|
ADELPHA E.
MALABED, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE ENRIQUE C. ASIS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran, Respondent. |
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2031 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 06-2484-RTJ) Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: August 4, 2009 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a verified
complaint[1]
dated
Herein
complainant, therein plaintiff in the civil case, acquired a parcel of land
from her brother Conrado Estreller. Thereafter, therein defendants, spouses
Ruben and Delia Cericos, began building their house on the said parcel of land
belonging to Estreller. When complainant knew that she would acquire the parcel
of land from Estreller, she wrote the Spouses Cericos, informing them of her
intention to use the land, and asked that they vacate the premises. After the
title to the land had been transferred in her name, complainant, through
counsel, made a written demand on the spouses Cericos to vacate the land in
question within a period of 90 days from receipt thereof. Still, the Spouses Cericos refused to heed
complainant’s request and the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
Thus, on
In
its Decision[2] dated
WHEREFORE, for
all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants:
1.
Ordering
the defendants to vacate the premises by removing any structure found or
building inside the lot of the plaintiff which is described in paragraph 2 of
the complaint;
2.
Ordering
the defendants to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fee and appearance
fees of P3,500.00;
3.
Ordering
the defendants to pay the plaintiff the expenses of litigation in the amount of
P5,000.00;
4.
Ordering
the defendants to pay plaintiff punitive and corrective damages in the amount
of P3,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
The
defendants in said civil case, represented by counsel, Atty. Redentor
Villordon, appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16 of Naval,
Biliran, where respondent Judge presided. Said case was re-docketed as Civil
Case No. B-1016.
On
On
On
In
an Order[6]
dated
x
x x x
The
thrust of the petition is anchored on the fact that plaintiff-appellee failed
to disclose a material fact in court that she had given her consent to the
defendants-appellants before they started to build the residential house on the
lot allegedly owned by plaintiff-appellee which is the subject matter of the
above-entitled case.
Defendants-appellants’
mother, Simplicia A. Ybañez, widow, manifested in her affidavit of good faith
that sometime in the month of April 1990, she, her daughter Delia Cericos, and
one Melda Ampong, met Adelpha E. Malabed, plaintiff-appellee, her mother
Matilde Estreller, Conrado Estreller, eldest brother, and one Charita
Estreller, elder sister of the plaintiff-appellee in a rented house of Charita
Estreller and Conrado Estreller at Kamuning, Quezon City for the purpose of
asking their formal consent to renovate her old house standing on the lot in
question. In that meeting, Adelpha E. Malabed, plaintiff-appellee, together
with her mother, brother and sisters, approved her plans and had given their
consent not only to the renovation of the old house owned by Simplicia A.
Ybañez but, if possible, to construct a new one for the Cericos Family and her
mother.
That
pursuant to the approval, consent and agreement to allow them to construct said
residential house and to surrender the same to the plaintiff-appellee after
twenty-five (25) years as one of the terms and conditions,
defendants-appellants through [their] mother, Simplicia A. Ybañez, started
working in the construction sometime in 1991 and the house was finished in
1992.
Considering
the warranty under this verbal agreement which induced the
defendants-appellants to construct the said residential house at the cost of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), there is therefore a need to
look into and dig deeper by way of giving the defendants-appellants their day
in court to show by evidence whether this [is] true or not. This alleged
warranty on the part of the plaintiff-appellee which she failed to disclose is
very material and could possibly tilt the judgment of this court on the ground
of bad faith on the part of plaintiff-appellee. As a matter of fact, Conrado
Estreller, plaintiff-appellee’s eldest brother, was the one who procured the
building permit for the defendants-appellants. The failure therefore on the
part of the plaintiff-appellee to disclose this material fact of prior
agreement, which resulted in the judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellee,
is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. x x x
x
x x x
The
Court believes that there is a need to ventilate the facts and the evidences
pertaining to that prior agreement which, as a result of the failure on the
part of the plaintiff-appellee to disclose this material fact, resulted to the
injury of the defendants-appellants whose house is now the subject of a motion
for demolition.
