THIRD
DIVISION
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HEIRS OF TOMAS DOLLETON, HERACLIO ORCULLO, REMEDIOS
SAN PEDRO, HEIRS OF BERNARDO MILLAMA, HEIRS OF AGAPITO VILLANUEVA, HEIRS OF
HILARION GARCIA, SERAFINA SP ARGANA, and HEIRS OF MARIANO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, - versus - FIL-ESTATE MANAGEMENT INC., ET AL. AND THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF LAS Respondents. |
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G.R. No.
170750 Present: QUISUMBING,* YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,** CHICO-NAZARIO,
and PERALTA,
JJ. Promulgated: April 7, 2009 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing (1) the Decision[1]
dated 16 September 2005, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
80927, which affirmed the Resolutions[2]
dated 8 September 2000 and 30 June 2003, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 253, of Las Piñas City, dismissing the Complaints in Civil Cases No.
LP-97-0228, No. LP-97-0229, No. LP-97-0230, No. LP-97-0231, No. LP-97-0236, No.
LP-97-0237, No. LP-97-0238, and No. LP-97-0239; and (2) the Resolution dated
In October 1997,
petitioners Heirs of Tomas Dolleton,[3]
Heraclio Orcullo, Remedios San Pedro, et
al.,[4]
Heirs of Bernardo Millama, et al.,[5]
Heirs of Agapito Villanueva, et al.,[6]
Heirs of Hilarion Garcia, et al.,[7]
Serafina SP Argana, et al.,[8]
and Heirs of Mariano Villanueva, et al.[9]
filed before the RTC separate Complaints for Quieting of Title and/or Recovery
of Ownership and Possession with Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order and
Damages against respondents Fil-Estate Management Inc., Spouses Arturo E. Dy
and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty Development, Inc.,[10]
and the Register of Deeds of Las Piñas. The Complaints, which were later
consolidated, were docketed as follows:
1. Civil Case No. L-97-0228, which was filed by the Heirs of Tomas Dolleton covering a parcel of land with an area of 17,681 square meters, located in Magasawang Mangga, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal under Psu-235279 approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands on 20 February 1959;
2. Civil Case No. L-97-0229, which was filed by Heraclio Orcullo covering two (2) parcels of land with the total areas of 14,429 square meters and 2,105 square meters, respectively, located in Magasawang Mangga, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal under Lots 1 and 2, Psu-169404 approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands on 4 December 1959;
3. Civil Case No. L-97-0230, which was filed by Remedios San Pedro, et al., covering a parcel of land with an area of 17,159 square meters, located in Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal under Psu-96901 approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands on 21 July 1933;
4. Civil Case No. L-97-0231, which was filed by the Heirs of Bernardo Millama, et al., covering a parcel of land with an area of 23,359 square meters, located in Magasawang Mangga, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal under Psu-96905 approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands on 16 January 1933;
5. Civil Case No. L-97-0236, which was filed by the Heirs of Agapito Villanueva covering a parcel of land with an area of 10,572 square meters, located in Magasawang Mangga, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal;
6. Civil Case No. L-97-0237, which was filed by the Heirs of Hilarion Garcia, et al., covering a parcel of land with an area of 15,372 square meters, located in Magasawang Mangga, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal under Psu-96920 approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands on 16 January 1933;
7. Civil Case No. L-97-0238, which was filed by Serafina SP Argana, et al., covering a parcel of land with an area of 29,391 square meters, located in Magasawang Mangga, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal under Psu-96909 approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands on 18 January 1933; and
8.
Civil Case No. L-97-0239, which was filed by the Heirs
of Mariano Villanueva, et al., covering
a parcel of land with an area of 7,454 square meters, located in Magasawang
Mangga, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal under Psu-96910 approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands on
The eight
Complaints[11] were
similarly worded and contained substantially identical allegations. Petitioners claimed in their Complaints that
they had been in continuous, open, and exclusive possession of the afore-described
parcels of land (subject properties) for more than 90 years until they were
forcibly ousted by armed men hired by respondents in 1991. They had cultivated the subject properties
and religiously paid the real estate taxes for the same. Respondents cannot rely on Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 9176, No. 9177, No. 9178, No. 9179, No. 9180, No.
9181 and No. 9182,[12] issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas in their names, to support their claim over
the subject properties since, petitioners averred, the subject properties were
not covered by said certificates. Petitioners
also alleged that said TCTs, purportedly derived from Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 6122, issued in favor of Jose Velasquez, were spurious.
