are ready
for their use. Each shall be allowed to
buy in installment one relocation lot, not exceeding 100 square meters, at
prevailing market value. Any area in
excess of their home lot shall be surrendered immediately to ROXAS.
Areas
in the relocation site shall be uniform.
Original CLOA holders/awardees have the option to choose which area to
buy. Each barangay, over which ROXAS has
landholdings, shall have one relocation site in proportion to the number of
original CLOA holders residing thereat.
Again, this is to minimize, as much as possible, dislocation on the part
of the Group B members. ROXAS reserves
the right to cluster the barangay relocation areas to contiguous and accessible
sites according to the demands of the development in these areas. Furthermore, the Roxas Gargallo Foundation,
in cooperation with the Technical Skills and Development Authority, shall
conduct a series of livelihood and training programs for the benefit of the
original CLOA holders/awardees.
GROUP C
For
those who belong to Group C, they
have to vacate immediately the premises and surrender possession of the subject
properties, without any compensation.
However, they shall be allowed to remove the improvements that they have
introduced to the subject landholdings.
Since the afore-quoted
proposed compensation and accommodation packages by Roxas & Co. are not
only in accord, but even in excess of what the law requires, it is worthy of
approval by this Court.
I am not cowed by accusations that my
position on the instant Petitions is contrary to social justice, because it is
substantially favors Roxas & Co., the landowners. Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution recognize the right of the landowners, alongside the farmers and
farmworkers, in the implementation of the CARP.
It has been declared, furthermore, that the duty of the Court to
protect the weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an
extent as to deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to
be on his side.[87] As this Court unhesitatingly declared in Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association
(ARBA) v. Nicolas[88]:
This Court can not sit idly and allow a government instrumentality to trample on the rights of bona fide landowners in the blind race for what it proclaims as social justice. As Justice Isagani Cruz succinctly held, social justice is to be afforded to all:
x x x social justice - or any justice for that matter - is for the deserving whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor simply because they are poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to eject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.
IV
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO
Even given the
ruling of the majority that Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 did not convert
all agricultural lands within the Municipality of Nasugbu to non-agricultural
uses, I still submit that the we should not sweepingly grant the Petitions and
prayers of KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW in the Petitions at bar. It must be remembered that particular
properties of Roxas & Co. in G.R. No. 149548, No. 179650, and No. 167505
were already determined in appropriate proceedings before the DAR Secretary,
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, to be exempt from CARP pursuant to the
Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982.
Quoting
from McQuillin,[89] the
Court described zoning in Pampanga Bus
Company, Inc. v. Municipality of Tarlac[90]
as follows:
Zoning is governmental regulation of
the uses of land and buildings according to districts or zones. It is
comprehensive where it is governed by a single plan for the entire municipality
and prevails throughout the municipality in accordance with that plan. It is
partial or limited where it is applicable only to a certain part of the
municipality or to certain uses. Fire limits, height districts and building
regulations are forms of partial or limited zoning or use regulation that are
antecedents of modern comprehensive zoning. (pp. 11-12.)
The term "zoning," ordinarily used with the connotation of comprehensive or general zoning, refers to governmental regulation of the use of land and buildings according to districts or zones. This regulation must and does utilize classification of uses within districts as well as classification of districts, inasmuch as it manifestly is impossible to deal specifically with each of the innumerable uses made of land and buildings. Accordingly, zoning has been defined as the confining of certain classes of buildings and uses to certain localities, areas, districts or zones. It has been stated that zoning is the regulation by districts of building development and uses of property, and that the term "zoning" is not only capable of this definition but has acquired a technical and artificial meaning in accordance therewith. Zoning is the separation of the municipality into districts and the regulation of buildings and structures within the districts so created, in accordance with their construction, and nature and extent of their use. It is a dedication of districts delimited to particular uses designed to subserve the general welfare. Numerous other definitions of zoning more or less in accordance with these have been given in the cases. (pp. 27-28.)
In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Farmers
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[91]
the Court affirmed the authority of the municipal council to issue a zoning
classification and to reclassify a property from agricultural to residential,
as approved by the HSRC (now the HLURB).
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2264, amending the Local Government Code,
specifically empowered municipal and/or city councils, in consultation with the
National Planning Commission, to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regulations.