x x x x
Respondent
Judge likewise denied complainant’s motion for reconsideration in an Order
dated
Complainant
then filed a petition for certiorari[7]
with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the Order dated
In
its Decision[8] dated
x
x x x
The petition for
relief was filed out of time (on
x
x x x
Furthermore,
in Garcia v. Court of Appeals (202
SCRA 228), it was held that fraud as a ground for petition for relief must be
extrinsic or collateral. In the same case, the Supreme Court made a distinction
between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, thus:
x x x x
Given
the definitions of extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, private respondents’
averments concerning the fraud purportedly committed by petitioner and her
predecessor-in-interest (Conrado) do not constitute extrinsic fraud.
x
x x x
In
her Complaint, complainant alleged that respondent Judge showed bias and
partiality in favor of defendants Spouses Cericos because their new counsel,
Atty. De la Peña, represented respondent Judge in administrative complaints
filed against the latter. Complainant further averred that her sister, Perla
Haverly, was plaintiff in a civil case for ejectment docketed as Civil Case No.
973, filed with the MCTC of Kawayan, Biliran, which rendered a decision in her sister’s
favor. The defendants therein filed an appeal with respondent Judge’s court,
which granted the same. Complainant
claimed that respondent Judge reversed the decision of the MCTC because the
counsel for the defendants was Atty. De la Peña.
In
his Comment[9] dated
In
her Reply[11] dated
In
his Rejoinder to Reply[12]
dated
In
its Report[13] dated
EVALAUTION: Before a respondent
judge can be declared as biased and partial in favor of a party, the court has
to be shown acts and conduct of a judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice. Mere suspicion that the judge is partial to a party is not enough;
there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge. (Opis vs. Judge Dimaano, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1942,
In
this case, complainant alleged that respondent judge was biased in favor of
Atty. Meljohn Dela Peña because he was his counsel in the administrative case
filed against him by Ms. Gina Ang. The respondent judge disputed this, arguing
that there was no administrative case yet when Atty. Dela Peña handled the case
of the Sps. Cericos.
The
charge of bias and partiality must, therefore, fail. Aside from the
complainant’s allegation of bias and partiality because the Sps. Cericos are
represented by Atty. Meljohn Dela Peña, she failed to substantiate her claims.
The
complainant, in her Reply dated
The
petition for relief was filed out of time (on
The
60-day period was not suspended during the pendency of the motion for
reconsideration. Thus, in Meralco v.
Domingo (18 SCRA 961), the Supreme Court held:
The
filing of the motion for reconsideration and a new trial, while it suspended
the period for the finality of the judgment did not suspend the period provided
for in Rule 38. It is error and grave abuse of discretion by the trial court to
subtract from the sixty-day period the time when the motion for reconsideration
and a new trial was pending because it has been constantly held that the
periods fixed by Rule 38 are mandatory and non-extendible and are not subject
to any condition or contingency, as the rule was itself devised to meet a
condition or contingency.
x x x
The
petition for relief is based mainly on the alleged verbal agreement between
private respondents and Conrado whereby the former were allowed to build a
house on the land and occupy the same for twenty-five years, upon expiration of
which they would vacate the house and the ownership thereof would vest in
Conrado.
We
disagree with respondent’s ruling that it was the duty of petitioner to
disclose the alleged verbal agreement during the trial. Said verbal agreement
is a matter of defense which private respondent should have presented at the
earliest opportunity.
Although
there was no direct finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge, the Court of Appeals found that the petition for relief was
filed out of time counting from the date the Sps. Cericos received the adverse
decision on the case presumably on
The
Court has always emphasized that ignorance of the law or procedure is the mainspring
of justice. For this reason, members of the bench are always reminded of their
duty to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence. Judges
are called upon to exhibit more than cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. Basic rules must be at the palms of their hands. Their
inexcusable failure to observe the basic laws and rules will render them
administratively liable. Where the law or procedure involved, as in this case,
is simple and elementary, lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross
ignorance of the law or procedure (Abbariao
vs. Judge Beltran, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1839,
Under
Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court (as amended), gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Section
11A (3) of the same Rules states that the fine for such charge is more than P20,000.00,
but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In
the light of the prevailing facts of this case, a fine of P30,000.00 is
commensurate under the circumstances.
