SPECIAL SECOND
DIVISION
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OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
Petitioner, - versus - PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 178188 |
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CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner, - versus - HON.
JUDGE BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan,
and PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Respondents. |
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PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Petitioner, -
versus - CITINICKEL MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, acting for
its own interest and on behalf of OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent. |
G.R. No. 181141
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PLATINUM GROUP METALS CORPORATION,
Petitioner, -
versus - COURT OF APPEALS and POLLY C. DY,
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 183527
Present: *CARPIO MORALES, J. Acting Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., **LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
brion, and PERALTA,
JJ.
Promulgated:
August 14, 2009
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E S O L U T I O N |
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BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Resolution: (1) the motions
for reconsideration of the Court’s Decision of
The dispositive of the Court’s May 8, 2009
Decision declared:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we rule as follows:
a)
in G.R. No. 178188 (Olympic
Mines v. Platinum Group Metals Corporation): Olympic’s petition is denied
for lack of merit and the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97259 is AFFIRMED;
a)
in G.R. No. 183527 (Platinum
Group Metals Corporation v. Court of Appeals): The assailed CA Resolution
in CA-G.R. SP No. 101544 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
b)
in G.R. No. 180674 (Citinickel
Mines and Development Corporation v. Judge Bienvenido Blancaflor and Platinum
Group Metals Corporation): The
questioned CA Decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 99422 is AFFIRMED; and
c)
in G.R. No. 181141 (Platinum
Group Metals Corporation v. Citinickel Mines and Development Corporation):
The CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97288
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The POA
Resolution, having been issued in violation of a previously issued writ of
preliminary injunction, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
BACKGROUND FACTS
In 1971 and 1980, Olympic was
granted “Mining Lease Contracts” by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
covering mining areas located in
On July 18, 2003, Olympic entered
into an Operating Agreement with the Platinum Group Metals Corporation (Platinum), under which Platinum
was given the exclusive right to control, possess, manage/operate, and conduct
mining operations, and to market or dispose mining products found in the
Toronto Nickel Mine in the Municipality of Narra and in the Pulot Nickel Mine
in the Municipality of Espanola (subject mining areas) for a period of
twenty-five years. In return, Platinum bound
itself to pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2½ of the gross revenues.
In
2006, Olympic made various attempts to terminate the Operating Agreement and to
deprive Platinum of its rights and interests over the subject mining areas,
alleging that Platinum committed gross violations of the Operating
Agreement. These attempts included:
a)
sending Platinum a letter on
b)
filing a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of an
injunctive writ against Platinum on April 25, 2006 before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Puerto Princesa,
Branch 52 (docketed as Civil Case No. 4181) to enjoin Platinum from
conducting mining operations on the subject mining areas and to recover
possession thereof;
c)
filing a letter with Governor Joel T. Reyes of
d)
sending another letter to Platinum on June 8, 2006 to
inform Platinum that it would file legal actions for the alleged violations of
the Operating Agreement; and
e)
filing two administrative cases[6]
before different agencies of the DENR, both with the intent to terminate the
Operating Agreement and to revoke Platinum’s SSMPs.
During the pendency of the two
administrative cases, Olympic transferred its MPSA applications (which
necessarily included all its mining rights over the subject mining areas) to
Citinickel via a Deed of Assignment dated
Fearing the consequences of
Olympic’s various attempts to invalidate the Operating Agreement, Platinum
filed a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of contract, and
specific performance against Olympic before the RTC of Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, Branch 95 on June 14, 2006 (docketed as Civil Case No. 4199). Olympic filed a motion to dismiss alleging
that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the issues raised in
the complaint, as these involved a
mining dispute requiring the technical expertise of the Panel of Arbitrators (POA). The RTC,
through Judge Blancaflor, denied Olympic’s motion to dismiss.[7]
On
Meanwhile,
Citinickel, after the execution of the Deed of Assignment, also made several
attempts to invalidate the Operating Agreement, in the way its predecessor
Olympic did. It filed Civil Case No. 06-0185 before the RTC of Parañaque,
Branch 258, on
While Civil Case No. 06-0185 was
pending before the RTC of Parañaque, however, Citinickel filed another administrative
action with the POA of the DENR, docketed as POA Case No. 002-06-B,
asking for a writ of injunction against Platinum and for the cancellation of
the Operating Agreement. This time, Citinickel succeeded; the POA issued a
resolution dated October 30, 2006 (POA Resolution) cancelling the
Operating Agreement and Platinum’s SSMPs, and Platinum was ordered to cease and
desist from operating the subject mining areas.
