|
PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, - versus - Elegio
an, Appellant. |
G.R. No. 169870 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: August 4, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1]
dated August 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00223,
affirming the Decision[2]
dated January 7, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calauag, Branch 63,
in Criminal Case No. 3024-C, finding appellant Elegio An guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the
following:
Around
Immediately after appellant fled from the scene,
Conchita went to her Ate Zenaida Andallon, who was at that time working
in the ricefield. When her sister saw that Conchita was crying, the former
asked the latter as to the reason.
Instead of answering, Conchita asked her sister to be brought home in Barangay Munting Parang. Zenaida asked
Conchita again as to why the latter was crying.
It was then that Conchita told Zenaida that she felt pain in her body
and was afraid to see appellant, to which Zenaida queried as to the reason why
her sister was frightened of said appellant.
Conchita confided to her sister that she was inasawa by appellant. This prompted Zenaida to ask what appellant
did to her sister. Conchita told her
sister that appellant kissed her lips, rolled up her dress, removed her bra and
sinusuhan or sucked her breast, laid her forcibly, inserted his penis in
her vagina and niyugyugan or made pumping motions. Zenaida then brought Conchita to Dominga's house,
where she was able to see Conchita's bloodied underwear. A white spot was also present in the said underwear. When Zenaida looked at Conchita's vagina, she
noticed that it was bleeding.
Thereafter, Zenaida accompanied Conchita to the Lupon ng Barangay
of Bukal and afterwards to Barangay Captain Celso Razon who looked for appellant. After finding appellant, Barangay Captain
Razon brought him, Conchita and Zenaida to the municipal hall where an
investigation was conducted. Upon the
conclusion of the investigation, appellant was taken to the municipal jail,
while Zenaida was given instructions to go back to said municipal hall the
following day and have Conchita medically examined.[4]
The next day, Conchita went to
the Municipal Health Office of Tagkawayan, Quezon and underwent a laboratory
examination. She was examined by a
medical technologist, Rodelo V. Teopy.
The laboratory report showed that Conchita's vagina was positive for the
presence of spermatozoa. Consequently,
on
x x
x x
Internal
Examination:
1.
Multiple lacerations noted with no discharged noticed at the time of
examination.
2.
Admits two (2) fingers with ease.
Please
see attached Laboratory Result.
x x x
x
Upon
securing the medico-legal certificate and the laboratory report, Conchita and
Zenaida went back to the police station.
Zenaida executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay and, subsequently, filed a
criminal complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Tagkawayan, Quezon, in
behalf of Conchita.[6]
Consequently, an Information[7]
was filed against appellant for the crime of rape, stating:
That
on or about the 8th day of March 1998, at Barangay Bukal, in the
Municipality of Tagkawayan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design, by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Conchita Maranan,
a mental retardate, against her will.
Contrary to law.
Appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty
during the arraignment[8]
on
The prosecution presented the
testimonies of Dr. Arnel Artos, Zenaida Andallon, Celso Razon, and Conchita
Maranan. The said witnesses testified as
to the facts narrated above.
The defense, on the other hand,
presented the testimonies of Leoncio Zamora, Nilo de Torres and appellant. Appellant raised the defense of denial and
alibi by stating that he did not rape Conchita and that he was at a baptismal
celebration or buhos tubig when the incident occurred. According to him, on
The RTC found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby finds accused Elegio
An GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby sentences
said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the private
offended party Conchita Maranan the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
as civil indemnity plus the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Due to the penalty imposed, which
is Reclusion Perpetua, the case was elevated to this Court on
appeal. However, per Resolution[10]
of this Court dated September 6, 2004, the case was transferred to the CA in
conformity with the Decision of this Court, dated July 7, 2004, in People v.
Mateo,[11] modifying
the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
particularly Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any
other rule insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this
Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of this Court en banc, dated
September 19, 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, in cases similarly
involving death penalty, pursuant to this Court's power to promulgate rules of
procedure in all courts under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, and
allowing an intermediate review by the CA before such cases are elevated to
this Court.
