SECOND
DIVISION
|
PRUDENCIO M.
REYES, JR., Petitioner, - versus - SIMPLICIO C.
BELISARIO and EMMANUEL S.
MALICDEM,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 154652 Present: *CARPIO, J., **CARPIO MORALES, Acting Chairperson, BRION, ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: August 14, 2009
|
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D
E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
This
petition for review on certiorari[1] challenges
the Court of Appeals (CA) decision of
THE
FACTS
The
factual antecedents, based on the records before us, are summarized below.
On
March 3, 2000, respondents Deputy Administrators Simplicio Belisario, Jr. and
Emmanuel B. Malicdem[6] (respondents),
along with Daniel Landingin and Rodolfo S. De Jesus, all officers of the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint against LWUA Administrator Prudencio M.
Reyes, Jr. (petitioner) for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
On
March 16, 2000, or only 13 days after the filing of the graft charge, the
petitioner issued Office Order No. 69 reassigning
respondents together with De Jesus from the offices they then held to the
Office of the Administrator. Supposedly,
the reassigned officers were to act as a core group of a LWUA Task Force and
their specific assignments were to be given by petitioner; Officers-in-Charge (OICs)
were designated for the offices they vacated.
The
following day,
On
On
On March 30, 2000, the
petitioner, via Office Order No. 99, directed the respondents to “desist in performing and exercising the
functions and activities pertaining to [their] previous positions” and relieved
them of their designations or assignments as 6th Member and interim
Directors of the Water Districts under their responsibility. To implement this latest Office Order, and
in the respondents’ absence, entry was effected into their respective rooms with
the help of police officers; their room locks were replaced with new ones; and
their cabinet drawers were sealed with tapes.[7]
The
CSC responded on
Worthy
of note is the provision of Section 6a of CSC MC No. 40, s. 1998 which provides
that:
a. Reassignment – movement of an employee from
one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does
not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary. If reassignment is without the consent of the
employee being reassigned it shall be allowed only for a maximum period of one
year. Reassignment is presumed to be regular and made in the interest of
public service unless proven otherwise or if it constitutes constructive
dismissal.
On the basis
thereof, although the reassignment is presumed regular and made in the interest
of public service, there is an iota of bad faith attendant to the herein
case evidenced by the fact that the
reassignment was issued barely ten days after the reassigned officials filed a
criminal complaint against the Administrator for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.
Moreover, while the reassigned officials used to head their specific
departments, being Deputy Administrators at that, their reassignment resulted
to a diminution of their respective ranks. To apply the ruling of the Court of Appeals in
the Fernandez case to the herein case, it is clear that there was such a
diminution in rank because the reassignment order “did not state any justifiable reason for the reassignment, has no
specificity as to the time, functions, duties and responsibilities, making it a
floating assignment, and removes from their supervision employees who are part
of their staff and subordinates.” And more importantly,
the recent development wherein the
reassigned officials were directed to desist from performing and exercising the
functions of their respective positions constituted constructive
dismissal x x x.
x
x x (Emphasis supplied.)
On
The
Office of the Ombudsman resolved the administrative case through a decision
dated
The CSC is the central personnel
agency of the government and as such it is the Office tasked with the duty of
rendering opinions and rulings
on
all personnel and other civil service matters which shall be binding on all
heads of departments, offices and agencies. x x x.
Hence,
this Office can hardly arrogate unto itself the task of resolving the said
issue. As stated by the Supreme
Court, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
but at the same time denied weight to
the CSC legal opinion, contending that it was “not a final and categorical ruling”
on the validity of the reassignments. On
this premise, the Ombudsman declared that the reassignments enjoyed the
presumption of regularity and were thus considered valid. For this reason and
for lack of evidence of force or intimidation on the part of the petitioner and
co-defendant OICs in the implementation of the reassignments, the Ombudsman
exonerated the petitioner and his co-defendants and dismissed the administrative
case against them.
Meanwhile,
the CSC en banc rendered Resolution No. 001729[11]
dated
The
petitioner responded by filing a motion for reconsideration of CSC Resolution
No. 001729 and thus avoided the implementation of the respondents’
reinstatement.