In
its appeals from the grant by the DAR Secretary of the applications for
exemptions in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 (G.R. No. 149548 and
No. 179650) and No. A-9999-008-98 (G.R.
No. 167505), DAMBA-NSFW was, in effect, questioning the sufficiency of
the evidence of Roxas & Co.
Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded
probative value or weight, or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not
the proofs on one side or the other are clear and convincing and adequate to
establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact. Whether or not the body of proofs presented
by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary evidence submitted by adverse
party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not certain
documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the
face of protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or
not inconsistencies in the body of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to
justify refusing to give said proofs weight — all these are issues of
fact. Questions like these are not
reviewable by this Court which, as a rule, confines its review of cases decided
by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in the petition and
therein distinctly set forth.[92]
Well-settled
in this jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative
agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or preponderant.[93] If supported by substantial evidence, the
factual finding of an administrative body, charged with a specific field of
expertise, is conclusive and should not be disturbed.[94]
Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of evidence required to establish a
fact in cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, is that
level of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.[95]
There is no reason to disturb the
findings of the DAR Secretary that the lots subject of the applications for
exemption, in both DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98, are located within
non-agricultural zones under the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4,
series of 1982; the said findings being supported by substantial evidence.
In both DAR Administrative Cases No.
A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98,
Roxas & Co. was able to submit the documents in support of its applications
for exemption, as required in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994,
including the certifications from the Deputized Zoning Administrator and the
HLURB.[96] It was on the basis of said documents,
together with ocular inspection reports, that the DAR Secretary based its
findings that the lots subject of the two applications were indeed reclassified
for non-agricultural uses[97]
by Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, prior to the
effectivity of the CARL on 15 June 1988, thus, exempting the said properties
from CARP coverage.
The
Certifications, issued by the appropriate public officers, is prima facie evidence of the
facts therein set out. To overcome the
presumption of regularity of performance of official functions in favor of such
Certifications, the evidence against them must be clear and convincing.[98] Belief, suspicion, and conjectures cannot
overcome the presumption of regularity and legality which attaches to the
disputed Certifications. The bare
allegations of DAMBA-NFSW that the
provisions of Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, were
too vague or inexact to be used as bases for determining the zoning
classification of the lots of Roxas & Co., failed to defeat the
Certifications issued by the Deputized Zoning Administrator and the HLURB – who
are charged with the approval, interpretation, and implementation of said
zoning ordinance – expressly confirming that the said lots are located in
non-agricultural zones. There is also
utter lack of basis for the insistence of DAMBA-NFSW that in addition to
Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, Roxas & Co.
should have also submitted a Land Use Plan approved prior to
Once more, it should be kept in mind
that administrative bodies are given wide latitude in the evaluation of
evidence, including the authority to take judicial notice of facts within their
special competence. Absent any proof to the contrary, the presumption is
that official duty has been regularly performed. Hence, the DAR Secretary is presumed to have
performed his duty of studying the available evidence, prior to the grant of
the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co.[99]
DAMBA-NFSW is also seeking the
nullification of the proceedings in
DAR Administrative Cases No.
A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98 for
lack of notice to DAMBA-NFSW whose members hold CLOAs over the lots subject of
said applications for exemption.
DAMBA-NFSW invokes our ruling in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, nullifying the acquisition
proceedings for lack of proper notice upon Roxas & Co.
This
argument is without merit.
The decision in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals painstakingly presented the specific
provisions in the CARL; DAR Administrative Order No. 12, series of 1989;
DAR Administrative Order No. 9,
series of 1990; DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993; and the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure, which
explicitly require the service of notice upon the landowner in both voluntary
and compulsory acquisition proceedings.
Other than
a general averment of its right to due process, DAMBA-NFSW was not able to cite
a rule expressly requiring the landowner who is applying for exemption from CARP
coverage of his landholding based on Section 3(c) of the CARL and DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, to give notices of the filing of
said application and the subsequent proceedings as regards the same to the
occupants of the subject property.
It bears to
point out that at the time Roxas & Co. filed its applications for exemption
in DAR Administrative
Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No.
