G.R. No. 172680

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE FERNANDO S. FALCASANTOS, namely; MODESTA CANDIDO-SAAVEDRA and ANGEL F. CANDIDO; and the HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE S. FALCASANTOS, namely: FELIX G. FALCASANTOS, RAMON G. FALCASANTOS, CORAZON N. FERNANDO, ANASTACIO R. LIMEN, PAZ CANDIDO-SAYASA and MARIO F. MIDEL; represented by ANASTACIO R. LIMEN IN HIS BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHERS AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,

Petitioners,

- versus -

SPOUSES FIDEL YEO TAN and SY SOC TIU, SPOUSES NESIQUIO YEO TAN and CHUA YOK HONG, SPOUSES NERI YEO TAN and MERCEDES UY and SPOUSES ELOY YEO TAN and EVELYN WEE,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 172680

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,

BRION,

DEL CASTILLO, and

ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 28, 2009

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D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The now deceased Policarpio Falcasantos (Policarpio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Zamboanga City covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3371[1] issued on September 10, 1913.

OCT No. 3371 was cancelled and, in its stead, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 5668 was issued on March 6, 1925[2] in the name of Jose Falcasantos (Jose), one of his eight children, the others being Arcadio, Lecadia, Basilisa, Fernando, Martin, Dorothea, and Maria, all surnamed Falcasantos.

TCT No. 5668 was in turn cancelled on May 28, 1931 and, in its stead, TCT No. RT-749 (10723) was issued in the name of one Tan Ning.[3]

Still later, TCT No. RT-749 (10723) was cancelled and TCT No. 3366 was issued in its stead in the name of one Tan Kim Piao a.k.a. Oscar Tan on August 30, 1950.[4]

Finally, TCT No. RT-749 (10723) was cancelled and in its stead TCT No. T-64,264 was issued on July 27, 1981 in the name of herein respondents spouses Fidel Yeo Tan and Sy Soc Tin et al.[5]

On January 26, 2004, the heirs of brothers Jose and Fernando Falcasantos, herein petitioners, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City a complaint,[6] which was later amended on July 15, 2004, for quieting of title and/or declaration of nullity of documents against respondents, alleging that on March 6, 1922, Jose, without the knowledge of his seven siblings, through fraud, deceit and/or undue influence caused their (Jose and his siblings’) father Policarpio, who was then sick and incapacitated, to sign a Deed of Sale, which came to their knowledge only in 2003, by making it appear that Policarpio sold him (Jose) one half of the property on account of which Jose was able to have even the entire area of the property titled in his name on March 6, 1925.

Petitioners also alleged that while respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have not taken possession of the property, they (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest have exercised exclusive, public, continuous, and adverse possession of the property for about 82 years since the supposed sale to Jose in 1922.

In a Motion to Dismiss,[7] respondents contended that, among other things, petitioners’ action, which involves an immovable, had already prescribed in 30 years, citing Article 1141 of the New Civil Code; and that petitioners were in fact estopped by laches. To the Motion, petitioners countered that an action for quieting of title is imprescriptible and that, in any event, they had already acquired the property by acquisitive prescription.[8]

By Order[9] of September 30, 2004, Branch 14 of the Zamboanga City Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint in this wise:

On the quieting of title [cause of action] . . . plaintiffs miserably failed to allege in their complaint that they possess . . . legal ownership [or] equitable ownership of the litigated property. Hence, plaintiff’s cause of action on quieting of title has no legal leg to stand on.

As regards plaintiffs’ cause of action invoking the declaration of nullity of the aforementioned certificates of title, they based their claim of ownership thereof on the alleged fraud and deceit in the execution of deed of sale between Jose Falcasantos and his father Policarpio on March 7, 1922.

It is well-settled that a Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership over registered land.

The certificate serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the persons whose names appear therein (Republic v. Court of Appeals, Artemio Guido, et al. 204 SCRA 160 (1991), Demausiado v. Velasco, 71 SCRA 105, 112 [1976]).

