SECOND
DIVISION
|
FRANCISCO
MADRID· and EDGARDO
BERNARDO,
Petitioners, -
versus - SPOUSES
BONIFACIO MAPOY
and FELICIDAD MARTINEZ, Respondents. |
G.R.
No. 150887 Present: *CARPIO-MORALES, J., Acting Chairperson, **CARPIO, ***CHICO-NAZARIO,
****LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION,
JJ. Promulgated: August 14, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
BRION, J.:
Before
us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1]
filed by petitioners Francisco Madrid and Edgardo Bernardo (petitioners-defendants) to reverse and
set aside the Decision[2]
dated July 16, 2001 and Resolution[3]
dated November 19, 2001 of the Former Second Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47691 entitled “Spouses Bonifacio Mapoy and Felicidad
Martinez v. Edgardo Bernardo and Francisco Madrid.”
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case, based on the
records, are summarized below.
The spouses Bonifacio and Felicidad
Mapoy (respondents-plaintiffs) are
the absolute owners of two parcels of land (the properties) known as Lot
Nos. 79 and 80 of Block No. 27 of the Rizal Park Subdivision, located at No. 1400
Craig Street corner Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila, under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
130064 and 130065 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The properties have a combined area of
two-hundred seventy (270) square meters.
On
April 4, 1988, the respondents-plaintiffs sought to recover possession of the
properties through an accion publiciana
filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila[4]
against Gregorio Miranda and his family (Mirandas)
and two other unnamed defendants. After the pre-trial conference, the unnamed
defendants were identified as the present petitioners and summons were duly
served on them. These defendants are referred to in this Decision as the petitioners-defendants. The Mirandas are no longer parties to the
present case; they did not appeal the lower court decision to the CA.
The
respondents-plaintiffs alleged that they acquired the properties from the spouses
Procopio and Encarnacion Castelo under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20,
1978. They merely tolerated the petitioners-defendants’ continued occupancy and
possession until their possession became illegal when demands to vacate the
properties were made. Despite the demands, the petitioners-defendants continued
to occupy and unlawfully withhold possession of the properties from the respondents-plaintiffs,
to their damage and prejudice. Efforts
to amicably settle the case proved futile, leaving the respondents-plaintiffs no
recourse but to file a complaint for ejectment which the lower court dismissed because
the respondents-plaintiffs should have filed an accion publiciana. Thus, they filed their complaint for accion publiciana, praying for recovery
of possession of the properties and the
payment of P1,000.00 as monthly rental for the use of the properties from January 1987 until the petitioners-defendants
vacate the properties, plus P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages,
and P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
The
Mirandas countered that Gregorio Miranda owned the properties by virtue of an oral
sale made in his favor by the original owner, Vivencio Antonio (Antonio). They claimed that in 1948,
Gregorio Miranda was Antonio’s carpenter, and they had a verbal contract for
Miranda to stay in, develop, fix and guard the properties; in 1972, Antonio
gave the properties to Gregorio Miranda in consideration of his more than
twenty (20) years of loyal service.
Petitioner-defendant
Bernardo also asserted ownership over the portion he occupies based on an oral
sale to him by Antonio. He alleged that he became a ward of Gregorio Miranda in
1965 when he was 10 years old and helped in the development of the properties;
he helped construct a bodega and a house within the properties. He and Antonio met in 1975, and Antonio
promised that the bodega would be given to him in gratitude for his work.
Petitioner-defendant
Madrid, for his part, claimed that he started occupying a portion of the
properties in 1974, and constructed a house on this portion in 1989 with the
permission of Bernardo, the son of Gregorio Miranda.
On
the basis of the length of their claimed occupation of the properties, the petitioners-defendants
likewise invoked Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1517 (PD 1517), also known as the Urban Land Reform Law,
which provides that legitimate tenants of 10 year or more, who have built their
homes on these lands and who have continuously resided thereon for the past ten
years, shall not be dispossessed of their occupied lands and shall be allowed
the right of first refusal to purchase these lands within a reasonable time and
at reasonable prices.
THE RTC RULING
On
July 21, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 3, rendered its decision,[5] the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE,
judgment is rendered, ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights
thereto to vacate the premises located at the corner of Ma. Clara and Craig
Streets, Sampaloc, Manila, evidenced by TCT No. 130064 and 130065 and restore
the same to the plaintiffs. The
defendants are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and the sum of P1,000.00 as reasonable rental for the
use and occupation of the premises beginning from the filing of this complaint
until they vacated the premises.