The CA, in its Decision dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the January 7, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 3024-C, finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant, in his Brief,[12]
ascribed a lone assignment of error which reads:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.
Appellant
questioned the credibility of Conchita due to inconsistencies in her
testimony. He also assailed the finding
of the trial court that Conchita was a mental retardate. He argued that the prosecution was not able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the fact of Conchita's mental
ratardation. Finally, appellant contended
that due to the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, his defense of alibi
should have been given more weight as it was corroborated by two disinterested
witnesses.
The Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Brief,[13]
stated the following arguments:
I. THE RAPE VICTIM'S CATEGORICAL AND
SPONTANEOUS TESTIMONY IS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II. APPELLANT'S ALIBI AND DENIAL CANNOT PREVAIL
OVER HIS POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY THE VICTIM.
According
to the OSG, the trial court was correct in its observation that Conchita's
testimony was credible as it was categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank. It stated that Conchita's
narration of the incident was simple and direct, and that her testimony was
able to withstand the rigorous cross-examination. The OSG also contended that appellant's
defense of alibi was not strong because the element that there must be physical
impossibility for the latter to be at the situs criminis at the time the
incident took place was lacking.
Finally, the OSG argued that Conchita could not have been mistaken in
positively identifying appellant whom she knew since her childhood; hence, such
positive identification must prevail over appellant's defense of denial and
alibi.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In reviewing rape cases, this Court has constantly been guided by three
principles, to wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be made
with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of
the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. And
as a result of these guiding principles, credibility of the complainant becomes
the single most important issue. If the testimony of the victim is credible,
convincing and consistent with human nature, and the normal course of things,
the accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.[14]
In
connection therewith, this Court has always been consistent in ruling that the duty to ascertain the competence and credibility of a
witness rests primarily with the trial court,[15]
because it has the unique position of observing the witness’s deportment on the
stand while testifying. Absent any
compelling reason to justify the reversal of the evaluations and conclusions of
the trial court, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s
findings.[16]
A review of the testimony of Conchita clearly shows
its consistency and straightforwardness, a matter which the trial court
correctly appreciated. In narrating the
incident, Conchita said:
(Prosecutor
Florido) Q Now, on
(Conchita)
A Yes, sir.
Q What
happened to you if you can recall?
A He
pushed me to the floor, sir.
Q Who pushed you?
A Elegio An, sir.
Q The person you pointed to a while ago
before this
A Yes, sir.
Q And where were you then when he pushed you
to the floor?
A From the river I took a bath, then he suddenly
entered our house, sir.
Q And he pushed you inside your house or
inside the room?
A In a room, sir.
Q When the accused Elegio An pushed you to
the floor inside the room, what happened to you?
A Ako po ay inasawa niya.
Q What do you mean by inasawa?
A He removed his clothes in front of me,
sir.
Q What about you, did he remove your
clothes?
ATTY.
FULLANTE:
Objection
Your Honor, no basis.
PROS.
FLORIDO:
If
Your Honor please, at this juncture, we want to make of record that we be
allowed to ask leading questions, because of the defect of the witness so we
will make that kind of question.
COURT:
Witness
may answer.
(Conchita)
A The removing of my clothes came
first, sir.
(Pros.
Florido) Q After he removed his
clothes, what did he do?
A Inasawa po niya ako.
Q When you said inasawa, he kissed
you?
A Yes, sir.
Q After that what else?
A He put himself on top of me, sir.
Q What do you mean he put himself on top of
you?
A Inasawa niya ako, sir.
Q Did he insert anything to . . .
ATTY.
FULLANTE:
Objection
Your Honor.
COURT:
What
do you mean by inasawa?
(Conchita)
A He removed his clothes in front of
me, Your Honor.
Q When you said inasawa, what did you
feel if you felt anything?
