EN BANC
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, - versus - Arnold garchitorena Y camba a.ka. junior; joey
pamplona a.k.a. nato and jessie garcia y adorino, Accused-Appellants. |
G.
R. No. 175605
Present:
PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,* CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,** LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and ABAD, JJ.
Promulgated: ____________________ |
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D
E C I S I O N
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.:
For automatic review is the
Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 00765 which affirmed an earlier
Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case
No.9440-B, finding accused-appellants Arnold Garchitorena y Gamba, a.k.a. “Junior,”
Joey Pamplona, a.k.a. “Nato,” and Jessie Garcia y Adorino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death
and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00
as exemplary damages, P16,700.00 as actual damages, P408,000.00
for loss of earning capacity and to pay the costs of the suit.
The conviction of accused-appellants
stemmed from an Information[3]
dated January 22, 1996, filed with the RTC for the crime of Murder, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on
or about September 22, 1995, in the Municipality of Binan, Province of Laguna,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Arnold
Garchitorena y Gamba, alias “Junior”, Joey Pamplona alias “Nato” and Jessie
Garcia y Adorino, conspiring, confederating together and mutualy helping each
other, with intent to kill, while conveniently armed with a deadly bladed
weapon, with abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Mauro Biay y Almarinez
with the said weapon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different
parts of his body which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice
of his surviving heirs.
That the crime
was committed with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, accused-appellants,
duly assisted by their counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The prosecution
presented three (3) witnesses; namely, Dulce Borero, elder sister of the victim
Mauro Biay and eyewitness to the killing of her brother; Dr. Rolando Poblete,
who conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim and prepared the post-mortem
report; and Amelia Biay, the victim’s widow.
The
evidence for the prosecution, as culled from the CA Decision under review, is
as follows:
In the
proceedings before the trial court, witness for the prosecution Dulce Borero
testified that on September 22, 1995, at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening,
she was selling “balut” at Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela Paz,
Binan, Laguna. Her brother, Mauro Biay,
also a “balut” vendor”, was also at the area, about seven (7) arms length away
from her when she was called by accused Jessie Garcia. Borero testified that when her brother Mauro
approached Jessie, the latter twisted the hand of her brother behind his back
and Jessie’s companions- accused Arnold Garchitorena and Joey Pamplona – began
stabbing her brother Mauro repeatedly with a shiny bladed instrument. Joey was at the right side of the victim and
was strangling Mauro from behind.
Witness saw her brother Mauro struggling to free himself while being
stabbed by the three (3) accused., until her brother slumped facedown on the
ground.
Dr.
Rolando Poblete, the physician who conducted an autopsy on victim Mauro Biay
and prepared the post-mortem report, testified that the victim’s death was
caused by “hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds.” Witness specified the eight (8) stab wounds
suffered by the victim – one in the neck, two in the chest, one below the
armpit, two on the upper abdomen, one at the back and one at the left thigh –
and also a laceration at the left forearm of Mauro. According to the expert witness, the nature of
stab wounds indicate that it may have been caused by more than one bladed
instrument.
The
victim’s widow, Amelia Biay, testified that she incurred burial expenses
amounting to P16,700.00 due to the death of her husband. Also, her husband allegedly earned a minimum
of P300.00 a day as a “balut” vendor and P100.00 occasionally as
a part-time carpenter.
The accused-appellants denied the
charge against them. Specifically,
accused-appellant Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing of
Mauro Bay, accused-appellant Jessie Garcia interposed the defense of alibi,
while accused-appellant Arnold Garchitorena interposed the defense of
insanity. Succinctly, the CA Decision
summed up their respective defenses:
On the
other hand, accused Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing
of Mauro Biay. Joey Pamplona claims that
he was seated on a bench when co-accused Arnold came along. Then the “balut” vendor arrived and Joey saw
Arnold stand up, pull something from the right side of his pocket and stab the
“balut” vendor once before running away.
Joey Pamplona testified that after the stabbing incident, due to fear
that
Danilo
Garados testified that on Septemebr 22, 1995, he was at the store of Mang Tony
to buy cigarettes and saw
Clavel
Estropegan testified that on September 22, 1995, around 9:00 p.m. Joey Pamplona
entered her store and told her that Junior or Arnold Garchitorena was stabbing
somebody. She did not hear any commotion
outside her house which is just four houses away from the artesian well. However, she closed her store for fear that
Barangay
Captain Alfredo Arcega testified that he investigated the stabbing incident
and, although he had no personal knowledge, he found out that it was Arnold
Garchitorena who stabbed Mauro Biay.