SO
ORDERED.[6]
The
RTC upheld the respondents-plaintiffs’ right of possession as registered owners
of the properties. It found no merit in the petitioners-defendants’ claims of
ownership via an oral sale given the absence
of any public instrument or at least a note or memorandum supporting their
claims. The RTC also found the petitioners-defendants’ invocation of PD 1517 futile,
since its Section 6 refers to a legitimate tenant who has legally occupied the
lands by contract; the petitioners-defendants are mere squatters.
The
petitioners-defendants elevated the RTC decision to the CA via an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The
Mirandas did not join them, and thus failed to file a timely appeal. The
petitioners-defendants objected to the RTC’s ruling that the sale or promise of
sale should appear in a public instrument, or at least in a note or memorandum,
to be binding and enforceable. They
argued that the RTC failed to consider the respondents-plaintiffs’ bad faith in
acquiring the properties since they knew of the defects in the title of the
owner. They further argued that the CA should have noted Gregorio Miranda’s occupancy
since 1948, Bernardo’s since 1966 and Madrid’s since 1973. The petitioners-defendants
further submitted that their continuous residence for more than ten (10) years
entitled them to the rights and privileges granted by PD 1517. They also argued that the RTC should not have
applied the pre-trial order to them, since they had not then been served with
summons and were not present during the pre-trial.
THE CA RULING
The
CA dismissed the appeal in its decision[7] of July 16, 2001, affirming
as a consequence the RTC decision of July 21, 1994. The CA held that the certificate of title in the
name of the respondents-plaintiffs serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the properties. The CA found that the petitioners-defendants
never submitted any proof of ownership.
Also, their reliance on their alleged continuous occupation is misplaced
since petitioner-defendant Bernardo’s occupation in the concept of owner
started only in 1975 when Antonio allegedly gave him a portion of the properties
as a gift, while petitioner-defendant Madrid’s occupation could not have been in
the concept of an owner, as he recognized Gregorio Miranda as the owner and
paid him rents. The CA noted that the petitioners-defendants are not covered by
PD 1517 because the law does not apply to occupants whose possession is by the
owner’s mere tolerance. The CA also observed that the RTC did not err in
applying the pre-trial order to the petitioners-defendants because they derive
the right of possession from the principal defendants, the Mirandas, who were
duly represented at the pre-trial; they waived their right to pre-trial by
failing to move that one be held.
The
petitioners-defendants moved[8] but
failed[9] to
secure a reconsideration of the CA decision; hence, they came to us through the
present petition.
THE PETITION and THE
PARTIES’ POSITIONS
The
petitioners-defendants essentially reiterate the issues they raised before the
CA, i.e., that the ruling court failed
to consider: (1) the respondents-plaintiffs’ bad faith in the acquisition of
the properties; (2) the occupancy of Gregorio Miranda since 1948, Bernardo’s
since 1966, and Madrid’s since 1973; and, (3) petitioners-defendants’
continuous residence for more than ten (10) years entitling them to the rights
and privileges granted by PD 1517. They
also contend that the principle of indefeasibility of the certificate of title
should not apply in this case because fraud attended the respondents-plaintiffs’
acquisition of title. They again point out that the pre-trial order should not
have been applied to them since they were not present during the pre-trial
conference.
The
respondents-plaintiffs counter-argue that the issues raised by the petitioners-defendants
are essentially factual in nature and all have been well-considered and
adequately refuted in the challenged CA decision.
OUR
RULING
We
resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
a. Accion Publiciana
and Ownership
Accion publiciana, also
known as accion plenaria de posesion,[10] is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better right of possession of realty independently of title.[11] It refers to
an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.[12]
The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership.[13]
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass
upon the issue to determine who between or among the parties has the right to
possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not a final and binding
determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving
the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the
issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being
provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title
to the property.[14] The
adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.[15]
In the present case, both the petitioners-defendants
and the respondents-plaintiffs raised the issue of ownership. The petitioners-defendants
claim ownership based on the oral sale to and occupation by Gregorio Miranda,
their predecessor-in-interest, since 1948. On the other hand, the respondents-plaintiffs
claim that they are the owners, and their ownership is evidenced by the TCTs in
their names. Under this legal situation, resolution of these conflicting claims
will depend on the weight of the parties' respective evidence, i.e., whose evidence deserves more
weight.
b. Findings of Fact Below – Final and
Conclusive
A weighing of evidence necessarily involves the
consideration of factual issues – an exercise that is not appropriate for the Rule
45 petition that the petitioners-defendants filed; under the Rules of Court, the
parties may raise only questions of law under Rule 45, as the Supreme Court is
not a trier of facts.[16] As a rule, we are not duty-bound to again analyze
and weigh the evidence introduced and considered in the tribunals below.[17] This is particularly true where the CA has affirmed
the trial court's factual findings, as in the present case. These trial court
findings, when affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and are not open
for our review on appeal.[18]
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA gave
more weight to the certificate of title the respondents-plaintiffs presented, and
likewise found that the petitioners-defendants' possession of the properties
was merely upon the respondents-plaintiffs’ tolerance. We see no reason to
doubt or question the validity of these findings and thus recognize their
finality.