The validity of the POA Resolution in light of the writs of
injunction issued in Civil Case No. 4199 is the subject of the fourth case, G.R.
No. 181141.
For a more graphic presentation, as
in the Court’s Decision of
|
Case
Number |
Parties |
Cause
of Action |
Status |
|
Civil Case No. 4181 (RTC |
Olympic v. Platinum |
Complaint for injunction to enjoin Platinum from
continuing mining activities filed on |
·
May 16, 2006 Order dismissing the complaint for injunction after
finding that unilateral termination of the Operating Agreement was illegal (Branch
52 Order). ·
Olympic did not appeal the
Order. |
|
PMRB Case No. 001-06 |
Olympic v. Platinum |
Complaint for revocation of
Platinum’s SSMPs dated |
·
|
|
Civil Case No. 4199 (RTC |
Platinum v. Olympic |
Complaint for quieting of
title, damages, and specific performance |
·
·
|
|
DENR POA Case No. 2006-01-B |
Olympic v. Platinum |
Petition to cancel Operating
Agreement and revoke Platinum’s SSMPs dated |
·
|
|
Civil Case No. 06-0185 (RTC |
Citinickel v. Platinum |
Complaint to rescind Operating
Agreement dated |
·
·
Citinickel did not appeal the Order. |
|
PMRB Case No. 002-06 |
Citinickel v. Platinum |
Petition to cancel Platinum’s
SSMPs dated |
·
|
|
DENR POA Case No. 2006-02-B |
Citinickel v. Platinum |
Complaint to cancel Operating
Agreement and to issue injunction against Platinum dated |
·
October 30, 2006 Resolution cancelling
OA and SSMP of Platinum (POA Resolution) |
|
EMB letter- complaints filed
as DENR EMB Case No. 8253 |
Citinickel v. Platinum |
Complaint to cancel ECCs
issued to Platinum dated |
·
Elevated to DENR Secretary by Citinickel on
account of alleged inaction of EMB ·
·
Nov 22 Order denying MR of Platinum ·
|
|
Civil Case No. Q-07-59855 (RTC |
Citinickel v. DENR |
Petition for mandamus to
compel DENR Secretary to confiscate and hold mineral ores stockpiled in |
·
|
THE COURT’S
The consolidated cases raised the
following matters:
a)
in G.R. No. 178188, Olympic claimed that the RTC
of Palawan was without jurisdiction to hear Civil Case No. 4199 (Platinum’s
action for quieting of title) since it is the POA that has exclusive
jurisdiction over the case;
b)
in G.R. No. 183527, Platinum assailed the Court of
Appeals (CA) resolution[10]
that granted Dy’s petition to nullify the injunctive writs issued by the RTC of
Palawan in Civil Case No. 4199 and to enjoin the trial court from hearing and
conducting further proceedings in the same case. Platinum likewise questioned Dy’s standing to
assail the injunctive writs that were not addressed against her;
c)
in G.R. No. 180674, Citinickel assailed the
injunctive writ issued against it in Civil Case No. 4199, as it was allegedly
never impleaded in the case even though it was an indispensable party; and
d)
in G.R. No. 181141, Platinum assailed the POA
Resolution terminating the Operating Agreement, as it was issued in violation
of the injunctive writs issued in Civil Case No. 4199 and in blatant disregard
of the rules on forum shopping.
The
Court, through the
The Court upheld the RTC
Palawan’s jurisdiction to hear Civil Case No. 4199 after finding that the main
issue to be resolved – the validity of Olympic’s unilateral termination of the
Operating Agreement – is a judicial question, not a mining dispute. Platinum’s complaint merely sought to protect its
interest or title in the subject mining areas and to remove all doubts regarding
the Operating Agreement’s continuous effectivity by having a competent court
declare that Olympic’s unilateral termination of the Operating Agreement was
unlawful. In other words, Platinum
invoked the RTC’s jurisdiction for a judicial confirmation of the Operating
Agreement’s validity and existence, that, to the Court’s mind, is clearly a
legal question.