In the administrative case before the
Ombudsman, the respondents moved for the reconsideration of the Ombudsman's
attaching
to their motion a copy of CSC Resolution No. 001729. Nevertheless, the Ombudsman denied the
requested reconsideration,[12] stressing
that CSC Resolution No. 001729 was not
yet final in view of the
petitioner’s pending motion for reconsideration. The pertinent part of the
Ombudsman resolution of denial reads:
While
it is true that the CSC en banc thru the aforecited resolution appears to have
affirmed the earlier opinion of Assistant Commissioner ADELINA B. SARMIENTO
that the reassignment of the complainants by respondent REYES is not in order,
the same is not yet final considering the timely filing before the said
Commission of a Motion for Reconsideration by respondent REYES on August 29,
2000 x x x. Certainly, this is not
the final and categorical ruling which this Office had in mind when it issued
the questioned DECISION. (Emphasis supplied.)
The
same order expressed that under Section
7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules, the Ombudsman’s
The CSC en banc denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 001729 through CSC Resolution No.
002348[13]
dated
On
The CA ruled in the respondents’ favor
in its decision of
[The
Ombudsman] was right the first time when it ruled in the assailed Decision that
it can “hardly arrogate unto itself the task of resolving the issue” of whether
the personnel actions ordered by [the petitioner] against [the respondents]
were within the scope of the former's authority. It correctly ruled that the CSC is tasked
with the “duty of rendering opinions and rulings on all personnel and other
civil service matters.” It then ruled
that “unless there is a final and categorical ruling of the CSC that the
reassignment of the complainants by [petitioner] Administrator Reyes is not
valid, the said Order of Reassignment enjoys the presumption of regularity.”
Unfortunately, however, without
pursuing its initial ruling to its logical conclusion, the Ombudsman ultimately
ignored the legal premises presented before it and acted to absolve the
[petitioner and his co-defendants], thereby sustaining the illegal reassignments
of the [complainants], which only the LWUA Board of Trustees as the proper
appointing power was authorized to do pursuant to Section 3.1 of Executive
Order No. 286, s. 1995. (Emphasis supplied.)
The CA likewise declared that the
Ombudsman’s exoneration of the petitioner could not have become final and
unappealable pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules because
it is void for lack of substantial evidentiary basis. Again, to quote the appellate court:
[W]e cannot consider the Decision of the Ombudsman
as valid. Section 27 of Republic Act 6770 otherwise
known as “An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of
the Office of the Ombudsman” provides that findings of fact by the Office of
the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.
However, per our examination
of the evidence on hand, the findings of fact and conclusion by the Office of
the Ombudsman in the questioned Decision are not supported by substantial
evidence, and in fact, have deviated from the correct ruling it earlier
made as to the proper body to determine the validity of the reassignments of
petitioners, which is the Civil Service Commission. Consequently such findings are not binding
and the decision it rendered has not attained finality. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The
appellate court denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution[17] of
The petitioner lodged before this
Court the present petition for review on certiorari[18] on the sole ground that the
Ombudsman's
The Court's Ruling
The Propriety of the Recourse
Taken Before the CA
The threshold issue in
this petition is the procedural question of whether a complainant in an
administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman has the right to appeal
a judgment exonerating the respondent from liability.
By
statute and regulation, a decision of the Ombudsman absolving the respondent of the administrative charge is
final and unappealable. Section 7, Rule
III of the Ombudsman Rules provides:
SECTION
7. Finality of decision. — Where the respondent
is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month,
or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and
unappealable. In all other cases,
the decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from
receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration
or petition for certiorari shall have been filed by him (referring to
the respondent) as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770. (Emphasis and insertion
supplied.)
This rule is based on Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770[19] (RA
No. 6770) or the Ombudsman Act, that in turn states:
SECTION
27. Effectivity and Finality of
Decisions. — (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
x x x
Findings of fact by the Office of
the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision imposing the
penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's
salary shall be final and unappealable.[20] (emphasis
supplied).
Notably, exoneration is
not mentioned in Section 27 as final and unappealable. However, its inclusion
is implicit for, as we held in Barata v. Abalos,[21]
if a sentence of censure, reprimand and a one-month suspension is considered
final and unappealable, so should exoneration.[22]
The
clear import of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules is to deny the
complainant in an administrative complaint the right to appeal where the
Ombudsman has exonerated the respondent of the administrative charge, as in
this case. The complainant, therefore,
is not entitled to any corrective recourse, whether by motion for
reconsideration in the Office of the Ombudsman, or by appeal to the courts, to
effect a reversal of the exoneration. Only the respondent is granted the right
to appeal but only in case he is found liable and the penalty imposed is higher
than public censure, reprimand,
one-month suspension or fine a equivalent to one month salary.
