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AMADO
ALVARADO GARCIA, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R. No. 171951
Present: Quisumbing, J.,
Chairperson, Carpio Morales, BRION, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: August 28, 2009 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
For
review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR No. 27544 affirming the Decision[2]
dated July 2, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, Aparri,
Cagayan, which found petitioner Amado Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide. Contested as well is the
appellate court’s Resolution[3] dated
On
The undersigned, Provincial
Prosecutor accuses AMADO GARCIA @ Manding of the crime of Murder, defined and
penalized under Article [248] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about September
29, 1999, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
bottle, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, box, club
and maul one Manuel K. Chy, inflicting upon the latter fatal injuries which
caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
At approximately
On
Yet again, at around
At this juncture, petitioner ordered Esquibel to call on Chy
who, incidentally, was coming out of his house at the time. Upon being summoned, the latter approached petitioner
who suddenly punched him in the face. Chy
cried out, “Bakit mo ako sinuntok hindi ka naman [inaano]?” (Why did you box me[?] I’m not doing
anything to you.)[9]
But petitioner kept on assaulting him. Foz attempted to pacify petitioner but was
himself hit on the nose while Chy continued to parry the blows. Petitioner reached for a bottle of beer, and
with it, struck the lower back portion of Chy’s head. Then, Foz shoved Chy causing the latter to
fall.
When Chy found an opportunity to escape, he ran towards his
house and phoned his wife Josefina to call the police. Chy told Josefina about the mauling and
complained of difficulty in breathing. Upon
reaching Chy’s house, the policemen knocked five times but nobody answered. Josefina arrived minutes later, unlocked the
door and found Chy lying unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the
hospital. The autopsy confirmed that Chy
died of myocardial infarction.
After trial in due course, the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan (Branch
9) found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:
1) Finding AMADO
GARCIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of HOMICIDE defined and
penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and after applying in his
favor the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to
suffer an indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS OF PRISION MAYOR, as
minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as
maximum;
2) Ordering him to pay
the heirs of Manuel Chy the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS,
as death indemnity; TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS,
representing expenses for the wake and burial; THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P300,000.00)
PESOS, as moral damages; and THREE HUNDRED THIRTY[-]TWO THOUSAND (P332,000.00]
PESOS, as loss of earning, plus the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in a
Decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, appeal is hereby [DENIED] and the July 2, 2003 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch [9], in Criminal Case No.
08-1185, is hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was
denied in a Resolution dated
Hence, the instant appeal of petitioner on the following grounds:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER IS THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR INFLICTING
THE SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED MANUEL CHY.
II.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF MANUEL CHY
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH IS MYOCARDIAL INFARCTION, A
NON-VIOLENT RELATED CAUSE OF DEATH.
III.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH CONCLUDED THAT THE HEART FAILURE OF MANUEL CHY
WAS DUE TO “FRIGHT OR SHOCK CAUSED BY
THE MALTREATMENT.”
IV.
BOTH THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.[12]
In essence, the issue is whether or not petitioner is liable for
the death of Manuel Chy.
In his undated Memorandum,[13] petitioner insists
on a review of the factual findings of the trial court because the judge who
penned the decision was not the same judge who heard the prosecution evidence. He adds that the Court of Appeals had wrongly
inferred from, misread and overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.[14]
At the onset, petitioner denies laying a hand on Manuel Chy. Instead, he implicates Armando Foz as the
author of the victim’s injuries. Corollarily,
he challenges the credibility of Armando’s brother, Fidel, who testified concerning
his sole culpability. Basically, petitioner
disowns responsibility for Chy’s demise since the latter was found to have died
of myocardial infarction. In support, he
amplifies the testimony of Dr. Cleofas C. Antonio[15] that Chy’s medical
condition could have resulted in his death anytime. Petitioner asserts that, at most, he could be
held liable for slight physical injuries because none of the blows he inflicted
on Chy was fatal.
The Office of the Solicitor General reiterates the trial
court’s assessment of the witnesses and its conclusion that the beating of Chy was
the proximate cause of his death.
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by the
prosecution as well as the defense in this case, we are unable to consider the
petitioner’s appeal with favor.
The present petition was brought under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, yet, petitioner raises questions of fact. Indeed, it is opportune to reiterate that this
Court is not the proper forum from which to secure a re-evaluation of factual
issues, save where the factual findings of the trial court do not find support
in the evidence on record or where the judgment appealed from was based on a
misapprehension of facts.[16] Neither exception applies in the instant case
as would justify a departure from the established rule.
Further, petitioner invokes a recognized
exception to the rule on non-interference with the determination of the
credibility of witnesses. He points out
that the judge who penned the decision is not the judge who received the
evidence and heard the witnesses. But
while the situation obtains in this case, the exception does not. The records reveal that Judge Conrado F.
Manauis inhibited from the proceedings upon motion of no less than the
petitioner himself. Consequently,
petitioner cannot seek protection from the alleged adverse consequence his own
doing might have caused. For us to allow
petitioner relief based on this argument would be to sanction a travesty of the
Rules which was designed to further, rather than subdue, the ends of justice.