A-9999-008-98 on 29 May 1997 and 29 September 1997, respectively, only DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, governed such applications.[100] Said administrative order does not contain
any provision on notices. Rights of
farmers and other occupants of the land subject of the application for
exemption could only be presumed to have been taken into consideration by the
DAR officials mandated to conduct a joint investigation following the filing of
the application for exemption. Part IV
of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, prescribes that:
A. Upon filing of the application, the
Regional Office shall conduct a joint investigation with the duly authorized
representatives of the Provincial and Municipal Offices of the DAR that have
jurisdiction over the property. The investigation shall be undertaken and the
report prepared within thirty (30) days from the filing of the completed
application. x x x
B. The joint investigation report shall
concentrate on the presence of potential beneficiaries in the area, the payment
of disturbance compensation, the initial activities related to the coverage, and
other pertinent information which may be relevant in the grant or denial of the
application for exemption.
The joint
investigation report shall also contain a certification from the MARO on
whether or not the area has been placed under the coverage of Pres. Decree No.
27, or whether Certificates of Land Transfer or Emancipation Patents have been
issued over said property.
x x x
Even granting that DAMBA-NFSW should
have been given notices of the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co.,
the lack thereof does not necessarily mean that DAMBA-NFSW was deprived of due
process that would render the proceedings in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98 void. The Court has consistently held that the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s side or the
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of;
and any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration.[101] DAMBA-NFSW cannot deny that it was able to
file Motions for Reconsideration of the Orders of the DAR Secretary granting
the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co. in DAR Administrative
Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No.
A-9999-008-98, except that both Motions were subsequently denied by the DAR
Secretary for lack of merit.
After the DAR Secretary approved the
applications for exemption of Roxas & Co., and denied the Motions for
Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW in DAR Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and
No. A-9999-008-98, DAMBA-NFSW then went
before the Court of Appeals via Petitions for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the wrong
remedy.
In Sebastian v. Morales,[102]
the Court provided the following elucidation on the proper remedy from an order
of the DAR Secretary and the consequence for availing one’s self of the wrong
mode of appeal:
We agree with the appellate court that
petitioners’ reliance on Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 “is not merely a mistake
in the designation of the mode of appeal, but clearly an erroneous appeal from
the assailed Orders.” For in relying
solely on Section 54, petitioners patently ignored or conveniently overlooked
Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657, the pertinent portion of which provides that:
An appeal from the
decision of the Court of Appeals, or from any order, ruling or decision of the
DAR, as the case may be, shall be by a petition for review with the Supreme
Court, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy of said decision.
Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 should be read in
relation to R.A. No. 7902 expanding the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to include:
Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all
final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions…except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.21
With the enactment of R.A. No. 7902, this
Court issued Circular 1-95 dated
Section 61 of R.A. No. 665722 clearly
mandates that judicial review of DAR orders or decisions are governed by the
Rules of Court. The Rules direct that it
is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders,
or resolutions of the DAR Secretary. By pursuing a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review under
Rule 43, petitioners opted for the wrong mode of appeal. Pursuant to the fourth
paragraph of Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, “an appeal taken to the Supreme
Court or the Court of Appeals by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.” Therefore, we hold that the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 51288 for failure of petitioners
to pursue the proper mode of appeal.
Even
when there may be instances when the Court had chosen to relax its procedural
rules in the name of substantive justice, the lack of merit in the opposition
of DAMBA-NFSW to the applications for exemption of Roxas & Co. in DAR
Administrative Cases No. A-9999-142-97 and No. A-9999-008-98, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, does not
justify the reversal of the dismissal by the appellate court of the Petitions
for Certiorari of DAMBA-NFSW in
CA-G.R. SP No. 82225 and CA-G.R. No. 82226 for being the wrong mode of appeal.
As for G.R.
No. 167845 and No. 169163, proceedings have also been held before the PARAD
regarding CLOA No. 6654 (DARAB
Cases No. R-401-003-2001 to No. R-401-005-2001 and No. 401-239-2001,
respectively), which resulted in the partial and complete cancellations of
the said certificates. I accentuate once more that by reason
of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative departments over
matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass
judgment thereon and their findings of fact in that regard are generally
accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.[103] The Court must also not forget that the 27
May 2001 Decision of the PARAD in DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 already became
final and executory by failure of DAMBA-NFSW to file an appeal within the
reglementary period.
V
MY VOTE
WHEREFORE, premises considered, I concur in some part but dissent for
the most part in the ruling of the majority, and vote as follows:
(1) In G.R.
