THIRD
DIVISION
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REPUBLIC OF THE
Petitioner, - versus
- NEPTUNA G. JAVIER, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 179905 Present: CARPIO
MORALES,*
J., CHICO-NAZARIO,** Acting Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: August 19, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
Decision[1] dated
27 September 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69190, affirming in toto the Decision[2] dated
16 October 2000 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Taytay, Rizal in Land
Registration Case (LRC) Case No. 99-0012, which confirmed respondent Neptuna
Javier’s (Javier) title over a parcel of land, with an area of 12,903.50 square
meters, situated in Sitio Tabing Ilog, Sta. Ana, Taytay, Rizal, Philippines,
and denominated as Lot 30162-B of Subdivision Plan Csd-04-014340-D (subject
property).
The facts culled from the records are
as follows:
On
The
MTC originally set the initial hearing of LRC Case No. 99-0012 at
On 18 November 1999, a day before the
scheduled initial hearing, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
represented by the Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed its Notice of Appearance and Opposition[5] to
Javier’s Application for Registration, claiming among other things that neither
Javier nor her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land since 12 June 1945; and
that the muniment/s of title alleged in the Application did not constitute
competent and sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the subject land. The Republic further insisted that the subject
property was a portion of the public domain; hence, it was not subject to
private appropriation.
On even date, the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA), represented by its General Manager Atty. Joaqin
G. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), also filed its Opposition[6] to
Javier’s Application, claiming that the subject property was public land,
forming part of the bed of the Laguna de Bay. The LLDA contended:
[T]hat projection of the subject lot in our
topographic map based on the technical descriptions appearing in the Notice of
the Initial Hearing indicated that the lot subject of this application for
registration particularly described on plan Csd-04-014340-D lot 30162
containing an area of 12, 903.50 square meters is located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters referred to
datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water. Site is therefore part of the
bed of
Javier then submitted the following
documents to establish compliance with the jurisdictional requirements: (1) her
verified Application for Registration;[8]
(2) registry return receipts from the Forest Management Bureau (FMB), OSG, Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Community Environment and Natural Resource Office
(CENRO), and Land Management Bureau (LMB);[9]
(3) MTC Order setting the case for initial hearing on 23 July 1999;[10]
(4) Notice of Initial Hearing;[11]
(5) LRA Letter dated 26 August 1999 directing the publication of the Notice of
Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation;[12]
(6) Certificate of Posting;[13]
(7) Affidavit of Publication dated 26 October 1999 issued by People’s Balita;[14]
(8) issue of People’s Balita dated 23
October 1999, with the Notice of Initial
Hearing appearing on page 10 thereof;[15]
(9) Certificate of Publication in the Official Gazette dated 22 October 1999 issued
by the National Printing Office;[16]
(10) Certificate of Notification dated 27 October 1999 issued by the LRA;[17]
(11) issue of the Official Gazette dated 18 October 1999, with the Notice of Initial
Hearing appearing on pages 7541 and 7542 thereof;[18]
and (12) Notice of Appearance of the OSG filed on 18 November 1999.[19]
During
the hearing on
Javier testified
on her own behalf to establish her claim of actual, continuous, open, notorious,
and exclusive possession of the subject property.
According to Javier, she
acquired the subject property through a Deed of Donation executed by her paternal
aunt, Catalina Javier (Catalina), a childless widow, on
Javier also stated under
oath that Catalina and her husband, Alejandro Ramos (Ramos), had been in
possession of the subject property since 1907, but Javier did not know how
Catalina and Ramos acquired said possession.
Javier gained personal knowledge of Catalina’s ownership of the subject property
when Catalina came to live with Javier and the latter’s family in 1940. The subject property was being tilled by a kasama, Arturo Sarmiento, when Javier acquired
the said property, but at the time she filed her Application for Registration,
there were no more tenants on the subject property.
Javier additionally averred
that she had been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property, together with her
predecessor-in-interest, Catalina, for more than 30 years. Catalina declared the subject property in her
name for taxation purposes even before 1945, as shown by Tax Declaration No.
