G.R. No. 180363 – EDGAR Y. TEVES, petitioner, versus THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES, respondents.
Promulgated: April 28,
2009
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x
CONCURRING OPINION
BRION, J.
I fully concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago. I add these views to further explore the term “moral turpitude” – a term that,
while carrying far-reaching effects, embodies a concept that to date has not
been given much jurisprudential focus.
I. Historical Roots
The term “moral turpitude” first took
root under the United States (U.S.) immigration laws.[1] Its history can be traced back as far as the 17th
century when the States of Virginia and
In 1951, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
on the constitutionality of the term “moral turpitude” in Jordan v. De George.[5] The case presented only one question: whether
conspiracy to defraud the U.S. of taxes on distilled spirits is a crime
involving moral turpitude within the meaning of Section 19 (a) of the
Immigration Act of 1919 (Immigration Act). Sam De George, an Italian immigrant was
convicted twice of conspiracy to defraud the
Whatever the phrase “involving moral turpitude” may
mean in peripheral cases, the decided cases make it plain that crimes in which
fraud was an ingredient have always been regarded as involving moral
turpitude.xxx Fraud is the touchstone by which this case should be judged.xxx
We therefore decide that Congress sufficiently forewarned respondent that the
statutory consequence of twice conspiring to defraud the United States is
deportation. [7]
Significantly, the U.S. Congress has
never exactly defined what amounts to a “crime involving moral turpitude.” The legislative history of statutes
containing the moral turpitude standard indicates that Congress left the interpretation
of the term to
[An] act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in
private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man,
or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and man. xxx Act or
behavior that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of
community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal
offenses as distinguished from others. xxx The quality of a crime involving
grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished
from statutory mala prohibita.[10]
In the
In Re Basa,[22] a 1920 case, provided the first
instance for the Court to define the term moral turpitude in the context of
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the disbarment of a lawyer for conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude. Carlos
S. Basa, a lawyer, was convicted of the crime of abduction with consent. The sole question presented was whether the
crime of abduction with consent, as punished by Article 446 of the Penal Code
of 1887, involved moral turpitude. The
Court, finding no exact definition in the statutes, turned to Bouvier’s Law
Dictionary for guidance and held:
"Moral turpitude," it has been said,
"includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.)
Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact question, it
cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral turpitude.
The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and the
accepted rule of right conduct.
Thus,
early on, the
II. Problems with the Definition of Moral
Turpitude
Through the years, the Court has never
significantly deviated from the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of moral
turpitude as “an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties
which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.”[23]
This definition is more specific than
that used in In re Vinzon[24]
where the term moral turpitude was considered as encompassing “everything which
is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.”[25]
In the
Criticisms of moral turpitude as an
inexactly defined concept are not unwarranted.
First, the current definition of
the term is broad. It can be stretched
to include most kinds of wrongs in society -- a result that the Legislature
could not have intended. This Court
itself concluded in IRRI v. NLRC[29]
that moral turpitude “is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of
which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases
are reached” – once again confirming, as late as 1993 in IRRI, our case-by-case approach in determining the crimes
involving moral turpitude.
Second, the definition also assumes the existence of a universally
recognized code for socially acceptable behavior -- the “private and social duties
which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general”; moral turpitude is
an act violating these duties. The
problem is that the definition does not state what these duties are, or provide
examples of acts which violate them. Instead, it provides terms such as
“baseness,” “vileness,” and “depravity,” which better describe moral reactions
to an act than the act itself. In essence, they are “conclusory but
non-descriptive.”[30] To be sure, the use of morality as a norm
cannot be avoided, as the term “moral turpitude” contains the word “moral” and
its direct connotation of right and wrong. “Turpitude,” on the other hand,
directly means “depravity” which cannot be appreciated without considering an
act’s degree of being right or wrong.
Thus, the law, in adopting the term “moral turpitude,” necessarily
adopted a concept involving notions of morality – standards that involve a good
measure of subjective consideration and, in terms of certainty and fixity, are
far from the usual measures used in law.[31]
Third, as a legal standard, moral turpitude fails to inform anyone of
what it requires.[32]
It has been said that the loose terminology of moral turpitude hampers
uniformity since … [i]t is hardly to be expected that a word which baffle
judges will be more easily interpreted by laymen.[33] This led Justice Jackson to conclude in
Crimes
Categorized as Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude[35]
Since the early 1920 case of In re Basa,[36]
the Court has maintained its case-by-case categorization of crimes on the basis
of moral turpitude and has labeled specific crimes as necessarily involving
moral turpitude. The following is a list, not necessarily complete, of the
crimes adjudged to involve moral turpitude:
1. Abduction with consent[37]
2. Bigamy[38]
3. Concubinage[39]
4. Smuggling[40]
5. Rape[41]
6. Estafa through falsification of a
document[42]
7. Attempted Bribery[43]
8. Profiteering[44]
9. Robbery[45]
10.
