Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
ANTONIO NAVARRO, G.R. No. 165697
Petitioner,
-
versus –
METROPOLITAN BANK
& TRUST COMPANY,
Respondent,
x ---------------------------------------------x
CLARITA P. NAVARRO, G.R. No. 166481
Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
-
versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,
JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
METROPOLITAN BANK
& TRUST COMPANY, Promulgated:
Respondent.
August 4, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA,
J.:
The tendency of the law must always be to narrow down the field of uncertainty. Judicial process was conceived in this light to bring about a just termination of legal disputes. Although various mechanisms are in place to realize this fundamental objective, all of them emanate from the essential precept of immutability of final judgments.
These two petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 separately filed by petitioners Antonio
Navarro and Clarita Navarro, respectively docketed as G.R. No. 165697[1]
and G.R. No. 166481,[2] assail the July 8, 2004 Decision[3]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76872 which ordered the dismissal of the
complaint filed by petitioner Clarita Navarro in Civil Case No. 02-079 -- a
case for declaration of nullity of title and for reconveyance and damages.
Petitioners Antonio Navarro and Clarita Navarro were
married on December 7, 1968.[4] During their union, they acquired three
parcels of land in Alabang,
Clarita brought before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 an action for the declaration of nullity of the
real estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale.
The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-177, named as defendants Antonio,
MBTC, the Sheriff of Makati City and the Register of Deeds of Makati City. In it, Clarita alleged that the properties
involved belonged to her and Antonio’s conjugal partnership property as the
same were acquired during their marriage and that Antonio, with the connivance
of a certain Belen G. Belen, had secured the registration thereof in their
names without her knowledge. She pointed
out that Antonio and Belen then mortgaged the properties to MBTC in 1993
likewise without her knowledge. She
ascribed fault and negligence to MBTC because it failed to consider that the
properties given to it as security belonged to her and Antonio’s conjugal
partnership property. Accordingly, she
prayed for reconveyance as well as for payment of damages.[8]
MBTC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground,
inter alia, of laches. With the
denial of its motion, MBTC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 55780. The Court of Appeals found
merit in the petition and ordered the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the same was already barred by laches, pointing out that it had taken
Clarita 11 long years since the issuance of the TCTs on May 27, 1988 before she
actually sought to annul the mortgage contract.[9] The decision had attained finality without a
motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken therefrom.
Subsequently, on April 17, 2002, Clarita instituted another
action also before the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256[10]
but this time for the declaration of nullity of the TCTs covering the same
properties and for reconveyance and damages. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No.
02-079 and it impleaded Antonio, Belen, MBTC and the Registers of Deeds of
Makati City and
The said complaint was basically a
reiteration of Clarita’s allegations in Civil Case No. 99-177. Specifically, it alleged that the conjugal
properties involved were fraudulently registered in the name “Antonio N.
Navarro…married to Belen B. Navarro” and that the mortgage on the properties were
likewise fraudulently secured by Antonio and Belen to acquire a loan from MBTC
the proceeds of which, however, did not inure to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. Accordingly, she prayed
that at least her one-half conjugal share in the properties be reconveyed to
her without prejudice to MBTC’s rights against Antonio and Belen.[11]
MBTC moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it
was already barred by the prior judgment in Civil Case No. 99-177, and that Clarita’s
claim had already been waived, abandoned and extinguished.[12] The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in
its November 8, 2002 Order, noting that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177
did not constitute res judicata because
a dismissal on laches and failure to implead an indispensable party could never
be a dismissal on the merits.[13] MBTC filed a motion for reconsideration, but
it was denied for lack of merit in the trial court’s April 21, 2002 Order.[14]
Aggrieved, MBTC elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with an application for temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction, attributing grave abuse of discretion to the trial
court in denying its motion to dismiss.[15]
In the meantime, a compromise agreement was executed by Antonio
and Clarita in which the latter waived and condoned her claims against the former,
who in turn acknowledged his wife’s share in the properties subject of the
case. Antonio likewise stipulated therein that he had not availed of any
mortgage loan from MBTC and that it was the bank manager, Danilo Meneses, who
facilitated the manipulation of his account with the bank which led to the constitution
of the mortgage and the eventual foreclosure thereof.[16] The trial court approved the compromise on
November 5, 2003,[17]
thereby leaving the case to proceed against MBTC.
