EN
BANC
|
FRANCIS
F. YENKO, as Administrator & MAYOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, both of the Petitioners,
- versus - RAUL NESTOR C. GUNGON, Respondent. x
---------------------------------------------x RAUL NESTOR C. GUNGON, Petitioner,
- versus - FRANCIS
F. YENKO, as Administrator,
& MAYOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA, both of the Respondents. |
G.R. No. 165450 G.R. No. 165452 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING,* YNARES-SANTIAGO,* CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN,**
ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: August 13, 2009 |
x - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
PERALTA, J.:
These
are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari,
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Amended Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51093 dated September 28, 2004,
reinstating Raul Nestor C. Gungon to his former position as Local Assessment
Operations Officer III in the Assessor’s Office of the Municipal Government of
San Juan, Metro Manila, without loss of seniority rights, at the discretion of
the appointing authority and subject to Civil Service law, rules and
regulations; and ordering the payment to Gungon of back salaries equivalent to
five years from the date he was dropped from the rolls.
The facts are as follows:
On
On
On
In a letter[4]
dated
On
On
On
In a letter
dated
Dear Sir:
This is in response to your memorandum of
x x x x
The transfer/reassignment is arbitrary, malicious,
patently illegal, and palpably constitutes a violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) x x x.
You know very well that there is no factual nor legal basis to transfer
and assign me from the assessor’s office, where I work as assessor, to the POSO
where I will be working as a security guard in the guise of “exigency of
service” which, no matter how one looks at it, is false and beyond
comprehension. In fact, your memorandum
is silent as to why I am purposely selected to work as security guard amidst
the pendency of more important assessor’s work I was doing and am still to
perform being the number three man in the assessor’s office, and availability
of others subordinate to me who are more qualified to perform a police work,
thus, establishing that the only purpose is to cause injury to me.
Your charge that I have not reported for work is
equally untrue. I have been reporting to
the assessor’s office from
There is no
contumacy on my part not to report because, by your memorandum and implemented
by the POSO head, I had been given an assignment impossible to perform,
dangerous to undertake, and beyond my personal competence to discharge.[8]
In a Memorandum[9] dated
Gungon appealed the Memoranda dated
The CSC dismissed Gungon’s appeal in CSC Resolution No. 982525 dated
WHEREFORE, the Appeal of Raul Nestor C. Gungon is
hereby dismissed. Accordingly, the
decision of Mayor Jinggoy Estrada,
The CSC held that
even if Gungon suffered a reduction in rank when he was reassigned from the
Office of the Municipal Assessor to the POSO, it was improper for him to defy
the reassignment order. It cited its ruling in CSC Resolution No. 95-0114 dated
A reassignment order is generally implemented
immediately even if the employee does not agree with it. x x x The rule is a reassigned employee who does not agree with the
order must nevertheless comply until its implementation is restrained or it is declared to be not in the interest of
service or have been issued with grave abuse of discretion.[12]
The CSC held that
Gungon’s failure to report for work for more than 30 days was violative of CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993, as amended, which provides that
“[a]n officer or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave
(AWOL) for at least thirty (30) calendar days shall be separated from the
service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice.”
