EN BANC
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PAGAYANAN R. HADJI-SIRAD,
Petitioner, - versus - CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Respondent. |
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G.R.
No. 182267 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,
JJ. Promulgated: August
28, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Pagayanan Hadji-Sirad is seeking
the review and reversal of the Resolutions dated 18 January 2008[1]
and 12 March 2008[2]
of the Court of Appeals, dismissing her Petition for Certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 02103-MIN, for being the wrong mode of appeal, for her failure
to state material dates as regards her Motion for Reconsideration before the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), and for her failure to append a copy of said Motion
for Reconsideration to her dismissed Petition.
Petitioner intended to challenge in her Petition before the Court of
Appeals (1) CSC Resolution No. 070875[3]
dated 7 May 2007, affirming the Decision dated 27 February 2006 of CSC Regional
Office (CSCRO) No. XII, finding petitioner guilty of Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and dismissing
petitioner from service; and (2) CSC Resolution No. 072196[4]
dated
The
factual and procedural antecedents of the instant Petition are as follows:
On
The result of the investigation established
the following facts:
1. On
2. The
said Personal Data Sheet was submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-COA to
support her appointment as State Auditor I;
3. In
Item number 18 of the Personal data Sheet, particularly on civil service
eligibility, Hadji-Sirad indicated that she possesses Career Service
Professional Eligibility having passed the examination on October 17, 1993 at
Iligan City with a rating of 88.31%;
4. Accordingly,
the examination records of Hadji-Sirad were retrieved. The same were compared
with the entries in her Personal Data
Sheet. It is revealed that:
4.1 Applicant
and examinee Hadji-Sirad took the same as shown by the picture attached to the
application form and picture seat plan for Room 003 Administration Building,
4.2 Comparison,
however of these pictures with that found in the Personal Data Sheet of
Hadji-Sirad dated November 10, 1994 reveals that appointee bears no semblance
with applicant or examinee Hadji Sirad; Examinee Hadji Sirad looks older than
the true Hadji Sirad despite the fact that the examination was conducted in
1993 while the Personal Data Sheet was accomplished in 1994;
4.3 There
exist differences in the strokes used in affixing the signature in the picture
seat plan compared with that in the personal data sheet. The examinee
Hadji-Sirad used slanting strokes in affixing her signature while the appointee
Hadji-Sirad utilized vertical strokes.
The foregoing facts and circumstances
indicate that Pagayanan Romero Hadji-Sirad allowed another person to take the
WHEREFORE, Pagayanan Romero Hadji-Sirad is
hereby formally charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.[5]
A formal investigation was thereafter
conducted.
The
first hearing of the administrative case against petitioner was repeatedly
postponed, upon petitioner’s request, from the original date of
On
The hearing of the case was again set
on
Finally,
petitioner and her counsel attended the hearings on
The prosecution presented evidence establishing
that petitioner previously took, and failed, the Career Service (CS) Professional
Examination held on
The prosecution then rested after its
formal offer of evidence. It was
petitioner’s turn to present evidence in her defense.
Petitioner
herself took the witness stand on
Casanguan, recounted that she took
the CS Professional Examination on
Petitioner’s third and last witness
was Dick U. Yasa (Yasa). Yasa, then
Personnel Specialist II of CSCRO No. XII, testified that he personally got to
know petitioner, an employee of COA-ARMM, and formerly Ms. Pagayanan Romero,
since their offices previously shared the same building. Yasa was among those who assisted in the
conduct of the CS Professional Examination held on
CSCRO No. XII rendered its Decision
on
WHEREFORE,
respondent Pagayanan Romero-Hadji Sirad is hereby found GUILTY of Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service. She is hereby meted the penalty
of DISMISSAL from the service. The
accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of
eligibility, prohibition from entering the government service and
disqualification from taking future government examinations are likewise
imposed.
Let
copy of this Decision be furnished respondent and her counsel in their addresses
on record; the Commission on Audit – Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(COA-ARMM), Cotabato City; the Office for Legal Affairs (OLA), Civil Service
Commission, Quezon City; the Civil Service Commission – Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (CSC-ARMM), Cotabato City; the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) – Cotabato Branch; and the Examination Services Division and
Policies and Systems Evaluation Division, this Office, for information and
appropriate action.[7]
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by CSCRO No. XII in a Resolution[8]
dated
Aggrieved,
petitioner appealed to the CSC.