RECOMMENDATION: In view of the
foregoing, we respectfully submit for the consideration of the Honorable Court
our recommendations:
(1)
That
the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED
as a regular administrative matter;
(2)
That
respondent Judge Enrique C. Asis, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court (Branch
16), Naval, Biliran, be ADJUDGED administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the procedural rules; and
(3)
That
Judge Asis be FINED in the amount of
P30,000.00 and WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
In
her Verified Sur-Rejoinder[14]
dated October 20, 2006, complainant alleged that the act of respondent Judge in
granting the petition for relief with the entry of appearance of new counsel,
Atty. De la Peña, was suspect for the following reasons: (1) the petition for
relief was filed out of time and respondent Judge deliberately failed to
indicate in his Order dated August 12, 1999 the timeliness of the petition; (2)
the petition for relief was premised on an alleged verbal agreement between
therein defendants and complainant’s brother allowing defendants to occupy the
lot, which respondent Judge had argued was the duty of complainant to disclose
and, since complainant did not do so earlier, he granted relief to defendants.
Complainant claimed that this was irregular because the issue presented by
defendants was a new one and barred by estoppel, and; (3) respondent Judge
deliberately overlooked the basic remedy of defendants which would have been to
appeal the decision. Complainant also denied having entered respondent Judge’s
chambers.
In
a Resolution[15] dated
In
a Resolution[16] dated
On
x
x x x
The
administrative complaint of Adelpha Malabed against Judge Enrique C. Asis is
essentially that respondent Judge Asis was biased and partial in resolving two
civil cases in favor of certain parties because their lawyer, Atty. Meljohn
Dela Peña, was the respondent’s counsel in an administrative case against him.
The evidence submitted by the complainant is confined to the issuances of Judge
Asis in these two cases. Res ipsa
Loquitor. The Office of the Court Administrator had, on the basis of these
records, made the recommendation that the respondent be held liable for gross
ignorance of the procedural rules, which seems to imply that if the written
acts of the respondent without more cannot show bias or partiality, he can be
nailed down for gross ignorance.
The
respondent Judge Asis is the presiding judge of the RTC of Naval, Biliran,
Branch 16. The backdrop of the two cases coming before him is as follows: 1.)
civil case B-1016 entitled Adelpha Malabed vs. Spouses Ruben Cericos and Delia
Cericos was an appeal from the decision of the MCTC of Kawayan-Almeria Biliran
in civil case 860 for ejectment entitled Adelpha Malabed vs. Spouses Ruben
Cericos and Delia Cericos. The MCTC rendered a decision on
(2)
B-1252 entitled Perla Estreller Haverly vs. Rodolfo Catigbe, Juana Catigbe,
Adriano Ampong and Composa Ampong was an appeal from the decision of the MCTC
Kawayan-Almeria in civil case 973 entitled Perla Estreller Haverly vs. Rodolfo
Catigbe, Juana Catigbe, Adriano Ampong and Composa Ampong for recovery of
possession. The MCTC rendered the decision on
In
B-1016, Atty. Meljohn Dela Peña entered his appearance for the Cericos during
the presentation of the relief from judgment obtaining the favorable order of
But
we will observe that, as pointed out by the respondent in his comments which
the complainant did not refute, the administrative case RTJ-00-1590 where Atty.
Dela Peña represented the respondent was filed on
Hence,
for the complainant to say that the respondent issued the
The
complainant argues nonetheless that in SP 56613, the Court of Appeals found
that the respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
The
complainant cites several errors in the respondent’s order granting the
petition for relief in B-1016 as proof of his bias or partiality. To repeat,
the CA has found that the court erred in granting the petition for relief. But
any ruling that holds a judge civilly or administratively liable for errors in
his decision or order must have to reckon with the established doctrine of
immunity of judges for official acts. The rule is expressly stated in In re
Tayao, 229 SCRA 723, to the effect that a judge may not be administratively
charged for error of judgment in the absence of showing of bad faith, malice or
corrupt purpose. The error of the judgment must be so gross and patent as to
justify inference of gross ignorance or bad faith; otherwise, a judge must be
protected by the immunity of his office. As stated in Zabala vs. Pamaran, 39
SCRA 430, no one called upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process
of administering justice can claim to be infallible in his judgment.
In
this case, we cannot say that the respondent’s errors were so gross and patent
as to amount to evidence of bias or evasion of judicial duty.
As
the CA has observed in SP 56613, the petition for relief was filed 11 days late
on
The Cericos argued that they could
not be barred from filing a petition for relief, even if they failed to appeal.