Murder, whether consummated or attempted[46]
11.
Estafa[47]
12.
Theft[48]
13.
Illicit Sexual Relations with a Fellow Worker[49]
14.
Violation of BP Bldg. 22[50]
15.
Falsification of Document[51]
16.
Intriguing against Honor[52]
17.
Violation of the Anti-Fencing Law[53]
18.
Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Drug-pushing)[54]
19.
Perjury[55]
20.
Forgery[56]
21.
Direct Bribery[57]
22.
Frustrated Homicide[58]
Zari v. Flores[59] is one case
that has provided jurisprudence its own list of crimes involving moral
turpitude, namely: adultery, concubinage, rape, arson, evasion of income tax,
barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium,
dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of
loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication
of evidence, offenses against pension laws, perjury, seduction under the
promise of marriage, estafa, falsification of public document, and estafa thru
falsification of public document.[60]
Crimes Categorized as Crimes Not
Involving Moral Turpitude[61]
The Court, on the other hand, has also
had the occasion to
categorically rule that certain crimes do not involve moral turpitude, namely:
1. Minor transgressions of the law (i.e., conviction for speeding)[62]
2. Illegal recruitment[63]
3. Slight physical injuries and carrying
of deadly weapon (Illegal possession of firearms)[64]
4. Indirect Contempt[65]
III.
Approaches
and Standards.
Even a cursory examination of the above
lists readily reveals that while the concept of “moral turpitude” does not have
one specific definition that lends itself to easy and ready application, the
Court has been fairly consistent in its understanding
and application of the term and
has not significantly deviated from what it laid down in In re Basa. The key element,
directly derived from the word “turpitude,” is the standard of depravity viewed
from a scale of right and wrong.
The application of this depravity standard
can be made from at least three perspectives or approaches, namely: from the objective perspective of the act itself,
irrespective of whether or not the act is a crime; from the perspective of the crime itself, as
defined through its elements; and from the subjective
perspective that takes into account the perpetrator’s level of depravity when
he committed the crime.
The Court best expressed the first
approach in Zari v. Flores[66]
where the Court saw the involvement of moral turpitude where an act is intrinsically
immoral, regardless of whether it is punishable by law or not. The Court
emphasized that moral turpitude goes beyond being merely mala prohibita; the act itself must be inherently immoral. Thus, this approach requires that the
committed act itself be examined, divorced from its characterization as a crime.
A ruling that exemplifies this
approach is that made in the
Gambling has been in existence
since time immemorial. Card playing for small stakes is a common accompaniment
of social life; small bets on horse racing and the “policy or numbers games”
are diversions of the masses. That such enterprises exist surreptitiously is a
matter of common knowledge. Many countries permit it under a license system. In
ancient times laws were enacted to discourage people from gambling on the
theory that the State had first claim upon their time and energy, and at later
dates antigambling laws were aimed especially at the activity as practiced by
the working classes. Present-day movements to suppress gambling are also tinged
with other considerations. In urban communities in the past few decades the
purely religious opposition to gambling has tended to become less violent
because certain activities, highly reputable according to prevailing social
standards, have come more and more to resemble it. Prohibition against gambling
has had something of a police rather than a truly penal character. At all times
an important fact in arousing antagonism in gambling has been the association,
almost inevitable, with sharp practice. In established societies more or less serious
attempts are everywhere made, however, to prohibit or to regulate gambling in
its more notorious forms.
It would appear that statutes permitting gambling,
such as those under discussion, rest primarily on the theory that they are in the
interest of public policy: that is to regulate and restrict any possible abuse,
to obviate cheating and other corrupt practices that may result if
uncontrolled.
From this discussion, the
Court went on to conclude that gambling is a malum prohibitum that is not intrinsically evil and, thus, is not a
crime involving moral turpitude.
With the same approach, but with a
different result, is Office of the Court
Administrator v. Librado,[68] a case involving drug possession. Librado, a Deputy Sheriff in
In People v. Yambot,[71]
the Court categorically ruled that the possession of a deadly weapon does not
involve moral turpitude since the act of
carrying a weapon by itself is not inherently wrong in the absence of a law
punishing it. Likewise, the Court
acknowledged in Court Administrator v.
