THIRD DIVISION
|
REPUBLIC
OF THE Petitioner, - versus - FAR
EAST ENTERPRISES, INC., ARSOL MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,* MARIA
CHRISTINA C. BERNASCONI, JORGE C. BERNASCONI, RENE C. BERNASCONI, REGINA B.
TUASON, CHRISTIAN C. BERNASCONI, MARTIN C. BERNASCONI, JAIME C. BERNASCONI
and CHRISTINA MARIE C. BERNASCONI,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 176487 Present: PUNO,**' C.J., CARPIO
MORALES,*** J., CHICO-NAZARIO,**** Acting Chairperson, VELASCO, JR., and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: August 25, 2009 |
x- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 9 November 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72425 which dismissed
petitioner Republic of the Philippines’ Petition for Certiorari, and its Resolution[2]
dated 5 February 2007 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals held that the Regional
Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 674, did not act
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the Resolution dated 17 June 2002 ordering petitioner to make an
additional payment of P425.00 per square meter for the subject properties
of respondents Far East and the Bernasconis before the issuance of an Order to
take possession of the subject properties, and a writ of possession.
On 23 November 2001, the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint[3]
for Eminent Domain before the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas against
Far East Enterprises, Inc. (
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that:
5. Defendants are the declared owners of parcels of land situated at Barangay Balaytigue, Nasugbu, Batangas as shown in the Tax Declarations attached as Annexes “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, “I”, “J”, “K”, “L”, “M”, and “N”, and certificates of title attached as annexes “O”, “P”, “Q”, “R”, “S”, “T”, “U”, “V”, “W”, “X”, “Y”, “Z” and “AA” and more particularly described below together with the affected areas sought to be expropriated and the corresponding zonal values, to wit:
x x x x
6. To enable the plaintiff to construct the Ternate-Nasugbu Tali Batangas Road, a public purpose authorized by law to be undertaken by plaintiff, it is both necessary and urgent for plaintiff to acquire portions of the above parcels of land consisting of a total area of 29, 786 sq. m., more or less, shown in the attached sketch plan marked as Annex “CC” and made and integral part hereof.
7. The portion of above-described parcels of land sought to be expropriated have not been applied to nor expropriated for any public use and are selected by plaintiff as the site of the right-of-way in connection with the construction of the Ternate-Nasugbu Tali Batangas in a manner compatible with the greatest public good and the least public injury.
8. Plaintiff has negotiated with defendants for the acquisition of portions of the properties for the public purpose as above-stated at a price prescribed by law, but failed to reach an agreement with them notwithstanding the negotiations.
9. Under Section 7 of the Executive Order No.
1035 dated
10. Pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974[4] in relation to Section 12 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations thereof, plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real properties involves upon the issue of this Honorable Court of a Writ of Possession in favor of the plaintiff.
x x x x
11.
Plaintiff is willing to deposit the total amount of P2.233M representing
the zonal valuation of the affected portions of the subject parcels of land as
stated in paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof and which for purposes of the issuance of
the corresponding writ if possession, is required to be deposited by plaintiff
with the authorized government depository, subject to the orders and final
disposition of this Honorable Court.[5]
The properties subjects of this case
are all located in Barangay Balaytigue, Nasugbu, Batangas. The particulars of the parcels of land are as
follows:
|
Owner |
OCT/TCT No. |
Lot/Block No. |
Tax Declaration No. |
Area Affected in Square Meters |
|
|
T-60966 |
Block 7[6] |
014-01029 |
1,704 |
|
|
T-15189 |
|
014-01102 |
2,988 |
|
|
T-60540 |
|
014-01106 |
2,346 |
|
|
T-57762 |
|
014-01105 |
3,051 |
|
|
TP-1835 |
|
014-01313 |
2,317 |
|
Bernasconis |
T-54825 |
|
014-01119 |
2,053 |
|
Bernasconis |
T-54825 |
|
014-01120 |
190 |
|
Arsol |
T-50152 |
|
014-00182 |
1,432 |
|
Arsol |
T-50168 |
|
014-0098 |
1,356 |
|
Arsol |
T-50158 |
|
014-0097 |
2,960 |
|
Arsol |
T-51059 |
|
014-0088 |
2,398 |
|
Arsol |
T-50160 |
|
014-0087 |
4,484 |
|
Arsol |
T-50170 |
|
014-00175 |
457 |
|
Arsol |
T-51064 |
|
014-00109 |
1,898 |
Arsol filed its Answer with
Counterclaim[7] dated
Respondent
10.2 That answering defendant manifests that on
or about March 2001, during the meeting held at its office, plaintiff made an
offer to purchase the properties, of the answering defendant, subject matter of
this case, at P200.00 per square meter. x x x.