A He inserted his penis in my private part
and it was painful, sir.
Q It is now clear when you said inasawa
he inserted his penis to your private part or to your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q When he inserted his penis to your vagina,
what did you feel if you felt anything?
A It was painful, sir.
Q Why?
A Because he inserted it binigla,
sir.
PROS.
FLORIDO:
Q What happened to your vagina, did you
notice anything?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you said inasawa, did he say
anything after while (sic) he was doing inasawa ka?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A That he will do it again and he told me
not to tell anybody or else he will kill me, sir.
PROS.
FLORIDO:
We
want to make of record Your Honor that the witness is now crying and wiping her
eye.
Q When he said to you that he will kill you
if you reveal it to anybody, did you believe him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you fight back when you were inaasawa?
A I am
a woman and I cannot fight him because he is stronger than me, sir.
Q And after that what happened?
A He left the place, sir.[17]
It is apparent
from the above testimony that Conchita was able to narrate convincingly to the
trial court the incident that happened.
Hence, the trial court's assessment of Conchita's credibility must not
be disturbed. As ruled by this Court in People
of the
Findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial
court. What militates against the claim of appellant is the time-honored rule
that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are
matters best left to the trial court. The trial court has the unique position of
having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’
deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the
scant or full realization of an oath – all of which are useful aids for an
accurate determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity.[19]
Unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case, the trial court’s assessment must be respected, for it had
the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while
testifying and to detect if they were lying.[20]
As to the contention of appellant that Conchita
made inconsistent statements during cross-examination, this Court finds such
inconsequential. If at all, the cross-examination brought out more details that
would support Conchita's testimony during the direct examination. Thus, during
cross-examination:
(ATTY.
FULLANTE) Q What do you mean by
hindi naman ako pumayag?
(CONCHITA)
A He was embracing me and he was
inviting me in the manggahan at hindi ako pumayag, sir.
Q Elegio An did not force you to go to
manggahan?
A No, sir.
Q What happened after that Madam Witness?
A He touched my breast and my private part,
several times, sir.
PROS.
FLORIDO:
We
want to make of record that the witness is again crying.
COURT:
Place
on the record the observation of the prosecution.
ATTY.
FULLANTE:
Q And where did this incident took (sic)
place Madam Witness?
A In the house of Nanay Binyag, sir.
Q Was this Elegio An holding any weapon when
he did that?
A None, sir.
Q Was he shouting Madam Witness?
A No, sir.
Q By what manner was it, Madam Witness?
A That he will kill me, sir.
x
x x x
Q Now Madam Witness, did you shout for help?
A I did not shout because his mouth was in my
mouth.
x
x x x
Q And if you were shouting you will be heard
by any person working in the field?
A Yes, sir, but I cannot shout because his
mouth was in my mouth, sir.
Q You mean to say you were kissing each other?
A Yes, sir.
Q While he was kissing you, what did you do,
Madam Witness?
A None,
sir, I cannot move because my whole body was painful, sir.
x
x x x
Q How many minutes did he kiss you?
A I do not know how many minutes, sir.
Q What did you do while the accused was
kissing you?