Gungon’s motion for
reconsideration was denied in CSC Resolution No. 990194[13] dated
Gungon filed a petition for review of the CSC’s Resolutions with the Court
of Appeals. He alleged that the CSC
erred (1) in not nullifying the reassignment order and order of separation from the service notwithstanding its finding that as a result
thereof, he suffered a reduction in rank; (2) in holding that his failure and
refusal to comply with the reassignment order was justified; and (3) in holding
that for his failure and refusal to report for duty at the disputed job he was
deemed to have incurred continuous absences.[14]
Gungon also raised the following issues:
1)
Whether or not a
transfer of a Career Civil Service Employee amounting to a reduction in rank,
thus violative of the Civil Service Law, is valid and enforceable;
2)
Whether or not a
transfer to a new position which entails a job that is completely and entirely
different from the previous assignment is valid and enforceable;
3)
Whether or not a
refusal or failure to comply with a transfer which amounts to a reduction in
rank and/or involving a work completely and entirely
different from the previous designation constitutes a ground for dismissal or
dropping from the rolls.[15]
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Civil
Service Commission Resolution Nos. 982525 and 990194 are hereby SET ASIDE and
payment of petitioner’s back salaries from
The Court of Appeals held that Gungon, who
occupied the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer III under a
permanent appointment, enjoyed security of tenure, which is guaranteed by the
Constitution and Civil Service Law. His reassignment from Local Assessment Operations
Officer III to security guard involved a reduction in
rank and status, which is proscribed under Section 10, Rule 7 of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order
No. 292 (Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations).[17] Hence, his reassignment, which was directed by
Municipal Administrator Yenko in the Memorandum dated
However, the Court of
Appeals, pursuant to Section 35 of Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules
and Regulations,[19]
as amended, did not grant Gungon’s plea for reinstatement on the ground that Gungon
applied for terminal leave on P151,514.39 on
The Court of Appeals held that having voluntarily opted to sever his
employment by applying for terminal leave and having accepted his terminal leave
benefits, Gungon should only be awarded back salaries from the date of his
dismissal until the date he applied for terminal leave, which was from
The parties filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Gungon contended:
1.
The receipt by the
dismissed employee of his terminal leave pay is not fatal to his appeal for
reinstatement;
2.
Sec. 35 of the
Amended Rule XVI (Leave of Absence) of the Omnibus Rules finds no application
in the case x x x since Sec. 35 of the Amended Rule XVI was an amendment made
only on December 14, 1998, published in the Manila Times on December 30, 1998,
and took effect only on January 15,
1999;
3.
The applicable
Omnibus Rule in fact is the original or un-amended Sec. 6 of Rule XVI (Leave of
Absence) which was in force and effect at the time petitioner applied for terminal leave on [October] 13,
1998;
4.
The petitioner is
entitled to reinstatement with back salaries to a maximum of five (5) years in
view of the Honorable Court’s Decision in setting aside the Memoranda of Municipal
Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada, and the CSC Resolutions.[20]
On the other hand, Municipal Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada contended
that the conclusion and the order of payment of Gungon’s back salaries be
reconsidered based on the following grounds:
1.
Petitioner Gungon was
away on leave from
2.
There was a
prohibition to transfer any employee from one office to another effective
3.
The Memorandum of
respondent Municipal Administrator Yenko did not assign petitioner Gungon to
work as security guard.[21]
In an Amended Decision dated
WHEREFORE, the decision dated
Citing Dytiapco
v. Civil Service Commission,[23] the Court of Appeals held that Gungon’s
application for terminal leave and his subsequent acceptance of terminal leave
benefits could not be construed as an abandonment of his claim for
reinstatement or indicative of his intent to voluntarily sever his employment
with the government considering that
Gungon had appealed his case to the CSC and had a pending motion for
reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 982525 before he received his terminal leave
benefits. Gungon’s appeal to the CSC and
then to the Court of Appeals strongly indicated his desire to be reinstated, not
separated from the government service.
The
Court of Appeals stated that Section 35 of the amended Rule XVI[24]
of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, which was its basis for
denying Gungon’s reinstatement, does not apply to this case, because the
amended Rule took effect on January 15, 1999, after Gungon had applied for
terminal leave on October 13, 1998 and had received his terminal leave benefits
on November 10, 1998. The appellate
court held that the applicable rule is Sec. 6 of the original Rule XVI, which
was the prevailing rule when Gungon received his terminal leave benefits.
Section
6 of the original Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations gives
two options to a person whose leave
credits have been commuted following his separation from the service, but who
is thereafter reappointed in the
government service before the expiration of the leave commuted. These options are:
(a)
Refund
the money value of the unexpired portion of the leave commuted; or
(b)
May
not refund the money value of the unexpired portion of the leave commuted, but
insofar as his leave credits is concerned, he shall start from zero balance.
