Republic of the
Supreme Court
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ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, Complainant, -
versus - ROLANDO R. SOMOSA, EDGAR CORDERO, and RODOLFO HARO, Sheriffs, Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), GANI LACATAN and CAMILO DIVINAGRACIA, JR., Sheriffs, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Respondents. |
A.M. No.
P-09-2610 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3072-P) Present:
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing,* Ynares-Santiago,* CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, chico-nazario, velasco, jr., nachura, LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION,
PERALTA, BERSAMIN,
ABAD,
JJ. Promulgated: August 13, 2009
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- - - - - - - - - - - - - -x D E C I S
I O N PER CURIAM: |
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Before
this Court is a letter-complaint[1]
dated July 3, 2007 filed by complainant Atty. Hector P. Teodosio against
respondent Sheriffs Gani Lacatan and Camilo Divinagracia, Jr., Deputy Sheriffs
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City, and respondents Sheriffs
Rolando Somosa, Edgardo Cordero and Rodolfo Haro, Deputy Sheriffs of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City, with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) relative to the irregular manner of implementing the writ
of execution issued by the MTCC, Branch 2, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-6-5516 to 03-6-5542, 03-9-6218 to 03-9-6270, 03-10-6498
to 03-10-6549, entitled People of the
Philippines v. Mary Ann Ng.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On
August 27, 2004, the MTCC, Branch 2, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, rendered
a Decision[2] on
the civil aspect of Criminal Case Nos. 03-6-5516 to 03-6-5542, 03-9-6218 to
03-9-6270, 03-10-6498 to 03-10-6549, entitled People of the Philippines v. Mary Ann Ng, for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 filed by
therein private complainant Lita Gamboa against therein accused Mary Ann Ng,
President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Nueva Swine Valley, Inc. (Nueva
Swine). Said decision was based on an amicable settlement entered into between
accused Ng and Keylargo Commodities Trading (Keylargo), represented by therein
private complainant Lita Gamboa, wherein the former agreed to pay on
installment basis her civil liability in the form of post dated checks she will
issue, for and in behalf of Nueva Swine.
When
therein accused Ng failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the
judgment, therein private complainant, through her counsel, moved for the
execution of the decision. On
NOW
THEREFORE, you are hereby commanded to cause the execution of the aforesaid
judgment on the civil aspect of the cases; to levy the goods and chattels of
the accused, except those which are exempt from execution and to make the sale
thereof in accordance with the procedure outlined by Rule 39, Revised Rules of
Court, and in such cases made and provided together with all your lawful fees
for the service of this Writ.
In
case sufficient personal property of the accused cannot be found whereof to
satisfy the amount of the said judgment, you are hereby directed to levy the
real property of said accused and to sell the same or so much thereof in the
manner provided for by law for the satisfaction of the said judgment. You shall
only sell so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy
the judgment and lawful fees, and make a report to this Court every thirty (30)
days on the proceedings taken until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its
effectivity expires.
On
On
May 30, 2007, Nicolasito Solas, Ex-Officio
Sheriff and Clerk of Court of the MTCC, Iloilo City directed herein respondents,
Sheriffs Johnny Tugado, Rolando Somosa, Edgardo Cordero, and Rodolfo Haro, to
implement the writ.[5] Co-respondents, Sheriffs
Gani Lacatan and Camilo Divinagracia, Jr., both Deputy Sheriffs of the
On
On
On
On
On
On
In
a letter complaint dated July 3, 2007 and filed on July 9, 2007 with the OCA,
complainant alleged that although he had previously sought information from Atty.
Sumaculub of the RTC of Iloilo, and Mr. Solas of the MTC of Iloilo, on the
purported irregular implementation of the writ of execution in People of the Philippines v. Mary Ann Ng,
both had not replied. Complainant then sought help from the OCA requesting it to
direct Atty. Sumaculub and Mr. Solas to furnish him the said information.