Upon questioning
Defense
witness Miguelito Gonzalgo testified that on September 22, 1995, he was in his
shoe factory at his house located at
The other
co-accused Jessie Garcia took the stand and claimed that on September 22, 1995,
between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening, he was still riding a bus from his work
in Blumentritt. He arrived at his home
in Binan only at 11:00 p.m. On September
24, 1995, he was fetched by two (2) policemen and two (2) Barangay Tanods from
his house and brought to the Binan Police Station for questioning. Thereafter, he was put in jail and
incarcerated for six (6) months without knowing the charges against him. He was only informed that he was one of the
suspects in the killing of Mauro Biay by his mother.
With
respect to Arnold Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn Belen, Medical Officer III and
resident physician of the National Center for Mental Health, testified that she
examined the accused Arnold and based on the history of the patient, it was
found that he had been using prohibited drugs like shabu and marijuana for two
(2) years prior to the stabbing incident in 1995. The patient is allegedly suffering from
schizophrenia, wherein he was hearing auditory voices, seeing strange things
and is delusional. However, Dr. Belen
also testified that the accused Garchitorena had remissions or exaservation and
understands what he was doing and was aware of his murder case in court.[4]
On May 9, 2001, the
trial court rendered a Decision,[5]
as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
Court finds accused Arnold Garchitorena y Gamboa alias Junior, Joey Pamplona
alias Nato and Jessie Garcia y Adorino GUILTY beyond reasonable of the
crime of “MURDER” as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, by Republic Act 7659, (Heinous Crimes). Accordingly, all of them are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
Furthermore, all of the accused are hereby ordered to pay jointly
and severally Amelia Biay, widow of the victim Mauro Biay, the following sums:
a) 50,000.00 – as and
for civil indemnity
b) 50,000.00 – as and
for moral damages
c) 50,000.00 – as and
for exemplary damages
d) 16,700.00 – as and
for actual damages
e) 408,000.00 – as
and for loss of the earning capacity of Mauro Biay; and
f) To pay the costs
of suit.
Likewise, the Provincial Warden of the Provincial Jail, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, is hereby ordered to transfer/commit the three (3) accused to the New
Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt hereof.
Considering that death penalty was meted against all of the
accused, let the entire records of the above-entitled case be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment pursuant to Rule 122, Sec.10 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Accused-appellants appealed to the
CA. Pamplona and Garcia reiterated their denial of the charge against
them. Garchitorena who never denied his
participation in the killing, insisted, however, insisted that he is exempt
from criminal liability because he was suffering from a mental disorder before,
during and after the commission of the crime.
On May 31, 2006, the CA rendered
the Decision[7] now
under review, affirming RTC’s Decision in
toto, thus:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the appealed
March 9, 2001 Decuision of the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch
25, in Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding herein accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
In arriving at the
assailed Decision, the CA ratiocinated as follows:
After studying the records of this case, we do not find any reason
to overturn the ruling of the trial court.
Despite the testimony of defense witnesses that it was only
accused-appellant Arnold Garchitorena who stabbed the victim Mauro Biay, we
find reason to uphold the trial court’s giving credence to prosecution witness
Dulce Borero who testified as an eyewitness on the circumstances surrounding
the incident and the manner by which the crime committed.
Defense witness Garados testified that he was at the store and saw
both Arnold and Joey at the vicinity where the stabbing incident happened,
seated on a bench near the artesian well, when they called the victim
Mauro. Defense witness Gonzalgo was in
his house when he heard the commotion and went outside to see Arnold and Mauro
“embracing” near the artesian well and the former pulling a knife from the body
of the latter. On the other hand,
prosecution witness Borero was merely seven arms length away from the incident
and could easily see the victim Mauro overpowered and attacked by his
assailants, Arnold Garchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia. She witnessed the stabbing incident in its
entirely and positively identified the accused and their criminal acts. It is a well-settled rule that the evaluation
of testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the
highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity to observe the
witnesses on the stand and determine if they are telling the truth or not. (People vs. Cardel, 336 SCRA 144)
Evidence presented by the prosecution shows that the accused
conspired to assault the victim Mauro Biay.
