THIRD DIVISION
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THE CITY OF petitioners, - versus - COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 181845 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: August 4, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This case is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to review and reverse the Decision[1]
dated 18 January 2008 and Resolution[2]
dated 18 February 2008 of the Court of Tax Appeals en banc (CTA en banc) in C.T.A. EB No. 307. In its assailed Decision, the CTA en banc dismissed the Petition for
Review of herein petitioners City of Manila, Liberty M. Toledo (Toledo), and
Joseph Santiago (Santiago); and affirmed the Resolutions dated 24 May 2007,[3] 8
June 2007,[4]
and 26 July 2007,[5] of the
CTA First Division
in C.T.A. AC No. 31, which, in turn, dismissed the Petition for Review of
petitioners in said case for being filed out of time. In its questioned Resolution, the CTA en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioners.
The case stemmed from the following
facts:
Prior to
Section 14. – Tax on Manufacturers, Assemblers and Other
Processors. – There is hereby imposed a graduated tax on manufacturers,
assemblers, repackers, processors, brewers, distillers, rectifiers, and
compounders of liquors, distilled spirits, and wines or manufacturers of any
article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, in accordance with any of the
following schedule:
x
x x x
over P6,500,000.00 up to
P25,000,000.00
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- P36,000.00 plus 50% of 1%
in excess
of P6,500,000.00
x x x
x
Section 21. – Tax on Businesses Subject to the Excise,
Value-Added or Percentage Taxes under the NIRC. – On any of the following
businesses and articles of commerce subject to excise, value-added or
percentage taxes under the National Internal Revenue Code hereinafter referred
to as NIRC, as amended, a tax of FIFTY PERCENT (50%) of ONE PERCENT (1%) per
annum on the gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year is hereby
imposed:
(A) On
persons who sell goods and services in the course of trade or business; and
those who import goods whether for business or otherwise; as provided for in Sections
100 to 103 of the NIRC as administered and determined by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the said Code.
x x x x
(D) Excisable goods subject to VAT
(1) Distilled spirits
(2) Wines
x x x x
(8) Coal and coke
(9) Fermented liquor, brewers’ wholesale price, excluding the ad
valorem tax
x x x x
PROVIDED, that all registered businesses in the City
of
Petitioner City of Manila
subsequently approved on 25 February 2000, Tax Ordinance No. 7988,[7]
amending certain sections of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, particularly: (1) Section
14, by increasing the tax rates applicable to certain establishments operating
within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila; and (2) Section 21,
by deleting the proviso found therein,
which stated “that all registered businesses in the City of Manila that are
already paying the aforementioned tax shall be exempted from payment
thereof.”
Tax Ordinances No. 7988 and No. 8011
were later declared by the Court null and void in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. City of Manila[8] (Coca-Cola case) for the following
reasons: (1) Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was enacted in contravention of the
provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and its implementing
rules and regulations; and (2) Tax Ordinance No. 8011 could not cure the
defects of Tax Ordinance No. 7988, which did not legally exist.
However, before the Court could
declare Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 null and void,
petitioner City of Manila assessed respondent on the basis of Section 21 of Tax
Ordinance No. 7794, as amended by the aforementioned tax ordinances, for
deficiency local business taxes, penalties, and interest, in the total amount
of P18,583,932.04, for the third and fourth quarters of the year
2000. Respondent filed a protest with
petitioner Toledo on the ground that the said assessment amounted to double
taxation, as respondent was taxed twice, i.e.,
under Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, as amended by Tax Ordinances
No. 7988 and No. 8011. Petitioner
Consequently, respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
On
On
Again, on
On
Unaware of the
Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the foregoing Resolutions dated
Petitioners thereafter filed a
Petition for Review before the CTA en
banc, docketed as C.T.A. EB No. 307, arguing that the CTA First Division
erred in dismissing their Petition for Review in C.T.A. AC No. 31 for being
filed out of time, without considering the merits of their Petition.
The CTA en banc rendered its Decision on
Hence, the present Petition, where
petitioners raise the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED WITH THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD TO TIMELY APPEAL THE CASE FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE [CTA DIVISION].
