SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION
|
DAVID LU, Petitioner,
- versus - PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU YM, JR., VICTOR LU
YM, ET. AL. & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondents. PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU YM, JR., VICTOR LU
YM, JOHN LU YM, KELLY LU YM, and LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioners, - versus - DAVID LU, Respondent. JOHN LU YM and LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, -versus- THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS OF CEBU CITY (former
Twentieth Division), DAVID LU, ROSA GO, SILVANO LUDO & CL CORPORATION,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 153690 G.R. No. 157381 G.R. No. 170889 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CARPIO-MORALES,* CHICO-NAZARIO, NACHURA, and BRION,
JJ.** Promulgated: August 4, 2009 |
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NACHURA, J.:
For resolution is the Motion for
Reconsideration[1] filed by
petitioners John Lu Ym and Ludo & LuYm Development Corporation (movants),
praying that we reconsider our Decision[2] dated
August 26, 2008, where we disposed of the three consolidated cases in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos.
153690 and 157381 are DENIED for
being moot and academic; while the petition in G.R. No. 170889 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Status Quo Order dated
The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to proceed with CA-G.R. CV No. 81163 and to resolve the
same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.[3]
In support of their
motion, the movants advance the following arguments:
1. Private respondents are guilty of fraud in avoiding
payment of the correct docket fees by not listing the real properties in their
Complaint and Amended Complaint despite their admission that the real
properties are the subject matter of the case and by their act of annotating
notices of lis pendens on the
properties of Ludo Dev.
2. The present action is not an intra-corporate
controversy and therefore the RTC, being a special commercial court, has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
3. The RTC has no jurisdiction to order the
dissolution of the Corporation.
However, should this Honorable Court decide that the
foregoing grounds are not sufficient justification to warrant a dismissal of
SRC-021 CEB, petitioners ask that the Status
Quo Order of this Court be maintained during the appeal of the case or that
a Writ of Injunction be issued to stop the immediate implementation of the
March 1, 2004 decision based on the following grounds:
a) The
b) The Management Committee organized by the RTC in
the
c) Supervening event has made the management committee
functus oficio.[4]
To resolve the motion judiciously, it
is necessary to restate, albeit briefly, the factual and procedural antecedents
that gave rise to these consolidated petitions.
On
The defendants therein moved to
dismiss the complaint for non-compliance with the requirement of certification
of non-forum shopping, and for failure of the plaintiffs to exert efforts
towards a compromise. The trial court
denied the motion and placed LLDC under receivership.
Defendants Lu Ym father and sons
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64154.
However, the same was dismissed for insufficient signatures on the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Subsequently, they re-filed a petition, which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64523. On
Meanwhile, the Presiding Judge of
Branch 6 of the RTC of Cebu City, where the case was initially raffled,
inhibited himself on motion of the Lu Ym father and sons. The case was re-raffled to Branch 11. The Presiding Judge of the latter branch
directed the parties to amend their respective pleadings in order to conform to
the requirements of Republic Act No. 8799, and the case was re-docketed as SRC
Case No. 021-CEB.
The Lu Ym father and sons then filed
with the trial court a motion to lift the order of receivership over LLDC. Before the matter could be heard, David
instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA on the issue
of the motion to lift order of receivership, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
73383. On February 27, 2003, the CA
granted the petition and ruled that the proceedings on the receivership could
not proceed without the parties amending their pleadings. The Lu Ym father and sons thus filed a
petition for review with this Court (G.R. No. 157381).
In the meantime, the Presiding Judge
of Branch 11 also inhibited himself, and the case was transferred to Branch
12. On
On
On
In view of the executory nature of
the decision of the trial court, as mandated in the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies,[5]
the Lu Ym father and sons moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction which, however, was denied by the CA. They filed a motion for reconsideration,
wherein they further questioned the sufficiency of the docket fees paid by
David, et al. in the RTC. On
On
In our P1,087,055,105).”[6]
Upon deeper reflection, we find that
the movants’ claim has merit. The
600,000 shares of stock were, indeed, properties in litigation. They were the subject matter of the complaint,
and the relief prayed for entailed the nullification of the transfer thereof
and their return to LLDC. David, et al.,
are minority shareholders of the corporation who claim to have been prejudiced
by the sale of the shares of stock to the Lu Ym father and sons. Thus, to the extent of the damage or injury
they allegedly have suffered from this sale of the shares of stock, the action
they filed can be characterized as one capable of pecuniary estimation. The shares of stock have a definite value,
which was declared by plaintiffs themselves in their complaint. Accordingly, the docket fees should have been
computed based on this amount. This is
clear from the following version of Rule 141, Section 7, which was in effect at
the time the complaint was filed:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.