On July 8,
2004, the Court of Appeals, finding merit in MBTC’s petition, rendered the
assailed Decision.[18]
It held that the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 99-177 on the ground of laches should preclude the filing of Civil Case No.
02-079 because the former had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. Also, it pointed out that inasmuch as the two
cases presented identical issues and causes of action and prayed for the same relief,
the second complaint must likewise suffer the effect of laches. Citing Section 3,[19]
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, it emphasized Clarita’s neglect to prosecute her
claim since it took her another two years since the dismissal of Civil Case No.
99-177 to file Civil Case No. 02-079. In
conclusion, it held that the trial court indeed gravely abused its discretion
when it denied MBTC’s motion to dismiss and, accordingly, it ordered the
dismissal of the complaint as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order dated
November 8, 2002 issued by the Regional trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
256 is REVERSED. Civil Case No. 02-079 is ordered DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED.[20]
Antonio and Clarita are now before
this Court assailing the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals. They believe that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in directing the dismissal of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 02-079.
Both Antonio and Clarita advance that
it was error for the Court of Appeals to direct the dismissal of the complaint
in the present cases despite the fact that the prior dismissal of the complaint
for declaration of nullity of mortgage and foreclosure in Civil Case No. 99-177
was predicated on Clarita’s failure to implead Belen as an indispensable party therein
which, in effect, amounted to the court’s lack or jurisdiction to act on the
parties present and absent.[21] Additionally, Clarita posits that the
principle of laches is not applicable because an action to declare the nullity
of a mortgage contract is imprescriptible.[22]
MBTC, for its part, argues that
because the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780 ordering
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177 had already become final, then the same
should bar the filing of Civil Case No. 02-079 inasmuch as the two cases raised
identical causes of action and issues and prayed for the same relief.[23] In particular, it also notes that Clarita had
failed to timely file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision and
that the motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio himself should not be
considered to redound to Clarita’s benefit since Antonio, in the complaint
filed before the trial court, was impleaded as one of the defendants.[24]
The petitions are utterly unmeritorious.
A perusal of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 55780, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177, tells that the
complaint therein was dismissed not on the ground of non-joinder of Belen as an
indispensable party, but rather on the ground of laches. Indeed, what is clear from the said decision
is that the dismissal of the case was due to Clarita’s unjustifiable neglect to
timely initiate the prosecution of her claim in court -- a conduct that
warranted the presumption that she, although entitled to assert a right, had
resolved to abandon or declined to assert the same.[25]
While the Court agrees that an action to declare the
nullity of contracts is not barred by the statute of limitations, the fact that
Clarita was barred by laches from bringing such action at the first instance
has already been settled by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780. At this point in the proceedings, the Court
can no longer rule on the applicability of the principle of laches vis-à-vis the imprescriptibility of
Clarita’s cause of action because the said decision is not the one on appeal
before us. But more importantly, the
Court takes notice that the decision rendered in that case had already become final
without any motion for reconsideration being filed or an appeal being taken
therefrom. Thus, we are left with no
other recourse than to uphold the immutability of the said decision.
No other procedural law principle is indeed more settled
than that once a judgment becomes final, it is no longer subject to change, revision,
amendment or reversal, except only for correction of clerical errors, or the
making of nunc pro tunc entries which
cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment itself is void.[26]
The underlying
reason for the rule is two-fold: (1) to avoid delay in the administration of
justice and thus make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and (2) to
put judicial controversies to an end, at the risk of occasional errors, inasmuch
as controversies cannot be allowed to drag on indefinitely and the rights and
obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time.[27] As the Court declared in Yau v. Silverio,[28]
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere,
and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice
that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict. Courts must therefore guard against
any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to
put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong
them.
