THIRD
DIVISION
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ERLINDA MAPAGAY, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
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G.R.
No. 178984 Present: CARPIO
MORALES,* J., CHICO-NAZARIO,** Acting Chairperson, VELASCO,
JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: August
19, 2009 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In
this Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Erlinda Mapagay seeks the reversal of
the Decision,[2] dated 15
February 2007, and Resolution,[3]
dated 12 July 2007, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28978, which
affirmed in toto the Decision[4] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 196, Parañaque City, in Criminal Case
No. 04-0494, dated 14 September 2004, and the Decision[5] of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, Parañaque City, in Criminal
Case No. 93520, dated
The
records of the case bear the following facts:
On
That on or about
the 20th day of October 1996, in the Municipality of Paranaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously issue to apply on account or for value the check described below:
Check No. : 0011997
Drawn Against : PhilBank
In the Amount of :
P40,000.00
Dated/Postdated :
Payable to : Cash
Said accused well knowing at the time of
issue did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for payment in
full of the amount of such check upon its presentment which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereto, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason “Account Closed” and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said
payee the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment
thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
When
arraigned on
On
The
prosecution presented private complainant as its sole witness.
Private
complainant testified that petitioner borrowed money from her in November 1996.
Petitioner gave her a signed check for
the loan and promised to replace the check with cash. Upon failure of petitioner to give her cash
despite repeated demands, she presented the check to the drawee bank. The check was dishonored by the drawee bank
for the reason “Account Closed.” Thereafter,
private complainant consulted a lawyer. Her
lawyer sent a demand letter to petitioner, but the latter refused to receive
it. Private complainant told petitioner to
pay the loan or the former would sue her in court. Petitioner promised to pay, but failed to do
so. Thus, she filed a case for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against petitioner.[12]
On cross-examination, private complainant stated that there was a
previous agreement between her and petitioner not to deposit the check; that
she deposited the check despite the said agreement; that before depositing the
check, she told petitioner that she would deposit the check if petitioner would
not pay the loan; that petitioner refused to receive the demand letter; and that
private complainant’s lawyer sent the demand letter by registered mail.[13]
The
prosecution adduced documentary and object evidence to buttress the aforesaid
allegation, to wit: (a) three pictures of petitioner attached to her bail bond
(Exhibit “A”);[14] (b)
PhilBank Check No. P 260 0011997, dated 20 November 1996, for the amount of P40,000.00
and the notation “Account Closed” (Exhibit “B”);[15]
(c) notice of dishonor dated 3 January 1997 (Exhibit “B-3”);[16]
(d) demand letter, dated 7 May 1997, addressed to petitioner (Exhibit “C”);[17]
(e) registry return receipt (Exhibit “C-1”);[18]
(f) return card (Exhibit “C-2”);[19]
and (g) envelope with the notation “RTS” or Refused to Receive (Exhibit “C-3”).[20]
After
the prosecution had formally offered its evidence and rested its case, the
defense moved to reset its initial presentation of evidence to
On
P40,000.00. The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds
the accused, ERLINDA MAPAGAY, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the Violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and hereby sentences her with one (1) year
imprisonment and to pay private complainant the total amount of FORTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P40,000.00).[23]
Petitioner
filed a Notice of Appeal on
Petitioner
submitted her “Appellant’s Brief” with the RTC on
On
Hence,
petitioner filed the instant petition maintaining that the Court of Appeals
erred in denying due course to her appeal.
Under
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of the
judgment of conviction may be filed within 15 days from the promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from.[32] Failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period renders the subject decision final and
executory.[33]
Once
a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion
of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the court rendering it or by this Court.[34] Decisions that have long become final and
executory cannot be annulled by courts, and the appellate court is deprived of
jurisdiction to alter the trial court’s final judgment.[35] This doctrine is founded on considerations of
public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments must become final at some point in time.[36]
Evidence
on record shows that petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Antonio J. Ballena
(Atty. Ballena), received on
Petitioner
alleges that she learned of the RTC Decision only on
The
rule is that when a party is represented by counsel, notices of all kinds,
including motions, pleadings and orders, must be served on the counsel. Notice to counsel of record is binding on the
client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for
setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on its face.[39]
It
is indeed settled that the omission or negligence of counsel binds the client. This is more true if the client did not make a
periodic check on the progress of her case. Otherwise, there would be no end to a suit, so
long as a new counsel could be employed who would allege and show that the
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned.[40]
In
the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner had constantly followed up
her case with Atty. Ballena. Petitioner
did not even bother to call or personally go to the RTC to verify the progress
of her case. Clearly, petitioner did not
exercise diligence in pursuing her case.
Petitioner argues that the technical rules of procedure should be
relaxed in the interest of substantial justice, so as to afford her opportunity
to present her case.
We have invariably
pronounced that the bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” is
not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules. Rules of Procedure are
tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness, as well as to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required. Procedural
rules are not to be belittled or dismissed, simply because their non-observance
may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive reasons, when they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed. Rules of Procedure, especially those
prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, are absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and
speedy discharge of justice. We have held
that the rules may be relaxed only in “exceptionally meritorious cases.”[41]
In the instant case, we find no persuasive or exceptionally meritorious
reasons to justify the relaxation of the rules. The circumstances obtaining in the instant
case show that petitioner was accorded opportunity to settle her liability to
private complainant and to present her case during the proceedings. As earlier recounted, the MTC, upon motion of
petitioner, provisionally dismissed the case on the basis of an amicable
settlement between her and private complainant. However, the case was revived, because
petitioner failed to comply with the settlement. Petitioner was given several opportunities
during the trial to present evidence in her defense. Nonetheless, despite being
duly notified and subpoenaed, she did not appear during the trial proper and
promulgation of judgment.
It should be noted that private complainant has not been fully or
partially paid the amount stated in the check. The time-honored principle is “Justice is for
all. Litigants have equal footing in a
court of law. Rules are laid down for
the benefit of all and should not be made dependent upon a suitor’s sweet time
and own bidding.”[42]
Given the foregoing, we find no error in the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying petitioner’s appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision, dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice Acting Chairperson |
WE
CONCUR:
Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate
Justice |
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DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
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ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 679 dated
** Per
Special Order No. 681 dated
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-16 and 57.
[2] Penned
by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Regalado
E. Maambong and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 159-172.
[3] CA
rollo, pp. 205-206.
[4] Records,
pp. 168-173.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29] CA
rollo, pp. 2-16.
[30] CA
rollo, pp. 173-182.
[31]
[32] Rule 121, Section 1: At any time before
a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused
or at its own instance but with consent of the accused, grant a new trial or
reconsideration; Rule 122, Section 6:
An appeal must be taken within 15 days from promulgation of judgment or from
notice of the final order appealed from.
[33] Universal Robina Corporation v. Catapang,
G.R. No. 164736,
[34] Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128967,
[35] Cayana v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
125607,
[36] Cervantes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
166755,
[37] Records,
p. 173.
[38]
[39] GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v.
[40] Air Philippines Corporation v. International
Business Aviation Services Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 151963,
[41] Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, 386 Phil.
412, 417-418 (2000); Lustaña v.
Jimena-Lazo, G.R. No. 143558, 19 August 2005, 467 SCRA 429, 432; Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, G.R. No.
148739, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 218, 229-230; Villamor v. Heirs of Sebastian Tolang, G.R. No. 144689, 9 June
2005, 460 SCRA 26, 35; Bacarra v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162445, 20 October 2005, 473 SCRA 581,
586.
[42] Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, supra note
41 at 230.