5060 issued by the Local Assessor’s Office on
Pablo Javier Quinto (Quinto)
also offered his testimony in support of Javier’s claims to the subject
property. Javier is Quinto’s maternal
aunt. Quinto is familiar with the subject
property because he and his siblings, Evelyn and Adelino, co-owned a lot
adjacent to the same, which was also originally owned by Javier. The subject property and the adjacent lot were
part of Javier’s inheritance from Catalina.
Javier later transferred the adjacent lot to Quinto’s mother, from whom Quinto
and his siblings inherited the same. Quinto’s brother, Adelino, now working in
Quinto further testified
that the subject property is owned by his aunt, Javier, who has also been in
possession of the same since 1975 up to the present. And since 1979, no one else
has claimed ownership or possession of the subject property and there is no
tenant cultivating the said property at present. He does not know, however, for how long Catalina
had occupied the subject property before it was acquired by Javier.[24]
Neither the Republic nor
the LLDA presented evidence to substantiate their Oppositions to Javier’s
Application for Registration.
The MTC rendered a
Decision[25] on
WHEREFORE, premises considered the court
hereby rendered (sic) judgment confirming title of the applicant over the real
property denominated as Lot of the original survey plan, Lot 30162-B of the
subdivision plan, CSd-04-014340-D, being a portion of Lot 30162, Cad-688-D,
Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.
Upon finality of this decision the
corresponding decree of registration be issued in the name of Neptuna G.
Javier, of legal age, and residing at
Send copies of this decision of the office
of the Land Registration Authority, Office of the Solicitor General and to the applicants (sic) through her counsel.[26]
The Republic, through the
OSG, filed a Notice of Appeal[27]
with the Court of Appeals dated
I.
THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE APELLEE HAS ESTABLISHED OWNERSHIP OVER
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW.
II.
THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE APPELLEE FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE
PRESUMPTION THAT SUBJECT PROPERTY FORMS PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.[28]
The Republic argued that
the testimonies of Javier and Quinto hardly established that Javier and her
predecessor-in-interest, Catalina, have occupied the subject property openly,
continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since
On
In fine, [Javier’s] evidence conclusively
establish the following: a) that she acquired the parcel of land being applied
for original registration by inheritance from her aunt Catalina Javier; b) that
her possession thereof, tacked with that of her predecessors-in-interest, is
open, continuous, adverse against the whole world, in the concept of owner and
under a bona fide claim of ownership
for no less than fifty (50) years; c) that the subject property is not part of
any forest nor of any aerial, military or naval reservations of the government,
d) that said property is not encumbered or otherwise mortgaged in favor of any
person and/or entity, and e) that the subject property belongs to [Javier] and
she possesses a perfect title thereto which may be confirmed and registered to
her name under the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree.[30]
Hence, the appellate court decreed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
assailed decision of the MTC of Taytay, Rizal dated
The Republic presently
comes before this Court via the
instant Petition, raising the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals, in
its Decision dated
In its Petition,[32]
the Republic insists that Javier and Quintos failed to testify on specific acts
that would support Javier’s allegation of exclusive, open, continuous, and
adverse possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner since
In her Comment,[33]
Javier questions the propriety of the instant Petition for Review, since it
raises a question of fact.[34] Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
this Court is not a trier of facts. Javier also maintains that she has presented
sufficient evidence to warrant the registration of her title to the subject property
under Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, and the Court of Appeals did not commit any
reversible error in its assailed Decision dated
The settled rule is that the
jurisdiction of this Court over petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to
reviewing errors of law, not of fact.[35] A question of law exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts as
distinguished from a question of fact which occurs when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.[36] Where the petition makes no mention of any
law that was wrongly interpreted or applied by the lower court despite the
requirement under Rule 45 that questions of law raised must be “distinctly set
forth,” there is no basis for the petition.[37]
The Petition at bar is
essentially grounded on the argument that there is insufficient evidence to
support Javier’s possession of the subject property in the manner and for the
period required by law, as to entitle her to the registration of her title to
the said property. It is basic that
where it is the sufficiency of evidence that is being questioned, it is a
question of fact.[38] It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly
erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.[39]
A careful study of the
records shows no cogent reason to fault the finding of the MTC, as sustained by
the Court of Appeals, that Javier was able to sufficiently establish her title
to the subject property, which she is entitled to register under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.
Section 14 (1) of the
Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14.