It may be argued that the certificate of title is not conclusive of ownership when the issue of fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining it is raised. However, this issue must be raised seasonably (Monticives v. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 14, 21 [1973]).

In the present action, TCT No. 5668 was issued on March 6, 1925 to Jose Falcasantos. Upon the expiration of one (1) year from and after the date of entry of the decree of registration, not only such decree but also the corresponding certificate of title becomes incontrovertible and indefeasible (Section 32, P.D. 1529). Otherwise stated, TCT No. 5668 issued to defendant attained the status of indefeasibility one year after its issuance on March 6, 1925, hence, it is no longer open to review, on the ground of fraud. Consequently, the filing of instant complaint on January 27, 2004 or about 79 years after, can no longer re-open or revise or cancel TCT No. 5668 on the ground of fraud. No reasonable and plausible excuse has been shown for such unusual delay. The law serves these who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.

The same is true with TCT Nos. RT-749 (10723) issued on May 28, 1931, No. T-3366 issued on August 30, 1950 and T-64,264 issued on July 27, 1981. These certificates of title became indefeasible one (1) year after their issuance.

Although complainants may still have the remedy of reconveyance, assuming that they are the “owners” and actual occupants of the litigated Lot 2152, as claimed by them, this remedy, however, can no longer be availed of by complainants due to prescription, The prescriptive period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of issuance of the certificate of title.

Complainants’ discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the aforementioned certificates of title because the registration of the real property is considered a constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering (Serna v. Court of Appeals, 527 SCRA 537, 536).

Inasmuch the complaint was filed by the complainants only on January 7, 2004, the ten, year prescriptive period had elapsed.

On the matter of prescription raised by the defendants, the Supreme Court, in the case of Miailhe v. Court of Appeals, 354 SCRA 686, 681-682, held:

“x x x In Gicano v. Gegato, this Court held that a complaint may be dismissed when the facts showing the lapse of the prescriptive period are apparent from the records. In its words:

‘x x x We have ruled that the trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the parties’ pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; x x x and it may do so on the basis of the motion to dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff’s complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.’

It should be noted that the fact of prescription is clear from the very allegations found in paragraph 9 to 10.4 of the amended complaint, which reads:

“9. Lately, 2003 last year, the [plaintiffs wanted to extra-judicially settle and partition among themselves the real property above-described but when they went to the Office of the Registry of Deeds for Zamboanga City, to their dismay and consternation, they discovered that OCT No. T-3371 has already been cancelled and a certificate of title for the said real property, TCT No. T-64,264 in the name of private defendants was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Zamboanga City on July 27, 1981. By this time also, 2003, they have learned of the fraud and simulation perpetrated by Jose Falcasantos in the execution of the 1922 Deed of Sale. Certified machine copy of CT No, T-64,264 is hereto attached as Annexes “D” and “D-1”

10. The plaintiffs learned that further from the Office of the Registry of Deeds for Zamboanga City that:

10.1- TCT No, T-64,264 was derived from TCT No. T-3366, issued in the name of TAN KIM PIAO a.k.a. OSCAR TAN, married to Yeo King Hua, by the Registry of Deeds for Zamboanga City on August 30, 1950. Copy of TCT No. T-3366 is hereto attached as Annexes “F,” “F-1,” “F-2,” and “F-3.”

10.2- TCT No, T-3366 was derived from TCT No. RT-749 (10723), a reconstituted title issued in the name of TAN NING, widower and Chinese citizen, by the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Zamboanga City on May 28, 1931. Certified machine copy of TCT No RT-749 (10723) is hereto attached as Annexes “E,” “E-1,” “E-2,” and “E-3.”

