EN BANC
OLGA M. SAMSON, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138
Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
- v e r s u s - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA and
BERSAMIN,
JJ.
JUDGE
VIRGILIO G. CABALLERO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August
5, 2009
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R E S O L U T I O N
Per Curiam:
This is an administrative complaint
for dishonesty and falsification of a public document against respondent Judge
Virgilio G. Caballero, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30,
In her complaint,[1]
complainant Olga M. Samson alleged that respondent Judge Virgilio G. Caballero
should not have been appointed to the judiciary for lack of the constitutional
qualifications of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence[2], and for
violating the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) which disqualifies
from nomination any applicant for judgeship with a pending administrative case.[3]
According to the complainant,
respondent, during his JBC interviews, deliberately concealed the fact that he
had pending administrative charges against him.
She disclosed that, on behalf of
Community Rural Bank of Guimba (Nueva Ecija), Inc., she had filed criminal and
administrative charges for grave abuse of authority, conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal
Code against respondent in the Office of the Ombudsman on
At that time a public prosecutor,
respondent allegedly committed certain improprieties[4] and
exceeded his powers by overruling the Secretary of Justice in a reinvestigation
he conducted.
On
Thereafter, the complainant filed a
petition for review[7]
on
While the complainant’s petition was
pending in the CA, respondent was interviewed several times in the JBC from
February 2005 to August 2005 for the position of RTC judge. On
In his comment,[10]
respondent admitted that complainant had lodged criminal and administrative
cases against him in the Ombudsman. He, however, insisted that these were
already dismissed by virtue of the immediately effective and executory
The complainant filed a reply,[11] stating
that the
To further support her charge of
dishonesty against respondent, complainant pointed to the Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) filed by respondent on
On the basis of the pleadings and
documents presented by both parties, the OCA found respondent administratively
liable for dishonesty and falsification of an official document for his false
statement in his PDS. It recommended respondent’s dismissal from the service
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to re-employment in the government service.
We agree with the findings of the OCA
that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and falsification of an official
document.
We
have no way of knowing whether respondent withheld information from the JBC, as
both he and complainant never backed their respective allegations with concrete
evidence.[13]
Thus, no probative value can be given either to the charges or to the defenses.
However, respondent is not to be
exonerated on the basis of the foregoing alone. Regardless of whether he
disclosed his pending cases during his interviews, the fact remains that he
committed dishonesty when he checked the box indicating “No” to the question
“Have you ever been formally charged?” in his March 21, 2006 PDS filed in the
OAS-OCA RTC Personnel.[14]
Respondent’s act of making an
obviously false statement in his PDS was reprehensible, to say the least. It
was not mere inadvertence on his part when he answered “No” to that very simple
question posed in the PDS. He knew exactly what the question called for and
what it meant, and that he was committing an act of dishonesty but proceeded to
do it anyway. To make matters worse, he even sought to wriggle his way out of
his predicament by insisting that the charges against him were already
dismissed, thus, his negative answer in the PDS. However, whether or not the
charges were already dismissed was immaterial, given the phraseology of the question
“Have you ever been formally charged?,” meaning, charged at anytime in the past
or present.
In Ratti v. Mendoza-De Castro,[15] we held
that the making of untruthful statements in the PDS amounts to dishonesty and
falsification of an official document. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
Respondent, a judge, knows (or should
have known) fully well that the making of a false statement in his PDS could
subject him to dismissal. This Court will not allow him to evade the
consequences of his dishonesty. Being a former public prosecutor and a judge
now, it is his duty to ensure that all the laws and rules of the land are
followed to the letter. His being a judge makes it all the more unacceptable.
There was an obvious lack of integrity, the most fundamental qualification of a
member of the judiciary.
Time and again, we have emphasized
that a judge should conduct himself in a manner which merits the respect and
confidence of the people at all times, for he is the visible representation of
the law.[16]
Regrettably, we are convinced of respondent’s capacity to lie and evade the
truth. His dishonesty misled the JBC and tarnished the image of the judiciary.
He does not even seem remorseful for what he did as he sees nothing wrong with
it.
He deserves the harsh penalty of
dismissal from the service.
This administrative case against
respondent shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as
a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC.[17] This
resolution, entitled “Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases
Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of
Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the
Philippine Bar,” provides:
Some
administrative cases against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who
are lawyers are based on grounds which
are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such
other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as
grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
In
any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be
considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to
comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended,
disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
Before the Court approved this
resolution, administrative and disbarment cases against members of the bar who
were likewise members of the court were treated separately.[18] However,
pursuant to the new rule, an administrative case against a judge of a regular
court based on grounds which are also grounds for the disciplinary action
against members of the Bar shall be automatically considered as disciplinary
proceedings against such judge as a member of the Bar.[19]
This must be so as violation of the
fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the new Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of the following Canons of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):[20]
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act.
CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION…
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - a lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND
MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD
INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Since membership in the bar is an
integral qualification for membership in the bench, the moral fitness of a
judge also reflects his moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who disobeys the basic rules of
judicial conduct also violates his oath as a lawyer.[21] In this particular case, respondent’s
dishonest act was against the lawyer’s oath to “do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court.”
Respondent’s misconduct likewise constituted
a contravention of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which strictly
enjoins a lawyer from committing acts of deceit, otherwise, he may be suspended
or disbarred. Thus:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
This Court did not hesitate to apply
the provisions of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC in a plethora of cases.[22] Of
particular importance to this case is our decision in Cañada v. Suerte[23] where we applied the rule to its
fullest extent: automatic disbarment.