To support
their narration of facts, petitioners cited Vda.
de Cailles v. Mayuga[13]
and Orosa v. Migrino,[14]
which both involved the parcel of land referred to as
Petitioners
stressed, however, that in Vda. de
Cailles and Orosa, the land that
was transferred was
Petitioners
thus sought from the RTC that an order be issued enjoining respondents from
making any developments on the subject properties, and that after hearing,
judgment be rendered as follows:
A. [Herein respondents] be ordered to recognize the rights of [herein petitioners]; to vacate the subject lot and peacefully surrender possession thereof to [petitioners]; and that Transfer Certificate of Title Numbers 9176, 9177, 9178, 9179, 9180 and 9182 be cancelled by the Register of Deeds for Las Pinas, Metro Manila, insofar as they are or may be utilized to deprive [petitioners] of the possession and ownership of said lot.
B. Making the preliminary injunctions permanent.
C. An order be issued directing [respondents] to pay [petitioners] the sums of:
a. P500,000.00 as moral damages;
b. P150,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
c. P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
and,
d. Cost of suit.
[Petitioners] further pray for such other affirmative reliefs as are deemed just and equitable in the premises.[15]
Respondents
filed before the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction.[16] They moved for the dismissal of the eight Complaints
on the grounds of (1) prescription; (2) laches; (3) lack of cause of action;
and (4) res judicata.[17]
Respondents
argued that the Complaints sought the annulment of the certificates of title
that were issued in their names. Section
32 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree,[18]
provides that the decree of registration and the certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto can only be nullified on the ground of fraud within one year
after the entry of such decree of registration.
Respondents’ TCTs could be traced back to the decree/s of registration
entered in 1966/1967, which resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 6122 in the
name of Jose Velasquez, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest. Hence, the filing of the Complaints only in
October 1997 was made beyond the prescription period for assailing a decree of
registration and/or the certificate of title issued pursuant thereto. Additionally, petitioners’ Complaints were
actions for reconveyance of the subject properties based on implied trust, the
filing of which prescribes after 10 years from the time said properties were
first registered under the
Respondents
also contended that petitioners were guilty of laches. Despite their alleged possession of the
subject properties for 90 years, petitioners failed to take any steps to oppose
the land registration cases involving the same properties or to seek the
nullification of the decrees of registration and certificates of title which were
entered and issued as early as 1966 and 1967.[21]
Moreover, respondents
maintained that the Complaints should be dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action. Even assuming that petitioners
were able to prove their allegations of longtime possession and payment of realty
taxes on the subject properties, and to submit a sketch plan of the same, these
cannot defeat a claim of ownership over the parcels of land, which were already
registered under the Torrens system in the name of respondents and the other
consortium members.[22]
Lastly,
respondents insisted that the Complaints should be dismissed on the ground of res judicata.[23]
By virtue of the decided cases Vda. de Cailles and Orosa, which petitioners themselves cited in their Complaints, any
claims to all portions of
On
On
On the basis of the foregoing reasons alone, the instant complaint should immediately be DISMISSED. Accordingly, the prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is DENIED. This, however, is without prejudice to the complaint-in-intervention filed by intervenors over the disputed properties, their undivided interests being intertwined and attached to the disputed properties wherever it goes and whoever is in possession of the same, their right to bring action to pursue the same being imprescriptible.[28]
On
On
In its
Decision dated
Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the afore-mentioned Decision,[33]
which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 9 December 2005.[34]
Hence, the
present Petition, where petitioners made the following assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT A QUO, DATED SEPTEMBER 8, 2000 AND THE RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 30, 2003, BASED PURELY ON THE TECHNICALITY OF THE LAW RATHER THAN THE LAW THAT PROTECT[S] THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS WHO WERE FORCIBLY EVICTED FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE LANDHOLDINGS BY THE USED (sic) OF BRUTE FORCE OF ARMED MEN ON THE BASIS OF THE TITLES OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, IN VIOLATION OF THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS AND OF DUE PROCESS.
II
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT A QUO, DESPITE THE FACT THAT A FULL BLOWN HEARING ON THE MERIT[S] IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE ACTUAL LOCATION ON THE ACTUAL GROUND [OF] THE LOTS COVERED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT (sic) TITLES, LOTS COVERED BY ITS TITLES ARE MORE THAN THREE HUNDRED (300 m) METERS AWAY TO THE WEST-NORTHWEST FROM THE CONSOLIDATED LOTS OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS AND THEREFORE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS BRUTAL ACTION IN FORCIBLY EVICTING THE PETITIONERS FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE LANDHOLDINGS BY THE USED (sic) OF BRUTE FORCE OF ARMED MEN, ARE PURELY CASES OF LANDGRABBING.[35]
This Petition is meritorious.