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THIS COURT IN THE EARLIER [COCA-COLA CASE] IS DOCTRINAL AND CONTROLLING IN THE INSTANT CASE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER CITY OF
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ENFORCEMENT OF [SECTION] 21 OF THE [TAX ORDINANCE NO. 7794, AS AMENDED] CONSTITUTES DOUBLE TAXATION.
Petitioners assert that Section 1,
Rule 7[12]
of the Revised Rules of the CTA refers to certain provisions of the Rules of
Court, such as Rule 42 of the latter, and makes them applicable to the tax
court. Petitioners then cannot be
faulted in relying on the provisions of Section 1, Rule 42[13]
of the Rules of Court as regards the period for filing a Petition for Review
with the CTA in division. Section 1,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-day period, reckoned from
receipt of the adverse decision of the trial court, within which to file a
Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.
The same rule allows an additional 15-day period within which to file
such a Petition; and, only for the most compelling reasons, another extension
period not to exceed 15 days.
Petitioners received on
Petitioners argue in the alternative
that even assuming that Section 3(a), Rule 8[14]
of the Revised Rules of the CTA governs the period for filing a Petition for
Review with the CTA in division, still, their Petition for Review was filed
within the reglementary period.
Petitioners call attention to the fact that prior to the lapse of the
30-day period for filing a Petition for Review under Section 3(a), Rule 8 of
the Revised Rules of the CTA, they had already moved for a 10-day extension, or
until 30 May 2007, within which to file their Petition. Petitioners claim that there was sufficient
justification in equity for the grant of the 10-day extension they requested,
as the primordial consideration should be the substantive, and not the
procedural, aspect of the case.
Moreover, Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, is
silent as to whether the 30-day period for filing a Petition for Review with
the CTA in division may be extended or not.
Petitioners also contend that the Coca-Cola case is not determinative of
the issues in the present case because the issue of nullity of Tax Ordinance
No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 is not the lis mota herein. The Coca-Cola case is not doctrinal and
cannot be considered as the law of the case.
Petitioners further insist that
notwithstanding the declaration of nullity of Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax
Ordinance No. 8011, Tax Ordinance No. 7794 remains a valid piece of local
legislation. The nullity of Tax
Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 does not effectively bar petitioners
from imposing local business taxes upon respondent under Sections 14 and 21 of
Tax Ordinance No. 7794, as they were read prior to their being amended by the
foregoing null and void tax ordinances.
Petitioners finally maintain that
imposing upon respondent local business taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of
Tax Ordinance No. 7794 does not constitute direct double taxation. Section 143 of the LGC gives municipal, as
well as city governments, the power to impose business taxes, to wit:
SECTION 143. Tax on Business. – The municipality may
impose taxes on the following businesses:
(a) On
manufacturers, assemblers, repackers, processors, brewers, distillers,
rectifiers, and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits, and wines or
manufacturers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature, in
accordance with the following schedule:
x x x x
(b) On
wholesalers, distributors, or dealers in any article of commerce of whatever
kind or nature in accordance with the following schedule:
x x x x
(c) On
exporters, and on manufacturers, millers, producers, wholesalers, distributors,
dealers or retailers of essential commodities enumerated hereunder at a rate
not exceeding one-half (1/2) of the rates prescribed under subsections (a), (b)
and (d) of this Section:
x x x x
Provided,
however, That barangays shall have
the exclusive power to levy taxes, as provided under Section 152 hereof, on
gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year of Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) or less, in the case of cities, and Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000)
or less, in the case of municipalities.
(e) On
contractors and other independent contractors, in accordance with the following
schedule:
x x x x
(f) On banks and other financial
institutions, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%)
on the gross receipts of the preceding calendar year derived from interest,
commissions and discounts from lending activities, income from financial
leasing, dividends, rentals on property and profit from exchange or sale of
property, insurance premium.
(g) On peddlers engaged in the sale of any merchandise
or article of commerce, at a rate not exceeding Fifty pesos (P50.00) per
peddler annually.
(h) On any business, not otherwise specified in the preceding paragraphs, which the sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax: Provided, That on any business subject to the excise, value-added or percentage tax under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, the rate of tax shall not exceed two percent (2%) of gross sales or receipts of the preceding calendar year.
