RAMIE VALENZUELA,
Petitioner, -
versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
G.R.
No. 149988
Present: *CARPIO-MORALES, J., Acting Chairperson, **CARPIO, ***CHICO-NAZARIO,
****LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 14, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION,
J.: |
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Petitioner
Ramie Valenzuela (petitioner) seeks,
in this petition for review on certiorari,[1] to
reverse the Court of Appeals (CA)
decision and resolution dated June 18, 2001 and September 10, 2001,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 20533, that affirmed with modification the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan, dated
Petitioner
and his brother, Hermie Valenzuela (Hermie),
were charged with the crime of frustrated murder, allegedly committed as
follows:
That
on or about the 20th day of February 1996, in the evening, in Barangay
Maniboc, municipality of Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a sharp pointed, bladed instrument, with intent to kill, taking advantage
of their superior strength, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Gregorio P. Cruz, inflicting upon him the following:
-
Stab
wound 1 cm flank area left, 3 cm. depth
-
Stap
wound 1 cm flank area left, 3 cm. depth
the accused having
thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
murder as a consequence but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, that is, the timely medical assistance
afforded to Gregorio P. Cruz which prevented his death, to his damage and
prejudice.[2]
We
summarized below the facts based on the records before us.
Petitioner and the victim, Gregorio P.
Cruz (Gregorio), both lived in Barangay Maniboc, Lingayen, Pangasinan. In the early evening of
Based on the prosecution’s account of
the events, at around
After the stabbing, Gregorio was
brought to the clinic of one Dr.
Casipit who administered emergency treatment on the stab wounds. He was transferred the following day to the
-
Stab
wound 1 cm flank area left, 3 cm depth;
-
Stab
wound 1 cm flank area left, 3 cm depth.
The wounds were found not to be
fatal, as no vital organ was affected. Gregorio was discharged
after one week of confinement.
On
Trial of the case proceeded solely
with respect to the petitioner as his brother and co-accused, Hermie, was then,
and still is, at large.
The
prosecution presented Dr. Rivera of the
The prosecution likewise presented
Rogelio who declared that on the night of February 20, 1996, he accompanied
Gregorio to the house of their Barangay Captain to talk to the latter's
husband, Pepito dela Cruz; they drank as they talked with Pepito. As they headed for home while passing by the
Valenzuelas’ house/sari-sari store, the petitioner suddenly appeared from
behind and held Gregorio, while Hermie stabbed the victim. Rogelio was able to positively identify the
petitioner and Hermie as Gregorio's assailants, as the scene of the crime was well-lighted,
illuminated by a streetlight from a nearby electric post.
After
the stabbing, the two assailants ran towards their house, and Rogelio took
Gregorio initially to the house of Barangay Captain dela Cruz, and then to
the clinic of a certain Dr. Casipit for emergency treatment. Thereafter, he took Gregorio to the
The victim, Gregorio, likewise
testified for the prosecution. He
declared that he was the Chief Barangay
Tanod of their place and that he knew the two accused because they were
residents of his barangay. The
rest of his testimony was similar to Rogelio’s.
The petitioner,
after pleading not guilty to the charge, presented his defenses of denial and
alibi. He claimed that on the night of
The
petitioner claimed he was being implicated in the stabbing incident because he
had a previous altercation with the victim, Gregorio, when the latter
apprehended his other brother, Rommel Valenzuela. He further surmised that
Gregorio could have mistaken him for his brother, Willy, with whom he shares
physical similarities and who, he claimed, was one of the assailants in the
stabbing incident. Witnesses Nestor Cerezo
(Nestor) and Rhodora Manzano (Rhodora) supported the petitioner’s
defense of alibi.
Nestor
testified that he is a businessman and a resident of
At about
Rhodora also testified for the
defense. She declared under oath that
she is a friend of Annie Valenzuela, the younger sister of the accused. On
At around
Right after the stabbing, she saw
Hermie run to the direction of the Valenzuelas’ house, while Gregorio and
Rogelio proceeded to the house of Barangay
Captain Dela Cruz. She
categorically declared that the petitioner had no participation in the incident,
as only the petitioner's brothers, Willy and Hermie, were at the scene of the
crime.
After trial on the merits, the trial
court rendered its decision[4] of
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the
foregoing considerations, the court finds and holds the accused, Ramie
Valenzuela, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder as
charged in the information filed against him, pursuant to law, taking into
account the provision[s] of Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code and the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in his favor, hereby sentences said accused to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum and to pay the costs of the suit. x x x
In appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, the trial court explained:
The
information filed against the accused alleges that the two accused took
advantage of their superior strength in attacking and assaulting the offended
party with sharp pointed, bladed instrument twice on the left side of the
back. Abuse of superior strength is
determined by the excess of the aggressors natural strength over that of the
victim's, considering the momentary positions of both parties and the employment
of means weakening the defense of the victim, although not annulling it. Thus, there is abuse of superior strength in
the case where four persons attacked an unarmed victim (People v. Garcia, 94
SCRA 14) or where six persons inflicted injuries on the victim (People v.
Gonzales).
The petitioner appealed to the CA. In its decision of
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. In lieu thereof, another
one is entered CONVICTING the accused of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
The appellate court denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration that followed, thus paving the way for
the present petition for review on certiorari on the sole issue of —
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE PETITIONER FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER.
Thus framed, the sole issue before us is
whether the crime the petitioner
committed should properly be attempted murder based on the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
We
find the petition meritorious.
The RTC and the CA commonly found an
intent to kill. They differ in the
appreciation of the stage of execution of the crime as the RTC considered the
crime frustrated, while the CA
decided that it was attempted because
the victim’s wounds were not fatal. In
both rulings, the RTC and the CA characterized the act to be qualified by abuse
of superior strength; thus, it was either attempted or frustrated murder.
