NORMAN
A. GAID, G.R. No. 171636
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
-
versus - CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO,
JR., and
PERALTA,
JJ.
PEOPLE
OF THE
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 7, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Before
the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
assailing the
Petitioner
Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide in an information which reads as follow:
That
on or about 12:00 high noon of October 25, 2001, infront of the Laguindingan
National High School, Poblacion, Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused mentioned
above while driving a passenger’s jeepney color white bearing plate no. KVG-771
owned by barangay captain Levy Etom has no precautionary measure to preempt the
accident, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ran [sic] over Michael Dayata resulting of [sic] his untimely death as pronounced by
the attending physician of
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial ensued.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
At around 12:00 noon on 25 October
2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where
the Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog
in Misamis Oriental. His jeepney was
filled to seating capacity.[5] At the time several students were coming out
of the school premises.[6] Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael
Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near
a store on the left side of the road. From
where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag
down petitioner’s jeepney[7]
which was traveling on the right lane of the road.[8] However, neither did petitioner nor the
conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to
ride at that point.[9]
The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata’s
feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on
the ground behind the jeepney.[10] Another
prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was also situated on the left
side of the street but directly in front of the school gate, heard “a strong
impact coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in
order to hurdle an obstacle.”[11] Dayata was then seen lying on the ground[12]
and caught in between the rear tires.[13] Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of
the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side.[14]
Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was
run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the victim. Petitioner
stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of the victim.[15] Mellalos loaded the victim on a motorcycle
and brought him to the hospital. Dayata
was first brought to the
Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report
stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of death.[17] She testified that the head injuries of
Dayata could have been caused by having run over by the jeepney.[18]
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Laguindingan[19] found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The lower court held petitioner negligent in
his driving considering that the victim was dragged to a distance of 5.70
meters from the point of impact. He was
also scored for “not stopping his vehicle after noticing that the jeepney’s
left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards the right.”[20] On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[21]
affirmed in toto the decision of the
MCTC.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court’s judgment with modification in that it found petitioner guilty only
of simple negligence resulting in homicide.
The Court of Appeals exonerated
petitioner from the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide on the
ground that he was not driving recklessly at the time of the accident. However, the appellate court still found him to
be negligent when he failed “to promptly stop his vehicle to check what caused
the sudden jotting of its rear tire.”[22]
In its
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner submits that the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that “there is (sic)
absolutely lack of precaution on the part of the petitioner when he continued
even after he had noticed that the left rear tire and the jeep tilted to its
right side.”[24] Petitioner stressed that he, in fact, stopped
his jeep when its left rear tire bounced and upon hearing that somebody had
been ran over.
Moreover, petitioner asserts that the
Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in convicting him of the
offense of simple negligence resulting in homicide. Assuming arguendo that he failed to promptly stop
his vehicle, petitioner maintains that no prudent man placed in the same
situation could have foreseen the vehicular accident or could have stopped his
vehicle in time when its left rear tire bounced due to the following reasons:
(1) the victim was only a trespasser; (2) petitioner’s attention was focused on
the road and the students outside the school’s gate; and (3) the jeepney was
fully loaded with passengers and cargoes and it was impossible for the petitioner
to promptly stop his vehicle.[25]
The Office of the Solicitor-General
(OSG) maintained that petitioner was negligent when he continued to run towards
the direction of Moog, Laguindingan, dragging the victim a few meters from the
point of impact, despite hearing that a child had been run over.[26]
The presence or
absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative
events leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or
stages. The first stage began when
Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road
and ended when he was run over by the jeepney.
The second stage covered the span between the moment immediately after
the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a
halt.
During the first stage, petitioner
was not shown to be negligent.
Reckless imprudence consists of
voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the person performing or failing to perform such act.[27]
In Manzanares v. People,[28]
this Court convicted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting
in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries when he was found driving
the Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into a jeepney.[29] Likewise,
in Pangonorom v. People,[30] a
public utility driver, who was driving very fast, failed to slow down and hit a
swerving car. He was found negligent by
this Court.
In the instant case, petitioner was driving
slowly at the time of the accident, as testified to by two eyewitnesses. Prosecution witness Actub affirmed this fact
on cross-examination, thus:
ATTY. MACUA:
(to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, when the
passenger jeepney passed by the gate of the
A Yes, he was running slowly.[31]
The slow pace of the jeepney was seconded by Mellalos:
Q You testified that you heard somebody outside from the vehicle shouting that a boy was ran over, am I correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, before you heard that shouting, did you observe any motion from the vehicle?