Section 14 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794
imposes local business tax on manufacturers, etc. of liquors, distilled spirits, wines, and any other article of
commerce, pursuant to Section 143(a) of the LGC. On the other hand, the local business tax
under Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 is imposed upon persons selling
goods and services in the course of trade or business, and those importing
goods for business or otherwise, who, pursuant to Section 143(h) of the LGC,
are subject to excise tax, value-added tax (VAT), or percentage tax under the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Thus, there can be no double taxation when respondent is being taxed
under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, for under the first,
it is being taxed as a manufacturer; while under the second, it is being taxed
as a person selling goods in the course of trade or business subject to excise,
VAT, or percentage tax.
The Court first addresses the issue
raised by petitioners concerning the period within which to file with the CTA a
Petition for Review from an adverse decision or ruling of the RTC.
The period to appeal the decision or
ruling of the RTC to the CTA via a
Petition for Review is specifically governed by Section 11 of Republic Act No.
9282,[15]
and Section 3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282
provides:
SEC. 11. Who May Appeal; Mode of Appeal; Effect of Appeal. – Any party adversely affected by a decision, ruling or inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry or the Secretary of Agriculture or the Central Board of Assessment Appeals or the Regional Trial Courts may file an Appeal with the CTA within thirty (30) days after the receipt of such decision or ruling or after the expiration of the period fixed by law for action as referred to in Section 7(a)(2) herein.
Appeal shall be made by filing a petition for review under a procedure analogous to that provided for under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure with the CTA within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision or ruling or in the case of inaction as herein provided, from the expiration of the period fixed by law to act thereon. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section
3(a), Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA states:
SEC 3. Who may appeal; period to file petition. – (a) A party adversely affected by a decision, ruling or the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on disputed assessments or claims for refund of internal revenue taxes, or by a decision or ruling of the Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Secretary of Agriculture, or a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction may appeal to the Court by petition for review filed within thirty days after receipt of a copy of such decision or ruling, or expiration of the period fixed by law for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the disputed assessments. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is crystal clear from the
afore-quoted provisions that to appeal an adverse decision or ruling of the RTC
to the CTA, the taxpayer must file a Petition
for Review with the CTA within 30
days from receipt of said adverse decision or ruling of the RTC.
It is also true that the same
provisions are silent as to whether such 30-day period can be extended or
not. However, Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 9282 does state that the Petition for Review shall be filed with the CTA following the procedure analogous to Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. Section 1, Rule 42[16]
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the Petition for Review
of an adverse judgment or final order of the RTC must be filed with the Court
of Appeals within: (1) the original 15-day period from receipt of the judgment
or final order to be appealed; (2) an extended period of 15 days from the lapse
of the original period; and (3) only for
the most compelling reasons, another extended period not to exceed 15 days
from the lapse of the first extended period.
Following by analogy Section 1, Rule
42 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the 30-day original period for filing a Petition for Review with the
CTA under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282, as implemented by Section 3(a),
Rule 8 of the Revised Rules of the CTA, may be extended for a period of 15 days. No further extension shall be allowed
thereafter, except only for the most compelling reasons, in which case the
extended period shall not exceed 15 days.
Even the CTA en banc, in its Decision dated
Being suppletory to R.A. 9282, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure allow an additional period of fifteen (15) days for the movant to file a Petition for Review, upon Motion, and payment of the full amount of the docket fees. A further extension of fifteen (15) days may be granted on compelling reasons in accordance with the provision of Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure x x x.[17]
In this case, the CTA First Division
did indeed err in finding that petitioners failed to file their Petition for
Review in C.T.A. AC No. 31 within the reglementary period.
From 20 April 2007, the date petitioners received a copy of the 4 April
2007 Order of the RTC, denying their Motion for Reconsideration of the 16
November 2006 Order, petitioners had 30 days, or until 20 May 2007, within which to file their Petition for Review with
the CTA. Hence, the Motion for Extension
filed by petitioners on 4 May 2007 – grounded on their belief that the
reglementary period for filing their Petition for Review with the CTA was to
expire on 5 May 2007, thus, compelling them to seek an extension of 15 days, or
until 20 May 2007, to file said
Petition – was unnecessary and superfluous.