As a matter of law, a Torrens Certificate of Title
is evidence of indefeasible title of property in favor of the person in whose name
the title appears. The title holder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property, including possession, subject only to limits imposed
by law.[19]
In the present case, the respondents-plaintiffs are indisputably the holders of
a certificate of title against which the petitioners-defendants’ claim of oral
sale cannot prevail. As registered
titleholders, they are entitled to possession of the properties.
c. Claim of Fraud – a Prohibited Collateral Attack
Registration of land under the Torrens system, aside
from perfecting the title and rendering it indefeasible after the lapse of the
period allowed by law, also renders the title immune from collateral attack.[20] A collateral attack transpires when, in another
action to obtain a different relief and as an incident of the present action,
an attack is made against the judgment granting the title.[21] This manner of attack is to be distinguished from a
direct attack against a judgment granting the title, through an action whose
main objective is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such
judgment if not yet implemented, or to seek recovery if the property titled
under the judgment had been disposed of.[22] To permit a collateral attack on respondents-plaintiffs’
title is to water down the integrity and guaranteed legal indefeasibility of a
Torrens title.[23]
The
petitioners-defendants’ attack on the validity of respondents-plaintiffs’ title,
by claiming that fraud attended its acquisition, is a collateral attack on the
title. It is an attack incidental to
their quest to defend their possession of the properties in an "accion publiciana," not in a direct
action whose main objective is to impugn the validity of the judgment granting
the title.[24] This is the attack that possession of a Torrens
Title specifically guards against; hence, we cannot entertain, much less accord
credit to, the petitioners-defendants’ claim of fraud to impugn the validity of
the respondents-plaintiffs’ title to their property.
d.
Claimed Protection under PD 1517
To qualify for protection under PD 1517 and avail of
the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, the claimant must be: (1)
a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built
his home on the land by contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the
last ten (10) years. The “tenant”
covered by PD 1517 is, as defined under Section 3(f) thereof, "the
rightful occupant of land and its structures, but does not include those whose
presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract,
those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under
litigation."
Stated differently, those whose possession or occupation
of land is devoid of any legal authority or those whose contracts of lease are
already terminated, or had already expired, or whose possession is under
litigation are not considered "tenants" under the decree. Conversely,
a legitimate tenant is one who is not a
usurper or an occupant by tolerance.[25] The petitioners-defendants
whose occupation has been merely by the owner’s tolerance obviously fall
outside the coverage of PD 1517 and cannot seek its protection.
e. The Pre-Trial-based Objection
Without doubt, the petitioners-defendants, having
been belatedly served summons and brought into the case, were entitled to a
pre-trial as ordained by Section 2, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. Unless
substantial prejudice is shown, however, the trial court’s failure to schedule
a case for new trial does not render the proceedings illegal or void ab initio.[26] Where,
as in this case, the trial proceeded without any objection on the part of the
petitioners-defendants by their failure to bring the matter to the attention of
the RTC, the petitioners-defendants are deemed to have effectively forfeited a
procedural right granted them under the Rules. Issues raised for the first time
on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court are
barred by estoppel.[27] Points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the trial court ought not to be considered by a
reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[28] To consider
the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to trampling on
the basic principles of fair play, justice, and due process.
In arriving at this conclusion, we considered, as
the CA did, that the petitioners-defendants anchored their right to possess the
property on the defenses raised by the original defendant, Gregorio Miranda,
their predecessor-in-interest. While belatedly summoned, the petitioners-defendants
did not raise a substantial matter in their answer differently from those
propounded by Gregorio Miranda; they merely echoed Miranda’s positions and arguments.
Thus, no prejudice could have resulted to the petitioners-defendants,
especially after they entered trial and had the opportunity to fully ventilate
their positions.
f. Attorney’s Fees
As a general rule, the appellate court may only pass
upon errors assigned by the parties. By
way of exception, even unassigned errors may be taken up by the court on appeal
if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court's jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3) clerical errors.[29] In the
present case, we note that the award of attorney's fees appears only in the
dispositive portion of the RTC decision without any elaboration, explanation,
and justification. The award stood there
all by itself. We view this as a plain legal error by the RTC that must be
rectified.
Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the
instances justifying the grant of attorney’s fees; in all cases, the award must
be reasonable, just and equitable. Attorney's fees as part of damages are not
meant to enrich the winning party at the expense of the losing litigant. They
are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy
that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.[30] The award of attorney's fees is the exception
rather than the general rule. Thus, findings reflecting the conditions imposed
by Article 2208 are necessary to justify an award; attorney's fees mentioned
only in the dispositive portion of the decision without any prior justification
in the body of the decision is a baseless award that must be struck down.[31]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we here DENY the
petition for lack of any reversible error, and consequently AFFIRM the decision
of July 16, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47691, with the MODIFICATION
that the attorney's fees awarded to respondents-plaintiffs are hereby DELETED. Costs against the petitioners-defendants.
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Acting
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
· Died on May 12, 1992 during the pendency of the case in the trial court. He was substituted by his widow, Macrina Generalao Vda. de Madrid, as defendant; rollo, p. 35.
* Designated Acting Chairperson of the Second Division effective August 1, 2009 per Special Order No. 670 dated July 28, 2009.
** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective August 1, 2009 per Special Order No. 671 dated July 28, 2009.
*** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective June 3, 2009 per Special Order No. 658 dated June 3, 2009.
**** Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective May 11, 2009 per Special Order No. 635 dated May 7, 2009.
[1] Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (former member of this Court) and Hilarion L. Aquino (now retired), concurring; rollo, pp. 30-42.
[3] Id., p. 61.
[4]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 88-44149.
[5] Rollo, pp. 116-119.
[6] Id., p. 119.
[7] Id., pp. 30-42.
[8] Id., pp. 43-60.
[9] Id., p. 61.
[10] Bejar v. Caluag, G.R. No. 171277, February 17, 2007, 516 SCRA 84, 90; Barredo v. Santiago, 102 Phil. 127, 130 (1957).
[11] Bejar v. Caluag, id.; Sps. Cruz v. Torres, 374 Phil. 529, 533 (1999); Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 286, 291 (1906); Ledesma v. Marcos, 9 Phil. 618, 620 (1908).
[12] Encarnacaion v. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006, 502 SCRA 172, 179; Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No.152145, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 535, 543.
[13] Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil. 1, 25 (2002).
[14] Rivera v. Rivera, 453 Phil. 404, 412 (2003).
[15] Umpoc v. Mercado, G.R. No. 158166, January 21, 2005, 449 SCRA 220, 238.
[16] Mitsubishi Motors Phils. Corporation v. Simon, G.R. No. 164081, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 555, 560; Ochoa v. Apeta, G.R. No. 146259, September 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 235, 238.
[17] Diokno v. Cacdac, G.R. No. 168475, July 4, 2007, 526 SCRA 440, 460-461; Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, G.R. Nos. 123346, 134385 & 148767, November 29, 2005, 476 SCRA 305, 335.
[18] Puen v. Sta. Ana Agro-Aqua Corporation, G.R. No. 156051, January 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 493, 501; Child Learning Center, Inc. v. Tagorio, G.R. No. 150920, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 236, 241.
[19]
See Baloloy v. Hular,
G.R. No. 157767, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 80, 92 and CIVIL CODE, Article
428.
[20] Herce, Jr. v. Municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna, G.R. No. 166645, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 797, 807.
[21] Teoville Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Ferreira, G.R. No. 140086, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 459, 474.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Republic v. Guerrero G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424, 441; Tichangco v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 150629, June 30, 2004, 433 SCRA 324, 337.
[24] Ugale v. Gorospe, G.R. No. 149516, September 11, 2006, 501 SCRA 376, 386; Caraan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140752, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 543, 550; Baloloy v. Hular, supra note 19.
[25] Delos Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127465, October 25, 2001, 368 SCRA 226, 229; Bermudez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-73206, August 6, 1986, 143 SCRA 351, 355; Zansibarian Residents Asso. v. Municipality of Makati, G.R. No. L-62136, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 235, 239.
[26]
Martinez v. de la Merced,
G.R. No. 82039, June 20, 1989, 174 SCRA 182.
[27] Heirs of Dicman v. Cariño, G.R. No. 146459, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 240, 263; Cruz v. Fernando, Sr., G.R. No. 145470, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 173, 182.
[28] Valdez v. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 155009, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 687, 696; Philippine Ports Authority v. City of Iloilo, 453 Phil. 927, 938 (2003).
[29] Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares, G.R. No. 143826, August 28, 2003, 410 SCRA 97, 111; Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999, 309 SCRA 602, 614.
[30] Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc. 425 Phil. 511, 525 (2002); Ibaan Rural Bank, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 707, 714 (1999).
[31] Spouses Samatra v. Vda. de Pariñas, 431 Phil. 255, 267 (2002); Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118180, September 20, 1996, 262 SCRA 245, 253.