A The jeep was moving slowly and I noticed that there was something that [sic] the jeep a little bit bounced up as if a hump that’s the time I heard a shout from outside.[32]
Petitioner stated that he was driving
at no more than 15 kilometers per hour.[33]
It appears from the evidence Dayata
came from the left side of the street. Petitioner,
who was driving the jeepney on the right lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near the jeepney
at the left side. Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road
ahead. In Dayata’s haste to board the
jeep which was then running, his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire,
as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only saw
Dayata after he heard a strong impact coming from the jeep.
With the foregoing facts, petitioner
can not be held liable during the first stage.
Specifically, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide, as found by the trial court.
The proximate cause of the accident and the death of the victim was
definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to
get a ride.
In the instant case, petitioner had
exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of
the school. He cannot be faulted for not
having seen the victim who came from behind on the left side.
However, the Court of Appeals found
petitioner guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide for failing to
stop driving at the time when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the appellate court was referring to
the second stage of the incident.
Negligence has been defined as the
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[34]
The elements of simple negligence:
are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly
manifest.[35]
The
standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury
or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent
man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually
pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.[36]
In Philippine National Construction Corporation
v. Court of Appeals,[37]
the petitioner was the franchisee that operates and maintains the toll
facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways. It failed to exercise the requisite diligence
in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers
on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the
ground. The highway was still wet from
the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have
foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing
by at night or in the wee hours of the morning.[38]
Consequently, it was held liable for damages.
In an American case, Hernandez v. Lukas,[39] a motorist traveling within the speed limit and did
all was possible to avoid striking a child who was then six years old only. The place of the incident was a neighborhood
where children were playing in the parkways on prior occasions. The court ruled that it must be still proven
that the driver did not exercise due care.
The evidence showed that the driver was proceeding in lawful manner
within the speed limit when the child ran into the street and was struck by the
driver’s vehicle. Clearly, this was an
emergency situation thrust upon the driver too suddenly to avoid.
In this case, the courts below zeroed
in on the fact that petitioner did not stop the jeepney when he felt the
bouncing of his vehicle, a circumstance which the appellate
court equates with negligence. Petitioner contends that he did not
immediately stop because he did not see anybody go near his vehicle at the time
of the incident.[40]
Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that
his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate
cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the
result would not
have
occurred.[41] In order to establish a motorist's
liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there
was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or
damages complained of. Thus,
negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of
the accident is not the proximate cause of
an injury.[42]
The head injuries sustained by Dayata
at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death, as
indicated in the post-mortem findings.[43] His
skull was crushed as a result of the accident.
Had petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have
saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal.
The
evidence on record do not show that the jeepney dragged the victim after he was
hit and run over by the jeepney. Quite
the contrary, the evidence discloses that the victim was not dragged at
all. In fact, it is the other way
around. Bongolto narrated that after the impact, he
saw Dayata left behind the jeepney.[44] Actub saw Dayata in a prone position and
bleeding within seconds after impact.[45]
Right after the impact, Mellalos immediately jumped out of the jeepney and saw
the victim lying on the ground.[46] The distance of 5.70 meters is the length of
space between the spot where the victim fell to the ground and the spot where
the jeepney stopped as observed by the trial judge during the ocular inspection
at the scene of the accident.[47]
Moreover, mere suspicions and
speculations that the victim could have lived had petitioner stopped can never
be the basis of a conviction in a criminal case.[48] The Court must be satisfied that the guilt of
the accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.[49] Conviction must rest on nothing less than a
moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.
The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
innocence of the accused but whether it entertains doubt as to his guilt.[50]
Clearly then, the prosecution was not
able to establish that the proximate cause of the victim’s death was
petitioner’s alleged negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the
incident.
If at all again, petitioner’s failure
to render assistance to the victim would constitute abandonment of one’s victim
punishable under Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the omission is not covered by the
information. Thus, to hold petitioner
criminally liable under the provision would be tantamount to a denial of due
process.
Therefore, petitioner must be
acquitted at least on reasonable doubt. The
award of damages must also be deleted pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil
Code which states that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[2]
[27]People v. Garcia, 467 Phil. 1102, 1108-1109 (2004; People v. Agliday, 419 Phil. 555, 566 (2001)..
[36]Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159270, 22 August 2005, 467 SCRA 569, 581.
[41]Calimutan v. People, G.R.
No. 152133, 9 February 2006, 482 SCRA 44, 60; Lambert v. Heirs of Roy Castillon,
G.R. No. 160709, 23 February 2005, 452 SCRA 285, 291; St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, 426
Phil. 878, 886 (2002); Raynera v. Hiceta,
365 Phil. 546, 553 (1999).
[42]8 Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles §426, citing Branstetter v. Gerdeman, 364 Mo. 1230, 274 S.W.2d 240 (1955) and Salerno v. LaBarr, 159 Pa. Commw. 99, 632 A.2d 1002 (1993).
[43]Records, p. 65.
[47]