We reiterate, the efficacy of a decision
is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only took over
from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial. It does not follow that the judge who was not
present during the trial, or a fraction thereof, cannot render a valid and just
decision.[17]
Here, Judge Andres Q. Cipriano took over
the case after Judge Manauis recused himself from the proceedings. Even so, Judge Cipriano not only heard the
evidence for the defense, he also had an opportunity to observe Dr. Cleofas
Antonio who was recalled to clarify certain points in his testimony. Worth mentioning, too, is the fact that Judge
Cipriano presided during the taking of the testimonies of Fidel Foz, Jr. and
Alvin Pascua on rebuttal.
In any case, it is not unusual for a judge who did not try a
case in its entirety to decide it on the basis of the records on hand.[18] He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic
notes and calibrate the testimonies of witnesses in accordance with their
conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive and
procedural due process of law.[19]
The Autopsy Report on the body of Manuel Chy disclosed the following
injuries:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body embalmed, well
preserved.
Cyanotic lips and nailbeds.
Contusions, dark bluish red: 4.5 x 3.0 cms., lower portion of
the left ear; 4.0 x 2.8 cms., left inferior mastoid region; 2.5 x 1.1 cms.,
upper lip; 2.7 x 1.0 cms., lower lip; 5.8 x 5.5 cms., dorsum of left
hand.
Lacerated wound, 0.8 cm., involving mucosal surface of the upper
lip on the right side.
No fractures noted.
Brain with tortuous
vessels. Cut sections show congestion. No hemorrhage noted.
Heart, with abundant fat
adherent on its epicardial surface. Cut
sections show a reddish brown myocardium with an area of hyperemia on the whole
posterior wall, the lower portion of the anterior wall and the inferior portion
of the septum. Coronary arteries,
gritty, with the caliber of the lumen reduced by approximately thirty (30%)
percent. Histopathological findings show
mild fibrosis of the myocardium.
Lungs, pleural surfaces,
shiny; with color ranging from dark red to dark purple. Cut sections show a gray periphery with
reddish brown central portion with fluid oozing on pressure with some reddish
frothy materials noted. Histopathological
examinations show pulmonary edema and hemorrhages.
Kidneys, purplish with glistening
capsule. Cut sections show congestion. Histopathological examinations show mild
lymphocytic infiltration.
Stomach, one-half (1/2)
full with brownish and whitish materials and other partially digested food
particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: - Myocardial
Infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)[20]
At first, petitioner denied employing violence against Chy. In his undated Memorandum, however, he
admitted inflicting injuries on the deceased, albeit, limited his
liability to slight physical injuries. He
argues that the superficial wounds sustained by Chy did not cause his death.[21] Quite the opposite, however, a conscientious analysis
of the records would acquaint us with the causal connection between the death
of the victim and the mauling that preceded it. In open court, Dr. Antonio identified the immediate
cause of Chy’s myocardial infarction:
ATTY. TUMARU:
Q: You diagnose[d] the cause of death to be
myocardial infarction that is because there was an occlusion in the artery that
prevented the flowing of blood into the heart?
A: That was not exactly seen at the autopsy
table but it changes, the hyperemic changes [in] the heart muscle were the
one[s] that made us [think] or gave strong conclusion that it was myocardial
infarction, and most likely the cause is occlusion of the blood vessels
itself. (Emphasis supplied.)[22]
By definition, coronary occlusion[23] is the complete
obstruction of an artery of the heart, usually from progressive arteriosclerosis[24] or the thickening
and loss of elasticity of the arterial walls. This can result from sudden emotion in a
person with an existing arteriosclerosis; otherwise, a heart attack will not
occur.[25] Dr. Jessica Romero testified on direct
examination relative to this point:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: Could
an excitement trigger a myocardial infarction?
A: Excitement, I cannot say
that if the patient is normal[;] that is[,] considering that the patient [does]
not have any previous [illness] of hypertension, no previous history of
myocardial [ischemia], no previous [arteriosis] or hardening of the arteries,
then excitement [cannot] cause myocardial infarction. (Emphasis supplied.)[26]
The Autopsy Report bears out that Chy has a mild
fibrosis of the myocardium[27]
caused by a previous heart attack. Said
fibrosis[28]
or formation of fibrous tissue or scar tissue rendered the middle and
thickest layer of the victim’s heart less elastic and vulnerable to coronary
occlusion from sudden emotion. This
causation is elucidated by the testimony of Dr. Antonio:
ATTY.
CALASAN:
Q: You said that the physical injuries will
cause no crisis on the part of the victim, Doctor?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
[these] physical injuries [were] caused by the [boxing] on the mouth and[/]or
hitting on the nape by a bottle?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: On the part of the deceased, that [was]
caused definitely by emotional crisis, Doctor?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And because of this emotional crisis the
heart palpitated so fast, so much so, that there was less oxygen being pumped
by the heart?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
definitely that caused his death, Doctor?