The main issue in this case is
whether the RTC properly granted respondents’ motion to dismiss. This Court finds that the trial court erred
in dismissing petitioners’ Complaints.
Complaints sufficiently stated a cause of action.
Respondents seek the dismissal of
petitioners’ Complaints for failure to state a cause of action. Even assuming as true that the subject properties
have been in the possession of petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest
for 90 years; that petitioners have been paying the realty taxes thereon; and
that petitioners are able to submit a sketch plan of the subject properties,
respondents maintain that their ownership of the subject properties, evidenced
by certificates of title registered in their names, cannot be defeated. This contention is untenable.
Respondents mistakenly construe the
allegations in petitioners’ Complaints. What
petitioners alleged in their Complaints was that while the subject properties
were not covered by respondents’ certificates of title, nevertheless,
respondents forcibly evicted petitioners therefrom. Hence, it is not simply a question of whether
petitioners’ possession can defeat respondents’ title to registered land. Instead, an initial determination has to be
made on whether the subject properties were in fact covered by respondents’
certificates of title.
Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a
party violates the right of another. Its
essential elements are as follows: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of
the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff, for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. [36]
The elementary test for failure to
state a cause of action is whether the complaint alleges facts which if true
would justify the relief demanded. The
inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations.
If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be
maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
presented by the defendant.[37]
This Court is convinced that each of
the Complaints filed by petitioners sufficiently stated a cause of action. The
Complaints alleged that petitioners are the owners of the subject properties by
acquisitive prescription. As owners
thereof, they have the right to remain in peaceful possession of the said properties
and, if deprived thereof, they may recover the same. Section 428 of the Civil Code provides that:
Article 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
Petitioners averred that respondents
had violated their rights as owner of the subject properties by evicting the
former therefrom by means of force and intimidation. Respondents allegedly retained possession of
the subject properties by invoking certificates of title covering other parcels
of land. Resultantly, petitioners filed
the cases before the RTC in order to recover possession of the subject properties,
to prevent respondents from using their TCTs to defeat petitioners’ rights of
ownership and possession over said subject properties, and to claim damages and
other reliefs that the court may deem just and equitable.
The Court notes that petitioners’
prayer for the cancellation of respondents’ certificates of title are
inconsistent with their allegations.
Petitioners prayed for in their Complaints that, among other reliefs,
judgment be rendered so that “Transfer Certificate of Title Numbers 9176, 9177,
9178, 9179, 9180, 9181, and 9182 be cancelled by the Register of Deeds for Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, insofar as they are or may be utilized to deprive
plaintiffs of possession and ownership of said lot.” Yet, petitioners also made it plain that the
subject properties, of which respondents unlawfully deprived them, were not
covered by respondents’ certificates of title.
It is apparent that the main concern of petitioners is to prevent
respondents from using or invoking their certificates of title to deprive
petitioners of their ownership and possession over the subject properties; and
not to assert a superior right to the land covered by respondents’ certificates
of title. Admittedly, while petitioners can seek the recovery of the subject properties,
they cannot ask for the cancellation of respondents’ TCTs since petitioners
failed to allege any interest in the land covered thereby. Still, the other reliefs sought by
petitioners, i.e., recovery of the
possession of the subject properties and compensation for the damages resulting
from respondents’ forcible taking of their property, are still proper.
Petitioners’ Complaints should not
have been dismissed despite the seeming error made by petitioners in their
prayer. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.[38]
Complaints are not barred by prescription and laches.
In their Motion to Dismiss,
respondents argued that petitioners’ cases were barred by prescription, in
accordance with Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree and Articles
1144(2) and 1456 of the Civil Code.
Respondents relied on the premise that the actions instituted by
petitioners before the RTC were for the reopening and review of the decree of registration
and reconveyance of the subject properties.
Section 32 of the Property
Registration Decree provides that a decree of registration may be reopened when
a person is deprived of land or an interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation obtained by actual fraud.
On the other hand, an action for reconveyance respects the decree of
registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons’ names, to its
rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.[39]
In both instances, the land of which a person was deprived should be the same
land which was fraudulently or erroneously registered in another person’s name,
which is not the case herein, if the Court considers the allegations in
petitioners’ Complaints.
