SECOND DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee, - versus - RACHEL ANGELES y NAVAL alias RUSSEL ANGELES y CABAL,
Appellant. |
G.R. No.
177134 Present: CARPIO,* J., CARPIO MORALES,
J., Acting Chairperson, BRION, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: August 14, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
His conviction for murder by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18 in Criminal Case No. 98-167500 having
been affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals by Decision of
The Information against appellant reads:
That on or about September
1,
Oddly,
while appellant was alleged to have conspired with one whose whereabouts were
“still unknown,” the “John Doe” was not impleaded as accused.
From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Antonio Aguilar
(Aguilar) and Jonathan V. Carpio (Carpio) and the Medico-Legal Report of the
autopsy of the victim containing the following:
POSTMORTEM
FINDINGS:
x x x x
HEAD AND TRUNK:
1. Scalp hematoma, occipital region, measuring 6x5 cm, bisected by the posterior midline.
2. Stab wound, left mammary region, measuring 2.7 cm long with 3 stitches applied 17.5cm from the anterior midline, 15 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, downwards and medialwards, passing thru the 4th intercostals space, piercing the upper lobe of the left lung, pericardial sac and heart.
x x x x
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is hemorrhagic shock as a result of a stab wound of the trunk.
(Underscoring supplied),
the
following version of the prosecution is culled:
At around
After Aguilar’s tricycle passed by the victim’s tricycle, he
(Aguilar) made a “U-turn” upon which he heard the victim and appellant arguing
about the fare. While appellant was standing on the left side of the victim and
his companion was holding the victim’s hands, appellant stabbed the victim near
his armpit causing him to fall down. Appellant
and his companion immediately fled, passing by Carpio, also a tricycle driver.
Aguilar, with the help of people in the vicinity, immediately
brought the victim to the
As Carpio saw appellant holding a
knife, he went inside the nearby house of appellant’s aunt and told her what he
had witnessed. The aunt who was then
busy playing “tong-its” was
unmoved, however. Carpio thus left and proceeded to the nearby basketball
court where he learned from the people there that someone had been stabbed.[5]
On the other hand, appellant, interposing
alibi, claimed that at around
Appellant’s mother Evelyn corroborated appellant’s claim.
By Decision of
WHEREFORE, the accused,
Rachel Angeles, is hereby convicted of the crime of murder under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs. The accused is
further ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim moral and nominal
damages in the respective sums of P200,000.00 and P70,000.00,
plus compensation for the loss of the life of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date until
fully paid.[6] (Underscoring supplied)
This Court, following People v. Mateo,[7]
referred the case, by Resolution of
In his Brief,[9]
appellant faults the trial court in:
I.
… CONVICTING [APPELLANT] OF MURDER WHEN THE LATTER’S GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
…CONVICTING [APPELLANT] OF MURDER IN THE ABSENCE OF THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
III
…NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE M
The appellate court affirmed with
modification the trial court’s decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED by DELETING the award of
nominal damages in the amount of P70,000.00 and ORDERING
accused-appellant Rachel Angeles y Naval to pay the heirs of Michael Coligado
the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, REDUCING
the award of moral damages from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00 and
In deleting the trial court’s award of
nominal damages, the appellate court held that nominal damages are awarded only
when no actual damages resulted or none were shown. In the present case, however, the appellate
court noted that the family of the victim made a downpayment of P10,000
to the Davao Funeral Home as part of the funeral expenses, and while an
Agreement[11]
between the mother of the victim and the funeral home for funeral expenses and
interment in the amount of P38,000 was presented, it was not established
that the total amount of P38,000 was actually paid.[12] Hence, the appellate court’s award of
temperate damages instead of nominal damages.
Hence, the present appeal.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough
for an accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed. He must prove that he could
not have been physically present at the locus
criminis or in its immediate vicinity, and the same must be supported by
credible corroboration, preferably from disinterested witnesses who would swear
that they saw or were with the accused somewhere else when the crime was being
committed.[13]
Appellant’s mother’s corroboration of his alibi does not
impress. For while she declared that when
she went up the second floor of their house to sleep at around
Q: And what time did you go to sleep?