Indeed, just as a losing party has
the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party
also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his
case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment. Any attempt to thwart
this rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savor the fruit
of his victory must immediately be struck down.[29] Thus, in Heirs of Wenceslao Samper v.
Reciproco-Noble,[30] we had occasion to emphasize the significance of this rule, to wit:
It is an important fundamental
principle in our Judicial system that every litigation must come to an end x x
x Access to the courts is guaranteed.
But there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been
adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be
granted an unbridled license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should
not be harassed by
subsequent suits. For,
if endless litigations were to be encouraged,
then unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number
to the detriment of the
administration of justice.
Moreover, laches, or what is known as
the doctrine of stale claim or demand, is the neglect or omission to assert a
right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing
prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a right
which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some
change in the condition of the property involved or in the relations of the
parties.[31] It is based on public policy which, for the
peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which
otherwise could be a valid claim.[32]
As a ground for the dismissal of a complaint, the doctrine
of laches is embraced in the broad provision in Section 1[33]
of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which enumerates the various grounds on which
a motion to dismiss may be based.
Paragraph (h) thereof states that the fact that the claim or demand set
forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished, may be raised in a motion to dismiss. The language of the rule, particularly on the
relation of the words “abandoned” and “otherwise extinguished” to the phrase
“claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading” is broad enough to
include within its ambit the defense of bar by laches.[34]
Moreover, what is striking is that a reading of the two
complaints filed by Clarita one after the dismissal of the other discloses that
apart from the nature of the actions, the allegations in support of the claims
and the reliefs prayed for in both complaints were but the same. In her complaint in Civil Case No. 99-177,
denominated as an action for “declaration of nullity of mortgage and
foreclosure and sale of real property and reconveyance with damages,” Clarita
principally demanded the reconveyance of at least her conjugal share in the subject
property, while claiming that the registration of the properties as well as the
mortgage thereof in favor of MBTC had been made without her knowledge and
consent.[35] Yet in the complaint in Civil Case No. 02-079,
denominated as one for “declaration of nullity of TCT Nos. 155256, 155257,
155258 and for reconveyance with damages,” Clarita relied on the same
allegations embodied in her first complaint and prayed for the same relief of
reconveyance of at least her conjugal share in the property, while additionally
seeking the declaration of nullity of the TCTs registered in the name of
Antonio and Belen.[36]
Verily, we find no reason not to adhere to the finding of
the Court of Appeals that inasmuch as the two cases successively instituted by
Clarita were founded on the same claim and would have called for the same set
of or similar evidence to support them, then Civil Case No. 02-079 which is the
subject of the present petitions may well be deemed already barred by the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177.
Section 5 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court materially
provides:
Section 5. Effect
of dismissal.—Subject to the
right of appeal, an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f),
(h) and (i) of Section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same action or
claim.
In United Coconut
Planters Bank v. Belus[37] and
Strongworld Construction Corporation v. Perello,[38] the Court held that where the complaint
is dismissed on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior
judgment or by the statute of limitations; or that the claim or demand set
forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished; or that the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds, such dismissal
operates as one with prejudice and which therefore precludes the filing of
another action based on the same claim.
Hence, according to Madrigal v.
Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation,[39]
such dismissal already constitutes res
judicata.
