EN BANC

 

 

HARLIN CASTILLO ABAYON,

                              Petitioner,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-  versus  -

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAUL A. DAZA,

                          Respondents.

 

G.R. No. 181295

Present:

 

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO, 

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, 

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION, and

PERALTA, JJ.

 

 

Promulgated:

 

April 2, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

 

 

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Resolution[1] dated 28 January 2008 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EPC No. 2007-62, which affirmed the Order dated 8 October 2007 of the COMELEC First Division[2] dismissing the election protest of petitioner Harlin Castillo Abayon (Abayon) for having been filed out of time.

 

Abayon and respondent Raul Daza (Daza) were candidates for the Office of Governor of the Province of Nothern Samar during the 14 May 2007 elections.[3]

 

On 19 May 2007, Abayon filed a pre-proclamation protest before the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBoC) of Northern Samar, docketed as SPC No. 07-037, entitled, “IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO EXCLUDE THE CERTIFICATE[S] OF CANVASS (COC) OF THE MUNICIPALITIES OF CAPUL, ROSARIO AND BOBON—ALL IN THE PROVINCE OF NORTHERN SAMAR WHICH WERE PREPARED UNDER DURESS, THREATS AND INTIMIDATION.”[4] 

 

On 20 May 2007, Daza was proclaimed as the winning candidate having garnered a total of 101,819 votes against Abayon’s 98,351 votes, winning by a margin of 3,468 votes.[5]

 

On 21 May 2007, Abayon filed with the COMELEC SPC NO. 07-069, entitled, “PETITION TO EXCLUDE CERTIFICATE OF CANVAS (COC) OF MUNICIPALITY OF CATUBIG, NORTHERN SAMAR WHICH WAS PREPARED UNDER DURESS, THREATS, COERCION OR INTIMIDATION.”[6]

 

On the same day, Abayon filed with the COMELEC two other petitions, “IN THE MATTER OF PETITION TO DECLARE THE PROCLAMATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT [Daza] AS WINNING CANDIDATE FOR THE POSITION OF GOVERNOR OF NORTHERN SAMAR NULL AND VOID,” docketed as SPC No. 07-070, and “IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF FAILURE OF ELECTIONS IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF CAPUL, ROSARIO AND BOBON, ALL OF NORTHERN SAMAR,” docketed as SPA No. 07-460.[7] 

 

On 24 May 2007, Abayon filed with the COMELEC a fifth petition, “IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DECLARE FAILURE OF ELECTION IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF CATUBIG, NORTHERN SAMAR, AND FOR THE HOLDING OF SPECIAL ELECTIONS THEREOF,” docketed as SPC No. 07-484.[8]

 

          On 29 June 2007, Abayon filed with the COMELEC a Petition of Protest, docketed as EPC No. 2007-62, contesting the election and proclamation of Daza as Governor of Northern Samar.[9]

 

Of Abayon’s numerous petitions, three were denied or dismissed.  SPC No. 07-069, Abayon’s petition to exclude from canvass the COC of Catubig, Northern Samar, was denied by the COMELEC Second Division in a Resolution dated 2 July 2007.[10]  SPC No. 07-484, Abayon’s petition for the declaration of a failure of election in the Municipality of Catubig, Northern Samar, and for the holding of special elections therein, was dismissed by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution dated 9 July 2007.[11]  SPA No. 07-460, Abayon’s petition for the declaration of failure of elections in the Municipalities of Capul, Rosario and Bobon, in Northern Samar, was also dismissed by the COMELEC en banc in a Resolution dated 29 January 2008. [12]

 