Accused Jessie Garcia was the one who called the victim and prompted the
latter to approach their group near the artesian well. When the victim was near enough, accused
Jessie Garcia and co-accused Joey Pamplona restrained Mauro Biay and
overpowered him. Witness Borero then saw
the two accused, Jessie Garcia and Joey Pamplona, together with their
co-accused Arnold Garchitorena instructed his two co-accused to run. Conspiracy is apparent in the concerted
action of the three accused. There is
conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it (People vs. Pendatun, 434 SCRA
148). Conspiracy may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts
of the accused which show a joint or common purpose and design, a concerted
action and community of interest among the accused (People vs. Sicad, et al.,
391 SCRA 19).
Likewise, we affirm the trial court’s appreciation of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength to qualify the crime
into murder. “While it is true that
superiority in number does not per se mean superiority in strength, the
appellants in this case did not only enjoy superiority in number, but were
armed with a weapon, while the victim had no means with which to defend
himself. Thus, there was obvious
physical disparity between the protagonists and abuse of superior strength
attended the killing when the offenders took advantage of their combined
strength in order to consummate the offense.” (People of the Phils. vs. Parreno, 433 SCRA 591). In the case at bar, the victim was rendered
helpless when he was assaulted by the three accused. He was restrained and overpowered by the
combined strength and the weapons used by his assailants.
We do not find improbable Borero’s failure to act or shout for
help upon witnessing the stabbing of her brother Mauro Biay. It is an accepted maxim that different people
react differently to a given situation or type of situation and there is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or
startling experience. xxx There is no
standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident. The workings of the human mind when placed
under emotional stress are unpredictable.
(People of the
Accused-appellant Jessie Garcia’s denial of any involvement cannot
prevail over Borero’s positive identification.
As ruled by the trial court, allegations that accused Jessie Garcia was
somewhere else when the crime was committed is not enough. He must likewise demonstrate that he could
not have been present at the crime scene, or in its vicinity. He also could have sought the help of his co-worker,
employer or anyone in the area to support his defense of alibi. Indeed, we affirm that accused Jessie
Garcia’s allegation that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed is not
substantiated by evidence. Alibi can
easily be fabricated. Well-settled is
the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by the victim. (People
of the Phils. vs. Cadampog, 428 SCRA 336)
Finally, the defense of insanity cannot be given merit when the
expert witness herself, Dr. Belen, attested that accused Arnold Garchitorena
was experiencing remission and was even aware of his murder case in court. The trial court had basis to conclude that
during the commission of the crime,
Having found the court a quo’s decision to be supported by the
evidence on record, and for being in accord with prevailing jurisprudence, we
find no reason to set it aside.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the appealed
March 9, 2001 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Bińan, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 9440-B finding
herein accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
is AFFIRMED in its entirely.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to this Court
for automatic review. The People and the
accused-appellants opted not to file any supplemental brief. The respective assignments of errors
contained in the briefs that they filed with the CA are set forth
hereunder.
For accused-appellant
Pamplona:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN GIVING FULL AND TOTAL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS DULCE
BORERO
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN DULY PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT
For accused-appellant Garcia:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN GIVING UNDUE WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT GIVEN BY
DULCE BORERO, ELDER SISTER OF THE VICTIM AND PROSECUTION WITNESS, IN RESPECT OF
THE PARTICIPATION OF THE HEREIN ACCUSED DESPITE GLARING INCONSISTENCIES,
INHERENT IMPROBABILITIES AND UNRELIABLE DECLARATION ATTENDING THE SAME; AND, ON
THE OTHERHAND, IN DISREGARDING THE COHERENT, CONSISTENT AND CREDIBLE EYEWITNESS
ACCOUNT OF DEFENSE WITNESSES – ALL IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE RULES GOVERNING
QUANTUM OF PROOF IN CRIMINAL CASES AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENSE EXISTING IN
FAVOR OF ACCUSED GARCIA;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT
JESSIE GARCIA WHO WAS SOMEWHERE ELSE AT THE TIME AS TO RENDER IT PHYSICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO HAVE BEEN AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME AND EVEN IF THE SAME
IS SUBSTANTIATED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THAT IS, THE TESTIMONIES OF
OITHER DEFENSE WITNESSES WHO WERE ONE IN SAYING THAT HE WAS NOT PRESENT
THEREAT;
III
THE
IV
THE
For accused-appellant
Garchitorena:
I
THE COURT ERRED IN
NOT GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE OVER THE TESTIMONY OF AN EXPERT WITNESS.