On
In
compliance with said directive of the OCA, Executive Judge Patricio set the
initial hearing on
On
In
his Affidavit[12] dated
Complainant
further averred that on
Complainant
added that the swine levied upon were sold at a public auction on
To
support the complainant’s testimony, Dr. Donglal, Production Manager and Farm Veterinarian
of Nueva Swine, submitted his Affidavit[13]
dated
On
the other hand, respondents Lacatan, Divinagracia, Somosa and Haro alleged in
their Joint Counter-Affidavit[14]
dated August 29, 2007 that prior to the implementation of the writ, respondent
Sheriff Tugado, head of the group, together with Keylargo’s representative,
went to Bacolod City to verify certain matters before implementing the writ on
May 31, 2007. On
In their Joint Counter-Affidavit[15]
dated
On
x
x x x
In
summation, it was the late City Court Deputy Sheriff Johnny Tugado, assigned at
Branch 3, MTCC-Iloilo, who actively facilitated the preparatory matters, with
the active participation of a lawyer/practitioner Atty. Gelacio Lira by way of
following up with Branch 2, MTCC- Bacolod City, as far as, the implementation
of the Writ of Execution, issued by said Court, as well as the Order, dated
January 22, 2007.
It
was sheriff Tugado who got hold of the original copies of said Court document,
but he did not present it to Mr. Nicolasito Solas, the MTCC-Iloilo City Clerk
of Court/Ex-Officio City Sheriff,
instead showed to the latter, only a photocopy thereof. Yet, Mr. Solas issued
an office order, directing the four City Deputy Sheriffs to comply and execute
the order of Judge Demonteverde. He also wrote a letter request to RTC Clerk of
Court Atty. Jerry Sumaculub for him to
provide RTC Sheriffs to assist his City Sheriffs to implement the said Order,
who granted said letter request by issuing a memorandum to RTC Sheriffs Camilo
Divinagracia, Jr. and Gani Lacatan.
These
sheriffs therefore comprised the team that were responsible for the
implementation of the Order, and Writ of Execution issued by Branch 2,
Since
the letter of Atty. Hector Teodosio requested for these information, the
undersigned so limits its report to these matters as narrated, since an
exhaustive investigation is being formally conducted by RTC Executive Judge
Roger B. Patricio.
x
x x x
In
his Report dated
The
undersigned Investigator finds merit in the charges of the complainant.
1. The respondents-sheriffs violated the
procedure laid down by Sec. 9, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
governing the implementation in the execution of judgments for money. Under
Sec. 9(a), supra, it is clear that the officer executing the Writ of Execution
shall demand from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount
stated in the Writ of Execution and all the legal fees. The payment shall be in
cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or in any form
acceptable to the latter.
The
Rule further provides that levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor may
be had by the executing sheriff if the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part
of the full amount stated in the Writ of Execution and all the lawful fees in
cash, certified bank check or other acceptable mode of payment (Sec. 9(b), supra). If the judgment obligor cannot
pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other mode
acceptable to the judgment obligee, he is given the option to immediately
choose which of his property or part thereof, not otherwise exempt from
execution, may be levied upon sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the
judgment obligor does not exercise the option immediately, or when he is absent
or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can now first levy
his personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal
properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
The
respondents-sheriffs cannot and should not have been the ones to determine if
the judgment obligor (in this case Mary Ann Ng) cannot immediately pay because
it is the judgment obligor who is in the best position to know if he can
immediately pay by way of cash, certified bank check or any other mode of
payment acceptable to the judgment obligee.
x
x x x
From
the evidence on record, it appears that the respondents have violated the laws
and the Rules of Court by implementing a valid Writ of Execution issued by a
competent court in a “Gestapo”-like manner and have caused considerable damages
to the Nueva Swine Valley, Inc. in the form of hundreds of hogs which were
taken by the respondents without due process of law.
RECOMMENDATION
In
view of the foregoing, the undersigned Investigator finds respondent-Sheriffs
Gani Lacatan, Camilo Divinagracia, Jr., Rolando Somosa, Edgardo Cordero and
Rodolfo Haro guilty of the charges for GRAVE MISCONDUCT filed against them by
complainant Atty. Hector Teodosio, and considering the severity of the acts
committed and the extent of the damages they have caused to the Nueva Swine
Valley, Inc., client of the complainant, it is hereby respectfully recommended
that the respondents be suspended for a period of six (6) months without pay,
and that they should be warned that a repetition of similar offense, a more
severe penalty shall be imposed upon them.
For having been killed before the
investigation of this case was completed, the case against sheriff Johnny
Tugado is recommended to be dismissed.[16]
In
a Memorandum dated
We
agree with the findings of the Investigating Judge.