No. 167540, to DENY the Petition
for Review of KAMAHARI and DAMBA-NFSW, and to AFFIRM the Decision dated 24 November 2003 and Resolution dated 18
March 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131, which declared the
parcels of land comprising Haciendas Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico, all in the
name of Roxas & Co. and located in Nasugbu, Batangas, to be exempt from
CARP coverage pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, making Nasugbu
part of a tourist zone. I vote further to DISMISS the Petitions for Intervention
of the Sangguniang Bayan and the ABC of Nasugbu for failure to prosecute;
(2) In G.R.
No. 167543, to DENY the Motion
for Reconsideration of DAR, and to AFFIRM
the Resolution dated 20 June 2005 of this Court denying the Petition for Review
of DAR for the latter’s failure to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 24 November 2003 and
Resolution dated 18 March 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72131;
(3) In G.R. No. 179650 and No.
167505, to DENIED the Petitions for Review of
DAMBA-NFSW for being moot and academic, consistent with my vote in G.R. No.
167540 and No. 167543. With the
exemption from CARP coverage of the entire Hacienda Palico pursuant to
Presidential Proclamation No. 1520, the resolution of the exemption from CARP
coverage of smaller lots in the same Hacienda by virtue of the Nasugbu
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, series of 1982, serves no practical
purpose.
(4) In
G.R. No. 167845, to GRANT the
Petition for Review of Roxas & Co.
Accordingly, I vote to REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the Decision dated
(5) In G.R. No. 169163, to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of DAMBA-NFSW, and to AFFIRM the Resolution
dated 19 October 2005 of this Court denying the Petition for Review of
DAMBA-NFSW, in the absence of reversible error on the part of the Court
of Appeals when it dismissed in its Decision dated 28 February 2005 and
Resolution dated 3 August 2005 the Petition for Certiorari of DAMBA-NFSW in CA-G.R. SP No. 75952. I vote further to DECLARE AS FINAL AND EXECUTORY, with no appeal having been timely
filed therefrom, the 27 May 2001 Decision of the PARAD in DARAB Case No.
401-239-2001, ordering the cancellation of CLOA No. 6654, insofar as the
remaining 411.7249 hectares are concerned, after the partial cancellation
effected in G.R. No. 167845;
(6) In G.R.
No. 149548, to DISMISS for being
moot and academic the Petition for Review of Roxas & Co. seeking an
injunction against the installation by the DAR of the farmer-beneficiaries on Lots No. 21, No. 24, No. 28, No. 31,
No. 32 and No. 34, comprising 51.5472 hectares, situated in Brgys. Cogunan and
Lumbangan, Nasugbu, Batangas, until CLOA No. 6654, which covered the said lots,
among other parcels of land, was cancelled. This is pursuant to my vote in G.R. No.
167845 and No. 169163, already affirming the partial and complete cancellations
of CLOA No. 6654; and
7. To
APPROVE the compensation and
accommodation packages proposed by Roxas & Co. for bona fide tenants, shareholders, and leaseholders of Haciendas
Caylaway, Banilad, and Palico (Group A beneficiaries), and for original CLOA
holders/awardees who had no previous contractual relationship with Roxas &
Co. but were installed upon the latter’s landholdings by DAR (Group B
beneficiaries); with the corresponding directive to Roxas & Co. to
faithfully comply with the said compensation and accommodation packages.
|
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
[1] Subject: Guidelines for the
Issuance of Exemption Clearances based on Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 6657
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990.
[2] A
special task force of the DAR which conducts the field investigation and
dialogues with the applicants and the farmer beneficiaries to ascertain the
information necessary for the processing of an application for conversion of
land. The Chairman of the CLUPPI deliberates
on the merits of the investigation report and recommends the appropriate
action. This recommendation is
transmitted to the Regional Director, thru the Undersecretary, or Secretary of
the DAR.
[3] Rollo (G.R. No. 167540), p. 383.
[4] Penned by Associate Justice Jose
L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Regalado E.
Maambong, concurring; and Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Portia
Aliño-Hormachuelos, dissenting. Rollo (G.R.
No. 167540), pp. 58-68.
[5]
[6] G.R.
No. 103302,
[7] 376
Phil. 147 (1999).
[8]
[9]
[10] Penned
by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices Amelita G.
Tolentino and Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; and Associate Justices Ruben T.
Reyes and Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, dissenting.