In Cañada v. Suerte, complainant charged respondent Judge Suerte with
grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, grave coercion, dishonesty,
harassment, oppression and violation of Article 215 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) and the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The complaint alleged, among others,
that respondent tried to sell a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck and Daewoo car
to complainant. The latter refused. Their friendship later on turned sour when
they failed to reach an agreement on the commission respondent was supposed to
receive as agent-broker for the contemplated sale of complainant’s beach lot. The
complainant voiced out his fear that respondent would use his judicial power to
persecute him for what respondent may have perceived as complainant’s
infractions against him.
In his comment, respondent denied
offering to sell the vehicles to complainant since, according to him, he never
owned a dilapidated cargo pick-up truck nor could he recall if he had a Daewoo
car in 1998.
However, a perusal of respondent’s
Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the years 1998-2001 revealed that
among his personal properties were a Daewoo car acquired in 1996 and an L-200
double cab acquired in 1998. Accordingly, we found respondent guilty of
dishonesty for having falsely denied that he ever owned the aforementioned
vehicles. For his infraction, respondent judge was fined in the amount of P40,000.
He would have been dismissed from the service were it not for the fact that he
had already been dismissed therefrom because of an earlier case.[24]
Significantly, pursuant to A.M. No.
Under the same rule, a respondent
"may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned
as member of the Bar." The rule does not make it mandatory, before
respondent may be held liable as a member of the bar, that respondent be
required to comment on and show cause why he should not be disciplinary sanctioned
as a lawyer separately from the
order for him to comment on why he should not be held administratively liable
as a member of the bench.[25] In
other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an
explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a
member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and
reasonable meaning of “automatic
conversion” of administrative cases against justices and judges[26] to
disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No.
It cannot be denied that respondent’s
dishonesty did not only affect the image of the judiciary, it also put his
moral character in serious doubt and rendered him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. Possession of good moral character is not only a prerequisite
to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of
law.[29] If the
practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic
ideals, those counted within its ranks should not only master its tenets and
principles but should also accord continuing fidelity to them. The
requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the
general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning.[30]
A parting word.
The first step towards the successful
implementation of the Court’s relentless drive to purge the judiciary of morally
unfit members, officials and personnel necessitates the imposition of a rigid set
of rules of conduct on judges. The Court is extraordinarily strict with judges
because, being the visible representation of the law, they should set a good
example to the bench, bar and students of the law. The standard of integrity
imposed on them is – and should be – higher than that of the average person for
it is their integrity that gives them the right to judge.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Virgilio G.
Caballero of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30,
Respondent is likewise DISBARRED
for violation of Canons 1 and 11 and Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his name STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Let a copy of this resolution be
entered into respondent’s records in the Office of the Bar Confidant and notice
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
(On Official Leave) LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice
|
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Dated
[2] Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
SEC.
7. (1) No person shall be appointed member of the Supreme Court or any lower
collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
(2)
The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but
no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the
(3) A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. (Emphasis supplied)
[3] Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council provides:
SEC. 5. Disqualification. - The following are disqualified from being nominated or appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those
with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in
foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency. (Emphasis supplied)
[4] Complainant averred that respondent violated therein petitioner’s constitutional right to due process when he (a) conducted the reinvestigation without informing petitioner; (b) did not give the petitioner a chance to file a motion for reconsideration as he immediately filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court on the very same day he (respondent) rendered a joint resolution; and (c) filed the motion to dismiss without notifying petitioner and setting it for hearing.
[5] Annex A. Decision penned by Graft Investigation and Prevention Officer Ismaela B. Boco and approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Victor C. Fernandez. Rollo, pp. 87-90.
[6] Joint order dated
[7] Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
[8] Annex C. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C. Mendoza and Arturo G. Tayag of the Sixteenth Division of the Court of Appeals; Rollo, pp. 133-152.
[9] Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[10] Dated
[11] Dated
[12] Complainant
mistakenly referred to the PDS as the one filed by respondent in the JBC.
[13] In his
comment, respondent merely stated: “ x x x [I]t
could be said that he did not keep secret from the Judicial and Bar Council
that he had [a]dministrative and [c]riminal cases before the Ombudsman because
he showed the copy of the [r]esolution by the Ombudsman dismissing both said
cases during his [p]anel [i]nterview with the Judicial and Bar Council sometime
in February 2005.”
To this, respondent replied, “Allegations must be
proved, not simply averred. x x x There must be evidence presented by Judge
Caballero before this Honorable Office to support his allegation x x x.”
[14]
[15] A.M.
No. P-04-1844,
[16]
Cañada v. Suerte, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1884,
[17]
Resolution dated
[18]
Heck v.
[19] Cañada v. Suerte, supra note 16, at 426, citing Maddela v . Gallong-Galicinao, 490 Phil. 437, 442.
[20] Cañada v. Suerte, supra note
16, at 426-427, citing Juan dela
Cruz v. Carretas, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2043,
[21] I, ___________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I
will not wittingly or unwittingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
[22] See Mariano v. Nacional, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1688,
[23] Supra note 16.
Cañada v. Suerte is not the only case where we automatically disbarred a member of the judiciary or a court official or personnel as a consequence of his dismissal from the service (also see Dela Cruz v. Luna and Avanceña v. Liwanag, supra). However, we chose to cite and discuss Cañada as its factual milieu is closest to that of the facts of this case.
[24] See Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60,
Barili,
[25] Or as a court official or employee.
[26] And court officials and employees who are lawyers.
[27] As well as a court official or employee who is also a lawyer.
[28] Or a court official or employee who is also a lawyer.
[29] Dela Cruz v. Luna, supra note 22, at 45,
citing Heck v. Santos, supra note 18,
at 823.
[30] Id.,
citing Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, A.C.
No. 2714, 30 November 2006, 509 SCRA 1, 16.