10.2.1 That during the said meeting, answering
defendant bargained for a higher price but Atty. Lamberto Aguilar, Legal Office
of Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH, for brevity), suggested that
answering defendant accept the said amount of compensation at P75.00 per
square meter because he claims that the actual use of the real estate properties,
although classified as residential by the Municipal Assessor of Nasugbu, is
agricultural;
10.2.2 That in compliance with the suggestion of plaintiff to put into writing our counter-offer, answering defendant wrote the former informing it of its desired amount and requesting for a copy of the revised parcellary survey plan showing the area to be affected after reduction in width of the right of way from 30 meters to 20 meters intended by the DPWH.
10.2.3 That after learning of its rights as landowner
under Administrative Order No. 50 and Republic Act (RA, for brevity) No. 8974,
answering defendant in a letter dated July 16, 2001, retracted the previous
amount offered to plaintiff in its letter dated April 6, 2001 and, instead
offered the said properties on a negotiated sale at the amount of at least P600.00
per square meter.
x x x x.
10.2.4 That Plaintiff never replied to answering
defendant’s letter under date of P75.00 per square meter. x x x.
10.3 That plaintiff misleads the Honorable Court
in stating that the zonal valuation of the subject properties is P75.00
per square meter as the said amount corresponds only to agricultural lands, not
to residential lands owned by answering defendant and subject of this
complaint, as determined in the schedule of BIR zonal valuation attached as
Annex “BB” in its complaint;
x x x x
10.4 That the subject properties except for one (1) property, are parts and parcels of Talibeach Subdivision, a residential subdivision, in line with the approved subdivision plans and/or by the said subdivision’s Deed of Restriction, xerox copies of which are attached as annexes “4” to “4-1”;
10.4.1 That, in addition, the properties are located in the same general area of other residential subdivisions such as Peninsula de Punta Fuego, and Maya-Maya Subdivisions as well as approximately 3 kilometers from two other residential subdivisions currently being developed as sold, specifically, Terrazas de Punta Fuego and Kawayan Cove Subdivision;
10.4.2 That Per Proclamation 1801 and Zoning
Ordinance No. 03 of the
10.5 That as previously stated, the amount of P75.00
per square meter corresponds to agricultural lands located at Brgy. Balaytigue,
Nasugbu, Batangas and not to residential lands such as those of answering
defendant subject of the complaint, as determined in Annex “BB” in the
complaint;
x x x x
10.6 That similarly situated developed lots in
the area are sold at the range of P4,000.00 to 9,000.00 per square meter
more or less. x x x.
10.7 All in all answering defendant is not objecting to the expropriation of its properties but it must be paid justly in respect to not only the final compensation but also in respect to the initial compensation to be deposited in full with the court, in conformity with R.A. No. 8974 & A.O. No. 50 x x x.[9]
Respondent
Far East prayed that, after due notice and hearing, the complaint be given due
course by ordering petitioner to comply with the mandate of Section 4 (a) of Republic
Act No. 8974 by depositing in its name the initial amount of P7,433,600.00
or P600.00 per square meter for the total area of 12,406 sq.m. of its
properties to be used in the construction of the Ternate-Nasugbu Tali Batangas
Road. It also asked that said amount be
released to it and that the just compensation for its lands be fixed.
In
their Joint Answer[10]
dated P
1,345,800.00 or P600.00 per square meter for the 2,243 sq.m. of their
property being expropriated. They asked
that said amount be released to them, and that the just compensation for their
properties be fixed.
Petitioner
filed separate replies to the Answers of Arsol and
On
In
its Order dated 8 February 2002, the trial court ordered petitioner to comply
and manifest its compliance with the guidelines of Section 12 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 8974, within ten days
from receipt thereof, before it would issue an order for petitioner to take
possession of the affected properties, so it may commence the implementation of
the project mentioned in the complaint.[14]
On
P2,222,550.00) had been allotted and made available to cover
payment of properties sought to be expropriated as follows:
1. Arsol Management Corporation P1,123,875.00
14,985 sq.m.
@ P75.00/sq.m.
2. Maria Christina Bernasconi,
et al. P 168,225.00
2,243 sq.m.
@ P75.00/sq.m.
3. P 930,450.00
12,406 sq.m.
@ P75.00/sq.m.