Abayon was similarly unsuccessful in EPC No. 2007-62, his Petition of Protest.  On 8 October 2007, the COMELEC First Division issued its Order[13] dismissing Abayon’s election protest for having been filed out of time.  Under Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code,[14] an election protest should be filed within 10 days from the date of the proclamation of the results of the election.  Since Daza was proclaimed on 20 May 2007, Abayon had only until 30 May 2007 to file his election protest.   However, he filed his election protest only on 29 June 2007.  The COMELEC referred to the case of Villamor v. Comelec,[15] when it declared that in order for a petition for annulment of proclamation to suspend the period for filing of election protest, it should be based on a valid pre-proclamation issue.  In applying this ruling, it decreed that the pendency of SPC No. 07-070, Abayon’s petition for annulment of Daza’s proclamation, did not toll the running of the ten-day period for filing an election protest.  SPC No. 07-070 was based on SPC No. 07-037, Abayon’s earlier petition for the exclusion from canvass of the COCs from the Municipalities of Capul, Rosario and Bobon, Norther Samar, since they were prepared under duress, threats, and coercion or intimidation, grounds which do not involve proper pre-proclamation issues.  The COMELEC, thus, decreed in its Order dated 8 October 2007 that:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant election protest is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed out of time.[16]

 

 

          On 10 October 2007, Abayon filed before the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration[17] of the Order dated 8 October 2007 of the COMELEC First Division in EPC No. 2007-62.

 

The COMELEC en banc denied Abayon’s Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution[18] dated 28 January 2008.  It affirmed that the election protest in EPC No. 2007-62 was belatedly filed.  The COMELEC en banc maintained that SPC No. 07-037 seeking the exclusion from canvass of the COCs from three municipalities of Northern Samar was based on grounds that were not proper for a pre-proclamation controversy.  SPC No. 07-037 lacked merit and could not have rendered Daza’s proclamation void.  Consequently, SPC No. 07-070 – in which Abayon challenged Daza’s proclamation on the basis that it was made counting the votes in the COCs sought to be excluded in SPC No. 07-037 – was without merit.  The suspension of the ten-day period for filing an election protest was intended to ensure that the losing candidate who filed a pre-proclamation case retains the right to avail himself of an election protest.  This rationale presupposes that there is a valid pre-proclamation controversy; otherwise, such rationale would be defeated if the ten-day suspension period is applied to a pre-proclamation contest so manifestly baseless that it cannot prosper.  The COMELEC then ruled that:

 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES, as it hereby RESOLVED, to DENY the instant Motion for Reconsideration.  The Resolution of the Commission (First Division) ordering the dismissal of the case for having been filed out of time is hereby AFFIRMED.[19]

 

 

On 5 February 2003, Abayon sought remedy from this Court via the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, on the basis of the following arguments:

 

I

 

VILLAMOR VS. COMELEC APPLIES ONLY TO THE SPECIFIC INSTANCE WHERE THE BASIS FOR THE ANNULMENT OF PROCLAMATION IS BY ITS VERY NATURE COULD NOT BE A GROUND FOR THE ANNULMENT OF PROCLAMATION, LIKE THE ILLEGAL COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD;

 

II

 

VILLAMOR VS. COMELEC IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE THAT (sic) UNDER SECTION 248 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE; HENCE IT SHOULD BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY; AND

 

III

 

THE PROTEST IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE; HENCE, THE PUBLIC INTEREST INVOLVED IN DETERMINING THE TRUE WINNER IN THE ELECTION SHOULD BE PARAMOUNT OVER THE TECHNICAL OBJECTIONS.[20]

 

 

The Court identifies the two main issues in this case to be as follows: (1) whether the mere filing of a pre-proclamation case, regardless of the issues raised therein, suspends the ten-day period for the filing of an election protest; and (2) if the answer to the first issue is in the negative, whether the election protest which is untimely filed may still be considered by the COMELEC.

 

Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code fixes the period within which to file an election contest for provincial offices at ten days after the proclamation of the election results, to wit:

 

Section 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. - A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial and city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

 

 

However, this ten-day period may be suspended, as Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Law provides:

 

Section 248.  Effect of filing petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation.--  The filing with the Commission of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any candidate shall suspend the running of the period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceedings.

