SECOND DIVISION
|
A.
SORIANO AVIATION, Petitioner, - versus - EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION OF A. SORIANO AVIATION, JULIUS S. VARGAS IN HIS CAPACITY AS UNION PRESIDENT, REYNALDO ESPERO, JOSEFINO
ESPINO, GALMIER BALISBIS, GERARDO BUNGABONG, LAURENTE BAYLON, JEFFREY NERI,
ARTURO INES, REYNALDO BERRY, RODOLFO RAMOS, OSWALD ESPION, ALBERT AGUILA,
RAYMOND BARCO, REYNANTE AMIMITA, SONNY BAWASANTA, MAR NIMUAN AND RAMIR
LICUANAN, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 166879 Present: CARPIO,* J., CARPIO MORALES, J., Acting Chairperson, ABAD, JJ.
Promulgated: August 14,
2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On
May 22, 1997, A. Soriano Aviation (petitioner or the company) which is engaged
in providing transportation of guests to and from Amanpulo and El Nido resorts
in Palawan, and respondent Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation (the
Union), the duly-certified exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of petitioner, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
effective January 1, 1997 up to December 31, 1999. The CBA included a “No-Strike, No-Lock-out”
clause.
On May 1 & 12, and June 12, 1997, which were legal holidays
and peak season for the company, eight mechanics-members of respondent Union, its
herein co-respondents Albert Aguila (Aguila), Reynante Amimita (Amimita),
Galmier Balisbis (Balisbis), Raymond Barco (Barco), Gerardo Bungabong
(Bungabong), Josefino Espino (Espino), Jeffrey Neri (Neri) and Rodolfo Ramos,
Jr. (Ramos), refused to render overtime
work.
Petitioner treated the refusal to
work as a concerted action which is a violation of the “No-Strike, No-Lockout”
clause in the CBA. It thus meted the
workers a 30-day suspension. It also filed on
The attempted settlement between the
parties having been futile, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on October 3, 1997, attributing to petitioner the following acts:
(1) union busting, (2) illegal
dismissal of union officer, (3) illegal suspension of eight mechanics, (4) violation
of memorandum of agreement, (5) coercion of employees and interrogation of
newly-hired mechanics with regard to union affiliation, (6) discrimination
against the aircraft mechanics, (7) harassment through systematic
fault-finding, (8) contractual labor, and (9) constructive dismissal of the
Union President, Julius Vargas (Vargas).
As despite conciliation no amicable
settlement of the dispute was arrived at, the
Meanwhile, pursuant to its
reservation in NLRC Case No. 07-05409-97, petitioner filed a Motion to Re-Open
the Case which was granted by Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion by Order of
By Decision[1]
dated
The
In
the interim or on June 16, 1998, eight months into the “second strike,”
petitioner filed a complaint against respondents before the Labor Arbiter,
praying for the declaration as illegal of the strike on account of their
alleged pervasive and widespread use of force and violence and for the loss of their
employment, citing the following acts committed by them: publicly shouting of foul and vulgar words to
company officers and non-striking employees; threatening of officers and
non-striking employees with bodily harm and dousing them with water while
passing by the strike area; destruction of or inflicting of damage to company
property, as well as private property of company officers; and putting up of
placards and streamers containing vulgar and insulting epithets including imputing
crime on the company.
By
Decision[3] of
The Labor Arbiter went on to hold that
the Union deliberately resorted to the use of violent and unlawful acts in the
course of the “second strike,” hence, the individual respondents were deemed to
have lost their employment.
On appeal, the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed in
toto the Labor Arbiter’s decision, by Resolution[4]
dated
Its motion for reconsideration having
been denied by Resolution[5]
dated
By the assailed Decision of April 16,
2004,[6]
the appellate court reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling, holding that the
acts of violence committed by the Union members in the course of the strike
were not, as compared to the acts complained
of in Shell Oil Workers’ Union v. Shell
Company of the Philippines,[7]
First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc., v. Roldan-Confesor[8]
and Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant
Employees Association v. Tandaya, [9]
(this case was applied by the Labor Arbiter in his Decision of September 28,
2008) where the acts of violence resulted in loss of employment, concluded that
the acts in the present case were not as serious or pervasive as in these
immediately-cited cases to call for loss of employment of the striking
employees.
Specifically, the appellate court
noted that at the time petitioner filed its complaint in June 1998, almost eight
months had already elapsed from the commencement of the strike and, in the
interim, the alleged acts of violence were committed only during nine non-consecutive
days, viz: one day in October, two days
in November, four days in December, all in 1997, and two days in January 1998. To the appellate court, these incidents did
not warrant the conversion of an otherwise legal strike into an illegal one,
and neither would it result in the loss of employment of the strikers. For, so the appellate court held, the
incidents consisted merely of name-calling and using of banners imputing
negligence and criminal acts to the company and its officers, which do not
indicate a degree of violence that could be categorized as grave or serious to
warrant the loss of employment of the individual strikers found to be
responsible.