Even without said Motion for Extension, petitioners could file their
Petition for Review until
The Motion for Extension filed by the
petitioners on 18 May 2007, prior to the lapse of the 30-day reglementary
period on 20 May 2007, in which they prayed for another extended period of 10
days, or until 30 May 2007, to file
their Petition for Review was, in reality, only the first Motion for Extension
of petitioners. The CTA First Division
should have granted the same, as it was sanctioned by the rules of
procedure. In fact, petitioners were
only praying for a 10-day extension, five days less than the 15-day extended
period allowed by the rules. Thus, when
petitioners filed via registered mail
their Petition for Review in C.T.A. AC No. 31 on
Nevertheless, there were other
reasons for which the CTA First Division dismissed the Petition for Review of petitioners
in C.T.A. AC No. 31; i.e.,
petitioners failed to conform to Section 4 of Rule 5, and Section 2 of Rule 6
of the Revised Rules of the CTA. The
Court sustains the CTA First Division in this regard.
Section 4, Rule 5 of the Revised
Rules of the CTA requires that:
SEC. 4. Number of copies. – The parties shall file eleven signed copies of every paper for cases before the Court en banc and six signed copies for cases before a Division of the Court in addition to the signed original copy, except as otherwise directed by the Court. Papers to be filed in more than one case shall include one additional copy for each additional case. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 2, Rule 6 of the Revised
Rules of the CTA further necessitates that:
SEC. 2. Petition for review; contents. – The petition for review shall contain allegations showing the jurisdiction of the Court, a concise statement of the complete facts and a summary statement of the issues involved in the case, as well as the reasons relied upon for the review of the challenged decision. The petition shall be verified and must contain a certification against forum shopping as provided in Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. A clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the decision appealed from shall be attached to the petition. (Emphasis supplied.)
The aforesaid provisions should be
read in conjunction with Section 1, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of the CTA,
which provides:
SECTION 1. Applicability of the Rules of Court on procedure in the Court of Appeals, exception. – The procedure in the Court en banc or in Divisions in original or in appealed cases shall be the same as those in petitions for review and appeals before the Court of Appeals pursuant to the applicable provisions of Rules 42, 43, 44, and 46 of the Rules of Court, except as otherwise provided for in these Rules. (Emphasis supplied.)
As found by the CTA First Division
and affirmed by the CTA en banc, the
Petition for Review filed by petitioners via
registered mail on 30 May 2007 consisted only of one copy and all the
attachments thereto, including the Decision dated 14 July 2006; and that the assailed
Orders dated 16 November 2006 and 4 April 2007 of the RTC in Civil Case No.
03-107088 were mere machine copies.
Evidently, petitioners did not comply at all with the requirements set
forth under Section 4, Rule 5; or with Section 2, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules
of the CTA. Although the Revised Rules
of the CTA do not provide for the consequence of such non-compliance, Section 3,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily, as allowed by
Section 1, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of the CTA. Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
reads:
SEC. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. – The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
True, petitioners subsequently
submitted certified copies of the Decision dated 14 July 2006 and assailed
Orders dated 16 November 2006 and 4 April 2007 of the RTC in Civil Case No.
03-107088, but a closer examination of the stamp on said documents reveals that
they were prepared and certified only on 14 August 2007, about two months and a
half after the filing of the Petition for Review by petitioners.
Petitioners never offered an
explanation for their non-compliance with Section 4 of Rule 5, and Section 2 of
Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of the CTA.
Hence, although the Court had, in previous instances, relaxed the application
of rules of procedure, it cannot do so in this case for lack of any
justification.
Even assuming arguendo that the Petition for Review of petitioners in C.T.A. AC
No. 31 should have been given due course by the CTA First Division, it is still
dismissible for lack of merit.
Contrary to the assertions of
petitioners, the Coca-Cola case is
indeed applicable to the instant case.
The pivotal issue raised therein was whether Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and
Tax Ordinance No. 8011 were null and void, which this Court resolved in the
affirmative. Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was
declared by the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) as null and void
and without legal effect due to the failure of herein
By virtue of the Coca-Cola case, Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011
are null and void and without any legal effect.
Therefore, respondent cannot be taxed and assessed under the amendatory
laws--Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011.
Petitioners insist that even with the
declaration of nullity of Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011,
respondent could still be made liable for local business taxes under both
Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7944 as they were originally read,
without the amendment by the null and void tax ordinances.