Section
9 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in the
execution of a judgment for money, the officer enforcing such judgment shall
demand from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount
stated in the writ of execution and all lawful fees. If the judgment obligor
cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank check or other
mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon
the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever
which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution
giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part
thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment
obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the
personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal
properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
In
the implementation of the writ of execution, respondents failed to strictly
comply with the above rule. They failed to show that they demanded from accused
Ng the payment of the judgment obligation. Records show that the writ was
served on an officer of Nueva Swine who is not a party to the case and not on
accused Ng. In their Return of Service dated
Respondents’
argument that the checks, subject of the criminal case, were issued by accused
Ng as president of Nueva Swine and for the benefit of the corporation is irrelevant.
The
Writ of Execution dated August 4, 2007 issued by MTCC, Branch 2, Bacolod City,
specifically directed the sheriff or his deputies to cause the execution of the
judgment on the civil aspect of the cases; to
levy the goods and chattels of the accused, except those which are exempt
from execution and to make the sale thereof in accordance with the procedure
outlined by Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court. If the personal property of the
accused is insufficient to satisfy the amount of the said judgment by levying
the real property of said accused and to
sell the same or so much thereof in the manner provided for by law for the
satisfaction of the said judgment. The writ made no mention of implementing the
writ on the properties of Nueva Swine, rather, it provided to levy the goods
and chattels of the accused Ng. Further, the Order dated
It
is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against
property unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor.
In
the case at bench, the officer of Nueva Swine during the implementation of the
writ of execution informed respondents that the personal properties being
levied upon does not belong to accused Ng, the judgment obligor, but to Nueva
Swine, a juridical person separate and distinct from the judgment obligor. Such
information should have warned respondents of the possibility of levying
properties not belonging to accused Ng. Respondents have no authority to
determine which property to levy based on documents presented to them and to
conclude that the checks issued by accused Ng was for and in behalf of Nueva
Swine. Their only directive is to implement the writ on the properties of
accused Ng. They have no capacity to vary the judgment and deviate therefrom
based on their own interpretation thereof.
Well settled is the rule that when
writs are placed in the hands of sheriffs, it is their ministerial duty to
proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute them in accordance
with their mandate. It is not their duty to decide on the truth or sufficiency
of the processes committed to him for service as their duty to execute a valid
writ is not ministerial and not discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty
is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. Where a requirement
is made in explicit and unambiguous terms, no discretion is left to the sheriff
– he must see to it that its mandate is obeyed.
Thus,
echoing the decision of the Honorable Court in Tropical Homes vs. Fortune “it is basic that the only portion of
the decision that becomes the subject of execution is that ordained in the
dispositive portion. Whatever may be found in the body of the decision can only
be considered as part of the reason or conclusions of the court and while they
may serve as a guide or enlighten to determine the ratio decidendi what is controlling is what appears in the
dispositive part of the decision.
Being one specifically entrusted
with the proper execution of judgments, a sheriff should know that the writs of
execution were not enforceable against persons who are clearly not claiming
rights under the judgment debtors nor acting in the latter’s discretion and
control. It must be emphasized that in serving the court’s writs and processes,
and in implementing the orders of the court, sheriffs cannot afford to err
without affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of justice.
They should set the example by faithfully observing the Rules of Court, and not
brazenly disregard the Rules.
We
take note of the Order of the RTC, Branch 66, Barotac Viejo,
As
shown by the evidence on record, the writ of execution was on the civil aspect
of the criminal cases which were filed against accused Mary Ann Ng before the
MTCC, Branch 2 in
It was alleged by the private
respondent Lita Gamboa that the transaction which gave rise to the filing of
the several cases for Violation of BP 22 against accused Mary Ann Ng was for
the benefit of the petitioner-corporation in payment for feeds. The checks
which were issued by the accused as signatory had the name of the corporation
printed on them.
During
the hearing, however, it was not clearly shown that when accused issued the
checks to complainant Keylargo Commodities, it was authorized by the petitioner
corporation through a board resolution. When the compromise agreement was
signed by Mary Ann Ng as regard the civil aspects of the criminal cases, there
was no evidence presented wherein the petitioner corporation authorized Mary
Ann Ng to sign the same. These were not introduced in evidence.
