EN BANC
QUERY
OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court – BRANCH 81, ROMBLON,
ROMBLON – ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.
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A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC
Present: PUNO, C.J., *Quisumbing, *Ynares-Santiago, CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO
MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO,
velasco, JR., NACHURA, leonardo-de
castro, brion,
peralta, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, and ABAD, JJ. Promulgated: August 19, 2009 |
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D E C I S I O N
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BRION, J.: |
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This administrative matter started as a letter-query
dated
The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision places a limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and those already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:
x x x
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or
x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe
posed these questions: “Why may an
incumbent engage in private practice under (b)(2), assuming the same does not
conflict or tend to conflict with his official duties, but a non-incumbent like
myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why
is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very public position that he
is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like myself – who is no longer in a
position of possible abuse/exploitation – cannot?”[1]
The query arose because Atty. Buffe
previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned
from her position effective
Atty.
Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential
treatment to an incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private
practice of his profession so long as this practice does not conflict or tend
to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or
employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government
service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter
before the office where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of her separation from
government employment.
Atty. Buffe further alleged that the
intention of the above prohibition is to remove the exercise of clout,
influence or privity to insider information, which the incumbent public
employee may use in the private practice of his profession. However, this
situation did not obtain in her case, since she had already resigned as Clerk
of Court of RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon. She advanced the view that she could
engage in the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long
as her appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with
her former duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.
Then Deputy Court Administrator (now
Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez made the following observations when the
matter was referred to him:
The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is “to uphold the time-honored principle of public office being a public trust.” Section 4 thereof provides for the norms of conduct of public officials and employees, among others: (a) commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and sincerity. Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism that “[t]hey [public officials and employees] shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the appearance of impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the retired government employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.[2]
Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated
The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. Clearly, there is a misreading of that provision of law.[4]
and further observed:
The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term “such practice” after the phrase “provided that.” It may indeed be misinterpreted as modifying the phrase “engage in the private practice of their profession” should be prefatory sentence that public officials “during their incumbency shall not” be disregarded. However, read in its entirety, “such practice” may only refer to practice “authorized by the Constitution or law” or the exception to the prohibition against the practice of profession. The term “law” was intended by the legislature to include “a memorandum or a circular or an administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of law.”
x x x
The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent public officials and employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy on accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the Constitution …
x x x
The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time public service so that in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter should take precedence over the former.[5][Footnotes omitted]
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel – the rule that deals with outside employment by an incumbent judicial employee and which limits such outside employment to one that “does not require the practice of law.”[6] The prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter where they have intervened while in the government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government service.[7]
In view of the OCAT findings and
recommendations, we issued an En Banc Resolution dated
In compliance with this our Resolution,
Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon reported the
following appearances made by Atty. Buffe:
(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar
Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. versus Leonardo M. Macalam, et al. on February 19,
2008, March 4, 2008, April 10, 2008 and July 9, 2008 as counsel for the
plaintiffs;
(2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled
Melchor M. Manal versus Zosimo Malasa, et al., on (sic) February, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff;
(3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled
Solomon Y. Mayor versus Jose J. Mayor, on
(4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled
Philippine National Bank versus Sps. Mariano and Olivia Silverio, on
Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our
1.
SCA No. 089119028
(Annex C), filed with Branch 54 of the RTC Manila, which had been dismissed
without prejudice on
2.
SCA No. 08120423
(Annex A), filed with Branch 17 of the RTC of Manila, which had been also
dismissed (with or without prejudice) on December 4, 2008 (Annex B) – a recourse taken when undersigned was
already a public prosecutor appearing before the same Branch 81, after she
took her oath of office as such on August 15, 2008.[Emphasis supplied]
She also made known her intent to
elevate the dismissal of the above cases “so
that eventually, the Honorable Supreme Court may put to rest the legal issue/s
presented in the above petitions which is, why is it that R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7
(b)(2) and last par. thereof, apparently contains an express prohibition (valid
or invalid) on the private practice of undersigned’s law profession, before
Branch 81, while on the other hand not containing a similar, express
prohibition in regard to undersigned’s practice of profession, before the same
court, as a public prosecutor – within the supposedly restricted 1-year period?”
OUR ACTION AND RULING
Preliminary Considerations
As we stated at the outset, this
administrative matter confronts us, not merely with the task of determining how
the Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the substance and
form (as the Court does not give interpretative opinions[9]
but can issue circulars and regulations relating to pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts[10]
and in the exercise of its administrative supervision over all courts and
personnel thereof[11]),
but also with the task of responding to admitted violations of Section 7 (b)(2)
of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses on the same subject.
After our directive to the Office of
the Court Administrator to issue a circular on the subject of the query for the
guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we consider this aspect of the
present administrative matter a finished task, subject only to confirmatory
closure when the OCA reports the completion of the undertaking to us.
Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearance,
before the very same branch she served and immediately after her resignation,
is a violation that we cannot close our eyes to and that she cannot run away
from under the cover of the letter-query she filed and her petition for
declaratory relief, whose dismissal she manifested she would pursue up to our
level. We note that at the time she
filed her letter-query (on
Nor can she hide behind the two
declaratory relief petitions she filed, both of which were dismissed, and her
intent to elevate the dismissal to this Court for resolution. The first, filed before the RTC,
Branch 54, Manila, was dismissed on July 23, 2008 because the “court declined
to exercise the power to declare rights as prayed for in the petition, as any
decision that may be rendered will be inutile and will not generally terminate
the uncertainty or controversy.”[12] The second, filed with the RTC, Branch
17,
A last matter to consider before we
proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffe’s actions relates to possible objections
on procedural due process grounds, as we have not made any formal directive to Atty. Buffe to explain why she should not be
penalized for her appearance before Branch 81 soon after her resignation from
that Branch. The essence of due process
is the grant of the opportunity to be heard; what it abhors is the lack of the
opportunity to be heard.[14] The records of this case show that Atty.
Buffe has been amply heard with respect to her actions. She was notified, and she even responded to
our
The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally
provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and
employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits
them from engaging in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency. As an exception, a public
official or employee can engage in the practice of his or her profession under
the following conditions: first, the
private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict,
or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue
to apply for a period of one year after the public official or employee’s
resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the
private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be
undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the
one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the office
the public officer or employee used to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are
predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to
remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government
transactions between a former government official or employee and his or her
former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the
observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours
to serve the public.[15]
Parenthetically,
in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only prohibition
to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also
applies. The latter provision provides
the definitive rule on the “outside employment” that an incumbent court
official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head
of office provided it complies with all of the following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a
person or entity that practices law before the courts or conducts business with
the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be
performed outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible with the
performance of the court personnel’s duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court personnel may render services as
professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or continuing
education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not
require or induce the court personnel to disclose confidential information
acquired while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be
with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless specifically
authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists,
may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment reflects
adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not
accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the
quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered; the practice of law is a
practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside
employment requiring the practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,[16] we
defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.[17] Under both provisions, a common objective is
to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly
or unwittingly use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use
his or her familiarity with court personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases to apply as it applies specifically
to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue
to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty.
Buffe’s situation falls under Section 7.
Atty. Buffe’s
Situation
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty.
Buffe’s admission that she immediately engaged in private practice of law
within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No.
6713. We find it noteworthy, too, that she
is aware of this provision and only objects to its application to her
situation; she perceives it to be unfair that she cannot practice before her
old office – Branch 81 – for a year immediately after resignation, as she
believes that her only limitation is in matters where a conflict of interest
exists between her appearance as counsel and her former duties as Clerk of
Court. She believes that Section 7
(b)(2) gives preferential treatment to incumbent public officials and employees
as against those already separated from government employment.
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets
Section 7 (b)(2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to
practice law. We reiterate what we have
explained above, that the general rule under Section 7 (b)(2) is to bar public
officials and employees from the practice of their professions; it is unlawful
under this general rule for clerks of court to practice their profession. By way of exception, they can practice their
profession if the Constitution or the law allows them, but no conflict of
interest must exist between their current duties and the practice of their
profession. As we also mentioned above,
no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their profession, as
they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of
Conduct for Court Personnel from doing so.
Under both the general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffe’s
basic premise is misplaced.
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in
the practice of law immediately after her separation from the service and
without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under Section
7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court’s
limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within one year before
the office where he or she used to work with.
In a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or
employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on the other,
the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to the
office he or she used to work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save
only where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in
areas where no conflict of interests exists.
This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe’s basic premises.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe’s approach to Section 7
(b)(2) is her awareness of the law and her readiness to risk its violation
because of the unfairness she perceives in the law. We find it disturbing that she first violated
the law before making any inquiry. She
also justifies her position by referring to the practice of other government lawyers
known to her who, after separation from their judicial employment, immediately
engaged in the private practice of law and appeared as private counsels before
the RTC branches where they were previously employed. Again we find this a cavalier attitude on
Atty. Buffe’s part and, to our mind, only emphasizes her own willful or
intentional disregard of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as “unlawful,” Atty. Buffe contravened Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
x x x
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As indicated
by the use of the mandatory word “shall,”
this provision must be strictly complied with. Atty. Buffe failed to do this,
perhaps not with an evil intent, considering the misgivings she had about
Section 7 (b)(2)’s unfairness. Unlawful
conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does not necessarily require the
element of criminality, although the Rule is broad enough to include it.[18] Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the
part of the lawyer is not essential to bring his or her act or omission within
the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in
unlawful conduct.[19] Thus, we find Atty. Buffe liable under this quoted
Rule.
