ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA,
Petitioner, - versus - EDWARD RUMBAUA, Respondent. |
G.R. No.
166738
Present:
*CARPIO-MORALES, J.,
Acting Chairperson, **CARPIO,
***CHICO-NAZARIO, ****LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ.
Promulgated: August 14, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her petition for review on certiorari,[1] the decision dated June 25, 2004[2] and the resolution dated January 18, 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095. The challenged decision reversed the decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Edward Rumbaua (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage against the respondent before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise to live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial support to her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; he represented himself as single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.
Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as personal service proved futile.[5] The RTC ordered the provincial prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no fabrication or suppression of evidence would take place.[6] Prosecutor Melvin P. Tiongson’s report negated the presence of collusion between the parties.[7]
The
Republic of the
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate her charges.
The
petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors in
Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime
in 1987, they met again and became sweethearts but the respondent’s
family did not approve of their relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, the
respondent promised to marry the petitioner as soon as he found a job. The job
came in 1993, when the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted the respondent as a computer engineer. The respondent proposed to the petitioner
that they first have a “secret marriage” in order not to antagonize
his parents. The petitioner agreed;
they were married in
The
petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first six months
of their marriage. At that point, the respondent refused to live with the petitioner
for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his application
for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the couple’s
daily meetings became occasional visits to the petitioner’s house in
In
1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret marriage. The respondent’s mother tried to
convince him to go to the
In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The respondent blamed the petitioner, associating his mother’s death to the pain that the discovery of his secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent’s action, the petitioner severed her relationship with the respondent. They eventually reconciled through the help of the petitioner’s father, although they still lived separately.
In
1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job in
The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication between her and respondent had ceased. Aside from her oral testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract;[13] and the testimony, curriculum vitae,[14] and psychological report[15] of clinical psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following tests on the petitioner: a Revised Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI.[16] She thereafter prepared a psychological report with the following findings:
TEST
RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate
in an average intellectual level. Logic and reasoning remained intact. She is
seen to be the type of woman who adjusts fairly well into most situations
especially if it is within her interests. She is pictured to be faithful to her
commitments and had reservations from negative criticisms such that she
normally adheres to social norms, behavior-wise. Her age speaks of maturity,
both intellectually and emotionally. Her one fault lies in her compliant
attitude which makes her a subject for manipulation and deception such that of
respondent. In all the years of their relationship, she opted to endure his
irresponsibility largely because of the mere belief that someday things will be
much better for them. But upon the advent of her husband’s infidelity,
she gradually lost hope as well as the sense of self-respect, that she has
finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of being aggressive and
very cautious at times – so as to fight with the frustration and
insecurity she had especially regarding her failed marriage.
Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a
very self-centered manner as he believes that the world revolves around him.
His egocentrism made it so easy for him to deceitfully use others for his own
advancement with an extreme air of confidence and dominance. He would do
actions without any remorse or guilt feelings towards others especially to that
of petitioner.
REMARKS
Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless
as it goes beyond the expectations people tagged with it. In love, “age
does matter.” People love in order to be secure that one will share
his/her life with another and that he/she will not die alone. Individuals who
are in love had the power to let love grow or let love die – it is a
choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she expected.
In the case presented by petitioner, it is very
apparent that love really happened for her towards the young respondent –
who used “love” as a disguise or deceptive tactic for exploiting
the confidence she extended towards him. He made her believe that he is
responsible, true, caring and thoughtful – only to reveal himself
contrary to what was mentioned. He lacked the commitment, faithfulness, and remorse
that he was able to engage himself to promiscuous acts that made petitioner
look like an innocent fool. His character traits reveal him to suffer
Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared to be grave, severe and incurable.[17]
[Emphasis supplied.]
The RTC Ruling
The
RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of
x x x x
Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and
wishes of his wife. Respondent imposed limited or block [sic] out communication with his wife, forgetting special occasions,
like petitioner’s birthdays and Valentine’s Day; going out only on
occasions despite their living separately and to go to a motel to have sexual
intercourse.