 

 

In Dagloc v. Commission on Elections,[21] this Court clarified that the “petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation,” which Section 248 refers to, and which suspends the running of the period within which to file the election protest or quo warranto proceedings, must be a pre-proclamation controversy.  The Court, thus, decreed in the same case that a petition for the declaration of failure of election was not a pre-proclamation controversy and, therefore, did not suspend the running of the reglementary period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceedings.

 

In this case, it is worthy to reiterate that on 20 May 2007, Daza was already proclaimed the winning candidate for the Office of Governor of the Province of Nothern Samar in the 14 May 2007 elections.  Abayon had until 30 May 2007 to file his election protest.  Yet, he filed EPC No. 2007-62, his Petition of Protest only on 29 June 2007, or almost 40 days after Daza’s proclamation. 

 

The Court scrutinized the petitions filed by Abayon in the present case to determine if any of them suspended the ten-day period for the filing of an election protest. 

 

SPA No. 07-460 and SPA No. 07-484, which are petitions for the declaration of failure of elections in the Municipalities of Capul, Rosario, Bolon, and Catubig, Northern Samar, cannot suspend the ten-day period for filing an election protest, per the ruling of the Court in Dagloc.  Abayon also readily admits that SPC No. 07-069, a petition for the exclusion from canvass of the COC from the Municipality of Catubig, had been previously resolved and denied by the COMELEC.[22] 

 

Abayon, however, maintains that SPC No. 07-037, a petition for the exclusion from canvass of the COCs from the Municipalities of Capul, Rosario, and Bobon, Northern Samar; and SPC No. 07-070, a petition to annul the proclamation of Daza, both effectively suspended the running of the period to file EPC No. 2007-62, his election protest.  As regards particularly SPC No. 07-037, Abayon asserts that it is a pre-proclamation case. 

 

Abayon’s position is untenable.

 

Jurisprudence makes it clear that the mere filing of a petition denominated as a pre-proclamation case or one seeking the annulment of a proclamation will not suspend the ten-day period for filing an election protest.  It is required that the issues raised in such a petition be restricted to those that may be properly included therein. 

 

The Court pronounced in Dagloc,[23] and quoted in Villamor v. Commission on Elections,[24] that:

 

Not all actions seeking the annulment of proclamation suspend the running of the period for filing an election protest or a petition for quo warranto.  For it is not the relief prayed for which distinguishes actions under [Section] 248 from an election protest or quo warranto proceedings, but the grounds on which they are based. (Emphasis ours.)

 

 

The grounds that must support a pre-proclamation controversy are limited by the Omnibus Election Code to the following:

 

Section 243.  Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy.—The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

 

(a)    Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

 

(b)    The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;

 

(c)    The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

 

(d)   When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

 

 

The enumeration is restrictive and exclusive.  Thus, in the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects; appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress; and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, which would affect the result of the election, a petition cannot be properly considered as a pre-proclamation controversy. [25]

 

The purpose of a pre-proclamation controversy is to ascertain the winner or winners in the election on the basis of the election returns duly authenticated by the board of inspectors and admitted by the board of canvassers.  It is a well-entrenched rule that the Board of Canvassers and the COMELEC are not to look beyond or behind electoral returns.  A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in nature.  It is the policy of the election law that pre-proclamation controversies be summarily decided, consistent with the law’s desire that the canvass and proclamation be delayed as little as possible.  There is no room for the presentation of evidence aliunde, the inspection of voluminous documents, and for meticulous technical examination.  That is why such questions as those involving the appreciation of votes and the conduct of the campaign and balloting, which require more deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the corresponding election protest.[26]

 

The COMELEC First Division herein found, and Abayon never disputed before the COMELEC or this Court, that SPC No. 07-037, his petition for exclusion from canvass of the COCs from three municipalities in Northern Samar, was based on the grounds quoted hereunder: 

 

[T]he petition for annulment of proclamation was based on an unresolved petition for exclusion from the canvass of three certificates of canvass on the ground that they were allegedly prepared under duress, threats, coercion or intimidation as shown by the following circumstances:

 