–
(a)
For
filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate
not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party,
fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all
clerical services in the same, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of interest,
or the stated value of the property in litigation, is:
x x x x[7]
We have earlier held that a court
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees.[8] Hence, without payment of the correct docket
fees, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the action filed by
David, et al.
We also stated in our Decision that
the earlier rule in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals[9]
has been relaxed. Subsequent decisions
now uniformly hold that when insufficient filing fees are initially paid by the
plaintiffs and there is no intention to defraud the government, the
Addressing this point, movants argue
that David, et al., were guilty of fraud in that, while they did not mention
any real property in their complaint, they were able to obtain the annotation
of notices of lis pendens on various
real properties of LLDC by alleging in their motion to conduct special raffle that
there was an “imminent danger” that “properties subject matter of this case”
might be disposed of. Moreover, David,
et al., prayed for, among others, the liquidation and distribution of the
assets of the corporation, so that they may receive their share therein. Among the assets of the corporation are real
properties. Hence, the case was, in
actuality, a real action that had for its objective the recovery of real
property.
Fraud is a “generic term embracing
all multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and which are resorted
to by one individual to secure an advantage over another by false suggestions
or by suppression of truth, and includes all surprise, trick, cunning,
dissembling and any unfair way by which another is cheated.”[11] Since fraud is a state of mind, its presence
can only be determined by examining the attendant circumstances.[12]
It is true, as we held in our
Decision, that David, et al., merely relied on the assessment made by the Clerk
of Court and cannot be faulted for their payment of insufficient docket
fees. However, movants now point out
that when David Lu moved for the annotation of notices of lis pendens on real properties owned by LLDC, they in effect
acknowledged that the case they filed was a real action.
A notice of lis pendens is governed by Rule 13, Section 14 of the Rules of
Court, which states:
Sec. 14. Notice of lis pendens. – In an action
affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff
and the defendant, when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record
in the office of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is
situated a notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names of the
parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of the
property in that province affected thereby.
Only from the time of filing such notice for record shall a purchaser,
or encumbrancer of the property affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against the
parties designated by their real names.
The notice of lis
pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only upon order of the
court, after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party
who caused it to be recorded.[13]
A notice of lis pendens is an
announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in
litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires interest over said
property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the
litigation over the said property. The
filing of a notice of lis pendens charges all strangers with notice of
the particular litigation referred to therein and, therefore, any right they
may thereafter acquire over the property is subject to the eventuality of the
suit. Such announcement is founded upon public policy and necessity, the
purpose of which is to keep the properties in litigation within the power of
the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the
judgment or decree by subsequent alienation.[14]
As a general rule, the
only instances in which a notice of lis
pendens may be availed of are as follows: (a) an action to recover
possession of real estate; (b) an action for partition; and (c) any other court
proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon
or the use or the occupation thereof. Additionally,
this Court has held that resorting to lis
pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or
possession of real property. This
annotation also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an
equitable estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an
encumbrance against it.[15]
From the foregoing, it is clear that
a notice of lis pendens is availed of
mainly in real actions. Hence, when
David, et al., sought the annotation of notices of lis pendens on the titles of LLDC, they acknowledged that the
complaint they had filed affected a title to or a right to possession of real
properties. At the very least, they must
have been fully aware that the docket fees would be based on the value of the
realties involved. Their silence or
inaction to point this out to the Clerk of Court who computed their docket
fees, therefore, becomes highly suspect, and thus, sufficient for this Court to
conclude that they have crossed beyond the threshold of good faith and into the
area of fraud. Clearly, there was an
effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct docket fees. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
Anent the issue of estoppel, we
earlier ruled that the movants are barred from questioning the jurisdiction of
the trial court because of their participation in the proceedings therein. In passing upon this issue, we take heed from
the pronouncement of this Court in the recent case Vargas v. Caminas:[16]
The Court finds that Tijam is not applicable in the present
case. The general rule is that lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. In Calimlim
v. Ramirez, the Court
stated that Tijam is an exception to the general
rule because of the presence of laches:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned
acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction
of a court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not
be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam]. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstance involved in
[Tijam] which justified the departure from the accepted concept of
non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a
blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling
in [Tijam] not as the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually
overthrowing altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
In Tijam, the lack of jurisdiction was raised for
the first time in a motion to dismiss filed almost fifteen (15) years
after the questioned ruling had been rendered.