More importantly, after
dissecting Section 77 of the Mining Act that outlined the POA’s jurisdiction, we
found that a dispute involving an Operating Agreement is clearly outside the
bounds of the POA’s jurisdiction.
Section 77 of the Mining Act reads:
Sec. 77. Panel of
Arbitrators. – xxx. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission
of the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and
original jurisdiction to hear and decide on the following:
a.
Disputes involving rights to mining areas;
b.
Disputes involving
mineral agreements or permits;
c. Disputes involving surface
owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and
d. Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at
the date of the effectivity of this Act. [Emphasis supplied.]
Citing recent jurisprudence,
particularly Celestial Nickel Mining
Exploration Corporation v. Macroasia Corporation,[11] the
Court ruled that Section 77(a) refers to an “adverse claim, protest, or
opposition to an application for a mineral agreement.” Notably, even
Justice Tinga, in his dissent, conceded that Section 77(a) of the Mining Act does
not apply to Platinum’s complaint.[12]
Section 77(b), on the other hand,
pertained to disputes involving mineral agreements or permits – terms
that have acquired technical meanings under Section 3 (ab) of the Mining Act:
ab. Mineral agreement means a
contract between the government and a contractor, involving mineral
production-sharing agreement, co-production agreement, or joint-venture
agreement.
Obviously the Operating Agreement, being a purely
civil contract between two private entities, cannot in any way be considered a
mineral agreement whose fundamental nature requires that it be a contract
between the government and a contractor.
Based on these findings, the
Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC of Puerto Princesa,
In the
same Decision, we did not find persuasive Citinickel’s argument that the
injunctive writ was not binding against it for Platinum’s failure to implead it
as an indispensable party. To begin with, the execution of the Deed of
Assignment on
THE MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION
The
various motions filed by Olympic, Citinickel, and Dy all raise
substantially the same issues, which can be reduced to the following:
a)
whether the RTC of Palawan or the POA has jurisdiction
over Platinum’s complaint for quieting of title, breach of contract, damages
and specific performance (Civil Case No. 4199);
b)
whether Citinickel was an indispensable party in Civil
Case No. 4199 and should have been
impleaded to make the injunctive writ binding against it; and
c) whether
Dy has the standing to have the injunctive writs issued in Civil Case No. 4199
nullified.
Also, both Olympic and Citinickel
pray that their motions for reconsideration be referred to the Court En Banc
for resolution.
THE COURT’S RULING
Referral to Court En Banc
is unwarranted
In
their motions, Olympic and Citinickel harp on the Court’s split majority in its
The Constitution itself decrees
that the Supreme Court can sit En Banc or in divisions of three, five,
or seven members.[13]
Cases or matters heard by a division shall
be decided or resolved with the concurrence of the majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations of the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members.[14] Under
SC Circular No. 2-89 (Guidelines and Rules in the Referral to the Court En
Banc of Cases Assigned to a Division), a decision of a Division of the
Court, when concurred in by a majority of its Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, is a decision of
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
sitting En Banc is not an appellate court in relation with the Divisions
to which the latter’s decisions may be appealed. Each division of the Court is not a body inferior to the Court En
Banc, and sits veritably as the Court En Banc
itself.[15]
Undoubtedly,
a decision by majority of a division of the Supreme Court – whether the vote is
a split 3-2 vote or a unanimous decision – is still a decision of the Supreme
Court. Therefore, the fact the May 8,
2009 Decision was reached by a 3-2 vote is not, by itself, sufficient ground to
refer the case to the Court En Banc.
More
importantly, we observe that Olympic and Citinickel merely rehashed
the same issues and arguments we already discussed and passed upon in our
I.
The
Issue of Jurisdiction
Olympic and Citinickel claim
that the doctrine that should be applied in these consolidated cases is that laid
down in Gonzales v.
Climax-Arimco Mining,[16] not the doctrine settled in the Celestial case.
