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PEOPLE OF THE
Petitioner,
- versus -
DIR. GEN. CESAR P.
NAZARENO, DIR. EVERLINO NARTATEZ, DIR. NICASIO MA. S. CUSTODIO, and THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION),
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 168982
Present:
PUNO, C.J., *QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, and BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 5, 2009
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D E C I S I O N |
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BRION, J.: |
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The People of the Philippines seeks,
through this petition for review on certiorari,[1]
the reversal of the decision of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in People of the Philippines v. Dir. Gen Cesar
P. Nazareno (Ret.), Dir. Gen Everlino Nartatez (Ret.), and Dir. Gen Nicasio Ma.
THE
ANTECEDENTS
Three (3) separate but related contracts
– between the Philippine National Police (PNP) and Beltra Industries, for
the purchase and delivery of Caliber .45 Thompson Brand pistols – spawned the
filing of the criminal charge against the respondents. The first of the contracts, covered by
Purchase Order (PO) No. 081190-654 dated P18,550.30 each, for the total amount of P52,348,946.60. The second was covered by P29,995,835.10. The third was under P23,039,472.60. The purchase orders were signed by then
Director General Nazareno and then Director Nartatez, while the corresponding
checks were signed by then Director Custodio.
Allegations of irregularity or overpricing
surrounded the procurement, leading then President Fidel V. Ramos to order the
creation of a tri-agency investigating committee composed of lawyers from the
PNP’s Inspector General’s Office, the National Police Commission, and the
Office of the President. This committee
found no overpricing; neither did it find collusion among the officers of the
PNP participating in the transactions.
The Commission on Audit, for its
part, created a special audit team to look into the same allegations of overpricing. After an investigation that compared the AFP
Logistics Command (LOGCOM) purchase
price of P10,5873.25 per
unit for the same brand and the PNP’s purchase of 5,681 units at P18,550.30 per unit, the audit team
found that the PNP procurement appeared to have been overpriced; the PNP purchases,
if made at the AFP LOGCOM unit price, would have cost P45 Million less.
After due proceedings and based on
the report of the special audit team, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
filed an information against the respondents with the Sandiganbayan. The information reads:
That on or about January 1, 1991 and May 29, 1992, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Cesar P. Nazareno, then Director General, Philippine National Police (PNP) and Everlino P. Nartatez and Nicasio Ma. S. Custodio, then directors of PNP Logistics Support Command, successively while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their positions and committing the crimes in relation to their offices, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally conspiring with one another, enter in behalf of the said PNP Contract/Document with Beltra Industries, Inc. a private enterprise at PILAND Building, Javier cor. Santillan Street, Makati for the supply of Five Thousand Six Hundred Eighty-One (5,681.00) units of Caliber .45 Pistol in the amount of One Hundred Five Million Three Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Three Hundred Fifty four Pesos and Seventy Centavos (105,384,254.70), under terms and conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
The respondents pleaded not guilty to the charge.
At the trial, the People presented
the members of the special audit team to testify on the overpricing that the
team found. Among others, a member of
the special audit team testified that there was a big difference between the
AFP price and the PNP’s; as shown by documents obtained from the Philippine
Navy, the AFP purchased the pistols at a unit cost of P10,578.25. The People
then presented the documents related to the various contracts and the documents
the members of the audit team mentioned in their testimonies.
The Sandiganbayan, in its Decision,[2]
graphically presented the claimed price difference as follows:
|
PNP |
Qty. |
Unit Cost |
Amount |
LOGCOM U/C |
Amount |
Price Difference |
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081190-854 |
2822 |
P18,550.30 |
P52,348,946.60 |
P10,578.25 |
P29,851,821.50 |
P22,497,125.10 |
|
240492-185 |
1617 |
P18,550.30 |
P29,995,835.10 |
P10,578.25 |
P17,105,030.25 |
P12,890,804.85 |
|
050592-153 |
1242 |
P18,550.30 |
P23,039,472.60 |
P10,578.25 |
P13,138,186.50 |
P9,901,286.10 |
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P105,384,254.30 |
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P60,095,038.25 |
P45,289,216.05 |
In their defense, the respondents took
the basic position that the AFP’s unit price could not be the basis for a comparison
to support the conclusion that the PNP purchase was overpriced. They presented witnesses[3]
who commonly testified that the AFP purchases were made under a foreign
military assistance program – the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program –
extended by the United States of America (US) to the
The respondents also presented some
of the members of the tri-agency team that investigated the alleged overpricing;[4]
all of them testified that they found no irregularity in the procurement of the
pistols. The respondents completed their
case with the presentation of their documentary evidence, including those identified
or touched upon in the testimonies of their witnesses.