The absence of any statutory right to appeal the
exoneration of the respondent in an administrative case does not mean, however,
that the complainant is left with absolutely no remedy. Over
and above our statutes is the Constitution whose Section 1, Article VIII
empowers the courts of justice to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This
is an overriding authority that cuts across all branches and instrumentalities
of government and is implemented through the petition for certiorari that
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides. A
petition for certiorari is appropriate when a tribunal, clothed with judicial
or quasi-judicial authority, acted without jurisdiction (i.e., without the appropriate legal power to resolve a case), or in excess of jurisdiction (i.e., although clothed with the
appropriate power to resolve a case, it oversteps its authority as determined
by law, or that it committed grave abuse of its discretion by acting either
outside the contemplation of the law or in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary
or despotic manner equivalent to lack of jurisdiction).[23] The
Rules of Court and its provisions and jurisprudence on writs of certiorari
fully apply to the Office of the Ombudsman as these Rules are suppletory to the
Ombudsman’s Rules.[24]
The Rules of Court are also the applicable rules in procedural matters on
recourses to the courts and hence, are the rules the parties have to contend
with in going to the CA.
In the present case, the
respondents did not file a Rule 65 petition for certiorari, and instead filed
a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. A Rule 43 petition for review is effectively
an appeal to the CA that RA 6770 and the Ombudsman Rules do not allow in an
exoneration situation as above discussed.
The respondents’ petition for
review, however, addressed the grave
abuse of discretion that the Ombudsman committed in exonerating the present
petitioner. This appeal to our overriding
constitutional duty and the results of our own examination of the petition compel
us to exercise our liberality in
applying the Rules of Court and to recognize that the recourse made to the CA had
the effect of a Rule 65 petition. We consider, therefore, the respondents’
petition before the CA as properly filed.
The Grave Abuse of
Discretion
a.
Effect of Grave Abuse of Discretion
We
fully support the finding of the CA that grave abuse of discretion attended the
Ombudsman’s decision. As discussed
above, grave abuse of discretion is a circumstance beyond the legal error
committed by a decision-making agency or entity in the exercise of its
jurisdiction; this circumstance affects
even the authority to render judgment. Grave abuse of discretion shares this
effect with such grounds as the lack of
substantial supporting evidence,[25] and the failure to act in contemplation of
law,[26]
among others.
In the absence of any
authority to take cognizance of a case and to render a decision, any resulting
decision is necessarily null and void. In
turn, a null decision, by its very nature, cannot become final and can be
impugned at any time.[27] In the context of the Ombudsman operations, a
void decision cannot trigger the
application of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman Rules.
This is the
step-by-step flow that arises from a finding of grave abuse of discretion, in
relation with the finality and uappealability of an Ombudsman decision
involving the penalties o exoneration, censure, reprimand, and suspension for
not more than one month.
b. The Grave Abuse of Discretion
in the Context of the Case
The factual starting
point in the consideration of this case is the propriety of the reassignments that
the petitioner, as the LWUA Administrator, ordered; this event triggered the
dispute that is now before us. The reassignments,
alleged to be without legal basis and arbitrary, led to the highhanded
implementation that the respondents also complained about, and eventually to
the CSC rulings that the respondents were constructively dismissed. They led also to the charge of harassment and
oppression filed against the petitioner, which charge the Ombudsman
dismissed. This dismissal, found by the
CA to be attended by grave abuse of discretion, is the primary factual and legal issue we have to
resolve in passing upon the propriety of the actions of the Ombudsman and the
CA in the case.
As the CSC and
Ombudsman cases developed, the validity of the reassignments was the issue
presented before CSC; the latter had the authority to declare the reassignments
invalid but had no authority to penalize
the petitioner for his acts. The character
of the petitioner’s actions, alleged to be harassments and to be oppressive,
were brought to the Ombudsman for administrative sanctions against the
petitioner; it was the Ombudsman who had the authority to penalize the
petitioner for his actions against the respondents.
Under this clear
demarcation, neither the CSC nor the Ombudsman intruded into each other’s jurisdictional
domain and no forum shopping issue could have succeeded because of simultaneous
recourses to these agencies. While both
entities had to examine and to rule on the same set of facts, they did so for
different purposes and for different resulting actions.