If
such facts had been established, this Court could readily disregard the legal
fiction of corporate entity or piercing the veil of corporate entity so that
judgment may be enforced against the property of the petitioner corporation.
x x x x x x x x x
As
regards the allegation that respondents slaughtered one pig and cooked it into
“lechon” over the objection of the officer-in-charge of Nueva Swine, records
show that respondents, in their Inventory of the hogs levied upon, admitted
that they slaughtered one swine but argues that it was Mr. Donglal who proposed
that the pig be slaughtered as the provision for food for those executing the
writ were missing. This was, however, belied by Mr. Donglal.
Sheriffs
play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents of the
law high standards are expected of them. They and their deputies are the
front-line representatives of the justice system, and if, through their lack of
care and diligence in the implementation of judicial writs, they lose the trust
reposed on them, they inevitably diminish likewise the faith of the people in
the judiciary.
Clearly,
respondents violated the laws and Rules of Court in implementing the writ of
execution that has caused considerable damage to Nueva Swine. They have been remiss
in the discharge of their duties as officers of the court in the implementation
of the subject writ of execution. Such acts constitute conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service which is punishable by
suspension from the service for six (6) months and one day to one year for the
first offense and dismissal for the second offense.
Respondent
Johnny Tugado was killed before the investigation of the case was completed,
hence, the complaint against him be dismissed.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is
respectfully recommended to the Honorable Court that:
(a)
[T]his
matter be FORMALLY DOCKETED as an
administrative complaint against respondents Rolando R. Somosa, Edgar Cordero
and Rodolfo Haro, Sheriffs of the MTCC,
(b)
Respondents
be held liable for acts grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and be SUSPENDED for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS without salary and other benefits and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the
future shall be dealt with severely.
(c)
The
complaint against respondent Johnny Tugado be DISMISSED in view of his death.
In
its Resolution dated
Sheriffs are ministerial officers. They are agents of the law and not
agents of the parties, neither of the creditor nor of the purchaser at a sale
conducted by either of them.[17] As
such, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs must discharge their duties with due care
and utmost diligence, because in serving the court’s writs and processes and in
implementing the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without
affecting the efficiency of the process of the administration of justice.
Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and as agents
of the law, high standards are expected of them.[18]
The
procedure for the implementation of a writ of execution of judgment is provided
for under Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which states:
SEC. 9. Execution
of judgments for money, how enforced. -
(a)
Immediate
payment on demand.
– The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding
from the judgment obligor the
immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all
lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash, certified bank check
payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the
latter, the amount of the judgment debt under proper receipt directly to the
judgment obligee or his authorized representative if present at the time of
payment. The lawful fees shall be handed under proper receipt to the executing
sheriff who shall turn over the said amount within the same day to the clerk of
court of the court that issued the writ. (Emphasis Supplied.)
x x x x
In
the present case, it was clearly shown that respondents failed to follow the
above-cited procedure. Instead of demanding payment from accused Ng, the
judgment obligor and therein defendant, as to the civil aspect in Criminal Case
Nos. 03-6-5516 to 03-6-5542, 03-9-6218 to 03-9-6270, 03-10-6498 to 03-10-6549,
respondents served the writ of execution on Dr. Donglal, an officer of Nueva
Swine. Respondents claimed that they tried to contact accused Ng through Dr.
Donglal although the latter did not mention such incident in his affidavit. However,
respondents failed to establish that they exerted all means to look for accused
Ng, who should have been given the option as to which of her personal properties
could be levied. They merely proceeded to demand payment from Dr. Donglal who
was not even a party to the said criminal case. Worse, they levied the property
of Nueva Swine.
In
the execution of a money judgment, the sheriff must first make a demand on the
obligor for payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution.[19] Property
belonging to third persons cannot be levied upon.[20] Accused
Ng was the judgment obligor as stated in said writ, and not Nueva Swine,
although she was the President and CEO of the said company. She has a personality
which is separate and distinct from that of the corporation[21]
and, likewise, her properties cannot be considered as properties of the
corporation. Even assuming that accused Ng owned a majority of the stocks of
Nueva Swine, respondents could have, at most, proceeded against her shares of
stock, but not levy the hogs of Nueva Swine. Although the legal fiction that a
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of stockholders
and members may be disregarded, this exception should not be applied if it is
used as a means to perpetrate fraud or an illegal act; or as a vehicle to evade
an existing obligation, to circumvent statutes, or to confuse legitimate issues.[22] Therefore, when respondents levied the
properties of the corporation, a third party to the case and not named in the
writ, they exceeded their authority to strictly comply with the writ of
execution.