The Verdict
of Acquittal
The
Sandiganbayan agreed with the respondents’ submissions and acquitted the
respondents after trial. It concluded that the AFP prices did not offer sufficient basis for comparison to be able
to establish firmly the alleged overpricing in the purchase of the subject
firearms by the PNP. The
Sandiganbayan based this conclusion on the testimonies of the respondents’
witnesses whose competence on the matters they testified on was never
questioned or disputed by the prosecution.
The Sandiganbayan further observed that
the audit team followed a flawed procedure in reaching its overpricing conclusion. The audit team merely relied on the AFP
Supply Issuance and did not conduct any actual canvass of the gun prices. Thus,
to the Sandiganbayan, the
comparison made between the PNP price and the AFP quoted cost was substantially
deficient under the prevailing rules that indispensably required an actual
canvass done on different and identified suppliers to show exactly the
variances in the prices of similar articles to firm up, for evidentiary
purposes and to a reliable degree of certainty, a finding of overpricing. The requirement of actual canvass, according
to the Sandiganbayan, was settled law as applied by this Court in Arriola v. Commission on Audit[5] and in
Despite its clearly negative conclusion
on the overpricing charge, the Sandiganbayan still proceeded to discuss and reject
the allegation of conspiracy between and among the respondents. Noting the respondents’ individual
participation in the questioned transactions (i.e., the necessity of the respondents’ individual signatures in
the documents for the purchase of the pistols) and the evidentiary requirement
that conspiracy must be proved by
evidence of a chain of circumstances and may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably
point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community
of interest, the Sandiganbayan rejected allegation of conspiracy with the
statement that -
X x x the Court
finds that the evidence presented by the prosecution, which focused more on
documents to prove the alleged overpricing, failed to show that the three
accused indeed conspired with one another in entering into the subject supply
contracts and in effecting the purchase of firearms through the execution of
the purchase orders and the supply contracts.
The
Petition and the Respondents’ Comments
The People filed the present petition under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, and raised the following ISSUES:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF THE ALLEGED LAWS OF THE
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE WITNESSES AS TO THE EXISTENCE AND EFFECTIVITY OF THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE PNP PURCHASED THE 5,681 UNITS OF PISTOLS AT AN OVERPRICED AMOUNT OF P18,550.30 PER UNIT
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT DOUBLE JEOPARDY HAS ALREADY ATTACHED TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS AND THUS PROSCRIBES THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY PETITIONER.
Expectedly,
the respondents object to the petition mainly because the review sought violates
their constitutional right against double jeopardy.[8] They assert that the petition is essentially
an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or a review of alleged errors in
judgment that throws the case wide open, placing the respondents in danger of
being punished twice for the same offense.
They also posit that a judgment of acquittal can only be challenged
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
citing our ruling in People v.
Sandiganbayan[9]
that only a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion or denial of due process to the State can justify a review
of a judgment of acquittal through a petition for certiorari. The present petition, according to the
respondents, is a Rule 45 appeal that raises errors of judgment, not errors of
jurisdiction. On the merits, the
respondents claim that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in acquitting them of the criminal charge.
OUR RULING
We resolve
to dismiss the petition on the basis of the double jeopardy clause of the
Constitution.
Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution provides that “no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.” Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court, which implements this particular constitutional right, reads:
SEC. 7. Former
conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case
shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites
are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the
second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated;
and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the
first. A first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused
was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.[10]
A judgment of acquittal is final and is no longer reviewable.[11] It is also immediately executory and the
State may not seek its review without placing the accused in double jeopardy.[12] We had occasion to fully explain the reason
behind the double jeopardy rule in People
v. Velasco[13]:
The fundamental
philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts
deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness over the
rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x x x x."
Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It
is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the
absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance
criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule,
confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need
for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability.
With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a
protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a
jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
The Constitution has expressly
adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials, thereby conclusively presuming that
a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a previous final judgment.[14] Further
prosecution via an appeal from a
judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because the government has already
been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal defendant’s
culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of
conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on
multiple trials applies and becomes compelling.[15] The
reason is not only the defendant’s already established innocence at the first
trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward
and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who
has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily
result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade
a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that
had attended the first trial, all in a process where the government’s power and
resources are once again employed against the defendant’s individual means. That the second opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects
any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience.
Thus, the absolute and inflexible rule
is that the State is proscribed from appealing the judgment of acquittal through
either a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, or an appeal by certiorari
on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.