II
THE COURT ERRED IN
FINDING ACCUSED
Accused-appellant
The core issues raised by the
both accused-appellants
Since the accused-appellants
raise factual issues, they must use cogent and convincing arguments to show
that the trial court erred in appreciating the evidence. They, however, have failed to do so.
Accused-appellant Pamplona contends
that the trial court’s decision was rendered by a judge other than the one who
conducted trial. Hence, the judge who
decided the case failed to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand
so as to gauge their credibility. This
argument does not convince the Court for the reason it has consistently
maintained, to wit:
We have ruled
in People v. Sadiangabay (G.R. No.
87214, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 551), that the circumstance alone that the
judge who wrote the decision had not heard the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses would not taint his decision. After all, he had the full record before him,
including the transcript of stenographic notes which he could study. The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily
impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a colleague who had
earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a clear showing of a grave abuse
of discretion in the factual findings reached by him.[8]
A perusal of the trial court’s
decision readily shows that it was duly based on the evidence presented during
the trial. It is evident that he
thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence before him and
carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses. This Court finds no plausible ground to set
aside the factual findings of the trial court, which were sustained by the CA.
The eyewitness Dulce Borero’s
testimony clearly established
“Fiscal Nofuente (To the witness)
Q: Madam witness, do you know Mauro Biay?
A: Yes sir.
xxx
Q: Do you know likewise the cause of his
death?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What
was the cause of his death?
A: He
was repeatedly stabbed sir.
Q: You said that Mauro
Biay was repeatedly stabbed, who stabbed
Mauro Biay repeatedly?
A:
Q: Was Arnold Gatchitorena alone when he
stabbed Mauro Biay?
A: They were three (3) who were stabbing
Mauro Biay, sir.
Q: You said that they
were three who were stabbing Mauro Biay, who are the other two?
A: Jessie
Garcia and Joey Pamplona sir.
Q: So that when you
said three, you are referring to Arnold Gatchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie
Garcia?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Now, when [did] this stabbing incident [happen]?
A: On September 22, 1995 sir.
Q: Do you know what was
[the] time when this incident happened on September 22, 1995?
A: 9:00 o’clock in the evening sir.
Q: Where [did] this stabbing [happen]?
A: At Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision, dela
Paz, Bińan, Laguna sir.
Q: Could you tell
Madam Witness, where in particular place in Sta. Inez, Almeda Subdivision this
stabbing incident happened?
A: In the street near the artesian well
sir.
Q: Do you know where is that street?
A:
Q: You said a while
ago that accused Arnold Gatchitorena, Jessie Garcia, Joey Pamplona repeatedly [stabbed]
Mauro Biay, do you know these three accused?
A: Yes sir.
xxx
Q: Will you kindly
step down from your seat and tap the three accused that you have pointed to us
to be the persons who stabbed and killed your brother Mauro Biay?
Court: Police Officer Dionisio will you kindly
accompany the witness.
P02 Dionisio: Yes sir.
Fiscal: I would like to manifest Your Honor, that the witness was
crying when she was pointing to the three accused, uttering that “Sila ang
pumatay sa aking kapatid!”.
xxx
Q: What is the name of that person wearing
that blue t-shirts?
A:
Q: We would like to
confirm if he is really Arnold Gatchitorena pointed to by the witness?
Interpreter: The person
pointed to by the witness wearing blue t-shirts identified himself as
Fiscal: Do you know the name of second person whom you
tapped on his side wearing white t-shirts?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What is his name?
A: Jessie Garcia sir.
Interpreter: The person
pointed to by the witness identified himself as certain Jessie Garcia.
Fiscal: Likewise Madam Witness, do you know the name
of a person in longsleeves polo shirts-checkered?
A: Yes sir, Joey Pamplona sir.
Interpreter: The person
pointed by the witness identified himself as certain Joey Pamplona.
xxx
Q: How far were you
from Mauro Biay when he was being stabbed by the three accused Joey Pamplona,
Jessie Garcia, and Arnold Gatchitorena?
A: Seven (7) arms length sir.
Q: You said that your
brother was stabbed successively by the three accused, how did it [happen]
Madam Witness?
A: They called him sir.
Q: Who was called?
A: Mauro Biay sir.
Q: Who called Mauro Biay?
A: It was Jessie who called sir.