The
Court of Appeals noted that the original provision in Section 6 of Rule XVI of
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations was substantially carried in
Section 26 of the amended Rule XVI, except that the first option to refund the money value of the unexpired
portion of the leave commuted was no longer included. Hence, the Court of Appeals held that Gungon may start from zero balance of his leave upon
reemployment in the government service.
As regards the
motion for reconsideration filed by Municipal Administrator Yenko and Mayor
Estrada, the Court of Appeals found no reason to change the position it had
taken on the said issues since no new matters were raised.
Both parties
filed a petition for review on certiorari
of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals. The petition of Municipal Administrator Yenko
and Mayor Estrada was docketed as G.R. No. 165450, while that of Gungon was
docketed as G.R. No. 165452. The Court
resolved to consolidate both cases in a Resolution[25]
dated
Municipal
Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada raised the following issues:
1.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in ordering the reinstatement of Gungon to his former position as Local
Assessment Operations Officer III without loss of seniority rights despite the
fact that Gungon subsequently opted to sever his employment by applying for
terminal leave and receiving the equivalent payments thereon.
2.
Whether
or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the payment to Gungon of five
years back salaries from the date he was dropped from the rolls on March [1],
1998 despite the undisputed fact that Gungon did not render any service to the
Municipal Government of San Juan from the time he was reassigned to POSO up to
the time he opted to voluntarily sever his employment when he applied for
terminal leave.[26]
Gungon raised
these issues:
1)
Whether
or not the appellate court was correct in declaring the reassignment of petitioner and the dropping
of petitioner from the rolls as void ab
initio and in setting aside the questioned CSC Resolutions;
2)
Whether
or not the petitioner, who was illegally dismissed, has the vested right to his
former position; hence, the right to be reinstated;
3)
Whether or not the reinstatement of a career
government employee who was illegally dismissed, through no delinquency or
misconduct, is discretionary upon the
appointing authority as ordered in the decretal portion of the Amended Decision
of the Court of Appeals.
4)
Whether or not the Supreme Court, based on the
realities of the time and situation, may now change its principle adopted in
the “Mercury Drug Rule” in fixing the amount of back wages at a reasonable
level without qualification and deduction.[27]
As regards the first issue raised by
petitioner Gungon in G.R. No. 165452, the Court agrees with the decision of the
Court of Appeals that the reassignment of Gungon from the Municipal Assessor’s
Office, where his primary function was that of land appraiser, to the POSO,
where he was required to work as a
security guard/duty agent, was void ab initio because it clearly involved a reduction in
rank and status. The CSC affirmed the reduction in rank;
petitioners Municipal Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada did not
dispute it. Such reassignment is expressly prohibited by Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, under Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter
5, Sec. 26 (7), thus:
(7) Reassignment.—An
employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same
agency; Provided, That such
reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salaries.[28]
The above provision is reflected in Section 10, Rule VII of the Omnibus
Civil Service Rules and Regulations:
Sec.
10. A reassignment is the movement of
an employee from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does
not involve a reduction in rank, status or salaries and does not
require the issuance of an appointment.[29]
Reassignments involving
a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employee’s security of tenure,
which is assured by the Constitution, the
Administrative Code of 1987, and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations.[30] Security of tenure covers not only employees
removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and
reassignments, which are tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.[31]
Since Gungon’s reassignment order was void
ab initio, his alleged failure to
report for duty at the POSO, where he was reassigned, had no legal basis.
Gungon could not have incurred absences in
the POSO, because his reassignment was
void. Thus, the cause of his separation from the
service, which was unauthorized absences from the post where he was reassigned,
was not a valid cause for dismissing him from the service. It is undisputed that Gungon reported at the Municipal
Assessor’s Office after his leave of absence, instead of the POSO. Under the
circumstances, Gungon is considered to have been illegally dismissed from the
service and entitled to reinstatement.
Gungon contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in subjecting his reinstatement to the
discretion of the Municipal Government of San Juan.
The contention
is meritorious.
The Court of
Appeals misconstrued CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, series of 1994 when it
cited the Circular as the basis for holding Gungon’s reappointment as “subject
to the discretion of the appointing authority and Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations.”