It would appear that the foregoing narration are the
attendant facts in this case which show the psychological incapacity of
respondent, at the time of the celebration of the marriage of the parties, to
enter into lawful marriage and to discharge his marital responsibilities (See
Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This incapacity is “declared grave,
severe and incurable.”
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage
between petitioner Rowena Padilla Rumbaua and respondent Edwin Rumbaua is
hereby declared annulled.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The CA Decision
The
Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the CA.[19]
The CA decision of
In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not mention the cause of the respondent’s so-called “narcissistic personality disorder;” it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus failed to give the court an insight into the respondent’s developmental years. Dr. Tayag likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the respondent’s incapacity was “deep-seated” and “incurable.”
The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to be psychological, although its manifestations may be physical. Moreover, the evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or physically ill so that he or she could not have known the marital obligations assumed, knowing them, could not have assumed them. In other words, the illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to perform the essential obligations of marriage. In the present case, the petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly refused to live with her because of his parents’ objection to their marriage.
The
petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her motion in
its resolution of
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that –
1. the
OSG certification requirement under Republic
v. Molina[22]
(the Molina case) cannot be dispensed
with because A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took effect
only on
2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her testimony, as well as to present additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and
3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric report.
The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and set aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in the event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside and the RTC’s decision be reinstated.
The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was applicable although it took effect after the promulgation of Molina; (b) invalidating the trial court’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings were not proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.[23]
The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.
THE COURT’S
RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for the
State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[24]
-- which this Court promulgated on
SEC. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require
the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their
claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may
require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the
case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may
be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without
the memoranda.
The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or remedial in character; it does not create or
remove any vested right, but only operates as a remedy in aid of or
confirmation of already existing rights. The settled rule is that procedural
laws may be given retroactive effect,[25]
as we held in De Los
Procedural Laws do not come
within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the
general rule against the retroactive operation of statues -
they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are
no vested rights in rules of procedure.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the
mandatory nature of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to
pending matters. In effect, the
measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the certification
prior to its promulgation. Our
rulings in Antonio v. Reyes[27]
and Navales v. Navales[28]
have since confirmed and clarified that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with
the Molina guideline on the matter of certification,
although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take place. Thus, what is important is the presence
of the prosecutor in the case, not the remedial requirement that he be
certified to be present. From this
perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina guideline on certification lacks
merit.
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper
The
petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and the
remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are
procedurally permissible. She
argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the fault of
her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case
to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits
in this regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be
liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.
We
do not find her arguments convincing.
A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity prima facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:[29]
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the
proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or
incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid
reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long
as a new counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel
had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the willful
and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new
trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant
case.
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the
petitioner’s requested remand.
Petitioner failed to establish the
respondent’s psychological incapacity
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is
anchored on
Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.” In Santos
v. Court of Appeals,[30]
the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability. The defect should
refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”
We laid down more definitive guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code in Republic v. Court of
Appeals where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as
the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally
“inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by
the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally
or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven
to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their “I do's.” The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there
is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date
the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
These
Guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements we established in
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to
emphasize in Ngo Te that each case
involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not
on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts.
Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband.
a.
Petitioner’s
testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of
respondent’s condition
The petitioner’s
evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a)
reneged on his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her occasionally from
1993 to 1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting
cards during special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa
application; (e) blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he
was working in Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the “psychological incapacity” that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,[34] we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his family. The respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner for his mother’s death and of representing himself as single in his visa application, could only at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; their problems only came in later.
To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character flaws. The presence of these imperfections, however, does not necessarily warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the time of the marriage that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:[35]
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations. Mere “difficulty,” “refusal” or
“neglect” in the performance of marital obligations or “ill
will” on the part of the spouse is different from
“incapacity” rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be
due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by
said rule.
b.
Dr.
Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.[36] For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who “believes that the world revolves around him”; and who “used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.” Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea of “love”; made a generalization that respondent was a person who “lacked commitment, faithfulness, and remorse,” and who engaged “in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a fool”; and finally concluded that the respondent’s character traits reveal “him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable.”
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered “Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable” – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag’s subsequent testimony in court cured whatever deficiencies attended her psychological report.
We do not share this view.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition was grave and incurable. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY.
RICHARD TABAGO:
Q: I
would like to call your attention to the Report already marked as Exh.
“E-7”, there is a statement to the effect that his character traits
begin to suffer narcissistic personality disorder with traces of antisocial
personality disorder. What do you mean? Can you please explain in
layman’s word, Madam Witness?
DR.
NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:
A: Actually,
in a layman’s term, narcissistic personality disorder cannot accept that
there is something wrong with his own behavioral manifestation. [sic] They feel that they can rule the
world; they are eccentric; they are exemplary, demanding financial and
emotional support, and this is clearly manifested by the fact that respondent
abused and used petitioner’s love. Along the line, a narcissistic person
cannot give empathy; cannot give love simply because they love themselves more
than anybody else; and thirdly, narcissistic person cannot support his own personal
need and gratification without the help of others and this is where the
petitioner set in.
Q: Can
you please describe the personal [sic]
disorder?
A: Clinically,
considering that label, the respondent behavioral manifestation under
personality disorder [sic] this is
already considered grave, serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I say this, a kind of
developmental disorder wherein it all started during the early formative years
and brought about by one familiar relationship the way he was reared and cared
by the family. Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of the child
disorder. [sic]
Q: You
mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the present?
A: Actually,
the respondent behavioral manner was [present] long before he entered marriage.
[Un]fortunately, on the part of the petitioner, she never realized that such
behavioral manifestation of the respondent connotes pathology. [sic]
x x x x
Q: So in
the representation of the petitioner that the respondent is now lying [sic] with somebody else, how will you
describe the character of this respondent who is living with somebody else?
A: This
is where the antisocial personality trait of the respondent [sic] because an antisocial person is one
who indulge in philandering activities, who do not have any feeling of guilt at
the expense of another person, and this [is] again a buy-product of deep seated
psychological incapacity.
Q: And
this psychological incapacity based on this particular deep seated [sic], how would you describe the
psychological incapacity? [sic]
A:
As I
said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I would say incurable in
nature and at this time and again [sic]
the psychological pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor of not
being able to give meaning to a relationship in terms of sincerity and
endurance.
Q: And
if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage of the respondent and
the petitioner, Madam Witness?
A: Clinically,
any disorder are usually rooted from the early formative years and so if it
takes enough that such psychological incapacity of respondent already existed
long before he entered marriage, because if you analyze how he was reared by
her parents particularly by the mother, there is already an unhealthy symbiosis
developed between the two, and this creates a major emotional havoc when he
reached adult age.
Q: How
about the gravity?
A: This
is already grave simply because from the very start respondent never had an
inkling that his behavioral manifestation connotes pathology and second ground
[sic], respondent will never admit
again that such behavior of his connotes again pathology simply because the
disorder of the respondent is not detrimental to himself but, more often than
not, it is detrimental to other party involved.
x x x x
PROSECUTOR
MELVIN TIONGSON:
Q: You
were not able to personally examine the respondent here?
DR.
NEDY TAYAG:
A: Efforts
were made by the psychologist but unfortunately, the respondent never appeared
at my clinic.
Q: On
the basis of those examinations conducted with the petitioning wife to annul
their marriage with her husband in general, what can you say about the
respondent?
A: That
from the very start respondent has no emotional intent to give meaning to their
relationship. If you analyze their marital relationship they never lived under
one room. From the very start of the [marriage], the respondent to have
petitioner to engage in secret marriage until that time their family knew of
their marriage [sic]. Respondent completely refused,
completely relinquished his marital obligation to the petitioner.
x x x x
COURT:
Q: Because
you have interviewed or you have questioned the petitioner, can you really
enumerate the specific traits of the respondent?