A: Yes,
sir, it could be.[29]
In concurrence, Dr. Antonio A. Paguirigan also testified as
follows:
ATTY. CALASAN:
Q: I will repeat the question… Dr. Antonio
testified that the deceased died because of the blow that was inflicted, it
triggered the death of the deceased, do you agree with his findings, Doctor?
A: Not probably the blow but the reaction
sir.
Q: So
you agree with him, Doctor?
A: It
could be, sir.
Q: You
agree with him on that point, Doctor?
A: Yes,
sir.[30]
It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the
emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led
to his death. The inevitable conclusion
then surfaces that the myocardial infarction suffered by the victim was the
direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that petitioner had
intended to commit.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal
liability shall be incurred “by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.” The essential requisites for the application
of this provision are: (a) the intended
act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the
unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.[31]
In this case, petitioner was committing a felony when he boxed the victim
and hit him with a bottle. Hence, the
fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter
petitioner’s liability for his death. Ingrained
in our jurisprudence is the doctrine laid down in the case of United States
v. Brobst[32]
that:
x x x where death results
as a direct consequence of the use of illegal violence, the mere fact that the
diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death,
does not relieve the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.[33]
In the same vein, United States v. Rodriguez[34] enunciates that:
x x x although the
assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if, because of
a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond
peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such
acceleration as the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)[35]
In this jurisdiction, a person committing a felony is
responsible for all the natural and logical consequences resulting from it
although the unlawful act performed is different from the one he intended;[36] “el que es
causa de la causa es causa
Considering that the petitioner has in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed without
any aggravating circumstance to offset it, the imposable penalty should be in
the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period,[40]or anywhere from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen years (14) years and eight (8)
months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law,[41]
the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years of prisión mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
We shall, however, modify the award of damages to the heirs of Manuel Chy
for his loss of earning capacity in the amount of P332,000. In fixing the indemnity, the victim’s actual
income at the time of death and probable life expectancy are taken into
account. For this purpose, the Court
adopts the formula used in People v. Malinao:[42]
Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80-age
of x a reasonable portion of the
the victim at the annual
net income which time of this death) would have been received
by
the heirs for support.[43]
Branch 9 of the Aparri, Cagayan RTC took
judicial notice of the salary which Manuel Chy was receiving as a sheriff of
the court. At the time of his death, Chy
was 51 years old and was earning a gross monthly income of P10,600 or a
gross annual income of P127,200. But,
in view of the victim’s delicate condition, the trial court reduced his life
expectancy to 10 years. It also deducted
P7,000 from Chy’s salary as reasonable living expense. However, the records are bereft of showing that
the heirs of Chy submitted evidence to substantiate actual living expenses. And in the absence of proof of living
expenses, jurisprudence[44]
approximates net income to be 50% of the gross income. Accordingly, by reason of his death, the heirs
of Manuel Chy should be awarded P1,229,600 as loss of earning capacity,
computed as follows:
Net earning capacity = 2/3
x (80-51) x [P127,200 - ½ (P127,200)]
= 2/3 x (29) x P63,600
= 19 1/3 x P63,600
= P1,229,600
We sustain the trial court’s grant of funerary expense of P200,000
as stipulated by the parties[45] and civil
indemnity of P50,000.[46] Anent moral damages, the same is mandatory in
cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than
the death of the victim.[47] However, in obedience to the controlling case
law, the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated P50,000.
Petitioner is further ordered to
indemnify the heirs of Manuel K. Chy P50,000 as civil indemnity; P200,000,
representing expenses for the wake and burial; and P1,229,600 as loss of
earning capacity.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
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WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
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ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
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ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate
Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 51-65. Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q. Roxas, with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. concurring.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 93-108. Penned by Presiding Judge Andres Q. Cipriano.
[3] Rollo, p. 101.
[4]
[5] Records, p. 2.
[6] TSN,
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] CA rollo, pp. 107-108.
[11] Rollo, p. 65.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] TSN,
[16] Lascano v. People, G.R. No. 166241,
[17] Resayo v. People, G.R. No. 154502,
[18] Decasa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
172184,
[19]
[20] Records, p. 260.
[21] Rollo, p. 216.
[22] TSN,
[23] R. Sloane, The Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary 506 (1987).
[24]
[25]
[26] TSN,
[27] Supra note 23, at 60.
Myocardium is the middle and thickest layer of the heart wall, composed of cardiac muscle.
[28]
[29] TSN,
[30] TSN,
[31] People v. Ortega, Jr., G.R. No.
116736,
[32] 14 Phil. 310 (1909).
[33]
[34] 23 Phil. 22 (1912).
[35]
[36] Quinto v. Andres, G.R. No. 155791,
[37] People v. Ural, No. L-30801,
[38] ART. 13. Mitigating circumstances. – The following are mitigating circumstances:
x x x x
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
x x x x
[39] People v. Ilustre, 54 Phil. 594, 599 (1930).
[40] Article 64(2) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. – In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contains three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties; each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
x x x x
2. When only a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its minimum period.
x x x x
[41] Act No. 4103.
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)
[42] G.R. No. 128148,
[43]
[44]
[45] TSN,
[46] People v. Ducabo, G.R. No. 175594,
[47]