FIRST DIVISION
G.R.
No. 184337 (Heirs of Federico C. Delgado and Annalisa Pesico v. Luisito Q. Gonzalez
and Antonio T. Buenaflor)
Promulgated:
August 7, 2009
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D I S S E N T I N
G O P I N I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I register
my dissent to the majority opinion on the main ground that the Court should
have entertained and resolved the petition on the merits.
It is conceded that only the Solicitor
General may bring and defend actions in behalf of the Republic of the
I submit that the instant petition
falls under the first exception wherein there was negation of due process which
prejudiced the State and the private offended party when the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) failed for unexplained reasons to file the petition for
the State within the extended period. As
an equitable gesture, the OSG could have simply filed a manifestation adopting
the instant petition and requesting that petitioners’ initiatory pleading
before this Court be treated as if filed by said office.
The instant petition has
unique and special circumstances that justify adjudication on the merits. The antecedents reveal that Investigating
Prosecutor Cielitolindo A. Layun dismissed the complaint for lack of probable
cause. On
On
The Court of Appeals (CA), acting on
the petition of respondents under Rule 65 in CA-G.R. SP No. 101196, found no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Acting Justice Secretary and
dismissed the petition on
The OSG did not appeal the
In this factual milieu, it is
submitted that there was denial of due process to the State and the private
offended party. It is settled in this jurisdiction that due process means a law
which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial. We held that “[d]ue process contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, affecting one’s person or
property. It is designed to secure justice as a living reality; not to
sacrifice it by paying undue homage to formality. For substance must prevail
over form.”[4]
Clearly, the essence of due process is
the opportunity to be heard.
Moreover, it has been explained in Santiago
v. Alikpala[5] that due
process is “responsiveness to the supremacy of reason” and “obedience to the
dictates of justice.”
The Court in
To satisfy the due process requirement official action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. It has been identified as freedom from the arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty to those strivings for justice and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect democratic traditions of legal and political thought.
When the OSG failed to file the
petition in G.R. 184507 to question the August 29, 2008 CA Amended Decision and
even declined to adopt the petition of petitioners in G.R. No. 184337, the
State and the private offended parties, herein petitioners, were deprived of
their opportunity to be heard on the flip-flopping posture of the CA on the
issue of probable cause. It was expected that the OSG will pursue the position
it has taken before the CA that probable cause exists and should have proceeded
to assail the August 29, 2008 CA Amended Decision since it overruled said OSG’s
postulation. With the inability of OSG to file the petition in question, the State
and petitioners were unfairly deprived of their right to have the
More importantly, in view of the
conflicting CA decisions, it would be to the best interests of the State and
the parties to have the conflicting decisions reviewed by this Court to settle
once and for all the correctness of the ruling on the determination of probable
cause against respondents. The failure
of OSG to file the petition in G.R. No. 184507 certainly prejudiced the rights
of the State and the private offended parties to due process of law. In this light, I find that the petition
should have been entertained by this Court to accommodate a judgment on the
merits.
Even granting arguendo that the factual setting of this petition does not fall
under any of the two (2) exceptions adverted to, the instant petition should
have been given due course as the Court can suspend the rules to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. The facts reveal
that there is an eyewitness to the killing, Annalisa Pesico. Settled jurisprudence is to the effect that
positive identification is preferred over alibi and denial. With this in mind, the best course of action
to take is to direct the trial court to proceed with the trial and decide the
case after full presentation and reception of evidence. What is required in a preliminary
investigation is only the finding of probable cause and not the determination
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This
is the better course of action to take since the case is already pending before
the RTC Manila. The CA, in its assailed
Even if the petition filed
by petitioners should be denied, still, the fallo
of the
The
eminent Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, in the celebrated case of Crespo,
explained the exercise of a court’s jurisdiction over a criminal case once the
information is filed:
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe (sic) and it maybe (sic) elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.[8] (Emphasis supplied.)
Roberts, Jr. reinforced Crespo this way:
This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering justice.
The real and ultimate test of the independence and integrity of his court is not the filing of the aforementioned motions at that stage of the proceedings but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information of the basis of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor. Before that time, the following pronouncement in Crespo did not yet truly become relevant or applicable:
The rule
therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed
in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or
acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in court he cannot impose his opinion on
the trial court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court [which] has the option to grant or deny
the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secertary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.
However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in faithful exercise of judicial prerogative. This Court pertinently stated so in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals:
Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by
the prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The
trial judge must himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient
evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after
an assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required was the trial judge’s own assessment of such evidence, it
not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion
merely to accept the prosecution’s word for its supposed insufficiency.
As aptly observed the Office of the Solicitor
General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case
and merely anchoring the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution,
the trial judge relinquished the discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In
effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of Justice which decided
what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in
violation of the ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul.[9]
(Emphasis supplied.)
The assailed CA Amended Decision of
For the above reasons, I vote to give due course to
the petition.
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice