ELY QUILATAN & ROSVIDA G.R. No. 183059
QUILATAN-ELIAS,
Petitioners, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
HEIRS
OF LORENZO QUILATAN,
namely
NENITA QUILATAN-YUMPING,
LIBRADA
QUILATAN-SAN PEDRO,
FLORENDA
QUILATAN-ESTEBRAN
and
GODOFREDO QUILATAN and
the
MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR OF
TAGUIG,
METRO MANILA Promulgated:
(now
Respondents. August 28, 2009
x
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YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
The issue for resolution is whether the
Court of Appeals correctly reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (
On August 15, 1999, petitioners Ely Quilatan
and Rosvida Quilatan-Elias filed Civil Case No. 67367 for nullification of Tax
Declaration Nos. D-014-00330 and D-014-00204 and Partition of the Estate of the
late Pedro Quilatan with damages against respondent heirs of Lorenzo
Quilatan. They claim that during his
lifetime, Pedro Quilatan owned two parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration
Nos. 1680 and 2301, both located in Taguig, Metro Manila; that sometime in
1998,[1]
they discovered that said tax declarations were cancelled without their
knowledge and new ones were issued, to wit: Tax Declaration No. D-014-00204 and
D-014-00330, under the names of Spouses Lorenzo Quilatan and Anita Lizertiquez
as owners thereof.[2]
On June 22, 2004, the trial court rendered its
decision declaring as void the cancellation of Tax Declaration Nos. 1680 and
2301. At the same time, it ordered the
partition of the subject properties into three equal shares among the heirs of
Francisco, Ciriaco and Lorenzo, all surnamed Quilatan.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
without prejudice the decision of the trial court on the ground that
petitioners failed to implead other co-heirs who are indispensable parties to
the case. Thus, the judgment of the
trial court was null and void for want of jurisdiction.[3] Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration[4] but it was denied.
Hence, this petition for review where
petitioners argue that the issue of failure to implead indispensable parties
was a mere afterthought because respondents did not raise the same in their
Answer to the complaint, but only for the first time in their Motion for
Reconsideration of the June 22, 2004 decision of the trial court.[5] Petitioners further argue that the order of
dismissal without prejudice and the re-filing of the case in order to implead
the heirs of Ciriaco only invite multiplicity of suits since the second action
would be a repetition of the first action, where the judgment therein rightly
partitioned the subject properties into three equal shares, apportioning each
share to the heirs of the children of Pedro Quilatan.[6]
The petition lacks merit.
Records show that Pedro Quilatan died
intestate in 1960 and was survived by his three children, namely, Ciriaco,
Francisco and Lorenzo, all of whom are now deceased. Ciriaco was survived by his children, namely Purita
Santos, Rosita Reyes, Renato Quilatan, Danilo Quilatan, and Carlito Quilatan;
Francisco was survived by herein petitioners and their two other siblings,
Solita Trapsi and Rolando Quilatan; while Lorenzo was survived by his children,
herein respondents.
In the complaint filed by petitioners before
the trial court, they failed to implead their two siblings, Solita and Rolando,
and all the heirs of Ciriaco, as co-plaintiffs or as defendants. It is clear that the central thrust of the
complaint filed in Civil Case No. 67367 was to revert the subject properties
back to the estate of Pedro Quilatan, thereby making all his heirs pro indiviso co-owners thereof, and to
partition them equally among themselves; and that all the co-heirs and persons
having an interest in the subject properties are indispensable parties to an action
for partition, which will not lie without the joinder of said parties.
Respondents could not be blamed if they did
not raise this issue in their Answer because in an action for partition of real
estate, it is the plaintiff who is mandated by the Rules to implead all the
indispensable parties, considering that the absence of one such party renders
all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.[7]
Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly applied
Section 1, Rule 69 and Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which read:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having
the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule
prescribed, setting forth in his complaint
the nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real
estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all the other
persons interested in the property. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 7. Compulsory joinder of
indispensable parties. — Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.
In Moldes
v. Villanueva,[8] the Court held that:
An indispensable party is one who has such an interest in the
controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his
absence, without injuring or affecting that interest. A party who has not
only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an
interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting
his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.
He is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the
parties already before the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable. In Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo v. Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, the
Court held that the joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the
presence of indispensable parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot
attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment
rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void, with no authority to act not
only as to the absent party but also as to those present. The responsibility of impleading all the
indispensable parties rests on the petitioner/plaintiff.
Likewise, in Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company v. Hon. Floro T. Alejo, the Court ruled that the evident aim
and intent of the Rules regarding the joinder of indispensable and necessary
parties is a complete determination of all possible issues, not only between
the parties themselves but also as regards to other persons who may be affected
by the judgment. A valid judgment cannot even be rendered where there is
want of indispensable parties.
On the issue of multiplicity of suits, the
Court of Appeals correctly ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67367
without prejudice for want of jurisdiction.
The dismissal could have been avoided had petitioners, instead of merely
stating in their complaint the unimpleaded indispensable parties, joined them
as parties to the case in order to have a complete and final determination of
the action. As aptly observed by the
appellate court:
Indeed, a perusal of the records will show that plaintiffs-appellees did
not implead their other co-heirs, either as plaintiffs or defendants in the
case. Their complaint squarely stated
that Pedro Quilatan had three children, namely, Ciriaco Quilatan, Francisco
Quilatan, and Lorenzo Quilatan, who are now all deceased. Ciriaco Quilatan is survived by his children,
namely, Purita Santos, Rosita Reyes, Renato Quilatan, Danilo Quilatan, and
Carlito Quilatan. Defendants-appellants
are the children of Lorenzo Quilatan.
The plaintiffs-appellees, along with Solita Trapsi and Rolando Quilatan,
are the children of Francisco Quilatan.
However, Purita Santos, Rosita Reyes, Renato Quilatan, Danilo Quilatan,
Carlito Quilatan, Solita Trapsi, and Rolando Quilatan were not joined as
parties in the instant case.[9]
The rationale for treating all the co-owners
of a property as indispensable parties in a suit involving the co-owned
property is explained in Arcelona v.
Court of Appeals:[10]
As held by
the Supreme Court, were the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be
maintained by a person having merely an undivided interest in any given tract
of land, a judgment in favor of the defendants would not be conclusive as
against the other co-owners not parties to the suit, and thus the defendant in
possession of the property might be harassed by as many succeeding actions of
ejectment, as there might be co-owners of the title asserted against him. The purpose of this provision was to prevent
multiplicity of suits by requiring the person asserting a right against the
defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all
persons standing in the same position, so that the whole matter in dispute may
be determined once and for all in one litigation.
In fine, the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present. Hence, the trial court should
have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
is hereby DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 88851 which reversed the decision of the
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 46.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Sepulveda v. Pelaez, 490 Phil. 710, 722 (2005).
[8] G.R. No. 161955, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 697, 707-708.
[9] Rollo, p. 69.
[10] 345 Phil. 250, 268-269 (1997), cited in Casals v. Tayud Golf and Country Club, Inc., G.R. No. 183105, July 22, 2009.