The CSC took the graft
charges the respondents brought against the petitioner into account, but this
was for purposes of looking at the motive behind the reassignments and of
viewing the petitioner’s acts in their totality.
The same is true in viewing the manner of the implementation of the
reassignments. Largely, however, the CSC based its ruling on a legal point –
that the LWUA Board, not the LWUA Administrator, can order reassignments. Thus, the CSC ruled that the reassignments
constituted constructive dismissal.
On the other hand, the
Ombudsman, also relying on the events that transpired, should have judged the
petitioner’s actions mainly on the basis of whether they constituted acts of harassment
and oppression. In making this
determination, the Ombudsman could not have escaped considering the validity of
the reassignments made – a determination that is primarily and authoritatively
for the CSC to make. The charge of
harassment and oppression would have no basis if the reassignments were in fact
valid as they were alleged to be the main acts of harassment and oppression
that drove the commission of the petitioner’s other similarly-motivated acts. In this sense, the validity of the
reassignments must necessarily have to be determined first as a prior question before the
full consideration of the existence of harassment or oppression could take
place. Stated otherwise, any finding of
harassment and oppression, or their absence, rendered without any definitive ruling
on the validity of the reassignments would necessarily be premature. The finding would also suffer from the lack
of factual and legal bases.
We
note that the Office of the Ombudsman duly noted in its decision that the CSC
has primary jurisdiction over the issue of the reassignments’ validity, declaring
that it “can hardly arrogate unto
itself the task of resolving the said
issue.” This is a correct reading of the law as the CSC is the central
personnel agency of the government whose powers extend to all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.[28] Constitutionally,
the CSC has the power and authority to administer and enforce the
constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system; promulgate
policies, standards, and guidelines for the civil service; subject to certain
exceptions, approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service; hear and decide administrative disciplinary
cases instituted directly with it; and perform such other functions that
properly belong to a central personnel agency.[29] Pursuant to these powers, the CSC has the
authority to determine the validity of the appointments and movements of civil
service personnel.
Along
the way, however, the Ombudsman’s decision diverged from its basic legal premise when it refused to
apply the rule it had acknowledged – that the CSC is the “administrative body
of special competence” to decide on the validity of the reassignments; it
refused to accord due respect to the CSC opinion and, later, to the CSC Resolution
No. 001729 on the flimsy ground that these were not yet final and conclusive.
On the strength of this “non-finality” argument, the Ombudsman proceeded
to declare the reassignments presumptively
regular and, finding insufficient evidence of force and intimidation in the
implementation of the reassignments by the petitioner and the OICs, sustained
the invalid reassignments and their complementary acts. The effect, of course,
was the exoneration of the petitioner and his co-defendants of the
administrative charge of oppression and harassment. To the respondents and to the CA as well, the
exoneration was attended by grave abuse of discretion.
c. Prematurity
and Arbitrariness
After due consideration
reflected in the discussions below, we find the Ombudsman’s decision fatally
flawed for prematurity and arbitrariness, particularly for its lack of legal
and factual bases.
As discussed above, a
CSC determination of the validity of the reassignments is a ruling that the
Ombudsman must consider in reaching its own conclusion on whether the
reassignments and their implementation were
attended by harassment or oppression.
With the CSC rulings duly pleaded, the Ombudsman should have accorded
these rulings due respect and
recognition. If these rulings had not
attained finality because of a properly filed motion for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman should have at least waited so that its own ruling on the allegations
of harassment and oppression would be grounded on the findings of the governmental
agency with the primary authority to resolve the validity of the reassignments.
An alternative course
of action for the Ombudsman to ensure that his decision would have legal and
factual bases and would not be tainted with arbitrariness or abuse of
discretion, would have been to undertake its own examination of these
reassignments from the perspective of harassment and oppression, and to make
its own findings on the validity of the petitioner’s actions. It should have explained in clear terms and on
the basis of substantial evidence on record why no harassment or oppression
attended the reassigments and their
implementation. Given the duly-pleaded
CSC rulings, the Office of the Ombudsman should have explained why it did not
need the CSC’s pronouncements in making its determination, or if needed, why
they should not be followed, stating clearly what exactly was wrong with the
CSC's reasoning and why, contrary to the CSC’s pronouncement, the reassignments were in fact valid and
regular.