Hence, the Court ruled that the issue of jurisdiction may no longer be
raised for being barred by laches.
The circumstances of the present case are different from Tijam.
Spouses Vargas raised the issue of
jurisdiction before the trial court rendered its decision. They continued to raise the issue in their
appeal before the Court of Appeals and this Court. Hence, it cannot be said that laches has set
in. The exception in Tijam finds
no application in this case and the general rule must apply, that the question
of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Spouses Vargas are therefore not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.[17]
The exhortations of
this Court in the above-cited case have constrained us to look more closely
into the nature of the participation of the movants in the proceedings, to
determine whether the exceptional principle of estoppel may be applied against
them. The records show that the very
first pleading filed by the Lu Ym father and sons before the court a quo was a motion to dismiss, albeit
anchored on the ground of insufficiency of the certificate of non-forum
shopping and failure of the plaintiffs to exert efforts towards a
compromise. When the trial court denied
this, they went up to the CA on certiorari,
where they were sustained and the appellate court ordered the dismissal of the
complaint below.
Next, the Lu Ym father
and sons filed a motion for the lifting of the receivership order, which the
trial court had issued in the interim.
David, et al., brought the matter up to the CA even before the trial
court could resolve the motion.
Thereafter, David, et al., filed their Motion to Admit Complaint to
Conform to the Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies. It was at this point that the Lu Ym father
and sons raised the question of the amount of filing fees paid. They raised this point again in the CA when
they appealed the trial court’s decision in the case below.
We find that, in the
circumstances, the Lu Ym father and sons are not estopped from challenging the
jurisdiction of the trial court. They
raised the insufficiency of the docket fees before the trial court rendered
judgment and continuously maintained their position even on appeal to the
CA. Although the manner of challenge was
erroneous – they should have addressed this issue directly to the trial court
instead of to the OCA – they should not be deemed to have waived their right to
assail the jurisdiction of the trial court.
The matter of lack of jurisdiction of the trial
court is one that may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. More importantly, this Court may pass upon
this issue motu proprio.
Hence, notwithstanding
that the petition in G.R. No. 170889 is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing an
interlocutory resolution of the CA, we have the power to order the dismissal of
the complaint filed in the court of origin and render all incidents herein moot
and academic.
With the foregoing findings,
there is no more need to discuss the other arguments raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
In summary, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for failure of David, et.al.
to pay the correct docket fees. Consequently, all interlocutory
matters pending before this Court, specifically the incidents subject of these
three consolidated petitions, must be denied for being moot and academic. With the dismissal of the main action, the
ancillary motions have no more leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by John Lu Ym and Ludo & LuYm Development Corporation
is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated
All interlocutory matters
challenged in these consolidated petitions are DENIED for being moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO
EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson,
Special Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution
and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated member per Raffle dated July 30, 2008.
** Designated member per Raffle dated March 4, 2009.
[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 153690), pp. 1052-1108.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC, Sec. 4. Executory nature of decisions and orders. – All decisions and orders issued under these Rules shall immediately be executory. No appeal or petition taken therefrom shall stay the enforcement or implementation of the decision or order, unless restrained by an appellate court. Interlocutory orders shall not be subject to appeal.
[6] Rollo (G.R. No. 153690), p. 97.
[7] Rules of Court, Rule 141, Section 7, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC (March 1, 2000).
[8] Far East Bank and
Trust Company v. Shemberg Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 163878,
[9] No. L-75919,
[10] Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation (IBC-13) v. Alonzo-Legasto, G.R. No. 169108, April 18, 2006, 487 SCRA 339; Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Achilles Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 475; Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 274, 285.
[11] Yap-Sumndad v. Harrigan, 430 Phil. 612 (2002).
[12] Commissioner of
Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 171516-17,
[13] Rules of Court, Rule 13, Section 14.
[14] Cunanan v. Jumping Jap Trading Corp.,
G.R. No. 173834,
[15] Atlantic Erectors, Inc. v. Herbal Cove Realty Corp., G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 409.
[16] G.R.
Nos. 137869 & 137940,
[17]