Republic of the
Supreme Court
THIRD
DIVISION
|
RODRIGO SUMIRAN, Petitioner, |
G.R.
No. 162518 |
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Present: |
|
- versus - |
CARPIO MORALES, J.,*
chico-nazario, Acting Chairperson,** VELASCO, JR., nachura, and PERALTA, JJ. |
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SPOUSES GENEROSO DAMASO
and EVA DAMASO, |
Promulgated: |
|
Respondents. |
August 19, 2009 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
PERALTA, J.:
This
resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22, 2003,
and the Resolution[2]
dated February 20, 2004, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, be
reversed and set aside.
The
antecedent facts are as follows.
Petitioner
filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary
attachment (Civil Case No. 93-2588) against respondents before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused GENEROSO DAMASO is hereby ACQUITTED
in Criminal Case Nos. 92-8157 and 92-8158 on grounds of insufficiency of
evidence.
As
for Civil Case No. 93-2588, in the interest justice and equity, judgment is
hereby rendered against the plaintiff Rodrigo Sumiran and in favor of the
defendants Damaso. The plaintiff is
further ordered to pay to the defendants the following:
a. P50,000.00 as moral damages
b. P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
c. the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On
On June 2, 2003, the RTC issued
an Order denying due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed out
of time, emphasizing that the decision was promulgated on February 21, 2003 in
the presence of both parties and their counsels. Considering counsel for petitioner to have
received a copy of the decision on said date of promulgation, the RTC ruled
that since petitioner had filed a motion for reconsideration on the 13th
day (March 6, 2003), he had belatedly filed the notice of appeal when he filed
it ten (10) days after allegedly receiving the Order of May 9, 2003 on May 19,
2003. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by petitioner on
Petitioner
then filed a petition for certiorari with
the CA. However, the CA found the
petition unmeritorious and dismissed the same in its Decision dated
Hence,
this petition where it is alleged that the CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s
period to appeal had lapsed, as such ruling was premised on misapprehension of
facts and contradicted by evidence on record.
The CA also allegedly failed to state in its decision and resolution the
particular evidence upon which the same was based; and there were supposedly
some facts that, if properly noticed and considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
The
petition deserves some consideration.
As early
as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals[5]
that by virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create
new procedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15
days within which to file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt
of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. This would standardize
the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to
when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the Court stated:
To
recapitulate, a party-litigant may
either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional
Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the
“final order”) denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be
availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes
final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in
Rule 41, Section 3.[6]
The
foregoing ruling of the Court was reiterated in Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes,[7]
to wit:
Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v.
Court of Appeals, promulgated on
x
x x x
With the advent of the "fresh period
rule," parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for
reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days
from the denial of that motion.
The “fresh period rule” is not inconsistent
with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court which states that the
appeal shall be taken “within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or
final order appealed from.” The use of
the disjunctive word “or” signifies disassociation and independence of one
thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense which
it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of
“or” in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed
within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the
“final order,” x x x.
x
x x x
The “fresh period rule” finally eradicates
the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted – from
receipt of notice of judgment or from receipt of notice of “final order”
appealed from.
Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway
v. Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a notice of appeal which
was purportedly filed five days late.
With the fresh period rule, the 15-day period within which to file the
notice of appeal was counted from notice of the denial of the therein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein we applied the principle granting a fresh
period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal, counted from
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,
we held that a party-litigant may now file his notice of appeal either within
fifteen days from receipt of the original decision or within fifteen days from
the receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration.
In De
los
The
retroactivity of the Neypes rule in
cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date of promulgation
of Neypes on
The
determinative issue is whether the “fresh period” rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in
cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to
Sps.
De los Santos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes bears the quested retroactive
effect, to wit:
Procedural
law refers to the adjective law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure
in order that courts may be able to administer justice. Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a
retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues
― they may be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, insomuch as there are
no vested rights in rules of procedure.
The “fresh period rule” is a procedural
law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be
made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower
court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the “fresh
period rule” should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.
Also,
to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the “fresh period rule” will amount
to injustice, if not absurdity, since the subject notice of judgment and final
order were issued two years later or in the year 2000, as compared to the
notice of judgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998.
It will be incongruous and illogical that parties receiving notices of
judgment and final orders issued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the
“fresh period rule” while those later rulings of the lower courts such
as in the instant case, will not.[9]
Since this case was already
pending in this Court at the time of promulgation of Neypes, then, ineluctably, the Court must also apply the foregoing
rulings to the present case. Petitioner
is entitled to a “fresh period” of 15 days − counted from
IN
VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 80267, dated December 22, 2003, and the Resolution dated
February 20, 2004, are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Order of the
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, per Special Order No. 679 dated
** Per Special Order No. 678 dated
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., with Associate Justices Mario L. Guariña III and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 70-74.
[2]
[3] Rollo, pp. 21-28.
[4]
[5] G.R. No. 141524,
[6]
[7] G.R. No. 167403,
[8] G.R. No. 173942,
[9]