We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyer’s oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]
By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed
the footsteps of the models she cited and wanted to replicate – the former
court officials who immediately waded into practice in the very same court they
came from. She, like they, disgraced the
dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying and disrespecting the law.[20] By
her irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law and in
lawyers.[21] Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her
transparent attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a
letter-query, which she followed up with unmeritorious petitions for
declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the same Section 7 (b)(2) issue,
in the hope perhaps that at some point she would find a ruling favorable to her
cause. These are acts whose implications
do not promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[22]
Considering Atty. Buffe’s ready
admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the principle of res ipsa loquitur finds application, making her administratively
liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[23]
In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort
to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the
basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In
Prudential Bank v. Castro,[24]
the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after
considering his actions based on records
showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the
image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest
and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases
handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the
payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in
their cases.[25] The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for
further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.[26]
Also on the basis of this principle,
we ruled in Richards v. Asoy,[27]
that no evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined
for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.
We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re: Wenceslao Laureta[28] where
we punished a lawyer for grave professional misconduct solely based on his
answer to a show-cause order for contempt and without going into a trial-type
hearing. We ruled then that due process is satisfied as long as the opportunity
to be heard is given to the person to be disciplined.[29]
Likewise
in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,[30]
the respondent was disciplined and
punished for contempt for his slurs regarding the Court’s alleged partiality, incompetence
and lack of integrity on the basis of his answer in a show-cause order for
contempt. The Court took note that the respondent did not deny making the
negative imputations against the Court through the media and even acknowledged
the correctness of his degrading statements. Through a per curiam decision, we justified imposing upon him the penalty of
suspension in the following tenor:
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.[31]
These
cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation
of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given
the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been
afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her
letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.
A member of the bar may be penalized,
even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violation of
the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[32] The
appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[33]
In this case, we cannot discern any
mitigating factors we can apply, save OCAT’s observation that Atty Buffe’s
letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of the parameters of the
prohibition on the practice of the law profession under Section 7 (b) (2) of
R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law,
however, is no excuse, particularly on a matter as sensitive as practice of the
legal profession soon after one’s separation from the service. If Atty. Buffe is correct in the examples she
cited, it is time to ring the bell and to blow the whistle signaling that we
cannot allow this practice to continue.
As we observed earlier,[34]
Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of various fora in
expressing her misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A.
6713. She formally lodged a query with
the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her successive
petitions for declaratory relief.
Effectively, she exposed these fora to the possibility of embarrassment
and confusion through their possibly differing views on the issue she posed. Although this is not strictly the
forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has done is something that we cannot help but consider
with disfavor because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the
Judiciary that it could have spawned.
This is a point against Atty. Buffe that cancels out the leniency we
might have exercised because of the OCAT’s observation about her ignorance of and
misgivings on the extent of the prohibition after separation from the
service.
Under the circumstances, we find that
her actions merit a penalty of fine of P10,000.00, together with a stern
warning to deter her from repeating her transgression and committing other acts
of professional misconduct.[35] This
penalty reflects as well the Court’s sentiments on how seriously the retired,
resigned or separated officers and employees of the Judiciary should regard and
observe the prohibition against the practice of law with the office that they
used to work with.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She is
hereby FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of this violation
and the commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let this Decision be noted in Atty.
Buffe’s record as a member of the Bar.
SO
ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
|
|
(On official leave) LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice |
(On official leave) CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO Associate Justice |
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
* On official leave.
* On official leave.
[1] Rollo, p. 2.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] The last paragraph of Section 5 states: Where a conflict if interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept the outside employment; see rollo, p. 16.
[7] Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
[8] Rollo, p. 23.
[9]
[10] CONSTITUTION,
Article VIII, Section 5(b).
[11]
[12] Rollo, pp. 57-58; attachment “D” to Atty. Buffe’s
Manifestation of
[13]
[14] Prudential
Bank v. Castro, A.C. No. 2756,
November 12, 1987, 155 SCRA 604; Richards v. Asoy, A. C. No. 2655
, July 9, 1987, 152 SCRA 45; In re: Wenceslao Laureta, G.R. No. L-68635,
[15] Aquino-Simbulan
v. Zabat, A.M. No. P-05-1993,
[16]
G.R. No. 100113,
[17] Ibid.
[18] Re:
Report on the Financial Audit Conducted on the Books of Accounts of Atty.
Raquel G. Kho, Clerk of Court IV, Regional Trial Court, Oras, Easter Samar,
A.M. No. P-06-2177,
[19]
[20] Catu v. Rellosa,, A .C. No. 5738,
[21]
[22]
[23] Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct (2004 edition), pp. 457-458; and Pineda, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1999 edition), pp. 338-339.
[24] Supra note 14.
[25]
[26]
[27] Supra note 14.
[28] Supra note 14.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Supra note 14.
[31]
[32] Catu v. Rellosa, supra note 20, p. 221.
[33] Lim-Santiago
v. Saguico, A.C. No. 6705,
[34] See 2nd paragraph of page 8 of this Decision.
[35] Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct, supra note 23, p.
408; Section 12 (c), Rule 139 of the Rules of Court in connection with Section
15 of the same Rule; and Visbal v. Buban, G.R. No. MTJ-02-1432,