San Andres[72] that
illegal recruitment does not involve moral turpitude since it is not in itself
an evil act – being ordinarily an act in the ordinary course of business – in
the absence of the a law prohibiting it.
The second approach is
to look at the act committed through its elements as a crime. In Paras
v. Vailoces,[73]
the Court recognized that as a “general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an
element are looked on as involving moral turpitude.” This is the same conclusion that the U.S.
Supreme Court made in Jordan, i.e.,
that crimes requiring fraud or intent to defraud always involve moral
turpitude.[74]
Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections[75] is a case in
point that uses the second approach and is one case where the Court even
dispensed with the review of facts and circumstances surrounding the commission
of the crime since Dela Torre did not assail his conviction. Dela Torre was
disqualified by the Comelec from running as Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna on the
basis of his conviction for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612,
otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law.
Dela Torre appealed to this Court to overturn his disqualification on
the ground that the crime of fencing is not a crime involving moral
turpitude. The Court ruled that moral
turpitude is deducible from the third element.
Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is
stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful
property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very
nature, are crimes of moral turpitude.
To be sure, the elements of the
crime can be a critical factor in determining moral turpitude if the second
approach is used in the crimes listed above as involving moral turpitude. In Villaber v. Commission on Elections,[76]
the Court, by analyzing the elements alone of the offense under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22, held that the “presence of the second element manifest moral
turpitude” in that “a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges
on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.” The same conclusion was reached by the Court in
Magno v. Commission on Elections,[77] when it ruled that direct bribery
involves moral turpitude, thus:
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that
the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust
act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors,
denotes a malicious intent on the
part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and
society in general. Also, the fact that
the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the
trust reposed on him by the public. It
is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice,
honesty and good morals. In all
respects, direct bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude. [Emphasis supplied]
The third
approach, the subjective approach, essentially takes the offender and
his acts into account in light of the attendant circumstances of the crime: was
he motivated by ill will indicating depravity? The Court apparently used this approach in Ao Lin
v. Republic,[78] a 1964 case, when it held “that the use of a meter stick without the corresponding seal
of the Internal Revenue Office by one who has been engaged in business for a
long time, involves moral turpitude because it involves a fraudulent use of a
meter stick, not necessarily because the Government is cheated of the revenue
involved in the sealing of the meter stick, but because it manifests an evil intent on
the part of the petitioner to defraud customers purchasing from him in
respect to the measurement of the goods purchased.”
In IRRI v. NLRC,[79]
the International Rice Research Institute terminated the employment contract of
Nestor Micosa on the ground that he has been convicted of the crime of homicide
– a a crime involving moral turpitude. The
Court refused to characterize the crime of homicide as one of moral turpitude
in light of the circumstances of its commission. The Court ruled:
These facts show that Micosa’s intention was not to
slay the victim but only to defend his person.
The appreciation in his favor of the
mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the
total absence of any aggravating circumstances demonstrate that Micosa’s
character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust. [italics supllied].
The
Court stressed, too, not only the subjective element, but the need for the
appreciation of facts in considering whether moral turpitude exists – an
unavoidable step under the third approach.
Thus, the Court explained:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime
of homicide do not involve moral turpitude.
Homicide may or may not involve
moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not
involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional
violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
surrounding circumstances. [Emphasis supplied]
In contrast, while IRRI refused to characterize the crime
of homicide as one of moral turpitude, the recent case of Soriano v. Dizon[80] held that based on the circumstances, the
crime of frustrated homicide committed by the respondent involved moral
turpitude. In Soriano,
complainant Soriano filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Manuel
Dizon alleging that the crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude under
the circumstances surrounding its commission, and was a sufficient ground for
his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The Court after noting the factual
antecedents of IRRI held that –
The present case is totally different. As the
IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of
respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as
he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it.
The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact
that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the
circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the
lawyer’s assault.