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of
1994 has for its subject Amendment No. 1 to the Omnibus Guideline on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38,
Series of 1993 (Dropped from the Rolls).
The pertinent portion of the Memorandum provides:
In order to
promote efficient and effective personnel administration in government and to
obviate any prejudice to the service, the Civil Service Commission pursuant to
Resolution No. 94-1464 dated March 10, 1994 hereby promulgates the following procedure
to be followed in separating from the service officials and employees who are
either habitually absent or have unsatisfactory or poor performance or have
shown physical and mental unfitness to perform their duties.
Accordingly, Item
2 of Section VI of the Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and other Personnel
Actions (MC No. 38, s. 1993- Dropped from the Rolls), now reads as follows:
2. Dropped from the Rolls
2.1 . Absence without Approved Leave
a. An officer or employee who is continuously
absent without approved leave (AWOL) for at least thirty (30) calendar days
shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior
notice. He shall however be informed of
his separation from the service not later than five (5) days from its
effectivity which shall be sent to the address appearing on his 201 files; and
b.
If
the number of unauthorized absences incurred is less than thirty (30) calendar
days, written return to work order shall be served on the official or employee
at his last known address on record.
Failure on his part to report for work within the period stated in the
order shall be a valid ground to drop him from the rolls.
2.2 . Unsatisfactory
or Poor Performance
x x x x
2.3.
Physical and Mental Unfitness
x x x x
2.4.
The
officer or employee who is separated from the service through any of the above
modes has the right to appeal his case to the CSC or its Regional Office within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of such order or notice of separation;
2.5.
The
order of separation is immediately executory pending appeal, unless the
Commission on meritorious grounds, directs otherwise;
2.6.
This
mode of separation from the service for unauthorized absences or unsatisfactory
or poor performance or physical and mental incapacity is non-disciplinary in
nature and shall not result in the forfeiture of any benefits on the part of
the official or employee nor in disqualifying him from reemployment in the
government;
2.7.
The
written notice mentioned in the preceding paragraphs may be signed by the
person exercising immediate supervision over the official or employee. However, the notice of separation shall be
signed by the appointing authority or head of office.
This shall likewise be without prejudice to the
reappointment of the official or employee to government at the discretion of
the appointing authority and subject to Civil Service law, rules and
regulations.[32]
To
reiterate, the italicized paragraph above was used by the Court of Appeals as
the basis for subjecting Gungon’s reinstatement to the discretion of the
appointing authority. The basis is
misplaced, because what the provision means is that the separation of an
employee from government service through any of the modes enumerated in the
Memorandum Circular, which includes unauthorized absences, shall be without
prejudice to his reappointment in the government service at the discretion of
the appointing authority and subject to Civil Service law, rules and
regulations. Hence, an employee who is validly dismissed due to unauthorized absences may still be
reappointed in the government service, but the reappointment is at the
discretion of the appointing authority and subject to Civil Service law, rules
and regulations.
In this case,
Gungon was not validly dismissed
from the service. His reassignment to
the POSO, which involved a reduction in rank and status, was void for being
violative of Executive Order No. 292 and the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and
Regulations. Hence, Gungon could not
have incurred absences in the office where he was reassigned since the
reassignment was void. Consequently, his
dismissal for unauthorized absences in the office where he was reassigned was
not valid. Therefore, Memorandum
Circular No. 12, series of 1994, does not apply in the case of Gungon.
In fine, Gungon is entitled to
reinstatement, without qualification, for having been illegally dismissed. A government official or employee reinstated
for having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left his office.[33]
His position does not become vacant and any new appointment made in order to
replace him is null and void ab initio.[34]
As regards the award of
Gungon’s back salaries, it is settled
jurisprudence that an illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled
to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years,[35] and not full back salaries from his illegal
termination up to his reinstatement.
In G.R. No. 165450, petitioners Municipal
Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada contend that an application for
commutation of vacation and sick leaves under Section 6 of the original Rule
XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations is similar to an application for terminal
leave under Section 35 of the amended Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service
Rules and Regulations, because in both provisions the application for the
respective leaves requires prior severance of employment. Thus, petitioners assert that when Gungon applied for terminal leave or commutation of
his leave credits, the application ended his employment with the Municipal Government
of San Juan. The subsequent payment was
merely the result of his severance from employment. Consequently, the municipal
government’s obligation to pay Gungon’s salaries ended. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in ordering
the municipal government to pay Gungon back salaries equivalent to five years.