Who may apply. — The following
persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial
Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those
who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The afore-quoted
provision lays down the following requisites for registration of title
thereunder: (1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land
of the public domain; (2) that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation; and (3) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12
June 1945 or earlier.[40] Javier was able to comply with all these
requirements.
The assertion of the Republic that
the subject property is not alienable and disposable is belied by the evidence
on record.
To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a
legislative act or statute.[41] In this case, the CENRO Report,[42]
issued by Special Land Investigator Romeo C. Cadano, confirms that the subject
property falls within the alienable and
disposable zone as established under Land Classification Project No. 5-A,
per L.C. Map No. 639, which was certified
and released on 11 March 1987; and that the same was neither covered by any
public land application nor embraced by any administrative title. Said CENRO Report enjoys the presumption of
regularity,[43] having
been executed in the performance of an official duty. The Republic has not been able to refute the
said Report.
In addition, Javier’s Approved Plan[44] contains
the statement that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable
area of the public domain as Project No. 5-A, L.C. Map No. 639, certified on 11
March 1987; and that the same property is outside any civil or military
reservation, per Certification of Rogelio Andrada of the Bureau of Forestry
Division dated 10 February 1998.
Furthermore, the LLDA, through its
General Manager, Atty. Mendoza, subsequently issued a Certification[45]
dated
This is to certify that Lot Number 30162-B, Cad
688-D, located in Barangay Sitio, Tabing Ilog, Sta. Ana, Taytay, Rizal,
containing an area of Twelve Thousand Nine Hundred Three (12,903) square meters
in the name of DRA. NEPTUNA G. JAVIER is
above the reglementary 12.50 meter elevation as referred to LLDA datum of
10.0 m below the Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW) elevation at
This certification is issued per request of DRA.
NEPTUNA G. JAVIER for land titling purposes.[46]
(Emphasis ours.)
The evidence on record likewise
supports the fact that Javier, together with her predecessor-in-interest,
Catalina, occupied the subject property in the concept of an owner since
Javier herself and her nephew,
Quinto, testified as to the uninterrupted possession of the subject property by
Catalina since 1907, followed by Javier in 1974. When Catalina came to live with Javier and
the latter’s family in 1940, Javier came to know that Catalina already owned
the subject property. By Quinto’s
personal knowledge, Javier possessed and owned the subject property after
inheriting the same from Catalina. The institution of Civil Case No. 6046 and execution of the
Deed of Partition dated 31 December 1974 demonstrated that other persons, i.e., Catalina’s other heirs, recognized
ownership of the subject property by Catalina, and later on, by Javier.
Catalina declared the subject
property in her name for real property tax purposes even before 1945 - clearly, prior to
Finally, per the CENRO Report[48]
dated
To reiterate, findings of
fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.[50] The totality of evidence on record, duly
considered by both the MTC and the Court of Appeals, bears out Javier’s claim
of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice Acting Chairperson |
WE
CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 679, dated
** Per
Special Order No. 681, dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 27-33.
[2] Penned by Judge Rustico C. Medina; records, pp. 180-188.
[3] Section 34 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
allows the inferior courts (i.e., Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), duly
assigned by the Supreme Court, to hear and determine cadastral and land
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition,
or contested lots with values not exceeding P100,000.00. Decisions
of the inferior courts in such cases shall be appealable in the same manner as
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
issued Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A, dated
[4] Records, p. 93.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Rollo, p. 101.
[21] Records, p. 43 .
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] CA rollo, p. 32.
[29] Rollo, pp. 27-33.
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33] Id at 48-62.
[34] Factual Issue Bar Rule- The petition filed before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
[35] Rodrin
v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 162837,
[36] Cebu Women’s Club v. De la Victoria, 384 Phil. 264, 269 (2000).
[37] Changco v. Court of Appeals, 429 Phil. 336, 342 (2002).
[38] Land
Bank of the
[39] FGU Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137775, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 337, 349.
[40] Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057,
[41] Republic
of the
[42] Records, p. 98.
[43] Rules of Court , Rule 131, Section 3. Disputable presumptions.—The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
x x x x
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed.
[44] Records, p. 27.
[45]
[46]
[47] Republic of the
[48] Records, p. 125.
[49]
[50] Pua v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 1064,
1077 (2000).