They attributed their failure to appeal to excusable negligence. They argued
that they were in
There
also appeared to be a genuine clash over the issue of whether the fraud is
extrinsic as it turns on the factual question of whether the defendants Cericos
were actually aware of the alleged fraud committed by plaintiff (now
complainant) Malabed.
It
is our sense that the erroneous ruling of the respondent on the petition for
relief cannot simply be a product of gross or plain ignorance, but results from
a judge’s failure to consider all the factors in the equation, legal and
factual, a judicial error for which certiorari or appeal is the remedy.
The
second case B-1252 was decided by the respondent subsequent to the administrative
cases in which Atty. Dela Peña was his lawyer. In B-1252, the parties
represented by Atty. Dela Peña won. Yet, until B-1252 was decided, there was no
protest or opposition to the appearance of Atty. Dela Peña. That Atty. Dela
Peña had represented respondent in the previous administrative cases was a
matter of public record. If the plaintiff in B-1252, who is the sister of the
complainant, had any cause to doubt the impartiality of the respondent, she
should have moved for his inhibition. But she did not do this. She allowed the
respondent judge to hear and terminate the case. It is too late in the day for
her to complain.
B-1252 involves issues of fact and
law which the undersigned cannot pass judgment upon at this point of time. The
reason is that we are not the ones who are called upon to review the ruling of
the respondent. We understand that the plaintiff in B-1252 had appealed the
respondent’s decision to the Court of Appeals in the Visayas. The proper
doctrine to follow is that in case a party disagrees with a decision of the
court, the remedy is not to file an administrative case but appeal the case to
the superior court. This was done here. Only after the case has been finally
resolved on appeal can the question of whether the respondent was grossly
ignorant in issuing his decision be ripe for analysis.
The
case B-1118 is mentioned in the dispute in connection with a counter charge of
the respondent against his accuser Malabed. It is not relevant to the issue in
the administrative case and may be disregarded.
VII. Recommendation:
It is recommended that the
respondent judge be exonerated.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Rule
1.02, Canon I of the Code of Judicial Conduct[18]
provides that a judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.
Partiality, or bias, has been defined as a predisposition to decide a cause or
an issue in a certain way, which does not leave the mind perfectly open to
conviction.[19] However, mere suspicion
that respondent Judge is partial is not enough. Clear and convincing evidence
to prove the charge is required. The burden to prove that respondent Judge
committed the acts complained of rests on the complainant.[20]
Complainant
alleged that respondent Judge, in granting a petition for relief from judgment
in Civil Case No. B-1016, committed bias and partiality because the counsel for
defendants therein was the same counsel who represented respondent Judge in
administrative complaints filed against the latter. She likewise claimed that
in another civil case in which her sister Haverly was plaintiff, respondent
Judge reversed the ruling of the MCTC in favor of Haverly simply because the
counsel for defendants therein was Atty. De la Peña. To support her
allegations, complainant stated that the CA Decision dated
The OCA recommended that respondent
Judge be fined in the amount of P30,000.00, while the Investigating
Justice recommended that he be exonerated as the documentary evidence presented
by the complainant during pre-trial failed to sufficiently establish bias and
partiality on the part of respondent Judge. The Court, however, is not adopting
the finding of the Investigating Justice, who probably was not aware of the
past violations of respondent Judge for which he was previously disciplined. It,
instead, holds that respondent Judge should be fined in the amount of P20,000.00,
considering the frequency of administrative complaints that have been filed and
sanctioned against him.
The
administrative case docketed as RTJ-00-1590 in which Atty. Dela Peña
represented respondent Judge, was filed on
Equally
tenuous is complainant’s contention that the CA’s finding of grave abuse of
discretion of the part of respondent Judge proves the latter’s bias and
partiality. A finding of grave abuse of discretion does not necessarily prove
that respondent Judge displayed a preference for one of the party-litigants. As
aptly observed by the Investigating Justice, the reversal of a judge’s order by
a superior court in a certiorari case
is, in itself, not a ground for an administrative action against the judge.
Respondent Judge, by granting the petition for relief in Civil Case No. B-1016
on the ground that complainant failed to disclose a verbal agreement between
her family and defendants therein, may have committed an error of judgment.