A:
Q: And you woke up on the following morning, is that correct?
A: Yes,
sir, early morning at
Q: While
you were asleep from
A: He was there sleeping, sir.
Q: The basis of your answer that he was sleeping is your allegation that when you went to sleep you saw him sleeping, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But
you cannot be absolutely certain that after you went to bed, he did not
leave your house because you admitted that you already went to sleep?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x x
COURT:
Q: Where
was he sleeping at that time when you slept at
A: At the sala, Your Honor.
COURT
Q: And where is your room situated, in what part of your house?
A: Upstairs, sir.
Q: And the sala of your house is located on the ground floor of your house?
A: Yes, sir. [14] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That appellant’s guilt is not ruled out in view of the
proximity of his house to the locus
criminis is reflected in his own testimony on cross-examination, viz:
Q: Now,
that place where you reside is at No. 2172 T. Pinpin
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is very near the place where where [sic] Michael Colligado was killed, is that correct?
A: It’s far, it’s on the other street, sir.
Q: That
is also along
A: No,
sir, it happened on
Q: And
that is at the corner of
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And from your house, you could reach that place by walk[ing] just for about 5 minutes, is that correct?
A: It would take me about ten minutes, sir.
Q: But if you run, you would reach that in a short period of time, probably about 5 minutes more or less, is that correct?
A: Probably about 5 minutes, sir.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It bears stressing that appellant and even his mother could
not impute any ill-motive on the part of prosecution eyewitness Aguilar to
falsely charge him of having stabbed the victim.
The well-settled rule that positive identification by a witness, absent any showing of ill motive on his part, prevails thus stands.[16]
That treachery attended the stabbing cannot be gainsaid. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving him of
any real chance to defend himself Even when the victim was forewarned of the
danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is decisive
is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or to retaliate.[17]
In the present case, even assuming that the victim was
forewarned of the danger because he was, immediately before the stabbing, engaged in an argument with appellant, he was
not in a position to defend himself as his hands were held by appellant’s
companion.
As for appellant’s claim of voluntary
surrender to mitigate the penalty imposed on him, the same fails. The records do not indicate that appellant
intended to assume responsibility for the death of the victim. As the Office of
the Solicitor General observes, he was “merely forced by circumstances.”[18]
Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot be proved with certainty, temperate damages may be recovered. Consistent
with prevailing jurisprudence, the appellate court correctly awarded the amount
of P25,000.[19]
Further, under Article
2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, in this
case, treachery. This is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings
and as vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.[20]
The imposition of exemplary damages is also justified under Article 2229 of the Civil
Code in order to set an example for the public good. The amount for the purpose
is P25,000 following precedents.[21]
WHEREFORE, the P25,000) as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
|
MARIANO C. |
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 671 in lieu of Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave..
[1] CA rollo, pp. 85-96. Penned by Justice Marina L. Buzon, with the concurrence of Justices Aurora Santiago-Lagman and Arcangelita Romilla-Lontok.
[2] Also spelled Taroyo in some parts of the records.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4]
[5] TSN, Jonathan
Carpio,
[6] Records, pp. 123-124.
[7] G.R. Nos. 147678-87,
[8] CA rollo, p. 83.
[9]
[10]
[11] Records, p. 77.
[12] CA rollo,
pp. 94-95.
[13] People v. Gusmo, 467 Phil. 199, 217-218.
[14] TSN, Evelyn
Angeles,
[15] TSN, Rachel Angeles,
[16] People v.
Barcimo, Jr. 467 Phil. 709, 719 (2004). Vide Sienes v. People,
G.R. No. 132925,
[17] People v. Rodas, G.R. No. 175881,
[18] CA rollo, p. 73.
[19] People v. Eling, G.R. No. 178546,
[20] People v. Malibiran, G.R. No. 178301,
[21] Vide People v. Obligado, G.R. No. 171735,