EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987 (HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC OF THE
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application for registration of a piece of land originally filed by the late Mario Malabanan (Malabanan), petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. The land subject of the instant Petition, being alienable and disposable land of the public domain, may not be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code, nor registered pursuant to Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
At the outset, it must be made clear that
the Property Registration Decree governs registration of land under the
Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree allows “those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws,” to apply for
registration of their title to the lands.
Petitioners do not fall under such
provision, taking into account that the land they are seeking to register is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, a fact which would have several substantial implications.
First,
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree clearly and explicitly refers
to “private lands,” without mention at all of public lands. There is no other way to understand the plain
language of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree except that the
land was already private when the applicant for registration acquired ownership
thereof by prescription. The
prescription therein was not the means by which the public land was converted
to private land; rather, it was the way the applicant acquired title to what is
already private land, from another person previously holding title to the same.[2] The provision in question is very clear and
unambiguous. Well-settled is the rule
that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason
for interpretation or construction, but only for application.[3]
With the
understanding that Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree applies
only to what are already private lands, then, there is no question that the
same can be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code, because,
precisely, it is the Civil Code which governs rights to private lands.
Second,
Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act,
as amended, reads:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis ours.)
The
afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural public lands may be
disposed of by the State, and at the same time, mandates that the latter can only do so by the modes identified in
the same provision. Thus, the intent of
the legislature to make exclusive
the enumeration of the modes by which agricultural public land may be disposed
of by the State in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as amended, is not only
readily apparent, but explicit. And, undeniably, the enumeration of the modes
for acquiring agricultural public land in the said provision does not include
prescription, in the concepts described and periods prescribed by the Civil
Code.
Neither the
Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree can overcome the express
restriction placed by the Public Land Act, as amended, on the modes by which
the State may dispose of agricultural public land.
The Public
Land Act, as amended, is a special law specifically applying to lands of the
public domain, except timber and mineral lands.
The Public Land Act, as amended, being a special law, necessarily
prevails over the Civil Code, a general law.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that "where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one
designed therefor specially should prevail." Generalia specialibus non derogant. [4]
As for the
Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed that the same cannot confer
title to land and can only confirm title that already exists or has
vested. As has already been previously
discussed herein, title to agricultural public land vests or is acquired only
by any of the modes enumerated in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as
amended.
And, third, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was amended several times, changing the period of possession required for
acquiring an imperfect title to agricultural public land:
Under
the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect title required
possession en concepto de dueño since time immemorial, or since
Prior to
Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to agricultural land of the
public domain could be acquired by adverse possession of 30 years. Presidential Decree No. 1073, issued on 25
January 1977, amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by requiring
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public domain
since 12 June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect title. Hence, by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
1073, the requisite period of possession for acquiring imperfect title to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain is no longer determined according to a
fixed term (i.e., 30 years); instead, it shall be reckoned from a fixed date (i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier) from which the possession should
have commenced.
If the
Court allows the acquisition of alienable and disposable land of the public
domain by prescription under the Civil Code, and registration of title to land
thus acquired under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, it would
be sanctioning what is effectively a circumvention of the amendment introduced by
Presidential Decree No. 1073 to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Acquisition of alienable and disposable land
of the public domain by possession would again be made to depend on a fixed
term (i.e., 10 years for ordinary
prescription and 30 years for extraordinary prescription), rather than being
reckoned from the fixed date presently stipulated by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended.
There being no basis for petitioners’ application for registration of the public agricultural land in question, accordingly, the same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the majority opinion concerning the contradictory pronouncements of the Court in Republic v. Naguit[6] and Republic v. Herbieto,[7] on imperfect titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, acquired in accordance with Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and registered pursuant to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
According to Naguit, a person seeking judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, need only prove that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession and occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
and that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the time of filing of the application for judicial confirmation
and/or registration of title. On the
other hand, it was held in Herbieto that
such a person must establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession and occupation of the subject land since
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to the dismissive treatment of my elucidation in said case on the acquisition of imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent.[8]
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed in Herbieto the registration of certain parcels of land of the public domain in the names of Jeremias and David Herbieto, based on two grounds, one substantive and the other procedural, i.e., (1) the applicants for registration failed to prove that they possessed the subject parcels of land for the period required by law; and (2) the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue first, and held that the alleged infirmity in the application constituted a misjoinder of causes of action which did not warrant a dismissal of the case, only the severance of the misjoined causes of action so that they could be heard by the court separately. The Court though took note of the belated publication of the notice of hearing on the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto, the hearing was already held before the notice of the same was published. Such error was not only procedural, but jurisdictional, and was fatal to the application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto.
The Court
then proceeded to a determination of the substantive issue in Herbieto, particularly, whether Jeremias
and David Herbieto possessed the parcels of land they wish to register in their
names for the period required by law.