1.      a voter was forcibly taken by members of the Philippine Army;

 

2.      a political leader was killed;

 

3.      threats which prevented the holding of campaign sorties or rallies;

 

4.      vote buying; threats and intimidation on voters;

 

5.      alleged missing certificate of canvass; and

 

6.      a wife of a BEI member was seen going in and out of the polling precinct under suspicious circumstances. [27]

 

 

None of the aforementioned circumstances fall under the enumeration of issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy.  Abayon acknowledges that SPC No. 07-037 does not involve the illegal composition of the board of canvassers.[28]  Not any of these circumstances involves defects or irregularities apparent from the physical examination of the election returns.  The alleged abduction of a voter, the killing of a political leader, the threats which prevented the holding of the campaign sorties, and the intimidation of voters, are acts of terrorism which are properly the subject of an election protest, but not of a pre-proclamation controversy.  Precisely, in Dipatuan v. Commission on Elections,[29] the Court held that massive vote-buying, like the allegation of bribery evidenced by the suspicious presence of the wife of a Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) member, was a proper ground for an election protest, but not for a pre-proclamation controversy.

 

          Since SPC No. 07-037 did not qualify as a pre-proclamation controversy, it could not have suspended the ten-day statutory period for the filing of an election protest.

 

Bereft of any legal basis, SPC No. 07-070, Abayon’s petition to annul the proclamation of Daza, likewise, could not have suspended the period for the filing of an election protest.  In SPC No. 07-070, Abayon questioned the validity of “the proclamation of [Daza] despite the pendency of a pre-proclamation controversy, SPC No. 07-037, which questioned the inclusion of three municipal certificates of canvass.”[30]  Abayon posited that Daza’s proclamation was void under Section 20(i) of Republic Act No. 7166, hereunder reproduced:

 

            Section 20.  Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.

 

x x x x

 

(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the object brought to it on appeal by the losing party.  Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.

 

 

To begin with, as this Court already ruled herein, SPC No. 07-037 was not a pre-proclamation case that should defer the proclamation of Daza during its pendency. 

 

More importantly, the procedure under Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7166 applies only to valid pre-proclamation contests.  The first part of Section 20, particularly paragraph (a), actually states that:

 

Section 20. Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns.

 

a) Any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties contesting the inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election returns on any of the grounds authorized under Article XX or Sections 234, 235 and 236 of Article XIX of the Omnibus Election Code shall submit their oral objection to the chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the questioned return is presented for inclusion in the canvass.  Such objection shall be recorded in the minutes of the canvass. [Emphasis ours.]

 

It bears to point out that under Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 7166, election returns may be contested on any of the grounds recognized under Article XX, and Sections 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code.  Sections 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code are the very same grounds for a pre-proclamation controversy recognized under Section 243(b) of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads: “The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236.”  On the other hand, Article XX entitled “Pre-Proclamation Controversies” is unequivocal about the kind of petition discussed therein. Section 20 (i) of Republic Act No. 7166 is part of the procedure undergone by a valid pre-proclamation contest.  Hence, Abayon cannot seek the annulment of Daza’s proclamation, where no valid pre-proclamation contest was filed.

 

SPC No. 07-070 sought the annulment of Daza’s proclamation and was necessarily filed after the said proclamation. Clearly it is not a pre-proclamation case.  Moreover, it is based on a legally implausible ground--the COMELEC’s failure to resolve SPC No. 07-037.  Under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 7166,[31] pre-proclamation cases which are unresolved at the beginning of the term of the winning candidate are automatically terminated. The COMELEC is not obligated to resolve each and every pre-proclamation case.  Since SPC No. 07-070 is apparently not a pre-proclamation contest and it is based on a legal argument which contradicts the law, this Court cannot possibly accord it the effect of suspending the statutory period for the filing of an election protest.

 

To reiterate, the circumstances pointed out by Abayon in SPC No. 07-037 are proper grounds for an election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.  In fact, had Abayon timely filed an election protest, bearing the same allegations and raising identical issues, it would have been given due course.  Instead, Abayon repeatedly insisted on pursuing remedies which were not available to him given, the circumstances alleged in his petitions.