As previously established,
petitioners’ main contention is that the subject properties from which they
were forcibly evicted were not covered by respondents’ certificates of title. Stated differently, the subject properties and
the land registered in respondents’ names are not identical. Consequently, petitioners do not have any
interest in challenging the registration of the land in respondents’ names, even
if the same was procured by fraud.
While petitioners improperly prayed
for the cancellation of respondents’ TCTs in their Complaints, there is nothing
else in the said Complaints that would support the conclusion that they are
either petitions for reopening and review of the decree of registration under
Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree or actions for reconveyance based
on implied trust under Article 1456 of the Civil Code. Instead, petitioners’ Complaints may be said
to be in the nature of an accion reivindicatoria,
an action for recovery of ownership and possession of the subject properties,
from which they were evicted sometime between 1991 and 1994 by respondents. An accion
reivindicatoria may be availed of within
10 years from dispossession.[40] There is no showing that prescription had
already set in when petitioners filed their Complaints in 1997.
Furthermore, the affirmative defense
of prescription does not automatically warrant the dismissal of a complaint
under Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
An allegation of prescription can effectively be used in a motion to
dismiss only when the Complaint on its face shows that indeed the action has
already prescribed. [41] If the issue of prescription is one involving
evidentiary matters requiring a full-blown trial on the merits, it cannot be
determined in a motion to dismiss.[42] In the case at bar, respondents must first be
able to establish by evidence that the subject properties are indeed covered by
their certificates of title before they can argue that any remedy assailing the
registration of said properties or the issuance of the certificates of title
over the same in the names of respondents or their predecessors-in-interest has
prescribed.
Neither
can the Court sustain respondents’ assertion that petitioners’ Complaints were
barred by laches.
Laches has been defined as the
failure of or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier; or to assert a right within reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert
it. Thus, the doctrine of laches
presumes that the party guilty of negligence had the opportunity to do what
should have been done, but failed to do so.
Conversely, if the said party did not have the occasion to assert the right,
then, he cannot be adjudged guilty of laches.
Laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time; rather, the party
must have been afforded an opportunity to pursue his claim in order that the
delay may sufficiently constitute laches.[43]
Again, going back to petitioners’ chief
claim that the subject properties are distinct from the land covered by
respondents’ certificates of title, then, petitioners would have no standing to
oppose the registration of the latter property in the names of respondents or
their predecessors-in-interest, or to seek the nullification of the
certificates of title issued over the same.
It also appears from the records that
the RTC did not conduct a hearing to receive evidence proving that petitioners
were guilty of laches. Well-settled is
the rule that the elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature, a fact that
cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and cannot be
resolved in a motion to dismiss. At this
stage, therefore, the dismissal of petitioners’ Complaints on the ground of
laches is premature. Those issues must
be resolved at the trial of the case on the merits, wherein both parties will
be given ample opportunity to prove their respective claims and defenses.[44]
Complaints are not barred by res judicata.
Lastly, respondents
argued in their Motion to Dismiss that petitioners’ Complaints are barred by res judicata, citing Vda. de Cailles and Orosa. Likewise, petitioners
are barred from instituting any case for recovery of possession by the MTC
Decision in Civil Case No. 3271.
Res judicata
refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former
suit. Res judicata has two concepts: (1) “bar by prior judgment” as
enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47 (b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2)
“conclusiveness of judgment” in Rule 39, Section 47 (c).
There is “bar by prior judgment”
when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the second
case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. But where there is
identity of parties and subject matter
in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the first
judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely involved therein. There is “conclusiveness of judgment.” Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment, facts and issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties, even if the
latter suit may involve a different claim or cause of action. The identity of causes of action is not
required but merely identity of issues.[45]
Vda. de Cailles and Orosa cannot bar the filing of petitioners’ Complaints before the
RTC under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, since they involve entirely
different subject matters. In both
cases, the subject matter was a parcel of land referred to as Lot 9 Psu-11411
Amd-2, while subject matter of the petitioners’ Complaints are lots which are
not included in the said land.