The petitioner, in his Reply,[5]
finds the appreciation of abuse of superior strength to be erroneous, as the
Information charging him with the crime of frustrated murder did not allege
this circumstance with particularity as a qualifying
circumstance. The petitioner therefore posits
that this circumstance, even if proven, must be considered a generic
aggravating circumstance.
We see no merit in the petitioner's
contention in light of our ruling in People v. Aquino[6]
which we intended to guide the bench and the bar on how to allege or specify
qualifying or aggravating circumstances in the Information. We held in this case that the words
“aggravating/qualifying,” “qualifying,” “qualified by,” “aggravating,” or
“aggravated by” need not be expressly stated, so long as the particular
attendant circumstances are specified in the Information.
This conclusion, notwithstanding, we
hold that the conviction of the accused of the crime of either attempted or
frustrated murder is substantively flawed, as both the RTC and the CA
erroneously appreciated the presence of abuse of superior strength as a
qualifying circumstance. Our own
examination of the evidence tells us that no conclusive proof exists showing
the presence of this circumstance in the commission of the felony.
Both the trial and appellate courts
concluded that abuse of superior strength was present because the petitioner
“held the arms of the victim to facilitate the stabbing by his brother (Hermie)
and to limit the degree of resistance that the victim may put up.”[7] The
trial court, in particular, held that “there is no doubt that accused took
advantage of their combined strength when one held the victim by the shoulder
and armpit and the other inflicted two stab wounds on the left side of his
back.” We find this reasoning erroneous.
Abuse of superior strength is present
whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor/s
that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor/s and purposely
selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime.[8] Evidence must show that the assailants
consciously sought the advantage,[9] or
that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.[10]
To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the person attacked.[11] The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size and strength
of the parties.[12]
In
the present case, the prosecution failed to present evidence to show a relative
disparity in age, size, strength, or force, except for the showing that two
assailants, one of them armed with a knife, attacked the victim. The presence of two assailants, one of them
armed with a knife, is not per se indicative
of abuse of superior strength.[13] Mere superiority in numbers does not indicate
the presence of this circumstance.[14] Nor can the circumstance be inferred solely
from the victim’s possibly weaker physical constitution. In fact, what the evidence shows in this case
is a victim who is taller than the assailants[15] and who was even able to deliver retaliatory
fist blows[16] against
the knife-wielder.
The events leading to the stabbing
further belie any finding of deliberate intent on the part of the assailants to
abuse their superior strength over that of the victim.[17] The testimonies of the witnesses, on the
whole, show that the encounter between the victim and his assailants was
unplanned and unpremeditated. The victim
and his companions were simply passing by after a night of conversation with
drinks, while the assailants were simply singing and engaged in merrymaking,
and no conscious effort on the part of the accused appeared to have been made
to use or take advantage of any superior strength that they then enjoyed.[18]
Specifically, we do not find it certain nor clearly established that the
accused, taking advantage of their number, purposely resorted to holding the
victim by the arms so that the knife-wielder would be free to stab him at the
back. In terms of numbers, the victim
was with a companion while only two of the Valenzuela brothers participated in
the attack; thus a parity in numbers existed.
Nor is it certain that the victim was simply overwhelmed by the act of
the accused of holding the victim by the shoulders while his brother stabbed
him at the back. The evidence on this point is simply too sketchy and too
confused for a definitive conclusion. What, to us, is certain is the intent to
kill, as shown by the two stab wounds and their location; they were back wounds
that could have been fatal or near fatal had greater force been used or the
dynamics of the parties’ movements at the time of the stabbing been different.
Even if the accused did not directly wield the knife, he is as guilty as the
knife-wielder for the unity of purpose he has shown in participating in the
attack against the victim, Gregorio.
In light of all these, we are compelled
to rule out the attendance of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying
circumstance. Considering further that
the victim sustained wounds that were not fatal and absent a showing that such
wounds would have certainly caused his death were it not for timely medical
assistance, we declare the petitioner’s guilt to be limited to the crime of attempted
homicide.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Associate
Justice
Acting
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO Associate
Justice |
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate
Justice |
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
CONCHITA
CARPIO-MORALES
Associate Justice
Acting
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Designated
Acting Chairperson of the Second Division effective
** Designated
additional Member of the Second Division effective
***
Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective
****
Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective
[1] Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Information dated May 15, 1996, as quoted in the Decision dated November 21, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan; rollo, p. 30.
[3]
[4] Supra note 2.
[5] Rollo, pp. 137-141.
[6] G.R. Nos. 144340-42,
[7] See CA Decision dated
[8] People v. Daquipil, G.R. Nos. 86305-06,
[9] People v. Casingal, G.R. No. 87163,
[10] People v. Escoto, G.R. No. 91756,
[11] People v. Ventura, G.R. Nos. 148145-46, July 5, 2004, 433 SCRA 389, citing People v. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285, 304 (1976); People v. Sarabia, 96 SCRA 714, 719-720 (1980); People v. Cabato, 160 SCRA 98, 110 (1988); People v. Carpio, 191 SCRA 108, 119 (1990); People v. Moka, 196 SCRA 378, 387 (1991); People v. De Leon, 320 SCRA 495, 505 (1999).
[12] People v. Cabato; People v. Carpio; People v. Moka, supra.
[13] People v. Asis, G.R. No. 118936,
[14] People v. Escoto, supra note 10.
[15] TSN,
[16] Ibid.
[17] People v. Cañete, G.R. No. 120495,
[18] Ibid.
[19] Pursuant to the guidelines laid down in Act No. 4103, as amended, or the Indeterminate Sentence Law.