P 2,222,550.00
It informed the trial court that DPWH
Regional Director Nestor V. Agustin sent separate letters to the defendants tendering
the price equivalent of 100% of the zonal valuation declared by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) for their respective properties to be expropriated. P2,222,550.00 in
three Land Bank checks in the names of the defendants, for its proper disposition.
In
their respective comments on petitioner’s compliance, both P600.00 per square meter. They prayed that the issuance of the writ of
possession be deferred until petitioner had deposited with the trial court the
correct amounts of P1,345,800.00 (for the Bernasconis) and P7,443,600.00
(for Far East), and that the previous amounts (P168,225.00 for the
Bernasconis and P930,450.00 for Far East) deposited be withdrawn by them
under protest without prejudice to the ruling of the trial court on the correct
amount of zonal valuation of residential lands in Balaytigue, Nasugbu,
Batangas.[16]
In an Order dated P75.00 per
square meter. It said that the deposit
should be based on P500.00 per square meter, because the subject lands were
residential lands. As to Arsol, the
trial court found the deposit of petitioner at P75.00 per square meter was
correct and directed Arsol to claim the check for P1,123,875.00 from the
Clerk of Court, under a proper receipt.[17] On the same day, Arsol received the check in
the amount of P1,123,875.00 representing the initial payment of just compensation
for its lands which were subject of the expropriation proceedings.[18]
P930,450.00
and P168,225.00, respectively, without prejudice to the final
determination of just compensation for the affected properties.[20] On
Petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration dated P500.00 per square meter instead of P75.00
per square meter. It prayed that the
trial court reconsider its Order dated
In a Resolution dated P75.00
per square meter) made by petitioner sufficient and substantial compliance with
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 and Section 8 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, and that Far East and the Bernasconis had already received the
checks as deposits for their properties under expropriation. It ordered the petitioner to take possession
of the affected properties and to start the implementation of the road
project. It likewise ordered the
issuance of a writ of possession commanding the proper officer to place
petitioner in possession of the affected portions of said properties.[25]
Far
East and the Bernasconis filed their Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated 2
May 2002 praying that the Order dated 26 April 2002 be reconsidered, and that the
court order petitioner to deposit the balance of P425.00 per square
meter in order to comply with the required deposit of the zonal value of P500.00
per square meter, as correctly ordered by respondent court in its Order dated 2
April 2002.[26]
Petitioner filed its Opposition to
Defendants’ Joint Motion for Reconsideration,[27]
to which
The
trial court issued a Resolution[29]
dated
After a re-assessment of the respective arguments of both parties, the Court finds merit in the joint motion for reconsideration.
For one, the definition of agricultural land is clear and leaves nothing for any other interpretation. The plaintiff has not shown any other definition of agricultural land, different from the above definition. The fact, as claimed by the plaintiff, that the lands of the movants are idle, raw and undeveloped, with no houses thereon, does not unmake the same as residential because they were already classified as such long before this case was filed. The fact that the subject properties may be suitable for agricultural uses does not make it agricultural because they were classified as residential per plaintiff’s Annexes “A” to “G” of the Complaint. The very tax declarations of the movants’ properties (Annexes “A” to “G”, Complaint) show that subject properties are indeed residential and not agricultural.
In this connection, tax declarations
do not prove ownership of the property.
It is only an evidence of possession.
It is the titles of the properties that show their ownership (Annexes
“O” to “T” of the Complaint). The Court
realizes its lack of discretion to substitute its judgment for the authority of
the
RA 8974 gives no discretion to the Court to determine the classification of the expropriated properties.
Plaintiff cannot question the very contents of its documents which are parts and parcels of its complaint. It is a cardinal rule in adjective law that pleadings are binding on the pleader.
In fine, the Court is fully
convinced to give weight to the contents of plaintiff’s Exhs. “A” to “G” and
“BB”, Complaint. Therefore, the deposit
of P75.00 per square meter made by plaintiff as regards movants’
properties is insufficient because the zonal valuation of the same is fixed at P500.00
per square meter.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises
considered, the order of P425.00 per square meter for the properties of the
movants before the order to possess and writ of possession issue.