We also consider the trial court’s
finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a
position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the
assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the
eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make
matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so
as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention
to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably
bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were,
he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be
slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which
was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a
lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not the
persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority
and to exact revenge. [81] [Emphasis
supplied]
Laguitan v. Tinio,[82] expressed in
terms of the protection of the sanctity of marriage,[83]
also necessarily looked at the subjective element because the offender’s
concubinage involved an assault on the basic social institution of
marriage. Another subjective element
case, in terms of looking at the damage wrought by the offender’s act, is People v. Jamero[84] where the
Court disregarded the appellants’ argument that the trial court erred in
ordering the discharge of Inocencio Retirado from the Information in order to
make him a state witness, since he has been previously convicted of the crime
of malicious mischief – a crime involving moral turpitude. The Court said:
In
the absence of any evidence to show the gravity and the nature of the malicious
mischief committed, We are not in a position to say whether or not the previous
conviction of malicious mischief proves that accused had displayed the
baseness, the vileness and the depravity which constitute moral turpitude. And considering that under paragraph 3 of Article
329 of the Revised Penal Code, any deliberate act (not constituting arson or
other crimes involving destruction) causing damage in the property of another,
may constitute the crime of malicious mischief, We should not make haste in declaring that such crime involves moral
turpitude without determining, at least, the value of the property destroyed
and/or the circumstances under which the act of destroying was committed.[85] [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, again, the need for
a factual determination was considered necessary.
In sum, a survey of jurisprudence
from the earliest case of In Re Basa[86]
to the recent case of Soriano v. Dizon [87] shows that the Court has used varying
approaches, but used the same standard or measure – the degree of attendant depravity.
The safest approach to avoid being misled in one’s conclusion is to
apply all three approaches, if possible, and to evaluate the results from each
of the approaches. A useful caveat in the evaluation is to resolve any
doubt in favor of the perpetrator, as a conclusion of moral turpitude invariably
signifies a worse consequence for him or her.
IV.
The Approaches Applied to
TEVES
The Objective Approach
The crime for
which petitioner Teves was convicted (possession of pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit) is, at its core, related to gambling – an act that by
contemporary community standards is not per
se immoral. Other than the ruling
heretofore cited on this point,[88]
judicial notice can be taken of state-sponsored gambling activities in the
country that, although not without controversy, is generally regarded to be
within acceptable moral limits. The ponencia correctly noted that prior to
the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, mere possession by a public
officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not expressly prohibited. This bit of history alone is an indicator
that, objectively, no essential depravity is involved even from the standards
of a holder of a public office. This
reasoning led the ponencia to
conclude that “its illegality does not mean that violation thereof . . . makes
such possession of interest inherently immoral.”[89]
From the Perspective of the Elements of the Crime
Under this approach, we determine
whether a crime involves moral turpitude based solely on our analysis of the elements
of the crime alone.
The essential elements of the offense
of possession of prohibited interest (Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law) for
which the petitioner was convicted are:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial
or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such
interest by the Constitution or any law.
From the perspective of moral
turpitude, the third element is the critical element. This element shows that the holding of interest
that the law covers is not a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted
rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals; it is illegal solely because of the
prohibition that exists in law or in the Constitution. Thus, no depravity immediately leaps up or
suggests itself based on the elements of the crime committed.
The Subjective Approach
This
approach is largely the ponencia’s
approach, as it expressly stated that “a determination of all surrounding
circumstances of the violation of the statute must be considered.”[90]
In doing this, the ponencia firstly
considered that the petitioner did not use his official capacity in connection
with the interest in the cockpit, not that he hid this interest by transferring
it to his wife, as the transfer took effect before the effectivity of the law
prohibiting the possession of interest.
The ponencia significantly
noted, too, that the violation was not intentionally committed in a manner
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals, but due simply to Teves’ lack of
awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.
This, in my view, is the clinching argument that no moral turpitude can
be involved as no depravity can be gleaned where intent is clearly absent.
Conclusion
To recapitulate, all three approaches
point to the conclusion that no moral turpitude was involved in the crime Teves
committed, with the predominant reasons being the first (or objective) and the
third (or subjective) approaches. Analysis in this manner, with one approach
reinforcing another, results in clear and easily appreciated conclusions.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
[1] Jordan v. De George, 341
[2] Brian C. Harms, Redefining “Crimes of Moral Turpitude”: A Proposal to Congress, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259, 261 (2001).
[3]
[4] Supra note 1, p. 227.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Derrick Moore, “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude”: Why the
Void-For-Vagueness Argument is Still Available and Meritorious, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 813, 816 (2008).
[9]
[10]
[11] Effective September 1, 1901.
[12] Now RULES OF COURT, Rule 138,
Section 27.
[13] ACT NO. 2711, Section 234,
[14] ACT NO. 3613, Section 45,
[15] COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 1, Section
57,
[16] COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473,
Section 4,
[17] COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 613, Section
29,
[18] REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, Rule 119, Section 17.