By
Resolution of
Petitioner
insists that, contrary to the appellate court’s finding, the questioned acts of
the strikers were of a serious character, widespread and pervasive; and that
the Union’s imputation of crime and negligence on its part, and the prolonged
strike resulted in its loss of goodwill and business, particularly the
termination of its lease and air-service contract with Amanpulo, the loss of its after-sales repair service agreement with
Bell Helicopters, the loss of its accreditation as the Beechcraft service
facility, and the decision of El Nido to
put up its own aviation company.
Apart
from the acts of violence committed by the strikers, petitioner bases its plea
that the strike should be declared illegal on the violation of the “No-Strike-No-Lockout”
clause in the CBA, the strike having arisen from non-strikeable issues. Petitioner proffers that what actually prompted
the holding of the strike was the implementation of the new shift schedule, a
valid exercise of management prerogative.
In
issue then is whether the strike staged by respondents is illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal acts and
violation of the “No Strike-No Lockout” clause of the CBA and, if in the
affirmative, whether individual respondents are deemed to have lost their
employment status on account thereof.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
The Court notes that, as found by the Labor Arbiter in NLRC Case No.
07-05409-97, the first strike or the mechanics’ refusal to work on 3 consecutive holidays was
prompted by their disagreement with the management-imposed new work
schedule. Having been grounded on a
non-strikeable issue and without complying with the procedural requirements,
then the same is a violation of the “No Strike-No Lockout Policy” in the
existing CBA. Respecting the second
strike, where the Union complied with procedural requirements, the same was not
a violation of the “No Strike- No Lockout” provisions, as a “No Strike-No
Lockout” provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a valid
stipulation but may be invoked only by employer when the strike is economic in
nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the
employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike
which is grounded on unfair labor practice.[10] In the
present case, the
On the submission that the strike was illegal for being grounded on a non-strikeable issue, that is, the intra-union conflict between the federation and the local union, it bears reiterating that when respondent company dismissed the union officers, the issue was transformed into a termination dispute and brought respondent company into the picture. Petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissing them upon request by the federation, respondent company was guilty of unfair labor practice in that it violated the petitioner’s right to self-organization. The strike was staged to protest respondent company’s act of dismissing the union officers. Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails. (Emphasis supplied)
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the second strike became invalid
due to the commission of illegal action in its course.
It is
hornbook principle that the exercise of the right of private sector employees
to strike is not absolute.
Thus Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 3. x x x
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, even if the purpose of a strike is valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the means
employed are illegal.
Thus, the employment of violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in
carrying out concerted activities which are injurious to the right to property
renders a strike illegal. And so is picketing or the obstruction to the
free use of property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when
accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute
nuisance.[12]
Apropos is the
following ruling in Sukhothai Cuisine v.
Court of Appeals:[13]
Well-settled is the rule that even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person engaged in picketing shall:
a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or
b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
c) obstruct public thoroughfares.
The following acts have been held to be prohibited activities: where the strikers shouted slanderous and scurrilous words against the owners of the vessels; where the strikers used unnecessary and obscene language or epithets to prevent other laborers to go to work, and circulated libelous statements against the employer which show actual malice; where the protestors used abusive and threatening language towards the patrons of a place of business or against co-employees, going beyond the mere attempt to persuade customers to withdraw their patronage; where the strikers formed a human cordon and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and vessels of the vicinity of the workplace and perpetrated acts of violence and coercion to prevent work from being performed; and where the strikers shook their fists and threatened non-striking employees with bodily harm if they persisted to proceed to the workplace. Permissible activities of the picketing workers do not include obstruction of access of customers. (emphasis supplied)
The appellate court found in the
present case, as in fact it is not disputed,
that the acts complained of were the following:[14]
1. On 29 October 1997, while Robertus M. Cohen, personnel manager of the Company, was eating at the canteen, petitioner Rodolfo Ramos shouted “insults and other abusive, vulgar and foul-mouthed word” with the use of a megaphone, such as, “sige, ubusin mo yung pagkain,” “kapal ng mukha mo;” that when he left the canteen to go back to his office he was splashed with water from behind so that his whole back was drenched; that when he confronted that strikers at the picket line accompanied by three (3) security guards, to find out who was responsible, he was told by petitioner Oswald Espion who was then holding a thick piece of wood approximately two (2) feet long to leave.