Admittedly, the tribunals or bodies participating in the jurisdictional
conflict in the present consolidated cases more closely resemble those involved
in Gonzales than those in Celestial. Gonzales involved the issue of whether or not it was the regular
court or the POA that has jurisdiction to resolve the presented dispute. Celestial,
on the other hand, involved the issue of whether or not it was the Secretary of
the DENR or the POA who has jurisdiction to cancel a mining lease contract or
existing mineral agreement. Under the
ruling in Gonzales that:
[T]he resolution of the validity or voidness of the contracts remains a
legal or judicial question as it requires the exercise of judicial function. It requires the ascertainment of what laws are applicable to the
dispute, the interpretation and application of those laws, and the rendering of
a judgment based thereon. Clearly, the dispute is not a mining
conflict. It is essentially judicial. The complaint was not merely
for the determination of rights under the mining contracts since the very
validity of those contracts is put in issue.
The Complaint is not about a dispute involving rights to mining
areas, nor is it a dispute involving claimholders or concessionaires. The main
question raised was the validity of the Addendum Contract, the FTAA and
the subsequent contracts. xxx.
xxxx
Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a
disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the contract between
them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that particular
knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or
validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as
in this case. The validity of the contract cannot be subject of
arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud and duress in the execution
of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of
law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application and
interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial
function. [Emphasis supplied.]
Olympic and
Citinickel posit that only questions involving the validity or voidness of
mining contracts or agreements can be settled by the courts; other matters,
especially those that require the interpretation and
the application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members
of the POA, should be resolved by the POA.
We do not agree. Nothing in Gonzales leads to the
conclusion that in mining cases, ordinary courts can only resolve questions of
validity of mining contracts or agreements; rather, Gonzales simply established that these questions are more properly
resolved by courts of law, as these are essentially judicial questions
requiring the application of laws.
Nothing more was said beyond this; Gonzales certainly did not
limit the courts’ authority to questions of validity of mining contracts or
agreements.
Olympic and Citinickel assert
that the principal issue raised in Civil Case No. 4199 was whether Platinum
committed gross violations of the Operating Agreement – a contractual
dispute between the parties that requires the technical expertise of the POA to
resolve. Assuming this to be correct, Olympic and Citinickel’s reliance on Gonzales
would actually work against the grant of jurisdiction to the POA. Gonzales decreed:
Decisions of the Supreme Court
on mining disputes have recognized a distinction between (1) the primary powers
granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (and the bureau directors) of an executive or administrative
nature, such as granting of license, permits, lease and contracts, or
approving, rejecting, reinstating or canceling applications, or deciding
conflicting applications, and (2) controversies or disagreements of civil or
contractual nature between litigants which are questions of a judicial nature
that may be adjudicated only by the courts of justice. This
distinction is carried on even in Rep. Act No. 7942. [Emphasis supplied.]
What is ultimately being
questioned in Civil Case No. 4199 is the validity of Olympic’s unilateral
termination of the Operating Agreement, as similarly found by Justice
Carpio Morales in her Concurring Opinion. Besides, in light of the ruling in Civil Case
No. 4181 (the complaint filed by Olympic against Platinum) that Platinum
substantially complied with the terms of the Operating Agreement – a ruling
that Olympic never appealed – the determination of whether Platinum committed
gross violations of the Operating Agreement may no longer be necessary.
Platinum’s resort to a judicial
action via a complaint to quiet title to question the
unilateral termination of the Operating Agreement by Olympic can be likened to an
action subjecting to judicial scrutiny the validity of a contracting party’s
extrajudicial rescission of a contract by resorting to the automatic resolution
clause. We ruled in UP v. De Los Angeles[17] that a party contesting the extrajudicial
rescission of its contract with another may seek judicial relief:
[T]he act of a party in
treating a contract as cancelled or resolved on account of infractions by the
other contracting party must be made known to the other and is always
provisional, being ever subject to scrutiny and review by the proper court.
If the other party denies that rescission is justified, it is free to
resort to judicial action in its own behalf, and bring the matter to court.
Then, should the court, after due hearing, decide that the resolution of the
contract was not warranted, the responsible party will be sentenced to damages;
in the contrary case, the resolution will be affirmed, and the consequent
indemnity awarded to the party prejudiced.
In other
words, the party who deems the contract violated many consider it resolved or
rescinded, and act accordingly, without previous court action, but it proceeds
at its own risk. For it is only the final judgment of the corresponding
court that will conclusively and finally settle whether the action taken was or
was not correct in law. xxx.