Respondents
P425.00 per
square meter.[30]
In
its Manifestation and Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession dated P425.00 per square meter to a higher court. It also said that in the interest of
expediting the implementation of the project the completion of which was of
utmost urgency, it had already made in protest a deposit of the additional amount
of P425.00 per square meter as specified in the trial court’s Resolution
dated P6,225,825.00
(P953,275.00 in favor of the Bernasconis and P5,272,550.00 in
favor of Far East) had been allotted for the purpose. Thus, it prayed that a writ of possession be
immediately issued.[31]
The
trial court found that petitioner did not attach the Certificate as to
Availability of Funds in its Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated
Petitioner
filed its Compliance dated P6,225,825.00. It also apologized for its failure to attach
said certificate in its Manifestation and Urgent Motion dated
In
an Order dated P953,775.00
and P5,272,550.00 to the Bernasconis and
On
P425.00 per square meter. It further asked the appellate court to
require the trial court to conduct an ocular inspection of the expropriated
properties to determine their actual use and to allow it to present its
evidence of the classification of said lands.[35] The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 72425.
While
CA-G.R. SP No. 72425 was pending before
the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of the trial court dated
In its Resolution dated
On
On P425.00
per square meter for the subject properties of
Petitioner submitted to respondent
court the Land Bank checks payable to private respondents, as well as to Arsol,
and a certification as to availability of funds. However, private respondents Far East and the
Bernasconis disagreed with the amount of petitioner’s deposit and prayed in
their Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 26 April 2002
that petitioner be ordered to deposit the balance of Php425.00 per square meter
in order to comply with the zonal value of Php500.00 per square meter, as
contained in the Order dated 02 April 2002.
They argued that their land is residential and that the zonal value of
P500.00 per square meter should be paid to them, instead of the zonal value of
P75.00 per square meter for agricultural lands.
This Joint Motion of private respondents was granted by respondent court
in the Resolution dated
We sustain the ruling of respondent court in the assailed Resolution. However, to be more precise, petitioner should make the additional initial payment (not deposit) of Php425.00 per square meter for the properties of private respondents before the order to take possession and writ of possession can be issued.
Petitioner itself attached to its Complaint
as Annex “BB” a certified photocopy of the BIR’s Schedule of Zonal Values of
Real Properties in the
BRGY. BALAYTIGUE
|
ALL LOTS[50] |
RR |
500.00 |
600.00 |
|
|
A |
75.00 |
80.00 |
|
|
CR |
1,500.00 |
1,700.00 |
|
|
GP |
|
200.00 |
Further, petitioner also appended to
its Complaint as Annexes “A” to “G” the Tax Declarations of private respondent
Thus, based on Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 and Section 8 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 8974, petitioner should have paid immediately to private respondents the amount equivalent to the sum of 100% of the value of the property based on the BIR zonal valuation of private respondents’ residential lots in Barangay Balaytigue, Nasugbu, Batangas in the amount of Php500.00 per square meter, and not Php75.00 per square meter which is the BIR current zonal valuation for agricultural lots in said barangay. R.A. No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations are clear as to the amount of payment which petitioner, through DPWH, the implementing agency, has to make, even as early as the filing of petitioner’s Complaint. No amount of verbiage on petitioner’s part can alter the plain and unequivocal provisions of the law and the implementing rules. Thus, respondent court did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it relied upon private respondents’ tax declarations (Complaint’s Annexes “A” to “G”), and the BIR zonal valuation of real properties in Nasugbu, Batangas (Complaint’s Annex “BB”); found the amount of Php75.00 per square meter insufficient as regards private respondents’ subject residential properties, the zonal valuation of which is Php500.00 per square meter; and ordered petitioner to make the additional payment of Php425.00 per square meter before the order to take possession and writ of possession can be issued in petitioner’s favor. As held in Republic v. Gingoyon [G.R. No. 166429, 19 December 2005, 478 SCRA 474, 520], R.A. No. 8974 provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, whichever is higher.
Rep. Act No. 8974 represents a significant change from previous expropriation laws such as Rule 67, or even Section 19 of the Local Government Code. In both cases, the private owner does not receive compensation prior to the deprivation of property. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government. Rep. Act No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the requirement of immediate prepayment, and no amount of statutory deconstruction can evade such requisite. It enshrines a new approach towards eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity. While expropriation proceedings have always demanded just compensation in exchange for private property, the previous deposit requirement impeded immediate compensation to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the determinations of the final amount of compensation would prove highly disputed. Under the new modality prescribed by Rep. Act No. 8974, the private owner sees immediate monetary recompense with the same degree of speed as the taking of his/her property.
While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the State, there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be protracted as far as practicable. In fact, the expedited procedure of payment, as highlighted under Rep. Act No. 8974, is inherently more fair, especially to the layperson who would be hard-pressed to fully comprehend the social value of expropriation in the first place. Immediate payment placates to some degree whatever ill-will that arises from expropriation, as well as satisfies the demand of basic fairness.