Moreover,
respondents committed grave abuse of authority when they forcibly took the
swine despite the explanation of Dr. Donglal that the properties being levied
did not belong to accused Ng. They continued to load the hogs into their cargo
trucks even after having been informed of the TRO. Respondents’ taking was
aggravated by the fact that they slaughtered one of the hogs, a fact that they expressly
admitted and even stated in the Sheriffs’ Return of Service[23]
dated
Such
conduct of respondents evidently falls short of the standard established by the
pertinent provisions of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,[26]
specifically Section 2, which states that court personnel shall carry out their
responsibilities as public servants in as courteous a manner as possible; and
Section 6, which states that court personnel shall expeditiously enforce rules
and implement orders of the court within the limits of their authority.
Respondents
became administratively liable for grave abuse of authority when they forcibly
levied and took away properties belonging to a third person and, thereafter, appropriated
the levied property for themselves. Respondents’ grave abuse of authority
amounted to gross misconduct, which under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,[27]
Rule IV, Section 52 A (3) thereof, is a grave offense punishable by dismissal
even for the first offense.
The
recommendations of both the Investigating Judge and the OCA that respondents be
suspended from the service for six (6) months without pay are not commensurate
to the gross misconduct committed. Although
respondents are first-time offenders, the Court takes into consideration the seriousness
of their offense. They did not only
implement a writ of execution in excess of their authority, but appropriated a
part of the levied property for themselves. Their act of appropriation is a
grave offense that may even subject them to criminal prosecution.
Previously, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Fuentes and Paralisan,[28] where
therein respondent sheriff hastily implemented a writ of execution when he
failed to confer with the officials concerned as to which properties were to be
levied, he was found guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reemployment in any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
In
Flores v. Caniya,[29] where
therein sheriff failed to issue receipts for money entrusted to him in his
official capacity, thereby amounting to misappropriation, he was found guilty
of dishonesty, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, and dismissed from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits, and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Likewise,
in Meneses v. Zaragoza,[30] where
therein respondent sheriff demanded money from therein complainant on the
pretext that it would be used for demolition expenses, he was found guilty of
grave misconduct and simple neglect of duty and, accordingly, dismissed from
the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except earned leaves, and
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government.
In
view of the gravity of respondents’ offense, and bolstered by established
jurisprudence, the Court finds respondents guilty of grave abuse of authority
amounting to grave misconduct, and is constrained to impose a penalty of
dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and privileges,
except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in
any branch or agency of the government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. The penalty of
dismissal even for the slightest breach of duty by, and the slightest
irregularity in the conduct of, said officers and employees, is warranted.[31]
WHEREFORE, herein respondents, Sheriffs Gani
Lacatan and Camilo Divinagracia, Jr., Deputy Sheriffs of the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, and Sheriffs
Rolando Somosa, Edgardo Cordero and Rodolfo Haro, Deputy Sheriffs of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities of Iloilo City, are found GUILTY of grave abuse of authority amounting to GRAVE MISCONDUCT, and are DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if
any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or agency of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
This
Decision shall take effect immediately.
SO
ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
On official leave LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
|
On official leave CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate
Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate
Justice
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate
Justice
|
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-4.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
Affidavit dated
[10] Sheriffs
Return of Service dated
[11] Report
dated
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16] Citations
omitted.
[17] Sismaet v. Sabas, A.M. No. P-03-1680,
[18] Abalde
v. Roque, A.M. No. P-02-1643,
[19]
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Balubar, Jr., A.M. No. P-04-1767,
[20] QBE Insurance (Phils.) Inc. v. Rabello, Jr.,
A.M. No. P-04-1884,
[21] Prudential Bank v. Alviar, G.R. No.
150197,
[22] Aratea and Canonigo v. Suico and Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 170284, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA 501.
[23] Rollo, pp. 67-69.
[24] Caja v. Nanquil, A.M. No. P-04-1885,
[25] Rules
of Court, Rule 39, Sec. 14.
[26] Promulgated
by the Supreme Court En Banc through A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC dated
[27] Promulgated
by the Civil Service Commission through Resolution No. 99-1936 dated
[28] A.M.
No. RTJ-94-1270,
[29] A.M.
No. P-95-1133,
[30] A.M.
No. P-04-1768,
[31] Orfila v. Arellano, A.M. No. P-06-2110,
and Spouses Arellano v. Maniñgas, et al.,
A.M. No. P-03-1692,