The arguments of
petitioners Municipal Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada do not persuade.
When Gungon
applied for terminal leave on
Sec. 6. Vacation and sick leave shall be cumulative
and any part thereof which may not be taken within the calendar year in which
earned may be carried over the succeeding years. Whenever
any officer or employee retires, voluntarily resigns or is allowed to
resign or is separated from the service
through no fault of his own, he shall be entitled to the commutation of all the
accumulated vacation and/or sick leave to his credit, provided his leave
benefits are not covered by special law.
The proper head
of Department, local government agency, government-owned or controlled
corporation with original charter and state college and university may, in his
discretion, authorize the commutation of the salary that would be received
during the period of vacation and sick leave of any appointive officer and
employee and direct its payment on or before the beginning of such leave from
the fund out of which the salary would have been paid.
When a person whose leave has been commuted
following his separation from the service is reappointed in the government
before the expiration of the leave commuted, he is given two options, as
follows:
(a)
Refund the money
value of the unexpired portion of the leave commuted; or
(b)
May not refund
the money value of the unexpired portion of the leave commuted, but insofar as
his leave credits is concerned, he shall start from zero balance.[36]
On
Sec.
26. Accumulation
of vacation and sick leave. -- Vacation and sick leave shall be cumulative
and any part thereof which may not be taken within the calendar year may be carried over to the succeeding years. Whenever
any official or employee retires, voluntarily resigns or is allowed to
resign or is separated from the service
through no fault of his own, he shall be entitled to the commutation of all the
accumulated vacation and/or sick leave to his credit, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, without limitation as to the number of days
of vacation and sick leave that he may accumulate provided his leave benefits
are not covered by special law.
When a person
whose leave has been commuted following his separation from the service is
reemployed in the government before the expiration of the leave commuted, he
shall no longer refund the money value
of the unexpired portion of the
said leave. Insofar as his leave credits is concerned, he
shall start from zero balance.
x x x x
Sec. 35. Terminal
leave.—Terminal leave is applied for by an official or an employee who
intends to sever his connection with his employer. Accordingly, the filing of
application for terminal leave requires as a condition sine qua non, the employee’s resignation, retirement or separation
from the service without any fault on his part. It must be shown first that
public employment ceased by any of the said modes of severance.[37]
Section 6 of the original Rule XVI
of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, which is applicable to this case, provides
two options for an employee like Gungon whose leave credits have been commuted
after separation from the service through
no fault of his, and who is subsequently
reinstated. These options are: (1) He
may refund the money value of the unexpired portion of the leave commuted;
or (2) he may not refund the money
value of the unexpired portion of the leave commuted, but insofar as his leave
credits is concerned, he shall start from zero balance. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly held
that Gungon may start from zero balance of his leave upon re-employment in the
government. Notably, the second option of Section 6 of the original
Rule XVI is still contained in Sec. 26 of the amended Rule XVI.
The Court cannot
subscribe to the assertion of Municipal
Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada
that mere application for terminal leave or the commutation of leave credits
ended Gungon’s employment because an
application for terminal leave and receipt of terminal leave benefits are not
legal causes for the separation or dismissal
of an employee from the service. The Constitution explicitly states that “[n]o officer or
employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law.”[38]
At most, an application for terminal leave under
Sec. 35 of the amended Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations shows the intent of an employee to sever his
employment, which intent is clear if he has resigned or retired from the
service. However, such intent may be
disproved in cases of separation from the service without the fault of the
employee, who questions his separation, even if the government agency, pending the employee’s
appeal, grants his application for
terminal leave because it has already dropped him from the rolls. In Dytiapco
v. Civil Service Commission,[39] the Court understood the
predicament of an employee who accepted
terminal leave benefits because of economic necessity rather than the desire to
leave his employment with the government.