It is therefore erroneous for petitioner to contend that respondent court abdicated its authority in determining just compensation. The compensations to private respondents based on the BIR zonal valuation of the properties sought to be expropriated at Php500.00 per square meter is merely the immediate payment of the initial just compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in order to effectuate the transfer of possession in favor of petitioner.
The issuance of the writ of possession does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation is not completed until payment to the property owner of just compensation. To effectuate transfer of ownership, it is necessary of the Government to pay the property owner the final just compensation.
Indeed, the determination of just compensation in expropriate proceedings is a judicial function. Section 5 of R.A. No. 8974 enumerates certain relevant standards which respondent court may consider, in order to facilitate the determination of just compensation.
x x x x
Thus, it is at this stage of the expropriation proceedings where the judicial function of determining just compensation is to be exercised by respondent court. It is also at this point when petitioner’s evidence regarding the use of the subject properties, value declared by the owners, current selling price, ocular findings, etc. will into play.[51]
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration
dated
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner raises the following
grounds in support of the petition:
I
IN RULING THAT PETITIONER SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PAY THE BIR ZONAL VALUATION OF THE PROPERTY BEFORE TAKING POSSESSION, THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO RESOLVE THE LIS MOTA OF THE CASE, THAT IS, WHICH FACTORS SHOULD CONTROL IN DETERMINING THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF PAYMENT OF THE BIR ZONAL VALUATION; COROLLARY THERETO, THE HONORABLE COURT’S RELIANCE IN REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON (“GINGOYON”), IS NOT CONTROLLING IN THIS CASE, BECAUSE THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED IS NOT IN AN ISSUE IN GINGOYON, AS IT IS IN THIS PETITION.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING TO APPLY THE STANDARDS SET IN R.A. NO. 8974 IN DETERMINING THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF EXPROPRIATION.
A. TAX DECLARATIONS AND THE MUNICIPAL ZONING ORDINANCE ARE NOT CONTROLLING BUT ARE MERE FACTORS AMONG SEVERAL OTHER FACTORS IN DETERMINING THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY.
B. THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SURROUNDING PROPERTIES AND THE ACTUAL USE OF THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE EXPROPRIATED AT THE TIME OF THE TAKING, PARTICULARLY IN THIS CASE WHERE THE LAND IS RAW, UNCULTIVATED, AGRICULTURAL PROPERTY, SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF PAYMENT OF THE BIR ZONAL VALUATION;
C. ACCORDINGLY, IN CASE OF DOUBT AS TO THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY, THE COURT SHOULD MAKE A JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF PAYMENT OF THE BIR ZONAL VALUATION;
III
COROLLARY THERETO, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULE ON MULTIPLE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE, THE FACT THAT PETITIONER INTRODUCED TAX DECLARATIONS OF THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES SOLELY AS PROOF OF OWNERSHIP OF THE EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY DOES NOT PRECLUDE PETITIONER FROM QUESTIONING RESPONDENTS’ UNILATERAL STATEMENT IN THEIR TAX DECLARATIONS THAT THE PROPERTIES ARE RESIDENTIAL.
In
paying a property owner 100% of the value of a property based on the current
relevant zonal valuation of the BIR for the purpose of an issuance of a writ of
possession, under which classification of the expropriated property should
petitioner, as the implementing agency, be required to make such payment? This, according to petitioner, is the issue
in this petition.
Section
4 of Republic Act No. 8974 (An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way,
Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other
Purposes) provides the guidelines for expropriation proceedings. Said section reads:
SECTION
4. Guidelines for Expropriation
Proceedings. — Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the
right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure
project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall
initiate the expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the
following guidelines:
(a) Upon
the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay
the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of one hundred
percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current
relevant zonal valuation of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures
as determined under Section 7 hereof;
(b) In
provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no zonal
valuation, the BIR is hereby mandated within the period of sixty (60) days from
the date of filing of the expropriation case, to come up with a zonal valuation
for said area; and
(c) In
case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency
and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its
proffered value taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5
hereof.
Upon compliance
with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the
implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ
of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate
of availability of funds from the proper official concerned.