Q: When you said
Jessie, are you referring to Jessie Garcia, one of the accused in this case?
A: Yes sir.
Q: When Mauro Biay was
called by Jessie Garcia, what was [M]auro Biay doing there?
A: Mauro Biay approached sir.
Q: By the way Madam
Witness, do you know why Mauro Biay was in that place where the incident
happened?
A: Yes sir.
Atty. Pajares:
Witness would be incompetent Your Honor.
Court: Witness may answer.
Fiscal: Why was he
there?
A: He was selling “balot” sir.
xxx
Fiscal: When Mauro Biay approached Jessie Garcia, what [did] Mauro
Biay do, if any?
A: Jessie Garcia twisted the hand of my
brother and placed the hand at his back sir.
Q: Who were the
companions of Jessie Garcia when he called [M]auro Biay?
A: Joey Pamplona and Jr. Gatchitorena sir.
Q: When you said Jr.
Gatchitorena are you referring to Arnold Gatchitorena?
A: Yes sir.
Q: So that when Jessie Garcia called Mauro
Biay, he was together with
A: Yes sir.
Q: If you know Madam Witness, what did Joey
Pamplona and
A:
xxx
Q: Were you able to
know the weapon used to stab Mauro Biay?
A: It was like a shiny
bladed instrument sir.
Q: Now, what was the position
of Mauro Biay when being stabbed by the three accused?
A: He was struggling to free himself sir.
Q: You said that he
was struggling to free himself, why did you say that he was struggling to free
himself?
A: Because I could see sir.
Q: You see what?
A: Because that three were repeatedly
stabbing Mauro Biay sir.
Q: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay, what was
Joey Pamplona doing to Mauro Biay, if you can still remember?
A: He was also
repeatedly stabbing my brother sir.
Q: Aside from that stabbing, what else if
any Joey Pamplona was doing to Mauro Biay?
A: Aside from stabbing Mauro Biay Joey
Pamplona was also struggling [strangling] the neck of Mauro Biay sir.
Q: You said that Mauro Biay was stabbed by
the three accused successively, was Mauro Biay hit by these stabbing?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Why do you know
that he was hit by stabbing of the three?
A: Because I saw the
blood oozing from the part of his body sir.
Q: Now, what happened
to Mauro Biay, when he was stabbed and hit by the successive stabbing of the
three accused?
A: The victim Mauro
Biay was suddenly slumped face down on the ground sir.
xxx
Q: What did you learn
if any when you went to the hospital to see your brother [M]auro Biay?
A: He was already dead sir.
Even under cross-examination,
Dulce Borero was unwavering, straightforward, categorical and spontaneous in
her narration of how the killing of her brother Mauro took place.[10] Notably, her testimony
as to the identification of Garchitorena as the one who stabbed Mauro Biay was
even corroborated by defense witness Miguelito Gonzalgo,[11] thus:
Q: From the time you saw these two persons
near the artesian well, what happened after that, mr. witness?
A: Mauro Biay slumped
on the floor and I saw Junior stabbed once more the victim but I am not sure if
the victim was hit at the back, ma’am.
Q: How far were you from the two when you
saw the incident, mr. witness?
A: More or less 7 to 8
meters, ma’am.
Q: Were there anything blocking your sight from
the place where you were standing to the place of incident, mr. witness?
A: None, ma’am.
Absent
any showing of ill motive on the part of Borero, we sustain the lower court in
giving her testimony full faith and credence. Moreover, the prosecution’s version is
supported by the physical evidence.[12] Borero’s testimony that the victim was
successively stabbed several times conforms with the autopsy
report that the latter suffered multiple stab wounds.[13]
Accused-appellant
The seeming inconsistencies between
her direct testimony and her cross-examination testimonies are not sufficient
ground to disregard them. In People v. Alberto Restoles y Tuyo, Roldan
Noel y Molet and Jimmy Alayon y De la Cruz,[15]
we ruled that:
…minor inconsistencies do not
affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen rather
than weaken their credibility.
Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect
to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth
of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.
Moreover, such inconsistencies did not contradict the credibility
of Borero or her narration of the incident.
On the contrary, they showed that her account was the entire
truth. In fact, her narration was in
harmony with the account of defense witness Gonzalgo. We note further that both the Sworn Statement[16]
of Borero and her testimony before the lower court[17]
were in complete congruence.