 

Abayon’s assertion that Villamor v. Commission on Elections[32] should not be applied to his case, because of the difference in the factual backgrounds of the two cases, is unconvincing.  In Villamor, the petition to annul the proclamation was based on the purported illegal composition of the municipal board of canvassers, a fact that could have constituted a pre-proclamation controversy.  However, since the petition therein was belatedly filed, after the proclamation of the winning candidate, the Court ruled that it still could not suspend the period for filing an election protest.  Even the factual background in Dagloc is not on all fours with the present case, for it involved a petition for the declaration of failure of elections, which was adjudged not to be a pre-proclamation case.  In the case presently before this Court, Abayon argues that the period for filing his election protest was suspended by his previous filing of SPC No. 07-037, a petition to exclude from canvass the COCs from three municipalities of Northern Samar; and SPC No. 07-070, a petition to annul Daza’s proclamation. 

 

Despite the aforementioned differences between the facts of Villamor and Dagloc vis-à-vis the case at bar, the Court finds the same to be actually irrelevant, and should not detract this Court from applying the wisdom of its ruling in its two decided cases to the one at bar.  It is clear from Villamor and Dagloc that, as provided under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code, the period within which an election protest must be filed could only be suspended upon the filing of a pre-proclamation case based on any of the grounds enumerated under Section 243 of the same Code.  Petitions based upon grounds other than those so identified under Section 243, even if they seek to annul the proclamation, will not suspend the period for filing the election protest.

 

Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code, allowing a pre-proclamation case to suspend the period for filing the election protest, was clearly intended to afford the protestant the opportunity to avail himself of a remedy to its fullest extent; in other words, to have his pre-proclamation case resolved, without the pressure of having to abandon it in order to avail himself of other remedies.  It protects the right of the protestant to still file later on an election protest on grounds that he could not raise in, or only became apparent after his filing of, a pre-proclamation case.  Section 248 is not to be used as a justification for the irresponsible filing of petitions, which on their face are contrary to the provisions of election laws and regulations, and which only serve to delay the filing of proper remedies and clog the dockets of the COMELEC and the courts.

 

The processes of the adjudication of election disputes should not be abused.  By their very nature and given the public interest involved in the determination of the results of an election, the controversies arising from the canvass must be resolved speedily; otherwise, the will of the electorate would be frustrated.  And the delay brought about by the means resorted to by petitioner is precisely the very evil sought to be prevented by election laws and the relevant jurisprudence.[33]

 

It bears enucleation that the rule prescribing the ten-day period for the filing of an election protest is mandatory and jurisdictional; and the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the protest.  Violation of this rule should not be taken lightly, nor should it be brushed aside as a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked.  This is not a mere technicality but an essential requirement, the non-compliance with which would oust the court of jurisdiction over the case.[34]

 

The cases cited by Abayon in support of his present Petition are not in point.  Saquilayan v. Commission on Elections[35] does not involve delay in filing an election protest, but rather the wrongful manner in which the allegations were made in the protest.  Respondent therein filed an election protest, which failed to specifically mention the precincts where widespread election fraud and irregularities supposedly occurred, as well as where and how these occurrences took place.  The Court, nevertheless, allowed the election protest to proceed, taking into account the then recent case Miguel v. Commission on Elections,[36] which was also invoked by Abayon.  Respondent in Miguel filed a timely election protest, wherein he made general allegations of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of the electoral exercise.  Petitioner therein insisted that a “preliminary hearing” on the particulars of the alleged fraud and irregularities must be conducted before the ballots were opened.  The Court ruled in favor of the respondent and held that the opening of the ballot boxes would ascertain, with the least amount of protracted delay, the veracity of fraud and irregularities. 