In the event that
the owner of the property contests the implementing agency's proffered value,
the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within
sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the
decision of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency
shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just
compensation as determined by the court. (Underscoring supplied)
Under
said law, the requirements for authorizing immediate entry in expropriation
proceedings involving real property are: (1) the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance; (2) due notice to the defendant;
(3) payment of an amount equivalent to 100% of the value of the property based
on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR including
payment of the value
of the improvements and/or structures if any, or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the
payment of the proffered value of the property to be seized; and (4)
presentation to the court of a certificate of availability of funds from the
proper officials.[54]
Upon
compliance with the requirements, a complainant in an expropriation case is
entitled to a writ of possession as a matter of right, and it becomes the
ministerial duty of the trial court to forthwith issue the writ of
possession. No hearing is required, and
the court exercises neither its discretion nor its judgment in determining the
amount of the provisional value of the properties to be expropriated, as the
legislature has fixed the amount under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974.[55]
In
the instant case, petitioner does not dispute that the provisional value to be
paid before a writ of possession can be issued is 100% of the value of the
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation by the BIR. What it questions is the classification
of the properties sought to be expropriated, which will then be used in determining
the 100% value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of
the BIR.
Petitioner
contends that the subject properties are agricultural for the following
reasons: (1) the BIR Zonal Valuation classifies properties in Barangay
Balaytigue, Nasugbu, Batangas as Residential, Agricultural, Commercial and
Industrial; (2) the properties involved are actually used for agricultural
purposes (raw, undeveloped with no houses); and (3) all the adjoining
properties are classified as agricultural.
On the other hand, respondents
Petitioner
argues that in cases where there is a dispute on the classification of the
property, the trial court is under obligation to judicially determine the
classification of the property prior to requiring the payment of the amount
based on the BIR zonal value. It should
be allowed to present evidence of the proper classification of the
properties. Petitioner adds that nothing
in Republic Act No. 8974 compels it or the Court to classify the property based
on tax declarations, for the latter has judicial discretion to ascertain the
classification and nature of the property based on the standards set under
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974. Petitioner
states that the expropriation court is not bound by a property owner’s
statement in the tax declaration that his property is residential or by a
municipal zoning ordinance that classifies the property as such, when there
exists controverting evidence to the contrary.
Thus, petitioner faults both the trial court and the appellate court for
ruling that the lands involved are residential, notwithstanding petitioner’s claim
that the there is evidence to show that the same are agricultural.
It
is clear from the foregoing that petitioner is questioning the classification
of the lands involved.
We
agree with petitioner that the courts have judicial discretion to determine the
classification of lands, because such classification is one of the relevant
standards for the assessment of the value of lands, subject of expropriation
proceedings. It is one factor that the
courts consider in determining just compensation. The determination of just compensation
is a function addressed by the courts of justice and may not
be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.[56] However, we would like to make it clear that
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974 lists the relevant standards that are to be
considered in determining just compensation for and not classification of lands,
as petitioner would like us to believe.
Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 8974 enumerates the standards that assist in the determination
of just compensation:
SEC.
5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of the Land Subject of
Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated
(a) The classification and use for which the property is suited;
(b) The developmental costs for improving the land;
(c) The value declared by the owners;
(d) The current selling price of similar lands in the vicinity;
(e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the removal and/or demolition of certain improvements on the land and for the value of improvements thereon;
(f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal valuation of the land;
(g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular findings, oral as well as documentary evidence presented; and
(h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as those required from them by the government, and thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.
The more important query
to be resolved is: Are the courts, in the first instance, the proper venue in
which to resolve any dispute involving the classification of lands?
We
do not think so.
By questioning the classification of
the lands involved, petitioner is, in effect, questioning the propriety, wisdom
and legality of the act of the Municipal Council of Nasugbu, Batangas of reclassifying
the subject lands as Residential. Per
certification of the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator/Zoning Administrator of the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas, the
lands of Far East and the Bernasconis sought to be expropriated were classified
as Residential, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 3 dated 3 May 1982,
as approved under Resolution No. 123, series of 1983 dated 4 May 1983 by the
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (now HLURB[57]).
This Court recognizes the power of a
local government to reclassify and convert lands through local ordinance,
especially if said ordinance is approved by the HLURB.[58] In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association,
Inc. v. Court Appeals,[59]
we acknowledged the power of local government units to adopt zoning ordinances. Discretion is vested in the appropriate
government agencies to determine the suitability of a land for residential,
commercial, industrial or other purposes.[60] It is also a settled rule that an ordinance
enjoys the presumption of validity.[61]
Having the power to classify lands, the local government unit may
consider factors that are just, reasonable and legal, for it is within the
local government unit’s power to determine these. However, if they abuse their authority in the
performance of this duty, the courts, if prompted, can step in.