Undoubtedly, accused-appellants’ identities as the perpetrators
were established by the prosecution. The
prosecution witness was able to observe the entire incident, because she was there. Thus, we find no reason to differ with the
trial court’s appreciation of her testimony.
Positive identification, where categorical and consistent, and not
attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial.[18]
Accused-appellant Garcia’s alibi has no leg to stand on. In People
v. Desalisa,[19] this Court ruled that:
…for the defense of
alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other
place when the crime was committed, but also that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity through clear
and convincing evidence.
Here, the crime was
committed at Binan, Laguna. Although
Garcia testified that he was still riding a bus from his work in Blumentritt
and arrived in Binan only at 11:00 P.M. or two hours after the killing
incident, still, he failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity. His alibi must fail.
Accused-appellant Garchitorena’s defense
of insanity has also no merit. Unlike
other jurisdictions, Philippine courts have established a more stringent
criterion for the acceptance of insanity as an exempting circumstance.[20] As aptly argued by the Solicitor General,
insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and avoidance. As such, it must be adequately proved, and
accused-appellant Garchitorena utterly failed to do so. We agree with both the CA and the trial court
that he was not totally deprived of reason and freedom of will during and after
the stabbing incident, as he even instructed his co-accused-appellants to run
away from the scene of the crime.
Accused-appellant Garcia also argues
that there was no conspiracy, as “there was no evidence whatsoever that he
aided the other two accused-appellants or that he participated in their
criminal designs.”[21] We are not persuaded. In People v. Maldo,[22]
we stated:
“Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct
proof is not essential, for conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the
accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. Such acts must point to a joint purpose,
concert of action or community of interest.
Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of the conspirators
for the act of one of them is deemed the act of all.” (citations omitted, emphasis ours)
In this case,
conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants were together in performing the
concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. Garcia grabbed the victim’s hands and twisted
his arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled
him on the ground, then stabbed him. The victim was trying to free himself from
them, but they were too strong. All
means through which the victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell
to the ground and expired. The three
accused-appellants’ prior act of waiting for the victim outside affirms the
existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design and purpose.
Where there is conspiracy,
as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered the fatal blow is not
necessary. All conspirators are liable
as co-principals regardless of the intent and the character of their
participation, because the act of one is the act of all.[23]
The
aggravating circumstance of superior strength should be appreciated against the
accused-appellants. Abuse of superior
strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim
and the aggressor, considering that a situation of superiority of strength is notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor and is selected or taken advantage of by him in
the commission of the crime.[24] This circumstance was alleged in the
Information and was proved during the trial.
In the case at bar, the victim certainly could not defend himself in any
way. The accused-appellants, armed with
a deadly weapon, immobilized the victim and stabbed him successively using the
same deadly weapon.
All told, the trial court
correctly convicted the accused-appellants of murder,
considering the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Since an aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength attended the commission of the crime, each of the accused-appellants
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of death in accordance with Article
63[25]
of the Revised Penal Code. Murder, under Article 248[26]
of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Following Article
63 of the same code, the higher penalty of death shall be applied.
In view, however, of the passage of
R.A. No. 9346,[27]
otherwise known as the Anti-Death Penalty Law, which prohibits the imposition
of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole should instead be imposed. Accordingly, accused-appellants shall be
sentenced to reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole in lieu of the penalty of death.
While the new law prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous
offense is still death and the offense is still heinous.[28] Consequently, the civil indemnity for the
victim is still P75,000.00. In People v. Quiachon,[29]
we explained that even if the penalty of death was not to be imposed on
appellant because of the prohibition in Republic Act No. 9346, the civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 was still proper. Following the ratiocination in People v. Victor,[30]
the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty,
but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty attended the commission of the crime.
Hence, we modify the
award of civil indemnity by the trial court from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
Civil
indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. Likewise the award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is modified and increased to P75,000.00,
consistent with recent jurisprudence[31]
on heinous crimes where the imposable penalty is death, it is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A.
9346. The award of moral damages
does not require allegation and proof of the emotional suffering of the heirs,
since the emotional wounds from the vicious killing of the victim cannot be
denied.[32] The trial court’s
award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 shall, however, be reduced to P30,000.00,
also pursuant to the latest jurisprudence on the matter.[33]
As to the award of
actual damages amounting to P16,700.00,
we modify the same. In People v. Villanueva,[34] this
Court declared that “…when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, as in this case, the award of temperate
damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual damages of a
lesser amount.” In the light of such ruling,
the victim’s heirs in the present case should, therefore, be awarded temperate
damages in the amount of P25,000.00.