2.
On the same day, 29 October 1997, petitioners Julius Vargas, Jeffrey Neri, and
Rodolfo Ramos, together with Jose Brin, shouted to Capt. Ben Hur Gomez, the
chief operating officer of the Company, in this wise, “Matanda ka na, balatuba ka pa rin. Mangungurakot ka sa kompanya!”
3.
In the morning of
4.
In the afternoon of the same day,
`
5.
On
6.
On the same day,
7. Also, on 12 November 1997, petitioner Oswald Espion was reported to have thrown gravel and sand to the car owned by Celso Villamor Gomez, lead man of the Company, as the said car was traveling along company premises near the picket line; (apart from the marks of mud, gravel and sand found on the entire body of the car, no heavy damages, however, appears to have been sustained by the car).”
8. On 08 December 1997, petitioners Julius Vargas, Rey Espero, Rey Barry, Galmier Balisbis, Rodolfo Ramos, Sonny Bawasanta and Arturo Ines, together with Jose Brin, shouted, “Max, ang sama mo talaga, lumabas ka dito at pipitpitin ko ang mukha mo!” “Cohen, inutil ka talaga. Nagpahaba ka pa ng balbas para kang tsonggo!” Cohen, lumabas ka dito at hahalikan kita.”
9.
On
10.
On
11.
Also on
12.
On
13.
On
14.
On 15 January 1998, while Julio Tomas, Avionics
Technician of the Company, and his girlfriend, Elizabeth Gali, also an employee
of the Company, were waiting for their ride, several union members shouted to
Elizabeth Gali, Beth iwanan mo na yang taong yan, walang kwentang tao yan!” “Beth, paano na yung pinagsamahan natin?” irked,
Julio Tomas upon boarding the passenger jeepney with his girlfriend threw a
P2.00 coin in the direction of the picketers, the coin hit the windshield of a
privately-owned jeepney belonging to petitioner Espion which was parked
alongside the premises of the strike area; The act of Tomas, provoked the
petitioners Espion and Amimita to follow Tomas, who when left alone inside the
tricycle after his girlfriend took a separate tricycle to her home, was
approached by petitioners Espion and Amimita; petitioner Espion then threw a P2.00
coin at him, and while pointing a baseball bat to his face shouted, “Huwag
mong uulitin yung ginawa mo kundi tatamaan ka sa akin!” (Emphasis
and italics in the original)
The Court notes that the placards and
banners put up by the striking workers in the company premises read: “ANDRES SORIANO AVIATION, INC. CAUGHT IN THE
ACT, ATTEMPTING TO BRIBE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BEWARE, NOW A NAME YOU CAN TRASH,”
“ASAI DETERIORATING SAFETY RECORD KILLS 2 DEAD + VARIOUS (IN PLANE CRASH)
FLIGHT MISHAPS BEWARE,” “FLY AT YOUR OWN RISK,” “ANDRES SORIANO AVIATION, INC.
DETERIORATING SAFETY RECORD KILLS
INNOCENT PEOPLE IN PLANE CRASH, THE CAUSE: UNTRAINED MECHANICS DOING
AIRCRAFT RELEASE, THE RESULT: SLIPSHOD MAINTENANCE AND SLOPPY PLANE
INSPECTION,” “WANNA FLY BLIND?,” “BENHUR
GOMEZ DRAGS COMPANY TO DEBT AND SHAMEFUL EXPERIENCE (MAHIYA KA NAMAN, OY!),”
“A. SORIANO AVIATION, INC., DEAD PEOPLE IN PLANE CRASH,” “ELY BONIFACIO (MASAKIT
ANG TOTOO) MAGNANAKAW NG PIYESA, PALITAN NA RIN! TINGNAN NYO KUNG NAGNANAKAW,”
“MEKANIKO DE EROPLANO Y HUELGA UN VIAJE DE PELIGRO, AIRCRAFT MANAGEMENT BULOK;
“A. SORIANO AVIATION KILLS PEOPLE FOR LAX OVERSIGHT OF SAFETY PROC.” “(ELY
BONIFACIO-PATALSIKIN NA RIN,” “MANDARAMBONG” “MUKHANG KWARTA,” “SAAN MO DINALA
ANG DORNIER SPECIAL TOOLS? IKAW HA!),” “ELY BONIFACIO KAWATAN BANTAY SALAKAY,”
“AMANPULO AND EL NIDO GUESTS, BEWARE OF ASAI FLIGHTS, AIRCRAFT MECHANICS STILL
ON STRIKE,” “GOING TO BORACAY AND EL NIDO IS GOOD BUT FLYING WITH A. SORIANO
AVIATION? THINK TWICE!” “ACHTUNG: A SORIANO AVIATION DEAD PEOPLE IN PLANE CRASH
INSURANCE ENTITLEMENTS DENIED DUE TO CAR VIOLATIONS,” “UNDRESS SORIANO AVIATION,
INC. UNRELIABLE FIXED BASED OPERATOR KILLS PEOPLE FOR LAX OVERSIGHT OF SAFETY
PROCEDURES.”