The principle of res
judicata denotes that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in their former
suit.[40]
It obtains where a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered a final
judgment or order on the merits of the case, which operates as an absolute bar
against a subsequent action for the same cause.[41] A substantial identity is necessary to
warrant the application of the rule, and the addition or elimination of some parties
or the difference in form and nature of the two actions would not alter the
situation.[42] In
other words, when material facts or questions in issue in a former action were
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions
constitute res judicata and may not
be again litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their
privies regardless of the form of the latter.[43]
Petitioners furthermore raise that the constitution of the mortgage
was the result of the fraudulent act committed by MBTC’s branch manager and
Belen, and for that reason the proceeds derived from it did not redound to the
benefit of their conjugal partnership.[44] But because this issue is factual in nature
and hence, not appropriately cognizable in a Rule 45 petition where only
questions of law may generally be raised, the Court is left with no other
option than to decline to rule on the same.
Anent the question raised by MBTC of whether Clarita had timely filed a
motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, we
find no necessity to expound on the matter since in view of the foregoing, the
petitions at bar must be denied in any event.
As a final word, it needs no elucidation that the solemn
and deliberate sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, should
be regarded as a final and conclusive determination of the question litigated,
and should forever set the controversy at rest.
Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some
definite time fixed by law. For, after
all, the very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies. [45]
All told, we find this basic rule decisive of the present
controversy.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R.
Nos. 165697 and 166481 are DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 76872, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-079, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Third
Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 165697), pp. 11-25.
[2] Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 13-34.
[3] Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., with Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring; rollo (G.R. No. 165697), pp. 31-31-35; rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 38-42.
[4] Records, p. 8.
[5] Id. at 9-17.
[6] Records, pp. 124-125.
[7] Id. at 108-110.
[8] Records, pp. 136-140.
[9] See the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 55780, CA rollo, pp. 38-39.
[10] Presided by Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
[11] Records, pp. 1-6.
[12] Id. at 59.
[13] Id. at 213.
[14] Records, p. 90.
[15] CA rollo, pp. 2-27.
[16] Records, pp. 497-499.
[17] Id. at 500-501.
[18] CA rollo, pp. 140-144.
[19] Section 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff.—If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or nay order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.
[20] CA rollo, p. 538.
[21] Rollo, (G.R. No. 165697), p. 17; Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 19-20.
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 19-20.
[23] Rollo (G.R. No. 165697).
[24] Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. 179-184.
[25] See Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil 19, 33-34 (1997).
[26] Yau v. Silverio, Sr., G.R. No. 158848,
February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 520.
[27] Social Security System v. Isip, G.R. No. 165417, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 310.
[28] Supra
note 26, at 531, citing Lim v. Jabalde, G.R. No. 36786, April
17, 1989, 172 SCRA 211 (1983).
[29] Yau v. Silverio, Sr., supra note 26, at 531, citing Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation v. Oriental Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 140613. October 15, 2002.
[30] G.R. No. 142594 June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 515, citing Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, 200 Phil. 516 (1982).
[31] De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, G.R. No. 144103, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 506, 518.
[32] Id.
[33] Section 1. Grounds.—Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:
(a) That the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the defending party;
(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
(c) That the venue is improperly laid;
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue;
(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations;
(g) That the pleading asserting a claim states no cause of action;
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds; and
(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has been complied with.
[34] Pineda v. Heirs of Guevarra,
[35] See the Complaint in Civil Case No. 99-177, records, pp. 136-141.
[36] See the Complaint in Civil Case No. 02-078, id. at 1-6.
[37] G.R. No. 159912, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 567, 602.
[38] G.R. No. 148026, July 27, 2006, 496 SCRA 700, 716.
[39] G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 138
[40] Taganas v. Emuslan, G.R. No. 146980, September 2, 2003, 410 SCRA 237.
[41] State Investment Trust Inc. v. Delta Motors Corporation, G.R. No. 144444, April 3, 2003, 400 SCRA 509; Dela Rama v. Mendiola, G.R. No. 135394, April 29, 2003401 SCRA 704.
[42] Dela Rama v. Mendiola, supra note 41.
[43] Id.
[44] Rollo (G.R. No. 165697), pp. 378-380; Rollo (G.R. No. 166481), pp. pp. 21-25.
[45] Mata v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 525(1999), citing Legarda v. Savellano, 158 SCRA 194 (1988).