The Court ruled in the negative.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, on judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, requires possession of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain since
The
discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition
of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
which could be the subject of judicial confirmation, was not unnecessary to the decision of said case. It was not
a mere remark made or opinion expressed upon a cause, "by the way," or
only incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon a question before the
Court; or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of the
cause; or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument, as to
constitute obiter dictum.
It must be emphasized that the acquisition
of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, was directly raised as
an issue in the Petition in Herbieto
and discussed extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That the application of Jeremias and David
Herbieto could already be dismissed on the ground of lack of proper publication
of the notice of hearing thereof, did not necessarily preclude the Court from
resolving the other issues squarely raised in the Petition before it. Thus, the Court dismissed the application for
registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto on two grounds: (1) the lack of
jurisdiction of the land registration court over the application, in light of
the absence of proper publication of the notice of hearing; and (2) the evident lack of merit of
the application given that the applicants failed to comply with the
requirements for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended.
This is only in keeping with the duty of the Court to expeditiously and
completely resolve the cases before it and, once and for all, settle the
dispute and issues between the parties.
Without expressly discussing and categorically ruling on the second
ground, Jeremias and David Herbieto could have easily believed that they could
re-file their respective applications for registration, just taking care to
comply with the publication-of-notice requirement.
Of
particular relevance herein is the following discourse in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals[9] on what constitutes, or more
appropriately, what does not
constitute obiter dictum:
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is, or might have been, made on some other ground, or even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise than it did. A decision which the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the contention, it was necessary to consider another question, nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2) or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be denied authority merely because another point was more dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a decision on one proposition make statements of the court regarding other propositions dicta.
An adjudication on any point within
the issues presented by the case cannot be considered a dictum; and this rule
applies as to all pertinent questions, although only incidentally involved,
which are presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of
the case, and lead up to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the opinion
as to a matter on which the decision is predicated. Accordingly, a point
expressly decided does not lose its value as a precedent because the
disposition of the case is or might have been made on some other ground, or
even though, by reason of other points in the case, the result reached might
have been the same if the court had held, on the particular point, otherwise
than it did.[10]
I submit
that Herbieto only applied the clear
provisions of the law and established jurisprudence on the matter, and is
binding as a precedent.
Section
14(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly requires for the
acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, possession by a Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land since
12 June 1945 or earlier, to wit:
Section. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
x x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours.)
Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, by substantially reiterating Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, recognizes the imperfect title thus
acquired and allows the registration of the same, viz:
Section 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile,
jurisprudence has long settled that possession of the land by the applicant for
registration prior to the reclassification of the land as alienable and
disposable cannot be credited to the applicant’s favor.[11]
Given the
foregoing, judicial confirmation and registration of an imperfect title, under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, respectively, should only be granted when: (1) a
Filipino citizen, by himself
or through his predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of the
public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) the
land in question, necessarily, was already declared alienable and disposable
also by 12 June 1945 or earlier.
There can
be no other interpretation of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which would not run
afoul of either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said laws or binding
judicial precedents.
I do not
agree in the observation of the majority opinion that the interpretation of
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, adopted in Herbieto, would result in
absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation
forecloses a person from acquiring an imperfect title to a parcel of land
declared alienable and disposable only after
Stringency
and prudence in interpreting and applying Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, is well justified by the significant consequences arising from a
finding that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural land of the public
domain. Not just any lengthy occupation
of an agricultural public land could ripen into an imperfect title. An
imperfect title can only be acquired by occupation and possession of the land by a person and his predecessors-in-interest for the period required and considered by law
sufficient as to have segregated the land from
the mass of public land. When a person
is said to have acquired an imperfect title, by operation of law, he acquires a
right to a grant, a government grant to the land, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. As
such, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and goes beyond the
authority of the State to dispose of. An
application for confirmation of title, therefore, is but a mere formality.[12]
In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of the Public Land
Act, as amended, has identified several ways by which agricultural lands of the
public domain may be disposed of. Each
mode of disposing of agricultural public land has its own specific requirements
which must be complied with. If a person
is not qualified for a judicial confirmation of an imperfect title, because the
land in question was declared alienable and disposable only after
Regardless of my dissent to the
affirmation by the majority of the ruling in Naguit on Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, I cast my vote with the
majority, to DENY the Petition at
bar and AFFIRM the Decision dated 23
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2000 of the Court of Appeals
dismissing, for absolute lack of basis, petitioners’ application for
registration of alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[1] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998,
[2]
As in the case where the land was already the subject
of a grant by the State to a private person, but the latter failed to
immediately register his title, thus, allowing another person to acquire title
to the land by prescription under the provisions of the Civil Code.
[3] Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 118745,
[4] See
De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 132257,
[5] Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112172,
[6] G.R.
No. 144057,
[7] G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005.
[8] Delta Motors
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 121075,
[9] G.R.
No. 142947,
[10]
1 C. J. S. 314-315, as quoted in the dissenting
opinion of Tuason, J., in Primicias v.
Fugoso, G.R. No. L-1800,
[11]
See Almeda v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322,
[12] See
National Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 4566,