In Resolution No. 070875 dated
WHEREFORE,
the appeal of Pagayanan R. Hadji-Sirad is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the
Decisions of the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. XII dated
February 27, 2006 finding Hadji-Sirad guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposing upon
her the penalty of dismissal from the service and its accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits,
disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking any Civil
Service examinations, and dated March 30, 2006 denying her Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.[9]
The CSC denied petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration in CSC Resolution No. 072196 dated
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur finds application in her case, as the evidence
cannot lie. Worst, the [herein petitioner] did not present any controverting
evidence sufficient enough to support her defense that indeed she was the same
person appearing in the PSP and AF for the October 17, 1993 Career Service
Professional Examination held in Iligan City and the one who actually took the
said examination. The [petitioner] must remember that, although the very
examination record in question was the
The CSC, in the end, disposed:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of
Pagayanan R. Hadji-Sirad [petitioner] is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, Civil Service Commission
Resolution No. 070875 dated
Unwavering, petitioner filed before
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari[12]
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that
the CSC Resolutions dated 7 May 2007 and 26 November 2007 were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The Petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
02103-MIN.
On
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
Petitioner comes before this Court via the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, posing the following issues
for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT RULE 65 IS THE PROPER REMEDY
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FILED BY PETITIONER BASED ON MERE TECHNICALITIES
WHETHER OR NOT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY IGNORING THE IMPORTANT PIECES OF
EVIDENCE DULY PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER.
The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
02103-MIN for being the wrong mode of appeal and for non-compliance with several
other procedural requirements.
Section 50, Rule III of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the CSC[13]
plainly states that a party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Court.[14]
Sections 1 and 5, Rule 43 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provide that final orders or
resolutions of the CSC are appealable to the Court of Appeals through a
petition for review, to wit:
SECTION 1. Scope. - This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of
quasi judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration,
Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of
Agrarian Reform under Republic Act. No. 6657, Government Service Insurance
System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of
Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary
arbitrators authorized by law.
SEC. 5. How
appeal taken. –Appeal shall be taken
by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with
the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party
and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for
the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner.
Hence, in accordance with the
foregoing rules, if petitioner indeed received a copy of CSC Resolution No.
072196 dated
As we have held in numerous cases, a special
civil action for certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal.[15]
We have often enough reminded members of
the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure lies only when there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[16]
Certiorari is not allowed when a
party to a case fails to appeal a judgment or final order despite the
availability of that remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and
not alternative or successive.[17] In this case, petitioner utterly failed to
provide any justification for her resort to a special civil action for certiorari, when the remedy of appeal by
petition for review was clearly available.
In addition to being the wrong mode
of appeal, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 02103-MIN
for petitioner’s failure to comply with the requirements for petitions under
Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly, the second
and third paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46, of the same rules, which read:
SEC. 3.
Contents and filing of petition;
effect of non-compliance with requirements. –
x x x x
In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition
shall further indicate the material
dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
subject thereof was received, when a motion
for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the
denial thereof was received.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly
legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with
the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner,
and shall be accompanied by a clearly
legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order,
resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such
material portions of the record as referred to therein, and other documents
relevant or pertinent thereto. The
certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly
authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal,
agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the
petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents
attached to the original.
The consequence for non-compliance
with any of such requirements is sheerly spelled out in the sixth paragraph of
Rule 3, Section 46 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, to be as
follows:
The failure of the petitioner to comply with
any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner failed to indicate in her
Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP
No. 02103-MIN the material date when she filed her Motion for Reconsideration
of CSC Resolution No. 070875 dated
Rules of procedure are tools designed
to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of
justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required.[18] However, technical rules of procedure are not
designed to frustrate the ends of justice.
The Court is
fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded,
for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice. However, it is equally true
that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the
prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an
end to litigation speedily and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be
heard.[19]
This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could
be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand
flexibility in their application.[20] In not a few
instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to
afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the
merit. This is in line with the
time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all
parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection
should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions.
In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of
procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but
to promote the administration of justice.[21]
In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court restated the reasons that may provide
justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to procedural rules,
such as: (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(c) the merits of the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought
is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.[23]
Pointedly, even if we were to
overlook petitioner’s procedural lapses and review her case on the merits, we
find no reason to reverse her dismissal from service by the CSC.
Firstly, petitioner was dismissed from
service only after being accorded due process.