 

While there is merit in allowing an election protest to proceed in order to ascertain the allegations of massive fraud and irregularities which tend to defeat the electorate’s will, one must also keep sight of jurisdictional requirements such as the period within which to file the protest.  Otherwise, election disputes would drag on, and the political stability which the election rules seek to preserve will be vulnerable to challenges even beyond a reasonable period of time.   In this case, Abayon failed to give this Court a justification for the delay in filing his election protest, apart from his reliance on the argument that the manifestly invalid pre-proclamation case he filed suspended the period for the filing of his election protest.

         

In a special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order.  Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[37]  In the present case, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion.  Rather, it decided the matter in accordance with the prevailing laws and jurisprudence.  The conclusion of the COMELEC on a matter decided within its competence is entitled to utmost respect.[38] 

 

          WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.  The Resolution dated 28 January 2008 of the COMELEC en banc, affirming the Resolution dated  8  October 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, is AFFIRMED. 

 

 

The election protest filed by Abayon is DISMISSED for having been filed out of time.  Costs against petitioner.

 

          SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

 

 

 

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

WE CONCUR:

 

 

 

 

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

 

 

 

 

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

On official leave

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate justice

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

 

 

 

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

 

        Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

 

 

 

 

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

 



*              On official leave.

[1]               Per Curiam, with  Acting Chairman Ressureccion Z. Borra, Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A. Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Moslemen T. Macarambon, concurring. Rollo, pp. 50-56.

[2]               Penned by Presiding Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra with Commissioner Romeo A. Brawner concurring; rollo, pp. 30-36.

[3]               Rollo, p. 30.

[4]               Id. at 6 and 85-86.

[5]               Id. at 5-6.

[6]               Id. at 6 and 86.

[7]               Id. at 6 and 86-87.

[8]               Id. at 6 and 87.

[9]               Id. at 6-7 and 88.

[10]             Id. at 7 and 88.

[11]             Id. at 87.

[12]             Id.

[13]             Id. at 30-36.

[14]             Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code states that:

                Section 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. - A sworn petition contesting election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial and city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

[15]             G.R. No. 169865, 21 July 2006, 496 SCRA 334.

[16]             Rollo, p. 35.

[17]             Id. at 37-49.

[18]             Id. at 50-60.

[19]             Id. at 55.

[20]             Id. at 213-214.

[21]             Dagloc v. Commission on Elections, 378 Phil. 906, 912-917 (1999).

[22]             Rollo, p. 212.

[23]             Supra note 21.

[24]             Supra note 15 at 340.

[25]             Sanchez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. L-78461, L-79146 and L-79212, 12 August 1987, 153 SCRA 67, 75.

[26]             Abella v. Larrazabal, G.R. Nos. 87721-30 and 88004, 21 December 1989, 180 SCRA 509, 516-517; Chu v. Commission on Elections, 377 Phil. 509, 515-518 (1999).

[27]             Rollo, pp. 34-35.

[28]             Sanchez v. Commission on Elections, supra note 25 at 75.         

[29]             Dipatuan  v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 86117, 7 May 1990, 185 SCRA 86, 92-94. ­

[30]             Rollo, p. 215.

[31]             Section 16.  Pre-proclamation Cases Involving Provincial, City and Municipal Offices.  Pre-proclamation cases involving provincial, city and municipal offices shall be allowed and shall be governed by Sections 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 hereof.  All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party.  However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission determined that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari. (Emphasis supplied.)

 

[32]             Supra note 15.

[33]             Baltazar v. Commission on Elections, 403 Phil. 444, 453-454 (2001).

[34]             Roquero v. Commission on Elections, 351 Phil. 1079, 1086 (1998); Robes v. Commission on Elections, 208 Phil. 179, 187 (1983).

[35]             462 Phil. 383 (2003).

[36]             390 Phil. 478 (2000).

[37]             Suliguin v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 166046, 23 March 2006, 485 SCRA 219, 233.

[38]             Ocate v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 170522, 20 November 2006, 507 SCRA 426, 437; Laodenio v. Commission on Elections, 342 Phil. 676, 688 (1997).