10.3- Reconstituted TCT No. RT-749 (10723) in the name of TAN NING was derived from TCT No. 5668 (Annexes “C” and “C-1”), issued in the name of Jose Falcasantos which cancelled OCT No. 3371; and

10.4- Reconstituted TCT No. RT- No. 749 (10723) and all its derivative certificates of titles, namely TCT Nos. T-3366 in the name of TAN KIM PIAO a.k.a. OSCAR TAN and T-64,264 in the name of private defendants are also void ab initio because the above-described real property was never sold by Jose Falcasantos to TAN NING.[10]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[11] of the dismissal of the complaint which the trial court, by Order of July 28, 2005, denied. Copy of the July 28, 2005 Order was received by petitioners’ counsel on August 18, 2005 who thus had 15 days or up to September 2, 2005 to appeal. No appeal having been filed, the trial court issued on September 12, 2005 a Certificate of Finality of Judgment.

On October 18, 2005, petitioners assailed the trial court’s Orders of September 30, 2004 and July 28, 2005 via Certiorari before the Court of Appeals, relying, in the main, as ground for the allowance thereof, their alleged deprivation of due process by the trial court for not giving them the opportunity to present evidence “to prove the causes of action.”

By Decision[12] of January 20, 2006, the appellate court, holding that Certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail a final order of the trial court and, in any event, the petition for Certiorari was not only filed one day late, but was also defective in form and substance in that

a) The Petition failed to indicate all the material dates showing the timeliness of the Petition, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Revised Rules of Court. It failed to state the date when the notice of assailed Order dated 30 September 2004 was received.

b) The Petition and the Certification against Forum Shopping was only signed and verified by Petitioner ANASTACIO LIMEN. It was only Petitioner ROMAN FALCASANTOS who executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Petitioner ANASTACIO LIMEN to file the instant Petition. The special Power of Attorney allegedly executed by other heirs was not presented.

c) The attached copy of the Order dated 30 September 2004 is not legible and a certified true copy as mandated under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and worse, it lacks page 5 thereof.

d) The attached copy of Petitioners’ “VEHEMENT OPPOSITION” marked as Annex “D” is not legible, (Underscoring supplied),

dismissed the petition.

Hence, the present petition, faulting the appellate court

X X X IN RULING THAT CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT APPROPRIATE OR IS AN UNAVAILABLE REMEDY INSTITUTED BY THE PETITIONERS; [AND]

X X X IN NOT DISREGARDING PROCEDURAL DEFECTS IN THE DISMISSED PETITION.[13] (Emphasis in the original)

The trial court’s order of dismissal of petitioners’ complaint attained finality on September 2, 2005 following their failure to appeal it, which is a final, not an interlocutory order, within 15 days from August 18, 2005 when their counsel received a copy thereof.

Even if procedural rules were to be relaxed by allowing petitioners’ availment before the appellate court of Certiorari, instead of appeal, to assail the dismissal of their complaint, not only was the petition for Certiorari filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period. It glaringly failed to allege how the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint. It merely posited that in dismissing the complaint, petitioners were deprived of the opportunity to present evidence to “prove the causes of action.” Such position does not lie, however, for petitioners’ complaint was dismissed precisely because after considering respondents’ Motion to Dismiss and petitioners’ 14-page “VEHEMENT OPPOSITION to the Motion to Dismiss” in which they proffered and exhaustively discussed the grounds for the denial of the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.

While in their Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision petitioners explained why the questioned dismissal by the trial court of their complaint was issued in grave abuse of discretion, viz:

The questioned orders were issued in grave abuse of discretion because the rulings therein violated the doctrine stare decisis that obliged judges to follow the principle of law laid down in earlier cases when the court a quo did not apply the jurisprudence cited by the petitioners in their “VEHEMENT OPPOSITION” dated 21 April 2004 and Motion for Reconsideration dated October 29, 2004.[14] (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted),

the Court finds that just the same, the petition for Certiorari before the appellate court was doomed for it failed to allege that the trial court 1) acted without jurisdiction for not having the legal power to determine the case; 2) acted in excess of jurisdiction for, being clothed with the power to determine the case, it overstepped its authority as determined by law; and 3) committed grave abuse of discretion for acting in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[15]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[12] Penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Ricardo R. Rosario. CA rollo, pp. 200-209.

[15] Vide Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, Ninth Revised Ed., p. 781.