In administrative proceedings, such
as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to
explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.[24]
“To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.[25]
In administrative proceedings,
procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings, which
may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence
in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with
competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.[26]
Petitioner cannot claim denial of due process
when records reveal that (1) petitioner was given sufficient notice of the
Formal Charge against her and the setting of the hearings of her administrative
case before CSCRO No. XII; (2) petitioner was formally charged after an
initial investigation was conducted; (3) her several requests for postponement of
the hearings were granted; (4) the prosecution only presented evidence during
the hearings on 17 May 2004 and 23 September 2004, when petitioner and her
counsel were present; (5) petitioner herself and her two witnesses, Casanguan
and Yasa, got the opportunity to testify on 25 November 2004; (6) only
after the parties had submitted their arguments and evidence did CSCRO No. XII render its Decision on
Secondly, the Decision dated
The law requires that the quantum of
proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.[27]
Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial
proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt,
is sufficient basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon an
employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the
employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for
the misconduct, and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and
confidence demanded by his position.[28]
There is such substantial evidence herein to
prove petitioner guilty of the administrative offenses for which she was
charged.
Even only a cursory examination of
petitioner’s pictures and signatures in her PDS dated 10 November 1994, and in
the AF and PSP for the CS Professional Examination of 29 November 1992, on one
hand; and petitioner’s purported pictures and signatures in the AF and PSP for the
CSC Professional Examination of 17 October 1993, on the other, reveals their
marked differences from one another. It
can be observed by the naked eye that the pictures and signatures bear little
resemblance/similitude, or none at all.
The pictures could not have been those of the same individual, nor could
the signatures have been made by the same person.
This conclusion is strengthened by
the CSCRO when it expostulates that:
It
is a different matter, however, upon evaluation of the examination records of
respondent for the October 17, 1993 CS Professional Exam vis-à-vis her Personal
Data Sheet as well as her examination records for the November 29, 1992 CS
Professional Exam. It reveals that
respondent Hadji Sirad is not the same person who took the
And reechoed by the CSC, thus:
The
Commission also made a careful examination and comparison of the picture
attached to the PSP and AF for the Career Civil Service Professional
Examination held on October 17, 1993 with those attached to the PSP and AF for
the previous Career Service Professional Examination she took on November 29,
1992 on file with the Commission, and those attached to Hadji-Sirad’s PDS; it
is convinced that another person took the Career Service Professional
Examination held on October 17, 1993.
While
it is true that the pictures of Hadji-Sirad attached to the PSP and AF for the
Career Service Professional Examination held on
The
Commission also noted a remarkable difference in the signatures of Hadji-Sirad
appearing in the PSP and AF for the October 17, 1993 Career Service
Professional Examination and those affixed in the PSP for the November 29, 1992
Career Service Professional Examination previously taken by her and in her PDS.
The strokes used in the signature affixed in the PSP and AF of the October 17,
1993 Career Service Professional Examination were somewhat forcedly pressed and
slanting, and the letters thereof were more prominent and defined while those
affixed in other documents on file with the Commission were finer and were in
an upright stroke and the letters were less defined. Even to the naked eye, the
slants and strokes are very dissimilar and are clearly made by two (2)
different persons.
Based
on the foregoing circumstances and on the substantial evidence on record, the
Commission is convinced that Hadji-Sirad has allowed another person to apply
and take the Career Service Professional Examination held on
As a general rule, the findings of
fact of the CSC and the Court of Appeals are accorded great weight. In a plethora of cases, we have held that
lower courts are in a better position to determine the truth of the matter in
litigation, since the pieces of evidence are presented before them, and they
are able to look into the credibility and the demeanor of the witnesses on the
witness stand. Furthermore,
quasi-judicial bodies like the CSC are better-equipped in handling cases
involving the employment status of employees as those in the Civil Service
since it is within the field of their expertise. Factual findings of administrative agencies
are generally held to be binding and final so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence in the record of the case. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence and credibility of witnesses
presented before the lower court, tribunal or office. The Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. Its jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, its findings
of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court.[31]
Petitioner attributes the difference
in the way she looked in the pictures to the passage of time or difference in
the “positioning” when the pictures were taken; and the variance in her
signatures to her state of mind at the time she was actually signing and the
kind of writing implement and paper she was using.
We are unconvinced. Petitioner’s explanations would have
accounted for small or few differences in the pictures and signatures; but not
when they are on the whole strikingly dissimilar. Moreover, it would have been easy for
petitioner to submit evidence such as pictures to show the gradual change in
her appearance through the years, or samples of her signatures made when she
was of a different state of mind or using other writing implements and papers;
yet, petitioner failed to do so.