In every
case where the extrajudicial resolution is contested, only the final award of
the court of competent jurisdiction can conclusively settle whether the
resolution was proper or not. It is in this sense that judicial action will be
necessary, as without it, the extrajudicial resolution will remain contestable
and subject to judicial invalidation, unless attack thereon should become
barred by acquiescence, estoppel or prescription. [Emphasis supplied.]
Section 20 of the Operating Agreement requires a
30-day notice before a party can terminate the agreement.[18] Olympic failed to show that it satisfied this
requirement; indeed, a day after it sent Platinum the letter of termination,
Olympic instituted Civil Case No. 4181 to enjoin Platinum from conducting
mining activities on the subject mining areas.
Significantly, Gonzales never completely went into the specifics of the
POA’s jurisdiction as enumerated in Section 77 of the Mining Act in the same
thoroughness that Celestial did. It was
in Celestial that the POA’s jurisdiction on disputes involving
rights to mining areas and disputes involving mineral agreements or permit
under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 77, respectively, was clarified and
defined. Celestial accomplished this by tracing the development of
POA’s jurisdiction through a survey of the previously enacted mining laws and comparing
these laws with the present Mining Act and the implementing rules and
regulations.
In relation to Section
77 (a) on disputes involving rights to mining areas, Olympic contends that when
Platinum filed Civil Case No. 4199, it had a pending application for MPSA; this
situation allegedly brings the case within the POA’s jurisdiction under Section
77 (a), as it becomes a pre-approval protest or adverse claim that Celestial spoke of. Even
before Olympic raised this argument, however, Justice Leonardo-De Castro had
already addressed and settled this matter in her Separate Opinion:
In the cases at bar, there were no conflicting claims or rival
interests in a mineral agreement or permit granted by the government. There was only one grantee of, or applicant
for, a mineral agreement and that was Olympic (later substituted by
Citinickel). Any mining rights that
Platinum enjoyed or exercise under the Operating Agreement was in
representation of Olympic. It is
conceded that Platinum had no mining grant or concession from the government in
its own name over the same mining areas.
Platinum was issued mining permits, not as a grantee or applicant in its
own right, but as Olympic’s agent/operator.
There can be no rival or disputing claims to a granted mineral agreement
or permit.[19]
Platinum’s
complaint is not an adverse claim to Olympic’s/Citinickel’s mineral agreement
application; Platinum is not making a separate bid for the mining areas covered by
the Operating Agreement. On the contrary, Platinum merely wanted Olympic/Citinickel to acknowledge the validity of the Operating
Agreement and to remove all doubts as to its rights under the agreement.
And as pointed out, even Justice Tinga, in his dissent, recognized that Platinum’s complaint does not fall
under the POA’s jurisdiction based on Section 77(a) of the Mining Act.
In their petitions,
motions, and other pleadings, Olympic and Citinickel have thrown in every
conceivable argument they could raise against the trial court’s jurisdiction
over Civil Case No. 4199, yet they have been unable to reconcile and explain
why, despite these attacks, they themselves invoked the trial court’s
jurisdiction when they filed Civil Case Nos. 4181 and 06-0185 before the RTCs
of Palawan and Parañaque, respectively. By
their acts, Olympic and Citinickel acknowledged the authority and jurisdiction
of the ordinary courts to resolve their dispute with Platinum. They are now estopped from claiming the
contrary.
II.
The
Indispensable Party Issue
Echoing its earlier
claim, Citinickel insists that the injunctive writ issued by Judge Blancaflor
in Civil Case No. 4199 against it should not be sustained as it was never
impleaded in the case, despite being an indispensable party. We fully addressed this issue in our
In this case,
one fact resonates and remains unrebutted – the transfer of Olympic’s rights to
Citinickel was done surreptitiously, via
the Deed of Assignment dated June 9, 2006, without the knowledge or consent of
Platinum. Thus, when Platinum instituted Civil Case No. 4199 on June 14, 2006 –
five days after the execution of the Deed of Assignment – Platinum was not
notified of the assignment or even of the earlier Memorandum of Agreement
between Olympic and Rockworks, contrary to the terms of Section 13 of the
Operating Agreement xxx:
The rights and interests of either
[Olympic] or [Platinum] in and under this Agreement are assignable and/or
transferrable, in whole or in part, to persons or entities qualified xxx provided that the rights of both of the
parties under this Agreement are preserved and maintained, unaffacted or
unimpaired, and provided further that the assignee undertake to be bound by all
the provisions of this Agreement, provided furthermore that the assigning party shall duly notify in
writing the other party of such proposed assignment and/or transfer before
the actual assignment and/or transfer is done.