However, in the absence of bad faith, such erroneous judgment cannot be a
ground for disciplinary action.[21]
In
Maylas, Jr. v. Judge Sese,[22]
respondent Judge was administratively charged because he granted a motion to
quash based on a ground not raised by the accused, and the CA found that such
act was tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. The Court dismissed the
complaint against respondent Judge, holding thus:
x x x in the absence of fraud, dishonesty and
corruption, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action. He cannot be subjected to liability – civil, criminal or
administrative – for any of his official acts, no matter how erroneous as long
as he acts in good faith. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty,
gross ignorance, bad faith or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be
administratively sanctioned. Settled is the rule that errors committed by a
judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings, but should instead be assailed through judicial
remedies.[23]
While
the Investigating Justice may have cleared respondent Judge of administrative
liability in the present case, the Court, nonetheless, takes into consideration
that there have been several administrative complaints previously filed against
respondent Judge.
In
Tabao v. Judge Asis,[24] herein respondent Judge was found
administratively liable for gross irregularity in the performance of his
duties, violation of Supreme Court circulars and regulations, and abuse of
authority and conduct unbecoming of a judge, and fined in the amount of P10,000.00.
In
Almendra v. Judge Asis,[25]
herein respondent Judge was found guilty of serious inefficiency, for which he
was suspended for ten (10) days, fined P40,000.00 and warned that a
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.
In
Atty. Nenita Ceniza-Layese v. Judge
Enrique C. Asis,[26]
respondent Judge was also found guilty of misconduct and dishonesty, for which
he was fined P20,000.00.
On
the other hand, the cases of Ang v. Judge
Asis[27] and Dadizon v. Judge Asis[28] were
both dismissed for lack of merit, although in the former, respondent Judge was
reprimanded and made to pay a fine of P5,000.00, as well as admonished
to be more circumspect and act with more dispatch in the performance of his
official functions.
Respondent
Judge must bear in mind that membership in the judiciary circumscribes one’s
personal conduct and imposes upon him certain restrictions, the faithful
observance of which is the price one has to pay for holding such a
distinguished position. A magistrate of the law must comport himself in a
manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only with
respect to the performance of his official duties, but also to his behavior
outside of his sala and as a private individual. His
conduct must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the
ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the people’s faith in the judicial system lest public
confidence in the judiciary would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible
and negligent conduct of judges.[29]
In this case, respondent Judge should have been more cautious in his close
associations with members of the Bar that led complainant to believe that the
former had already been predisposed to the opposing party and, hence, renders
his impartiality questionable.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Enrique C.
Asis of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of Naval, Biliran, is ordered to
pay a FINE of P20,000.00,
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
This
Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
|
WE CONCUR: |
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
[1] Rollo, pp. 1-4.
[2] Id. at 6-12.
[3] Id. at 13-17.
[4] Id. at 18-19.
[5] Id. at 197-202.
[6] Id. at 20-23.
[7] Date
of filing does not appear in the records.
[8] Rollo, pp. 25-34.
[9] Id. at 46-51.
[10] Docketed
as Civil Case No. B-1118, entitled Perla
Estreller Haverly, joined by her husband William J. Haverly v. Rodolfo M.
Catigbe, Sr., Juan Catigbe, Adriano G. Ampong and Composa G. Ampong.
[11] Rollo,
pp. 71-73.
[12] Id. at 151-160.
[13] Id. at 188-192.
[14] Id. at 194-196.
[15] Id. at 209.
[16] Id. at 215.
[17] Dated
February 27, 2008.
[18] Promulgated
by the Supreme Court on September 5, 1989, which took effect October 20, 1989.
[19] Black’s
Law Dictionary Abridged Fifth Ed., p. 84.
[20] Fenina Santos v. Judge Erasto D. Tanciongco, A.M. No. MTJ-06-1631, September 30, 2008.
[21] Almendra v. Judge Asis, 386 Phil. 264,
272 (2000).
[22] A.M.
No. RTJ-06-2012, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 602.
[23] Id. at 605-606.
[24] 322
Phil. 630 (1996).
[25] Supra note 21.
[26] A.M.
No. RTJ-07-2034, October 15, 2008.
[27] 424
Phil. 105 (2002).
[28] 464
Phil. 571 (2004).
[29] Aureo G. Bayaca v. Judge Tranquilino V. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1676, January 29, 2009.