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Gungon’s
application for terminal leave and his acceptance of terminal leave benefits
could not be construed as an abandonment of his claim for reinstatement or
indicative of his intent to voluntarily sever his employment with the
government, because Gungon had appealed
his case to the CSC and had a pending motion for reconsideration of CSC
Resolution No. 982525 before he received his terminal leave benefits. Indeed, Gungon’s
appeal against his dismissal to the CSC
and, thereafter, to the Court of Appeals, and his
petition before this Court – all taken within a span of 11 years – show his desire to be reinstated, not separated from the government service. In this connection, the Court of Appeals aptly
stated that it would have been unjust for petitioner, who was dropped from the
rolls not to claim his terminal leave pay considering that it would take some
time for his appeal to be resolved. Gungon had no permanent employment and had to
sustain the needs of his two sons.
Further, Municipal
Administrator Yenko and Mayor Estrada contend that the Court of Appeals erred
in ordering the payment to Gungon of five years back salaries equivalent to
five years from the date he was dropped from the rolls on March 1, 1998 despite
the fact that Gungon did not render any service to the Municipal Government of
San Juan from the time he was reassigned to POSO up to the time he opted to
voluntarily sever his employment when he applied for terminal leave.
The contention is without merit.
It is settled that a government official or
employee who had been illegally dismissed and whose reinstatement was later
ordered is considered as not having left his office, so he is entitled to all
the rights and privileges that should accrue to him by virtue of the office
that he held.[40] Thus, Gungon is entitled to payment of back
salaries equivalent to a maximum period of five years.[41]
Lastly, the Court notes that the
dispositive portion of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals states that
Gungon is “entitled to five (5) years’ back salaries from the date he was
dropped from the rolls on
WHEREFORE,
the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51093 dated
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
|
On Official Leave LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate Justice
|
On Official Leave CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice RENATO C.
CORONA
Associate Justice
|
|
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice |
|
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice
|
ARTURO D.
BRION Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO
C.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* On official leave.
** No part.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto, with
Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo and Lucas P. Bersamin (now both
members of this Court), concurring; rollo
(G.R. No. 165450), pp. 25A-32.
[2] CA rollo, p. 26.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Petition, rollo (G.R. No. 165452), pp. 31-32.
[11] Rollo
(G.R. No. 165450), p. 53.
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
Sec. 10. A reassignment is the movement
of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department
or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salaries and
does not require the issuance of an appointment.
[18] Rollo
(G.R. No. 165450), pp. 39-46.
[19] Sec. 35. Terminal
leave. - Terminal leave is applied for by an official or an employee who
intends to sever his connection with his employer. Accordingly, the filing of
application for terminal leave requires
as a condition sine qua non, the employee's resignation, retirement or
separation from the service without any fault on his part. It must be shown
first that public employment ceased by any of the said modes of severance.
[20] Rollo
(G.R. No. 165450), p. 25-B.
[21]
[22]
[23] G.R.
No. 92136,
[24] As amended by CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 41, series of 1998.
[25] Rollo (G.R. 165450), p. 85.
[26]
[27] Rollo
(G.R. No. 165452), pp. 44-45.
[28] Emphasis supplied.
[29] Emphasis supplied.
[30] See Bentain v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89452,
[31]
[32] Italics supplied.
[33] Gementiza
v. Court of Appeals, G.R Nos. L-41717-33,
[34] Canonizado
v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132,
[35] Adiong
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136480, December 4, 2001, 371 SCRA 373, 381; Marohombsar
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126481, February 18, 2000, 326 SCRA 62, 73-74; San Luis v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 80160, June 26, 1989, 174 SCRA
258, 273; Tan, Jr. v. Office of the
President, G.R. No. 110936, February 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 677; Salcedo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40846,
[36] Emphasis
supplied.
[37] Emphasis
supplied.
[38] The Constitution, Art. IX (B), Sec. 2 (3).
[39] Supra
note 23.
[40] City
Government of
[41] Tan,
Jr. v. Office of the President, supra
note 35.
[42] CA rollo, p. 36.