Even if Platinum knew of the
assignment/transfer, it was not bound to include Citinickel in the complaint
because the assignment/transfer of a mineral agreement application would, by
law, take effect only after the
approval of the DENR Secretary or his representative. Section 40 of DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 (Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Mining Act) states:
Section 40. Transfer or Assignment of Mineral Agreement
Application. - Transfer or assignment of Mineral Agreement
applications shall be allowed subject to
the approval of the Director/concerned Regional Director taking into account
the national interest and public welfare: Provided, That such
transfer or assignment shall be subject to eligibility requirements and shall
not be allowed in cases involving speculation. [Emphasis supplied.]
The provision is clear – any
transfer or assignment of a mineral agreement application is still subject to
the approval of the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau or the
Regional Director concerned. xxx. Thus, although the Deed of Assignment between
Olympic and Citinickel was executed on
Citinickel
additionally argues that when Section 40 of DENR AO No. 96-40 declared that the
“transfer or assignment of the mineral agreement application shall be allowed
subject to the approval of the Director/concerned Regional Director” of the
DENR, the phrase “shall be allowed” should be construed to mean that the
transfer is effective immediately, though subject to the
condition of the DENR’s approval. Thus,
as of June 9, 2006, Citinickel claims there was already an effective transfer
or assignment of Olympic’s rights, and it became imperative for Platinum to implead
Citinickel as defendant in its June 14, 2006 complaint to make the orders and
writs issued therein binding against Citinickel.
Citinickel’s
argument does not merit a reversal of the Court’s ruling. Section 40 of DENR AO No. 96-40 (Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Mining Act) is derived from Section
30 of the Mining Act which reads:
Section 30. Assignment/Transfer.
– Any assignment or transfer of rights and obligations under any mineral
agreement, except a financial or technical assistance agreement, shall
be subject to the prior approval of the Secretary. Such assignment or transfer shall be
deemed automatically approved if not acted upon by the Secretary within
thirty (30) working days from official receipt thereof, unless patently
unconstitutional or illegal. [Emphasis supplied.]
If the Court were to
follow Citinickel’s argument, we would effectively render nugatory the
requirement of prior approval and the automatic approval clause
of Section 30 above. Such construction –
obviously against the literal wording of the law – is beyond the powers of this
Court to make, whether acting en banc or in division.
To be clear, Citinickel is not an indispensable party which
must be impleaded in Civil Case No. 4199 to make the writs and orders issued
therein binding against it. Rather, it
is a transferee pendente lite under Section 19 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court[20]
whose inclusion or substitution lies entirely within the discretion of the
court hearing the case. The formal
inclusion of a successor-in-interest is not an absolute requirement as a
judgment is binding against the parties and their successors-in-interest.[21]
III.
The Legal Standing Issue
While
Citinickel rejects the validity and binding force of the injunctive writ issued
in Civil Case No. 4199 that expressly included its name, Dy, whose name was
never included in either writs (July 21, 2006 injunctive writ and April 13,
2007 expanded injunctive writ), resists its probable application against
her and thus sought its annulment before the CA by filing a certiorari
petition against the trial court (CA-G.R. SP No. 101544). The CA issued a resolution (dated
We
have carefully read and scrutinized the injunctive writs and failed to find any
provision expressly mentioning Dy’s name or even implying that it can be made
enforceable against her. Dy, however,
reasons that:
Due to the xxx
allegations in the Amended Complaint of conspiracy and the alleged bad faith on
the part of private respondent Polly Dy in directing the affairs of Rockworks
and in allegedly sanctioning Rockworks’ interference with the Operating
Agreement of Platinum, it may be said that the order of injunction
issued by the respondent Judge a quo which continues to exist also operates
against private respondent Polly Dy. [Emphasis supplied.]
