EDGAR Y.
TEVES, G.R. No. 180363
Petitioner,
Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio,
Austria-Martinez,
- versus -
Carpio Morales,
Tinga,
Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
Leonardo-De
Castro,
Brion,
Peralta, and
Bersamin, JJ.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and HERMINIO G. TEVES, Promulgated:
Respondents.
April 28, 2009
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The
issue for resolution is whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves
was convicted in Teves v. Sandiganbayan[1]
involved moral turpitude.
The
facts of the case are undisputed.
Petitioner
was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd
legislative district of Negros Oriental during the
On
Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc which was denied in its assailed
It
appears, however, that [petitioner] lost in the last
WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration dated
SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, the instant petition based on
the following grounds:
I.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC DEMURRED IN RESOLVING THE MAIN ISSUE RAISED IN PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WHETHER PETITIONER IS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.
II.
THE MAIN ISSUE IS NOT RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC AS THE RESOLUTION THEREOF WILL DETERMINE PETITIONER’S QUALIFICATION TO RUN FOR OTHER PUBLIC POSITIONS IN FUTURE ELECTIONS.
III.
THERE WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN THE COMELEC EN BANC IN EFFECT AFFIRMED THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION WHICH RULED THAT PETITIONER’S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(H) OF R.A. 3019 AND THE IMPOSITION OF FINE IS A CONVICTION FOR A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.
A.
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE SHOULD BE RESOLVED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN G.R. NO. 154182.
B.
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT THAT SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE COMELEC, THAT BASED ON THE “TOTALITY OF FACTS” DOCTRINE, PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE.[7]
The
petition is impressed with merit.
The
fact that petitioner lost in the congressional race in the May 14, 2007
elections did not effectively moot the issue of whether he was disqualified from
running for public office on the ground that the crime he was convicted of involved
moral turpitude. It is still a
justiciable issue which the COMELEC should have resolved instead of merely declaring
that the disqualification case has become moot in view of petitioner’s defeat.
Further,
there is no basis in the COMELEC’s findings that petitioner is eligible to run again
in the 2010 elections because his disqualification shall be deemed removed
after the expiration of a period of five years from service of the sentence. Assuming
that the elections would be held on
Hence,
it behooves the Court to resolve the issue of whether or not petitioner’s violation
of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral turpitude.
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code reads:
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
Moral
turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice,
modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general.[9]
Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019 of
which petitioner was convicted, reads:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
x x x x
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
The
essential elements of the violation of said provision are as follows: 1) The
accused is a public officer; 2) he has a direct or indirect financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; 3) he either: a)
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such
interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or
by law.[10]
Thus,
there are two modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect
financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may
violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. The
first mode is when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official
capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract, or transaction. The
second mode is when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the
Constitution or by law.[11]
In
Teves v. Sandiganbayan,[12] petitioner
was convicted under the second mode for having pecuniary or financial interest
in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code
of 1991. The Court held therein:
However, the evidence for the
prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of
Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore, prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads:
Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to:
x x x x
(2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit…. [Emphasis supplied].
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest.[13]
However, conviction under the second
mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude. A
determination of all surrounding circumstances of the violation of the statute
must be considered. Besides, moral
turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case.
Thus,
in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,[14]
the Court clarified that:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that “as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine.” In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in “Zari v. Flores,” to wit:
“It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited.”
This guideline nonetheless proved
short of providing a clear-cut solution, for in “International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted
that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not
exist by merely classifying a crime as malum
in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve
moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether
or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statute. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying
the foregoing guidelines, we examined all the circumstances surrounding
petitioner’s conviction and found that the same does not involve moral
turpitude.
First, there is neither merit nor
factual basis in COMELEC’s finding that petitioner used his official capacity
in connection with his interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by
transferring the management to his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on
him by the people.
The
COMELEC, in justifying its conclusion that petitioner’s conviction involved
moral turpitude, misunderstood or misapplied our ruling in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. According to the COMELEC:
In the present case, while the crime
for which [petitioner] was convicted may per
se not involve moral turpitude, still the totality of facts evinces [his]
moral turpitude. The prohibition was
intended to avoid any conflict of interest or any instance wherein the public
official would favor his own interest at the expense of the public interest. The [petitioner] knew of the prohibition but
he attempted to circumvent the same by holding out that the Valencia Cockpit
and
[Petitioner] therefore maintained ownership of the cockpit by deceit. He has the duty to divest himself but he did not and instead employed means to hide his interests. He knew that it was prohibited he nevertheless concealed his interest thereon. The facts that he hid his interest denotes his malicious intent to favor self-interest at the expense of the public. Only a man with a malevolent, decadent, corrupt and selfish motive would cling on and conceal his interest, the acquisition of which is prohibited. This plainly shows his moral depravity and proclivity to put primacy on his self interest over that of his fellowmen. Being a public official, his act is also a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the people. Clearly, the totality of his acts is contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, honesty and good morals. The crime, as committed by the [petitioner], plainly involves moral turpitude.[15]
On
the contrary, the Court’s ruling states:
The
Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the
issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and
Thus,
petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or
power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his
interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his
wife considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the
present LGC prohibiting possession of such interest.
As
aptly observed in Teves v. Sandiganbayan:
As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was
already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit.
Since then until
Second, while possession of business and
pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit is
expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean
that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such
possession of interest inherently immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by
a public officer of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the
prohibitions. Thus, in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, the Court took
judicial notice of the fact that:
x x x under the old
LGC, mere possession of pecuniary
interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41
thereof. Such possession became unlawful or prohibited only upon the
advent of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on
The
downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine years and
twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum to a lighter penalty of a
fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioner’s violation was not intentionally
done contrary to justice, modesty, or
good morals but due to his lack of awareness or ignorance of the
prohibition.
Lastly, it may be argued that having an
interest in a cockpit is detrimental to public morality as it tends to bring
forth idlers and gamblers, hence, violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC
involves moral turpitude.
Suffice
it to state that cockfighting, or sabong
in the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was
prevalent even during the Spanish occupation.[19] While it is a form of gambling, the morality
thereof or the wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue. In Magtajas
v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., it was held that:
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do no sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections dated May 11, 2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar
Y. Teves from running for the position of Representative of the 3rd
District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered
declaring that the crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of
R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.
SO
ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MA.
ALICIA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO
M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] 488 Phil. 311 (2004).
[2] Rollo, pp. 130-134.
[3] Supra, note 1.
[4] Rollo, pp. 131, 133 & 134.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8] Rollo, p. 145.
[9] Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792,
[10] Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
149175,
[11]
[12] Supra note 4.
[13]
[14] 327 Phil. 1144, 1150-1151 (1996).
[15] Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[16] Teves v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 1 at 327-328.
[17]
[18] Supra note 4 at 333-334.
[19] Tan v. Pereña G.R. No. 149743,