The
award of
P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity is
justified. As a rule, documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of
earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case judicial notice
may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary
evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.[35] It cannot be disputed that the victim, at the
time of his death, was self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws. The
computation arrived at by the trial court was in accordance with the formula
for computing the award for loss of earning capacity.[36] Thus,
Award
for = 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual
income – 50% (GAI)]
lost
earnings
= 2/3 [80-29] x P24,000.00 – P12,000.00
= (34) x (P12,000.00)
= P408,000.00
WHEREFORE,
the appealed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00765, finding the
three-accused appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is hereby AFFIRMED WITH the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed
on accused-appellants is REDUCED to RECLUSION
PERPETUA without eligibility for parole pursuant to RA 9346; (2) the monetary awards to be paid
jointly and severally by the accused-appellants to the heirs of the victim are
as follows: P75,000.00
as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages; (3)
P408,000.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (4) interest is
imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% from this date until
fully paid.[37]
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA
J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice
|
(On
official leave)
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
|
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate
Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
|
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
|
|
ARTURO D. BRION Associate
Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate
Justice |
|
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate
Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate
Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate
Justice |
|
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
** No part. Filed pleading as Solicitor General.
[1] Penned by then Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion (ret.) with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Mariflor P. Punzalan-Castillo concurring; rollo Vol. II, pp. 3-10.
[2] Penned by Judge Hilario F. Corcuera, Records, Vol. II, pp. 427-444.
[3] Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[4] Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 4-7.
[5] Rollo, pp. 25-42.
[6] Id. at 41-42.
[7] Supra note 1.
[8] People v. Fulinara, G.R. No. 88326, August 3, 1995, 247 SCRA 38.
[9] TSN, April 23, 1996, Dulce Borero, pp. 4-14
[10] TSN, May 8, 1996, Dulce Borero, pp. 13-20.
[11] TSN, February 24, 1997, pp. 9-10.
[12] Exhibit “B,” Records, Vol. I, p. 127.
[13]
[14]
[15] G.R. No. 112692, August 25, 2000, 339 SCRA 40, citing People v. Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000, 334 SCRA 626.
[16] Exhibit “A,” Records, Vol. I, p. 8.
[17] TSN, Dulce Borero, May 8, 1996, pp. 13-20;
TSN, Dulce Borero, April 23, 1996, pp. 5-14
[18] People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 260.
[19] People v. Desalisa, G.R. No. 148327, June 12, 2003, 403 SCRA 723.
[20] People v. Belonio, G.R. No. 148695, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 579.
[21] Garcia’s Appellant’s Brief, rollo, Vol. I, p. 119.
[22] G.R. No. 131347, May 19, 1999, 307 SCRA 436.
[23] People v. Salison, Jr., G.R. No. 115690, February 20, 1996, 253 SCRA 758.
[24] People v. Cortez, G.R. No. 131924, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 663, 674.
[25] Art. 63. x x x
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1) When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
[26] Art. 248. Murder – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Art. 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. x x x
[27] Approved on June 24, 2006.
[28] People v. Salome, G.R. No. 169077, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 659, 676. See also People v. Ranin, G.R. No. 173023, June 25, 2008; and People v. Entrialgo, G.R. No. 177353, November 11, 2008.
[29] G.R. No. 170235, August 31, 2006, 500 SCRA 704, 719.
[30] G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998, 292 SCRA 186.
[31] People v. Audine, G.R. No. 168649, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 531, 547; People v. Orbita, G.R. No. 172091, March 31, 2008; People v. Balobalo, G.R. No. 177563, October 18, 2008.
[32] People v. Caraig, G.R. Nos. 116224-27, March 28, 2003, 448 Phil. 78, 98 (2003).
[33] People v. Sia, G.R. No. 174059, February 27, 2009.
[34] G.R. No. 139177, August 11, 2003, 408 SCRA 571.
[35] People v. Oco, G.R. Nos. 137370-71, September 29, 2003, 412 SCRA 190, 222.
[36] People
v. Ibańez et al, G.R. No. 148627, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 146, 163.
[37] People v. Regalario, G.R. No. 174483, March 31, 2009; People v. Guevarra, G.R. No. 182199, October 29, 2008.