The
argument borders on the absurd. Not
being the subject of the injunctive writs, Dy has no legal standing to assail
them through a certiorari petition. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, it is
the person aggrieved by the assailed act of a board, tribunal or officer
which has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction who can file a
petition for certiorari before the proper court.[22]
The Expanded Injunctive
Writs
Before
the Court finally resolves and disposes of these consolidated cases, we find it
significant to clarify the extent of the coverage of the RTC’s expanded
injunctive writ insofar it relates to the other functions of the agencies of
the DENR. As aptly observed by Justice
Leonardo-De Castro:
The RTC’s order should be understood as
only preventing the said agencies from taking jurisdiction over disputes
pertaining to the Operating Agreement. However, the RTC should not enjoin
the DENR and its offices, or other executive/administrative agencies, from
exercising their jurisdiction over alleged violations of the terms of
Platinum’s ECCs or other mining permits. To my mind, breaches of the
Operating Agreement and breaches of the terms of Platinum’s ECCs or mining
permits are different matters. The former belongs to the jurisdiction of the
regular courts while the latter belongs to the jurisdiction of the appropriate
executive/administrative agencies. Each should respect the jurisdiction of the
others.[23]
IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the Court hereby resolves to DENY the Motions to Refer the Resolution of
these consolidate cases to the Court En Banc filed by Olympic and
Citinickel, and similarly DENY the Motions for Reconsideration of the
Court’s May 8, 2009 Decision filed by Olympic, Citinickel and Dy.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated Acting Chairperson of the Second
Division per Special Order No. 618 dated
** Designated additional member of the Second
Division per Special Order No. 619 dated
[1] Dated June 5
and 9, 2009; rollo, pp. 475-485.
[2] Dated
[3] Dated
[4] Motions dated
June 15, 17 and 29, 2009 filed by Citinickel and motion dated
[5] Section
112. Non-impairment of Existing
Mining/Quarrying Rights. – All valid
and existing mining lease contracts, permits/licenses, leases pending renewal,
mineral production-sharing agreements granted under Executive Order No. 279, at
the date of effectivity of this Act, shall remain valid, shall not be impaired,
and shall be recognized by the Government:
Provided, That the provisions of Chapter XIV on government share in
mineral production-sharing agreement and Chapter XVI on incentives of this Act
shall immediately govern and apply to a mining lessee or contractor indicates
his intention to the secretary, in writing, not to avail of said
provisions: Provided, further, That no
renewal of mining lease contracts shall be made after the expiration of its
term: Provided, finally, That such
leases, production-sharing agreements, financial or technical assistance
agreements shall comply with the applicable provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.
Section 113. Recognition of Valid and Existing Mining
Claims and Lease/Quarry Applications. – Holders of Valid and existing
mining claims, lease/quarry applications shall be given preferential rights to
enter into any mode of mineral agreement with the government within two (2)
years from the promulgation of the rules and regulations implementing this Act.
[6] These two administrative cases filed by
Olympic against Platinum were:
a. Provincial Mining Regulatory
Board (PMRB) Case No. 001-06 (filed
on
b. Panel of Arbitrators (POA)
Case No. 2006-01-B (filed on
[7] Order dated
[8] Order dated
[9] The two administrative
cases filed by Citinickel against Platinum were:
a.
PMRB
Case No. 002-06 for revocation of Platinum’s SSMPs; and
b.
EMB
Case No. 8253 for revocation of Platinum’s ECCs.
[10] Dated
[11] G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, 176226, and
176319,
[12] See p. 28 of Justice Tinga’s Dissenting
Opinion.
[13] CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 4 (1).
[14]
[15] Apo Fruits Corporation v. CA, G.R. No.
164195, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 237; J.G.
Summit Holdings, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 124293, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA
169; Firestone
Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127022, June 28, 2000, 334 SCRA 465.
[16] G.R. No. 161957,
[17] G.R. No.
L-28602,
[18] Section 20 of
the Operating Agreement states:
The
FIRST PARTY may terminate this agreement by giving thirty (30) days notice to
the SECOND PARTY based on gross violations of the terms and conditions of this
agreement.
[19]
See p. 6 of J. Leonardo-De Castro’s Separate Opinion.
[20]
SECTION 19. Transfer of interest.—In
case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or against the
original party, unless the court upon motion directs the person to whom the
interest is transferred to be substituted in the action or joined with the
original party.
[21] I Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 178-179.
[22] SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
[23]
See p. 8 of J. Leonardo-De Castro’s Separate Opinion.