It
cannot be gainsaid that by the above-enumerated undisputed acts, the
That the alleged acts of violence
were committed in nine non-consecutive days during the almost eight months that
the strike was on-going does not render the violence less pervasive or
widespread to be excusable. Nowhere in
Art. 264 does it require that violence must be continuous or that it should be
for the entire duration of the strike.
The appellate court took against petitioner
its filing of its complaint to have the strike declared illegal almost eight months
from the time it commenced. Art. 264 does not, however, state for purposes of
having a strike declared as illegal that the employer should immediately report
the same. It only lists what acts are
prohibited. It is thus absurd to expect an
employer to file a complaint at the first instance that an act of violence is
alleged to be committed, especially, as in the present case, when an earlier
complaint to have the refusal of the individual respondents to work
overtime declared as an illegal strike was still pending — an issue resolved in
its favor only on September 25, 1998.
The records show that the
The acts complained of including the
display of placards and banners imputing criminal negligence on the part of the
company and its officers, apparently with the end in view of intimidating the
company’s clientele, are, given the nature of its business, that serious as to
make the “second strike” illegal. Specifically with respect to the putting up
of those banners and placards, coupled with the name-calling and harassment, the
same indicates that it was resorted to to coerce the resolution of the dispute
– the very evil which Art. 264 seeks to prevent.
While the strike
is the most preeminent economic weapon of workers to force management to agree
to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital, it exerts
some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between labor and
management, but also on the general peace and progress of society and economic
well-being of the State.[15]
If such weapon has to be used at all, it must be used sparingly and
within the bounds of law in the interest of industrial peace and public
welfare.
As
to the issue of loss of employment of those who participated in the illegal
strike, Sukhothai[16] instructs:
In the determination of the liabilities of the individual respondents, the applicable provision is Article 264(a) of the Labor Code:
Art. 264. Prohibited Activities – (a) x x x
x x x x
x x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during an illegal strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
x x x x
In Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., this Court explained that the effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264, make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during an illegal strike. In all cases, the striker must be identified. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
The liability for prohibited acts has
thus to be determined on an individual basis.
A perusal of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, which was affirmed in toto by the NLRC, shows that on
account of the staging of the illegal strike, individual respondents were all
deemed to have lost their employment, without distinction as to their
respective participation.
Of the participants in the illegal
strike, whether they knowingly participated in the illegal strike in the
case of union officers or knowingly
participated in the commission of violent acts during the illegal strike in
the case of union members, the
records do not indicate. While respondent
Julius Vargas was identified to be a union officer, there is no indication if
he knowingly participated in the illegal
strike. The Court not being a trier of
facts, the remand of the case to the NLRC is in order only for the purpose of determining
the status in the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dated April 16, 2004
and January 25, 2005, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolutions dated October 31, 2001 and December
14, 2001 of the National Labor Relations Commission affirming the Decision of
the Labor Arbiter in NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-06-04890-98 are AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION in light of
the foregoing discussions.
The case is accordingly REMANDED to the National Labor Relations Commission for the purpose of determining the
Union status and respective liabilities, if any, of the individual respondents.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
|
MARIANO C. Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A.
ABAD Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Acting
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Additional member per Special Order No. 671 in lieu of Senior Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who is on official leave.
** Additional member pursuant to Adm. Matter Circular No. 84-2007, as amended, in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion who took no part.
[1] Records, Vol. I, pp. 367-382.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Vide Entry of Judgment, id., unnumbered.
[6] Penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with the concurrence of Associate Justice B.A. Adefuin-dela Cruz and Associate Justice (now Associate Justice of this Court) Arturo D. Brion; CA rollo, pp. 667-679.
[7] G.R. No. L-28607,
[8] G.R. No. 106316,
[9] G.R. No. L-29217,
[10] Vide
Panay Electric Co. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 102672,
[11] G.R. No. 113907,
[12] Philippine
Diamond Hotel, G.R. No. 158075,
[13] G.R. No. 150437,
[14] Vide Decision, pp. 674-677.
[15] Vide
Pilipino Telephone Corp., v. PILTEA, et, al., G.R. No. 160058,
[16] Supra note 10.
[17] Sukhothai, supra.