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, empowers the local government units to
reclassify agricultural lands:
Sec. 20. Reclassification of
Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed
by the Sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize
the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for
the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when
the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes
as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have
substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial
purposes, as determined by the Sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of
the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to third class municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%); Provided further, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as “The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,” shall not be affected by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
x x x x
(c) The local government units shall in
conformity with existing laws, continue to prepare their respective
comprehensive land use plans enacted though zoning ordinances which shall be
the primary and dominant bases for the future use of land
resources: Provided, That the requirements for food production, human
settlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the
preparation of such plans.
x x x x
(e) Nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing, amending or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
In
the case before us, the lands in question had long been (almost 20 years) reclassified
as residential before the instant case was filed. All those years, no one questioned the
ordinance reclassifying the lands. If
petitioner would like to have the reclassification of the lands involved
changed to agricultural, the just and reasonable way of doing it is to go to
the municipal council -- not the courts – that enacted the ordinance and to ask
that the lands be reclassified again as agricultural. Technical matters such as zoning classifications and building certifications should be
primarily resolved first by the administrative agency whose expertise relates
therein.[62] The jurisprudential trend is for courts to
refrain from resolving a controversy involving matters that demand the special
competence of administrative agencies, “even if the question[s] involved [are]
also judicial in character.”[63] In this manner, we give the respect due to
these agencies (the municipal council and the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission
[now HLURB]), which unquestionably have primary jurisdiction to rule on matters
of classification of lands.
In Solmayor v. Arroyo,[64] we
declared:
Well
settled is the principle that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise
of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they
are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; thus their findings of fact
in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courts. Accordingly, since specialized government
agencies tasked to determine the classification of parcels of land, such as the
Bureau of Soils and the HLURB, among other agencies, have already certified
that the subject land is residential/commercial, the Court must accord such
conclusions great respect, if not finality, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.[65]
Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, there is a
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. Thus, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, there is a presumption that public officers performed their official
duties regularly and legally and in compliance with applicable laws, in good
faith, and in the exercise of sound judgment.[66] This presumption applies to this case.
If after going to the local government unit or government agencies that made
the classification of the lands and the implementing agency fails to obtain the
redress they seek (proper classification), despite evidence clearly showing erroneous
classification, it is only then that it can go to the court to ask for
intervention.
In the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals based their
classification of the lands concerned, not only on the tax declarations, but
more importantly on the certification issued by the Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator/Zoning Administrator of the Municipality of Nasugbu,
Batangas that said lands had been (re)classified as residential pursuant to
Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 3 dated 3 May 1982 as approved under Resolution
No. 123, series of 1983 dated 4 May 1983 by the Human Settlement Regulatory
Commission (now HLURB). The tax
declarations adduced and the certification show that the lands concerned are
classified as residential. There is no
discrepancy between the two as regards classification. Even if there is any inconsistency, what
prevails is the determination for zoning purposes.[67]
There is no question that a local
government unit can determine the suitability of a land for residential,
commercial, industrial of for other purposes.
It can do this through an ordinance passed by the Sanggunian for the purpose.[68] Moreover, under Section 447 of Republic Act No. 7160, the Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the legislative body
of the municipality, has the power to enact ordinances for the general welfare
of the municipality and its inhabitants. Among the functions of the Sangguniang Bayan enumerated under
Section 447 of Republic Act No. 7160 are:
(2)
Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues for the
development plans, program objectives and priorities of the municipality as
provided for under Section 18 of this Code with particular attention to
agro-industrial development and countryside growth and progress, and relative
thereto, shall:
x
x x x
(vii)
Adopt a comprehensive
land use plan
for the municipality: Provided, That the formulation, adoption,
or modification of said plan shall be in coordination with the approved
provincial comprehensive land use plan;
(vii)
Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the municipality subject to the
pertinent provision of this Code; x x x.
Under the facts obtaining, this Court
agrees with both lower courts that the classification of the lands concerned is
residential. No other certification from
the municipal council has been presented to show that a new zoning ordinance
has been passed by it changing the present classification of the lands, subject
of the expropriation case. Even if we
consider the allegations of petitioner that said lands are actually used for
agriculture, and that the lands adjoining the same are all classified as
agricultural, the same will not necessarily change said classification to
agricultural.
Even assuming that the lands are
still used for agricultural purposes, this will not cause the reversion of the
classification of the lands to agricultural.
In Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court Appeals,[69] we
ruled that the failure of the landowner to complete the housing project did not
have the effect of reverting the property to its former classification. In De Guzman v. Court of Appeals,[70] we
held that the continuous tillage of the land and the non-commencement of the
construction of the market complex did not strip the land of its classification
as commercial. Furthermore, even
assuming that all the adjoining lands are still classified as agricultural,
this does not mean that lands involved cannot be classified differently, as in
this case. In the certification issued by the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator/Zoning Administrator of the
We note that petitioner, in its
Complaint, classified the lands of P75.00 per square
meter. The classification it made for
the lands of P500.00 per square meter? As to the lands of Arsol, they were
classified as agricultural in the tax declarations, so petitioners used the
zonal valuation for agricultural lands, which was P75.00 per square meter. From the foregoing, it can be gathered that
from the very inception of this case, petitioner, though knowing that the lands
of P75.00 per square meter).
Petitioner knew that the lands of
Inasmuch as what is involved in this
case is the payment of the amount equivalent to 100% of the value of
the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, we must
distinguish the same from just compensation.
In Capitol
Steel Corporation v. Phividec
Industrial Authority,[73]
we ruled:
To clarify, the payment
of the provisional value as a prerequisite
to the issuance of a writ of possession differs from the payment
of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value
is based on the current relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on
the prevailing fair market value of the property. As the appellate court explained:
The first refers to the preliminary
or provisional determination of the value of
the property. It serves a double-purpose
of pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and of
an indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed. It is not a final determination of just
compensation and may not necessarily be equivalent to the prevailing fair
market value of the property.
Of course, it may be a factor to be considered in the determination of
just compensation.
Just compensation, on the other
hand, is the final determination of the fair market value of
the property. It has been described as
“the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing
expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.” Market values, has also
been described in a variety of ways as the “price fixed by the buyer and seller
in the open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal trade and
competition; the price and value of the article established
as shown by sale, public or private, in the ordinary way of business; the fair value of the property between one who desires to purchase and
one who desires to sell; the current price; the general or
ordinary price for which property may be sold in that locality.
As the preliminary or provisional
determination of the value of the property equivalent to 100% of the value of
the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, said
amount serves a double purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully
expropriated, and of indemnity for damages if the proceedings are dismissed. Said provisional value must be paid to the
owner of the land before a writ of possession may be issued. The issuance of a certificate of availability
of funds will not suffice for the purpose of issuance of a writ of possession.
After
payment of the provisional amount, the court may now proceed to determine the
amount of just compensation. Petitioner
can now present its evidence relative to the properties’ fair market value as
provided in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8974.[74]
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice Acting Chairperson |
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
|
|
|
DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice |
|
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
* Though named as respondent by petitioner, Arsol Management Corporation said it is not a party to be directly affected by the issue resolved in this case.
The Hon. Antonio de Sagun, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Nasugbu, Batangas was removed from the title of the action, he being a nominal party in this case.
**' Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno was designated to sit as additional member replacing
Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
*** Per
Special Order No. 679 dated
**** Per
Special Order No. 681 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 249-270.
[2]
[3] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-46.
[4] An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-Of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes.
[5] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 3, 5-6, 8-9.
[6] Part of Lots 263 and 340. See description of TCT No. T-60966.
[7] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 71-76-B.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Id.at 133.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35] CA rollo, pp. 1-31.
[36] Records, Vol. 2, pp. 468-474.
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42] Records, Vol. 3, pp. 815-817.
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46]
[47] Records, Vol. 4, p. 1137.
[48]
[49] CA rollo, pp. 249-269.
[50] RR-Regular Residential; A-Agricultural; CR-Commercial Regular; GP-General Purpose.
[51] Rollo, pp. 57-61.
[52] CA rollo, pp. 271-285.
[53]
[54] Capitol
Steel Corporation v. Phividec Industrial Authority,
G.R. No.
169453,
[55]
[56] Land Bank of the
[57]
[58] Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, G.R. Nos. 112526 and 118838, 453 SCRA 432, 459.
[59] 473 Phil. 64, 95 (2004).
[60] De Guzman v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 156965,
[61] Social Justice Society v.
Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052,
[62] Sadang v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 140138,
[63] Department of Agrarian Reform v.
[64] G.R. No. 153817,
[65]
[66] United BF Homeowners’ Associations,
Inc. v. The (Municipal) City Mayor,
[67] Junio v. Garilao, G.R.
147146,
[68] Section 20, Local Government Code.
[69] Supra note 59 at 96.
[70] Supra note 60 at 251.
[71] Table, Records, Vol. 1, p. 4.
[72] Annexes “A” to “N”; id. at 15-28.
[73] Supra note 54 at 602-603.
[74] Republic
v. Cancio, G.R. No. 170147, 30 January 2009.