We cannot even consider the
possibility that the CSC officials who supervised the examinations committed a
mistake in matching the pictures and signatures vis-à-vis the examinees, as the said CSC officials enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty. Besides, such a mix-up is highly unlikely due
to the strict procedures followed during civil service examinations, described
in detail in Cruz v. Civil Service
Commission,[32]
to wit:
It should be stressed that as a matter of
procedure, the room examiners assigned to supervise the conduct of a Civil
Service examination closely examine the pictures submitted and affixed on the
Picture Seat Plan (CSC Resolution No. 95-3694, Obedencio, Jaime A.). The
examiners carefully compare the appearance of each of the examinees with the
person in the picture submitted and affixed on the PSP. In cases where the
examinee does not look like the person in the picture submitted and attached on
the PSP, the examiner will not allow the said person to take the examination
(CSC Resolution No. 95-5195, Taguinay, Ma. Theresa).
The only logical scenario is that
another person, who matched the picture in the PSP, actually signed the AF and
took the CS Professional Examination on
True, petitioner was able to present
testimonial evidence supporting her allegation that she was at Room 003 of the Administration
Building of Iligan City National High School on
Further, testimonies of witnesses Casanguan
and Yasa do not stand conclusive of the fact that it was indeed respondent who
took the said examination. Yasa only
testified that he saw Romero’s name at Room No. 003 of Iligan City National
High School and that allegedly he saw respondent at around 7-7:30 a.m. in the
examination center but he did not stay any longer at the said venue, hence he
was not there anymore when the examination actually began and ended. Thus, Yasa could not claim that he actually
saw respondent take the examination.
x x x x
The testimony of respondent-movant and that
of witness Casanguan are self-serving.
The testimony of Yasa, on the other hand, negated his sworn statement
that he actually saw Hadji Sirad take the October 1993 examination. On the witness stand, it was made clear that
he only saw the name of Hadji Sirad in the list of examinees posted outside
Room 003. Further, that the only time he
saw Hadji Sirad was prior to the start of the examination. Clearly, he did not see Hadji Sirad actually
take the exam nor hand in her examination papers after she finished the
examination. Finally, it is stressed
that the fact that Yasa is a long-time employee of the Commission does not
render his statements relative to the conduct of the 1993 CS Professional
examination in
Given the foregoing, the Court finds
that petitioner is, indeed, guilty of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Dishonesty alone, being in the nature of a
grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification for reemployment in the government service.[33]
WHEREFORE, the
instant Petition is hereby DENIED.
The Resolutions dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBINGAssociate Justice |
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice |
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ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
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ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
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ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice
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DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA Associate Justice |
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LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
MARIANO C.
Associate Justice |
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Associate Justice
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
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REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice
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[1] Penned by Associate Justice Elihu A. Ybanez with Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Mario V. Lopez, concurring; rollo, pp. 55-57.
[2]
[3]
Penned by Chairman Karina
Constantino-David and concurred in by Commissioner Mary Ann Z.
Fernandez-Mendoza. (
[4]
[5] Rollo, pp. 234-235.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Section 50. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. – A party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
[14]
Commissioner on Higher Education v. Mercado, G.R. No. 157877,
[15] Tuazon, Jr. v. Godoy, 442 Phil. 130, 136 (2002).
[16] Dwikarna v. Domingo, G.R. No. 153454, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 748, 754; Marawi Marantao General Hospital, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 402 Phil. 356, 370 (2001); Heirs of Pedro Atega v. Garilao, 409 Phil. 214, 218 (2001); Zarate, Jr. v. Olegario, 331 Phil. 278, 287 (1996); Solis v. National Labor Relations Commission, 331 Phil. 928, 932 (1996).
[17]
Heirs of
[18]
Moncielcoji
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 409 Phil. 486, 491-492
(2001).
[19] Barranco v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, G.R. No. 168990, 16 June 2006, 491 SCRA 222, 232, citing Reyes v. Torres, 429 Phil. 95, 101 (2002).
[20]
Polanco v. Cruz, G.R. No. 182426,
[21] Asian Spirit Airlines (Airline Employees Cooperative) v. Bautista, 491 Phil. 476, 484 (2005).
[22] 452 Phil. 665, 674 (2003); Macasasa v. Sicad, G.R. No. 146547, 20 June 2006, 491 SCRA 368, 383, citing Barnes v. Padilla, 482 Phil. 903, 915 (2004).
[23] Barranco v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, supra note 19.
[24] Padilla v. Hon. Sto. Tomas, 312 Phil. 1095, 1103 (1995).
[25] Salonga v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 514, 528 (1997).
[26] Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 940, 952-953 (1997).
[27] Atty. San Juan, Jr. v. Sangalang, 404 Phil. 11, 21 (2001).
[28] Reyno v. Manila Electric Company, 478 Phil. 830, 840 (2004).
[29] Rollo, p. 402.
[30]
[31] Pabu-aya v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 782, 788 (2001).
[32] 422 Phil. 236, 245 (2001).
[33]
De la Pena v. Sia, A.M. No. P-06-2167,