An instance when the State can challenge
a judgment of acquittal is pursuant to the exercise of our judicial power “to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government,”[16]
as implemented through the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In such instance, however, no review of facts
and law on the merits, in the manner done in an appeal, actually takes place;
the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the
verdict was rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court
has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In other words, the review is on the question of whether there has been a
validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decision’s error or
correctness. Under the exceptional
nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden – a very heavy one – is on the shoulders
of the party asking for the review to show the presence of a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility.[17]
Applying all these principles, the
present Rule 45 petition must necessarily fail.
Even under our most liberal reading, we cannot treat the petition as a
Rule 65 petition, as it raises no jurisdictional error that can invalidate a
verdict of acquittal.
The petition itself states that it was formally filed under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court and seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of
the Sandiganbayan.[18] Thus, the petition’s clear and unequivocal
intention to seek a review on the merits of the Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal
puts it on a direct collision course with the constitutional proscription on
double jeopardy. This is more than
enough reason to deny the petition.
Additionally, a Rule 45 petition can only address pure questions of law,
not factual errors, committed by the tribunal below. In this petition, the People raise factual
errors, or to be exact, “appreciation of evidence” errors that the descriptive
term “gravely erred” cannot convert into jurisdictional errors. Specifically, the petition alleges: (1) that
the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in taking judicial notice of the alleged laws
of the US; (2) that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in relying solely on the
testimonies of the defense witnesses as to the existence and effectivity of the
laws of the US; and (3) that the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in not
appreciating the prosecution’s presented evidence on the guilt of the
respondents.
We add that any error that the Sandiganbayan might have committed in
appreciating the evidence presented at the trial are mere errors of judgment
and do not rise to the level of jurisdictional errors despite the allegation
that the Sandiganbayan had “gravely erred” in appreciating the evidence.
Misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on
evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level
of grave abuse of discretion.[19] That an abuse itself must be “grave” must be
amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction of the court, no less, will be
affected.[20] The mere fact, too, that a court erroneously
decides a case does not necessarily deprive it of jurisdiction.[21]
We have consistently ruled that a Rule 65 certiorari does not
involve the correction of errors of judgment:
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors
of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we
explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every
erroneous judgment would be a void judgment.
This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a
rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the
original civil action of certiorari.
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the
issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of
reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court – on the
basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as
long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond
the province of certiorari. Where the error
is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact –
a mistake of judgment – appeal is the remedy.[22]
In this case, the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over the nature of the case is not disputed, nor
was its jurisdiction over the respondents
ever brought into question. Neither does
the petition substantively and effectively impute any error based on the
Sandiganbayan’s grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of its jurisdiction. In other words, the petition, styled
as a Rule 45 petition, is not even one that we can liberally treat as a Rule 65
certiorari petition that may permit a review of a verdict of acquittal.[23]
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
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REYNATO
S. PUNO Chief Justice
(On official leave) |
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice
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LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO
* On official leave.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Rollo, pp. 80-109.
[3] The witnesses were: (1) Wilfredo Ona, former Chief of the International Logistics Division Office of the Defense Directorate Logistics J-4, General Headquarters, Camp Aguinaldo (see summary of his testimony at pp. 91-93 of the rollo); and (2) Commodore Daniel Trinidad Delgado, former Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (see summary of his testimony at pp. 95-97 of the rollo).
[4] The following members of the tri-agency team testified: (1) Benjamin Fajardo Valento, then Inspector General of the PNP (see the summary of his testimony at pp. 88-90 of the rollo); (2) Atty. Alexis Canonizado, representative of the National Police Commission (see the summary of his testimony at pp. 90-91 of the rollo) and Retired Colonel Rafael Ivia Jayme of the Office of the Inspector General (see the summary of his testimony at pp. 93-95 of the rollo).
[5]
G.R. No. 90364,
[6]
G.R. No. 114864,
[7]
G.R. No. 135294,
[8] See: (1) Respondents Nazareno and Nartatez’ joint comment; rollo, pp. 171-178, and (2) Respondent Custodio’s Comment/Opposition; id., pp. 135-155.
[9]
G.R. No. 152532,
[10] Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. No. 157472,
[11] People v. Terrado, G.R. No. 148226,
[12] People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
168188-89,
[13]
G.R. No. 127444,
[14] People v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 12.
[15] Ibid.
[16] CONSTITUTION,
Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2.
[17] This is how grave abuse of discretion has been defined in jurisprudence; see, for instance, People v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 12.
[18] Rollo, pp. 47, 73.
[19] Supra note 12.
[20]
See Office of the Ombudsman v. Magno,
G.R. No. 178923,
[21] Supra note 11.
[22]
See Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No.
172299,
[23] See People v. Terrado and People v. Sandiganbayan, supra notes 11 and 12, respectively.