Unfortunately, no such
determination was ever made. Instead,
the Office of the Ombudsman simply relied on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of duty that it claimed the petitioner enjoyed, and from this premise, ruled that no
harassment or oppression transpired in the absence of force or intimidation that
attended the implementation of the reassignments.
As a general rule,
“official acts” enjoy the presumption of regularity, and the presumption may be
overthrown only by evidence to the contrary.[30] When
an act is official, a presumption of regularity exists because of the
assumption that the law tells the official what his duties are and that he discharged these duties accordingly. But not all acts of public officers are “official
acts,” i.e., acts specified by law as
an official duty or as a function attached to a public position, and the presumption
does not apply when an official’s acts are not within the duties specified by
law,[31]
particularly when his acts properly pertain or belong to another entity,
agency, or public official.
In
the present case, the CSC had spoken by way of an en banc resolution, no
less, that the petitioner LWUA Administrator’s reassignment orders were illegal
because, by law, the authority to reassign officers and employees of the LWUA
lies with the LWUA Board; the LWUA Administrator’s authority is merely to recommend a reassignment to
the Board. For reason of its own, the
Office of the Ombudsman disregarded this clear statement of the legal
allocation of authority on the matter of reassignments. This omission cannot but have fatal
consequences for the Ombudsman’s decision, anchored as it is on the presumption
that the petitioner regularly performed his duty. For, shorn of any basis in law, the
petitioner could not have acted with official authority and no presumption of
regularity could have been applied in his behalf. Without a valid presumption of regularity, the
major linchpin in the Ombudsman’s decision is totally removed and the decision is
left with nothing to support itself.
An
administrative decision, in order to be valid, should have, among others,
"something to support itself."[32] It must supported by substantial evidence, or
that amount of relevant evidence adequate and acceptable enough for a
reasonable mind to justify a conclusion or support a decision,[33]
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.[34]
We
note in this regard that the Office of the Ombudsman, other than through its
“non-finality” argument, completely failed to explain why the reassignment
orders were valid and regular and not oppressive as the respondents
alleged. Effectively, it failed to rebut
the CSC’s declaration that a constructive dismissal took place. This omission is critical because the
constructive dismissal conclusion relates back to the filing of graft charges
against the petitioner as motive; explains why the respondents were transferred
to ad hoc positions with no clear
duties; and relates forward to the manner
the respondents were ejected from their respective offices.
If
the Ombudsman made any factual finding at all, the finding was solely on the
lack of violence or intimidation in the respondents’ ejectment from their
offices. Violence or intimidation, however, are not the only indicators of harassment
and oppression as jurisprudence shows.[35] They
are not the sole indicators in the context of the Ombudsman’s decision because
the findings in this regard solely relate to the implementation aspect of the
reassignments ordered. We take judicial
notice that harassments and oppression do not necessarily come in single
isolated acts; they may come in a series of acts that torment, pester, annoy,
irritate and disturb another and prejudice him; in the context of this case,
the prejudice relates to the respondents’ work. Thus, a holistic view must be
taken to determine if one is being harassed or oppressed by another. In this sense, and given the facts found by
the CA, the Ombudsman ruling dwelling solely with the absence of violence and
intimidation is a fatally incomplete ruling; it is not a ruling negating
harassment and oppression that we can accept under the circumstances of this
case. Effectively, it was an arbitrary
ruling for lack of substantial support in evidence.
The
other end of the spectrum in viewing the reassignments and its related events,
is the position the CSC and the CA have taken.
The appellate court stated in its own decision:
We likewise agree with the Civil
Service Commission that respondent Administrator acted in bad faith in
reassigning the petitioners barely ten (10) days after the latter filed their
complaint against him for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. No reassignment shall be undertaken
if done whimsically because the law is not intended as a convenient shield for
the appointing/disciplining authority to harass or suppress a subordinate on
the pretext of advancing and promoting public interest (Section 6, Rule III of
Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 40. S. 1998). Additionally, the reassignments involved a
reduction in rank as petitioners were consigned to a “floating assignment with
no specificity as to functions, duties, and responsibilities” resulting in the
removal from their supervision over their regular staff, subordinates, and even
offices. Finally, the subsequent Order
of respondent Administrator directing petitioners to desist from performing and
exercising the functions of their respective positions constituted constructive
dismissal.
We hold that, based on the evidence
presented, respondent Administrator is guilty of harassment and oppression as
charged, penalized as grave offense under Executive Order No. 292 (Civil
Service Law), section 22 (n) with suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
to one (1) year.”