A Iniipit po niya and paa ko, sir.[21]
The above testimony does
not diminish Conchita's credibility as a witness because the inconsistencies
found by appellant were merely trivial and do not bear on the very fact that
Conchita was raped through force and intimidation. Inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant details do not
destroy their credibility.[22]
More so, the minor inconsistencies signified
that the witness was neither coached nor lying on the witness stand. What is
important is her complete and vivid narration of the rape
itself, which the trial court herein found to be truthful and credible.[23]
Appellant
further argues that the trial court erred in finding that Conchita was a mental
retardate. According to him, the
prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the victim's mental
retardation citing People v. Dalandas.[24] The CA found the said argument meritorious,
as with this Court. The CA thus ruled
that:
However, the prosecution failed to present any
clinical evidence to establish that private complainant was indeed a mental
retardate. It merely relied on the testimony of Zenaida Andallon who stated
that private complainant does not know how to read and write, does not know how
to cook rice, does not respect anyone and acts like a child. While it is a
settled rule that mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than
clinical evidence,[25]
it is, however, an equally settled doctrine that clinical evidence is necessary
in borderline cases when it is difficult to ascertain whether the victim is of
a normal mind or is suffering from a mild mental retardation.[26]
To Our mind, such clinical evidence is indispensable in the present case
considering that there is a difficulty in ascertaining the mental condition of
private complainant. To be sure, the mere fact that private complainant does
not know how to read and write, or to cook rice, or that she acts like a child
are not conclusive indication that she is a mental retardate. There are people who manifest the same
behavior despite being perfectly normal. In fact, even Dr. Artos recommended
that private complainant be made to undergo further examination by a
psychiatrist in order to come up with a better assessment of her mental
condition.[27]
To reiterate, knowledge by the appellant
of the fact that private complainant is a mental retardate would make him
liable for qualified rape. Such being
the case, the prosecution must likewise prove beyond reasonable doubt that (1) private
complainant is a mental retardate, and (2) appellant knew of such mental
condition. The failure of the
prosecution to establish the first renders the second immaterial. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient
evidence to prove that private complainant is a mental retardate, appellant
cannot be convicted of qualified rape.
Finally, appellant
anchored his defense on denial and alibi.
This Court has ruled in various cases that denial
is inherently a weak defense as it is negative and self-serving. Corollarily,
alibi is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to contrive and difficult
to prove. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the accused to prove that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must likewise prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity
at the time of its commission.[28] However, in this case, appellant was not
able to prove that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
place of the crime at the time the latter took place. Appellant and his witnesses testified that Barangay
Mansilay, the place where appellant claimed to have been at the time the crime
took place is more or less nine (9) kilometers away from Barangay Bukal,
the place where the incident occurred. According to them, the travel time from Barangay
Bukal to Barangay Mansilay can be approximated to 1-2 hours by
walking and 30 minutes by using a tricycle.
Such a short distance is not demonstrative of the physical impossibility
for the appellant to be at the place of commission of the crime as contemplated
by this Court's past decisions. For
alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the appellant to prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must, likewise, demonstrate
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time.[29]
WHEREFORE,
the Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Chairperson |
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; rollo, pp. 3-18.
[2] Penned by Judge Mariano A. Morales, Jr.; CA rollo, pp. 70-83.
[3] TSN,
[4]
TSN,
[5] CA Decision, rollo, pp. 5-6.
[6]
[7] Records, p. 2.
[8]
[9]
TSN,
[10] Rollo, p. 49.
[11] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 433 SCRA 640.
[12] CA rollo, p. 57.
[13]
[14] People v. Arnulfo Aure, G.R. No. 180451, October 17, 2008, citing People v. Mangitngit, 502 SCRA 560, 572 (2006).
[15] People v. Abulon, G.R. No. 174473, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 675, 687, citing People v. Biong, 450 Phil. 432, 445 (2003), citing People v. Tadeo, 371 SCRA 303 (2001).
[16]
[17]
TSN,
[18] G.R. No. 171164,
[19] People v. Dy, 425 Phil. 608, 637 (2002), citing People v. Abacia, 359 SCRA 342 (2001).
[20]
[21] TSN,
[22] People
v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. 176742,
June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 682, 699, citing People v. Villadares, 406 Phil.
530, 540 (2001).
[23]
[24] G.R. No. 140209,
[25] People v. Almacin, G.R. No. 113253,
[26] People v. Dalandas, supra note 24, at 441, citing People v. Cartuano, Jr., 255 SCRA 403. (1996).
[27] TSN,
[28] People v. Aure, supra note 14.
[29] People of the Philippines v. Catalino Mingming, G.R. No. 174195,