Emphasis must be given to the fact
that prior to the passage of Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011
by
The Court easily infers from the
foregoing circumstances that petitioners themselves believed that prior to Tax
Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011, respondent was exempt from the
local business tax under Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794. Hence, petitioners had to wait for the
deletion of the exempting proviso in
Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 by Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax
Ordinance No. 8011 before they assessed respondent for the local business tax
under said section. Yet, with the
pronouncement by this Court in the Coca-Cola
case that Tax Ordinance No. 7988 and Tax Ordinance No. 8011 were null and void
and without legal effect, then Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794, as it has
been previously worded, with its exempting proviso,
is back in effect. Accordingly,
respondent should not have been subjected to the local business tax under
Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 for the third and fourth quarters of 2000,
given its exemption therefrom since it was already paying the local business
tax under Section 14 of the same ordinance.
Petitioners obstinately ignore the
exempting proviso in Section 21 of
Tax Ordinance No. 7794, to their own detriment.
Said exempting proviso was
precisely included in said section so as to avoid double taxation.
Double taxation means taxing the same
property twice when it should be taxed only once; that is, “taxing the same
person twice by the same jurisdiction for the same thing.” It is obnoxious
when the taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should be but once. Otherwise
described as “direct duplicate taxation,” the
two taxes must be imposed on the same subject matter, for the same purpose, by the same taxing authority, within the same jurisdiction, during the same taxing period; and the taxes
must be of the same kind or character.[18]
Using the aforementioned
test, the Court finds that there is indeed double taxation if respondent is
subjected to the taxes under both Sections 14 and 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794,
since these are being imposed: (1) on the same subject matter – the privilege
of doing business in the City of Manila; (2) for the same purpose – to make
persons conducting business within the City of Manila contribute to city revenues;
(3) by the same taxing authority – petitioner City of Manila; (4) within the
same taxing jurisdiction – within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of
Manila; (5) for the same taxing periods – per calendar year; and (6) of the
same kind or character – a local business tax imposed on gross sales or
receipts of the business.
The
distinction petitioners attempt to make between the taxes under Sections 14 and
21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7794 is specious.
The Court revisits Section 143 of the LGC, the very source of the power
of municipalities and cities to impose a local business tax, and to which any
local business tax imposed by
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
is hereby DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr. with Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, Associate Justices Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Caesar A. Casanova and Olga Palanca-Enriquez, concurring, rollo, pp. 32-44.
[2]
[3] Signed by Presiding Justice Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate Justices Lovell R. Bautista and Caesar A. Casanova, rollo, pp. 106-107.
[4]
[5]
[6] Otherwise known as “Revenue Code
of the City of
[7] Otherwise known as “Revised
Revenue Code of the City of
[8] G.R. No. 156252,
[9] Penned by Presiding Judge Augusto T. Gutierrez, rollo, pp. 47-53.
[10]
[11]
[12] SEC. 1. Applicability of the Rules on procedure in the Court of Appeals, exception. – The procedure in the Court En Banc or in Divisions in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as those in petitions for review and appeals before the Court of Appeals pursuant to the applicable provisions of Rules 42, 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court, except as otherwise provided for in these Rules.
[13] SEC.
1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – A party desiring to appeal
from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the Court
of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00
for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a
copy of the petition. The petition shall
be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought
to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the
full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except
for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
[14] SEC. 3. Who may appeal; period to file petition. – (a) A party adversely affected by a decision, ruling or the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on disputed assessments or claims for refund of internal revenue taxes, or by a decision or ruling of the Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Secretary of Agriculture, or a Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction may appeal to the Court by petition for review filed within thirty days after receipt of a copy of such decision or ruling, or expiration of the period fixed by law for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the disputed assessments. In case of inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on claims for refund of internal revenue taxes erroneously or illegally collected, the taxpayer must file a petition for review within the two-year period prescribed by law from payment or collection of the taxes.
[15] An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Elevating its Rank to the Level of a Collegiate Court with Special Jurisdiction and Enlarging its Membership, Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, Otherwise Known as the Law Creating the Court of Tax Appeals and for Other Purposes.
[16] Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. – x x x The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.
[17] Rollo, p. 40.
[18] Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Bank of Commerce, G.R. No. 149636,