[19] RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Section 2.
[20] BATAS PAMBANSA
BLG. 337, Section 60,
[21] BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881,
Section 12,
[22] 41 Phil. 275, 276 (1920).
[23] Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 121592, July 5,
1996, 258 SCRA 483, 487, citing Zari v.
Flores, 94 SCRA 317, 323 (1979).
[24] G.R. No. 561, April 27, 1967, 19
SCRA 815.
[25] Cited in Rafael Christopher Yap, Bouncing Doctrine:
Re-Examining the Supreme Court’s Pronouncements of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 as a Crime of Moral Turpitude (2006), p. 13 (unpublished J.D. thesis, Ateneo de
Manila University, on file with the Professional Schools Library, Ateneo de
Manila University).
[26] Supra note 8, p. 816.
[27] Supra note 1, p. 235.
[28] Supra note 8, p. 814.
[29] G.R. No. 97239, May 12, 1993,
221 SCRA 760.
[30] Nate Carter, Shocking The Conscience of Mankind: Using
International Law To Define “Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude” In Immigration
Law, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 955, 959 (2006).
[31] A similar concept is “obscenity,”
whose standards have been in continuous development in U.S. Supreme Court
rulings. See Roth v. United States;
Albert v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). Only a decade after Roth, Justice Harlan observed that “[t]he subject of obscenity has
produced a variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any
other course of constitutional adjudication.”
As evidence, Justice Harlan noted that in the thirteen obscenity cases
decided in the decade after Roth,
there were “a total of 55 separate opinions among the Justices;” Geoffrey R. Stone et al., Constitutional
Law, 1255, (1996
ed.) citing Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-705, 705 n.1 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
[32] Supra note 30, p. 959.
[33]
Supra note 8, p.
813, citing Note, Crimes Involving Moral
Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV. 117, 121 (1930).
[34] Supra note 1, p. 242.
[35] Supra note 25, pp. 20-21.
[36] Supra note 22.
[37]
[38] In Re Marcelino Lontok, 43 Phil. 293 (1922).
[39] In Re Juan C. Isada, 60 Phil 915 (1934); Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, A.C. No. 6148, February 27, 2004, 424 SCRA
42 citing Laguitan v. Tinio, A.C. No.
3049, December 4, 1989, 179 SCRA 837.
[40] In Re Atty. Tranquilino Rovero, 92 Phil. 128 (1952).
[41] Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143 (1955).
[42] In the Matter of Eduardo A. Abesamis, 102 Phil.1182 (1958).
[43] In Re Dalmacio De
[44] Tak Ng v. Republic of the
[45] Paras v. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439,
[46] Can v. Galing, G.R. No. L-54258,
[47] In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon, Admin. Case No. 561,
[48] Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. L-63652
[49]
[50] People v. Tuanda, A.M. No. 3360, January 30, 1990, 181 SCRA 692; Paolo C. Villaber v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No.148326, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 126; Selwyn F. Lao v. Atty. Robert W. Medel, A.C. No. 5916, July 1, 2003,
405 SCRA 227.
[51] University of the
[52] Betguen v. Masangcay, A.M. No. P-93-822,
[53] Supra note 23 at 483.
[54] Office of the Court Administrator
v. Librado, A.M. No. P-94-1089,
[55] People v. Sorrel, G.R. No. 119332,
[56] Campilan v. Campilan Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-96-1100,
[57] Magno v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 147904,
[58] Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792,
[59] Adm. No. (2170-MC) P-1356,
[60] Supra note 25 at 21.
[61]
[62] Ng Teng Lin v. Republic, 103 Phil. 484 (1959).
[63] Court Administrator v. San Andres, A.M. No. P-89-345,
[64] People v. Yambot, G.R. No. 120350,
[65] Garcia v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052,
[66] Supra note 59.
[67] 1
[68] Supra note 54.
[69] Supra note 25, p. 23.
[70] Supra note 59, p. 323.
[71] Supra note 64.
[72] Supra note 63.
[73] Supra note 45.
[74] Supra note 1, p. 228.
[75] Supra note 23.
[76] Supra note 50, p. 134.
[77] Supra note 57.
[78] G.R. No. L-18506,
[79] Supra note 29.
[80] Supra note 58.
[81] Supra note 58, pp. 10-11.
[82] Supra note 39.
[83] Supra note 25, p. 24.
[84] G.R. No. L-19852,
[85]
[86] Supra note 22.
[87] Supra note 58.
[88] Supra note 67.
[89] Ponencia, p. 9.
[90]