DR.
NEDY TAYAG:
A: One
is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and the dependent attitude of
the respondent.
Q: Even
if he is already eligible for employment?
A:
He
remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-go-lucky simply because
he never had a set of responsibility. I think that he finished his education
but he never had a stable job because he completely relied on the support of
his mother.
Q: You
give a more thorough interview so I am asking you something specific?
A: The
happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude on the part of the
mother merely because respondent happened to be the only son. I said that there
is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship [sic]
developed between the son and the mother simply because the mother always
pampered completely, pampered to the point that respondent failed to develop
his own sense of assertion or responsibility particularly during that stage and
there is also presence of the
simple lying act particularly his responsibility in terms of handling emotional imbalance and it is clearly
manifested by the fact that respondent refused to build a home together with
the petitioner when in fact they are legally married. Thirdly, respondent never
felt or completely ignored the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty
hurting the petitioner because on the part of the petitioner, knowing that
respondent indulge with another woman it is very, very traumatic on her part
yet respondent never had the guts to feel guilty or to atone said act he
committed in their relationship, and clinically this falls under antisocial
personality. [37]
In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very vague and inconclusive, thus:
x x x x
ATTY.
RICHARD TABAGO
Q: Can
this personally be cured, madam witness?
DR.
NEDY TAYAG
A: Clinically,
if persons suffering from personality disorder curable, up to this very moment,
no scientific could be upheld to alleviate their kind of personality disorder;
Secondly, again respondent or other person suffering from any kind of disorder
particularly narcissistic personality will never admit that they are suffering
from this kind of disorder, and then again curability
will always be a question. [sic][38]
This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder, she did not really show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited these traits. She mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence requires for the nullity of a marriage – namely, gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the marriage, psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own limited way, related these to the medical condition she generally described. The testimony, together with her report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. As the doctor admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such declaration.[39] If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit.[40] No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not because of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses likewise never appeared to have been factored in. Not a few married couples have likewise permanently separated simply because they have “fallen out of love,” or have outgrown the attraction that drew them together in their younger years.
Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure a remand of this case to the trial courts for the introduction of additional evidence; the petitioner’s evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to support the conclusion that the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent should be nullified on the ground of the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament. The respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital obligations, particularly the obligation to live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to comply with his marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.[41]
WHEREFORE, in view of these
considerations, we DENY the petition
and AFFIRM the decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated
Acting Chairperson of the Second Division effective
** Designated
additional Member of the Second Division effective
***
Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective
****
Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, and concurred in by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine (both retired); rollo, pp. 26-34.
[3]
[4] Penned by Hon. Gil L. Valdez, Presiding Judge, Branch 29, RTC, Boyombong, Nueva Vizcaya; records, pp. 1-4.
[5] Sheriff’s Return, id., p. 9.
[6]
[7] Resolution of
[8]
[9]
[10]
TSN,
[11]
[12]
TSN,
[13] Records, p. 46.
[14]
[15]
[16]
TSN,
[17] Records, pp. 51-53.
[18] Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[19]
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
[20] Annex “A”; id., pp. 26-29.
[21] Annex “A-1”; id., pp. 33-34.
[22]
G.R. No. 108763,
[23] Rollo, pp. 104-124.
[24] The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
[25] See Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
141530,
[26]
G.R. No. 149508,
[27] G.R.
No. 155800,
[28] G.R.
No. 167523,
[29] G.R.
No. 167245,
[30] G.R.
No. 112019,
[31]
Paras v. Paras, G.R. No. 147824,
[32] Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294,
[33] G.R.
No. 166562,
[34] Supra note 33.
[35] Supra note 29.
[36]
See So v.
[37]
TSN,
[38]
TSN,
[39]
See Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490,
[40] See Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No.
168328,
[41]
Supra
note 34.