[11] Revising
the Chapter of the Philippine Tourism Authority Created under Presidential
Decree No. 189, dated
[12] Initially,
CLOA No. 6654 was issued to only 153 regular sugar farms workers at Hacienda
Palico; but pursuant to the Decision dated
[13] Rollo (G.R. No. 149548), pp. 95-96.
[14]
[15] The details of which will be
subsequently presented herein under G.R. No. 167845.
[16] Rollo (G.R. No. 149548), pp. 101-102.
[17] Penned by Associate Justice Ma.
Alicia
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Rollo (G.R. No. 179650), pp. 125-127.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] Penned by Associate Justce Portia
Alino-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Arcangelita
Romilla-Lontok, concurring.
[30]
[31] Rollo (G.R. No. 167505), pp. 155-157.
[32]
[33] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente
S.E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G.
Tolentino, concurring.
[34] Penned
by Associate Justice Arturo B. Buena with Associate Justices Angelina S.
Gutierrez and Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., concurring. Rollo (G.R. No. 167845), pp. 60-80.
[35]
[36] Subsequent
events concerning CA-G.R. SP No. 63146 were already recounted in the factual
background of G.R. No. 149548 and No. 179650.
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42] The
circumstances pertaining to DARAB Case No. 401-239-2001 are presented in more
detail under G.R. No. 169163.
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46] Penned
by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang with Associate Justices Andres B.
Reyes and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring.
[47]
[48]
[50] Penned
by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Lucas P.
Bersamin and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, concurring.
[51] Agriculture, agricultural exercise,
or agricultural activity is defined, in turn, by Section 3(b) of the CARL as
the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising
of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products,
and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction
with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.
[52] Section
5(l) of Executive Order No. 129-A, “Modifying Executive Order No. 129
Reorganizing and Strengthening the Department of Agrarian Reform and for Other
Purposes.”
[53] Rules
of procedure governing the processing and approval of applications for land use
conversion were laid down by DAR Administrative Order No. 2, series of
1990.
[54] The enacting clause is that part of
a statute which states the authority by which it is enacted. (Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction [5th
edition, 2003], p. 14)
[55] Security Bank and Trust Company v. Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61, G.R. No. 113926, 23 October 1996, citing Quijano v. Development Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No.
L-26419,
[56] Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction [5th
edition, 2003], p. 80, citing People v.
Garcia, 85 Phil. 663 (1950).
[57] See Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 156087,
[58] Spouses
Tibay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
119655,
[59] Supra. note 4.
[60] Supra
note 5.
[61] Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
152085,
[62] G.R.
No. 147479,
[63] Delta Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 121075,
[64] Associate
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, in her concurring and dissenting opinion in Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 127876,
17 December 1999), quoted the following findings made by former DAR Secretary, Benjamin T. Leong, in
his DAR Order dated 22 January 1991, as regards the state of the GDFI property:
1.
Is, as contended by the petitioner GDFI "hilly, mountainous, and
characterized by poor soil condition and nomadic method of cultivation, hence
not suitable to agriculture."
2. Has
as contiguous properties two haciendas of Roxas y Cia and found by Agrarian
Reform Team Leader Benito Viray to be "generally rolling, hilly and
mountainous and strudded (sic) with long and narrow ridges and deep
gorges. Ravines are steep grade ending in low dry creeks."
3. Is
found in an area where "it is quite difficult to provide statistics on
rice and corn yields because there are no permanent sites planted. Cultivation
is by Kaingin Method."
4. Is
contiguous to Roxas Properties in the same area where "the people entered
the property surreptitiously and were difficult to stop because of the wide
area of the two haciendas and that the principal crop of the area is sugar . .
.."
[65]
[66] PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB
General Insurance Company, Inc., G.R. No. 162267, 4 July 2008.
[67] Section
4 of the CARL describes the scope of said law:
Section 4. Scope.
– The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands
as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including
other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the
following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral
lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act
until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain;
(b) All lands of the public domain in
excess of specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
(c) All other lands owned by the
Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture;
(d) All private lands devoted to or
suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that
can be raised thereon.
[68] Delgado v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
137881,
[69] G.R. No. 111387,
[70] In Secretary of
Agrarian Reform v. Tropical Homes, Inc. (G.R. No. 136827,
Not having perfected their appeal in the manner and
within the period fixed by law, the decision of the Court of Appeals had become
final and executory. Such a failure carries with it the result that no court
can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the case. However, it is true that we have recognized
certain exceptions to this rule. In Ramos v. Bagasao, we excused the
delay of four (4) days in the filing of a notice of appeal because the
questioned decision of the trial court was served upon appellant at a time when
her counsel of record was already dead.