We fully agree that the reassignments
the petitioner ordered were done in bad
faith amounting to constructive dismissal and abuse of authority. We affirm as well the CA’s ruling finding that
petitioner should be liable for oppression against the respondents.
d. The Appropriate Penalty
Oppression
is characterized as a grave offense
under Sec. 52(A)(14)[36]
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service[37]
and Sec. 22(n)[38]
of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent
Civil Service Laws,[39]
penalized with suspension of 6 months and 1 day to 1 year on the first offense.
Considering that the oppression found
was not a simple one, but was in response to the respondents’ filing of an
anti-graft complaint against the petitioner, the penalty we should impose
should reflect the graft-related origin of this case and should be in the
maximum degree. Consequently, we modify
the CA decision by increasing the penalty to suspension for one (1) year, in
lieu of the six (6) months and one (1) day that the appellate court imposed. If the petitioner is no longer in the
service, then the suspension should automatically take the form of a fine
equivalent to the petitioner’s one-year salary at the time of his separation
from the service.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED. We AFFIRM the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution dated
November 27, 2001 and August 1, 2002, respectively, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is suspension of one (1) year, or, alternatively,
a fine equivalent to one-year salary if the petitioner has been separated from
the service at the time of the finality of this Decision. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES
Associate
Justice
Acting
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MARIANO C.
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated additional Member of the Second
Division per Special Order No. 671 dated
** Designated
Acting Chairperson of the Second Division per Special Order No. 670 dated
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] In CA-G.R. SP No. 61312, rendered by the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals through Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos, and concurred in by Associate Justices Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino; rollo at 39-50.
[3]
[4]
[5] Administrative Order No. 7.
[6] Per
the Records, Malicdem resigned from office on
[7] See Court of Appeals Decision of
[8]
[9] Docketed as OMB-ADM-0-00-0377.
[10] Supra note 4.
[11] Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[12]
[13]
[14] Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court; id., pp. 68-76.
[15] Supra note 4.
[16] CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 43.
[17] Rollo, p. 52.
[18] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[19] Entitled “An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for other purposes,” otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989.”
[20] Note that in all other disciplinary cases, the respondent may appeal the order, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43, as per the ruling in Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R No. 129742, September 16, 1998, 295 SCRA 470.
[21] Barata
v. Abalos, Jr., G.R. No. 142888,
[22] Chan v.
Ombudsman Marcelo, G.R. No.159298,
[23] Active Realty and Development Corp. v.
Fernandez, G.R. No. 157186,
[24] Barata
v. Abalos, Jr., supra; Enemecio v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 146731,
[25] Tensorex Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117925, October 12, 1999, 316 SCRA 471, 479, cited in Republic v. Canastillo, G.R. No. 172729, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 546.
[26] Grave abuse of discretion also refers to violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence, or for failure or refusal to act according to the law under the facts and the circumstance, PCGG v. Desierto, February 10, 2003, 397 SCRA 171, “Without jurisdiction” refers to an absolute want of jurisdiction; “excess of jurisdiction” refers to the case where the court, office or officer has jurisdiction, but it transcended the same or acted without any statutory authority; “grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617.
[27] Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa, 86 Phil. 447 (1950).
[28] CONSTITUTION, Article IX_B, Section 3.
[29] CIVIL SERVICE LAW, Article V, Section 9.
[30] People v. Jolliffe, 105 Phil. 677 (1959), citing Administrative Law: Cases and Comments by Gellhorn, pp. 315-316.
[31] Republic
v. Principalia, G.R. No. 167639,
[32] Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
[33] RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Section 5.
[34] Montemayor v. Bundalian, G.R. No. 149335,
[35] “Oppression” has been defined as “an act of
cruelty, severity, unlawful exaction, domination, or excessive use of
authority” (
[36] Sec. 52. Classification of Offenses.—Administrative offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
x x x
14. Oppression. 1st Offense – Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;
2nd Offense – Dismissal.
x x x
[37] Resolution No. 99-1936, effective on
[38] Sec. 22. Administrative offenses with its corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave, and light, depending on the gravity of its nature and effects on the government service.
The following are grave offenses with [their] corresponding penalties:
x x x
(n) Oppression: 1st Offense – Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;
2nd Offense – Dismissal.
x x x
[39] Resolution No. 91-1631, dated