Her new counsel could only file the appeal four (4) days after the
prescribed reglementary period was over.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 we allowed the
perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six (6) days to
prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since it stood to lose hundreds of
hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for
educational purposes. In Olacao v.
National Labor Relations Commission, we accepted a tardy appeal considering
that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judicially settled, with
finality, in another case. The dismissal
of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to
make the same reparation to the appellee. x x x
[71] Ditching
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109834,
[72] Mayon Estate Corporation v.
Altura, G.R. No. 134462,
[73] Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 394 Phil. 22 (2000).
[74] Ginete, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36 (1998).
[75] Mayon Estate Corporation v. Altura, supra note 1.
[76] Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 890 (1997).
[77] DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, series of 2000.
[78] Under
Section 3(d) of the CARL, “agrarian dispute” includes “any controversy relating
to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of
lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.”
[79] Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 132561,
[80] See
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 132073,
[81] Ruben
E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction
(5th edition, 2003), p. 125; citing Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 116
SCAD 999, 320 SCRA 279 (1999) and Director
of Lands v. Abaya, 63 Phil. 559 (1936).
[82] An Act to Ordain the Agricultural
Land Reform Code and to Institute Land Reforms in the Philippines, including
the Abolition of Tenancy and the Channeling of Capital into Industry, Provide
for the Necessary Implementing Agencies, Appropriate Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes.
[83] An Act Amending Republic Act
Numbered Thirty-Eight Hundred and Forty-Four, as Amended, Otherwise Known as
the Agricultural Land Reform Code, and for Other Purposes.
[84] G.R. Nos. 148404-05,
[85] The requisites for a valid
agricultural leasehold relationship are: (1) The parties are the landowner and
the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of the relationship
is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. (Ibid.)
[86] G.R. No. 152085,
[87] Landbank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
118712,
[88] G.R. No. 168394,
[89] Treaties on Municipal Corporations,
Volume 8, 3rd ed.
[90] G.R. No. L-15759,
[91] G.R. No. 142359, 25 May 2004.
[92] Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680,
[93] Lumiqued
v. Exevea, G.R. No. 117565,
[94] National Power Corporation v. Philippine
Electric Plant Owners Association (PEPOA), Inc., G.R. No. 159457,
[95] Rule
134, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
[96] According
to III(B) of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994, the application
for exemption should be duly signed by the landowner or his representative, and
should be accompanied by the following documents:
1.
Duly
notarized Special Power of Attorney, if the applicant is not the landowner
himself;
2.
Certified
true copies of the titles which is the subject of the application;
3.
Current
tax declaration(s) covering the property;
4.
Location
Map or Vicinity Map;
5.
Certification
from the Deputized Zoning Administrator that the land has been reclassified to
residential, industrial or commercial use prior to
6.
Certification
from the HLURB that the pertinent zoning ordinance has been approved by the
Board prior to
7.
Certification
from the National Irrigation Administration that the land is not covered by
Administrative Order No. 20, s. 1992, i.e., that the area is not irrigated, nor
scheduled for irrigation rehabilitation nor irrigable with firm funding
commitment;
8.
Proof
of payment of disturbance compensation, if the area is presently being occupied
by farmers, or waiver/undertaking by the occupants that they will vacate the
area whenever required.
[97] The
six (eventually increase to seven) lots in DAR Administrative Case No.
A-9999-142-97 were within the industrial zone, while the nine lots in DAR
Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98
were within settlement clusters outside the Poblacion.
[98] See
Spouses Madrigal v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 129955,
[99] National Power Corporation v. Philippine
Electric Plant Owners Association (PEPOA), Inc., G.R. No. 159457,
[100] On
(h) Issuance of Notice. – The MARO
or investigating officer shall issue a notice of summary investigation to the
parties concerned within ten (10) days from termination of
mediation/conciliation (if unsuccessful) or from receipt of application,
protest or petition. The notice shall be
sent by personal delivery with proof of service or by registered mail with
return card.
[101] Samalio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
140079,
[102] G.R. No. 141116,
[103] Palele v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 138289,