It follows
that the more stringent requirements of res
judicata as “bar by prior judgment” will not apply to petitioners’
Complaints. In Vda. de Cailles, the Court confirmed the ownership of Dominador
Mayuga over a 53-hectare parcel of land located in Las Piñas, Rizal, more
particularly referred to as
The
adjudication of the land to respondents’ predecessors-in-interest in Vda. de Cailles and Orosa is not even relevant to petitioners’ Complaints. According to
petitioners’ allegations in their Complaints, although the subject properties
were derived from the 119.8-hectare parcel of land referred to as Lot 9,
Psu-11411, they are not included in the 53-hectare portion thereof, specifically
identified as Lot 9, Psu-11411, Amd-2, subject of Vda. de Cailles and Orosa. This was the reason why petitioners had to cite
Vda. de Cailles and Orosa: to distinguish the subject properties
from the land acquired by respondents and the other members of the consortium. There clearly being no identity of subject
matter and of parties, then, the rulings of this Court in Vda. de Cailles and Orosa do
not bar by prior judgment Civil Cases No. LP-97-0228, No. LP-97-0229, No.
LP-97-0230, No. LP-97-0231, No. LP-97-0236, No. LP-97-0237, No. LP-97-0238, and
No. LP-97-0239 instituted by petitioners in the RTC.
The Court is aware that petitioners
erroneously averred in their Complaints that the subject properties “originated
from Psu-11411,
Similarly,
the Decision dated
The MTC, in
its
The subject parcels of land are covered by (TCT) Nos. 9176, 9177, 9178,
9179, [9180], [9181] and 9182 (Exhs. “1” to “7”, Defendants) all issued in the
name of defendant Fil-Estate Management, Inc. It appears from the evidence presented that
defendant Fil-Estate purchased the said property from Goldenrod, Inc. It also appears from the evidence that the
subject property at the time of the purchase was then occupied by
squatters/intruders. By reason thereof,
the
x x x x
In fine, plaintiffs have not clearly established their right of possession over the property in question. They claim ownership, but no evidence was ever presented to prove such fact. They claim possession from time immemorial. But the Census prepared by Las Piñas negated this posture.[46] (Emphasis provided.)
The determination
by the MTC that petitioners were not occupants of the parcels of land covered
by TCTs No. 9176, No. 9177, No. 9178, No. 9179, No. 9180, and No. 9181 cannot
bar their claims over another parcel of land not covered by the said TCTs.
It should also be noted that petitioners Heirs of Agapito Villanueva do
not appear to be plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3271 and, therefore, cannot be
bound by the MTC Decision therein.
In all, this Court pronounces that
respondents failed to raise a proper ground for the dismissal of petitioners’ Complaints. Petitioners’ claims and respondents’
opposition and defenses thereto are best ventilated in a trial on the merits of
the cases.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice Chairperson |
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 607, dated
** Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales was
designated to sit as additional member replacing Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. with Associate Justices Portia
Aliño-Hormachuelos and Vicente Roxas, concurring. Rollo,
pp. 49-57.
[2] Penned
by Presiding Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr.
[3] The
Heirs of Tomas Dolleton are composed of the children of his deceased children
Marcelo, Alipio, Severa, Pablo, Nicomedes and Apolonio, herein named as Ignacia
Dolleton, Benjamin Dolleton, Jorge Dolleton, Rosita Dolleton, Rolando Dolleton,
Dominga Amatorio, Francisca Alcantara, Emeteria Solomon, Minerva Parel, Zoraida
D. Vargas, Pascual Dolleton, Nancy Dolleton, Alejandro Dolleton, Zenaida
Dolleton, Celia D. Vasquez, Apolonio Dolleton, Jr., Rosalia Panganiban.
Records, Vol. 1, p. 1.
[4] The
co-plaintiffs of Remedios San Pedro are Rodolfo San Pedro, Nora San Pedro,
Avelina San Pedro, Caridad San Pedro, Solidad San Pedro, Tomas San Pedro,
Nicasio San Pedro II, Alfredo San Pedro, Jesus San Pedro, Adorado San Pedro,
Dolores San Pedro, Francisca San Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Renato San Pedro and
Rea San Pedro. Records, Vol. 4, p. 1.
[5] The
Heirs of Bernardo Millama are composed of his children namely Mariano Millama,
Teodoro Millama, Candida Javier, Raymundo Millama, Eleuterio Estomata, and
Rodrigo Millama, as well as the children and granchildren of his deceased son
Valeriano Millama who were named as Julita M. Navarro, Amparo Gutierrez, Elena
Dimacale, Zenaida Simpron, Sonia Fiel, Ricardo Solis, Christina Solis, Federico
Solis Jr., Ronaldo Solis and Reynaldo Solis. Records, Vol. 5, p. 1.
[6] The
Heirs of Agapito Villanueva are composed
of his children namely Pablo Villanueva, Bernardo Villanueva, Francisco
Villanueva, Dolores Miranda, Benjamin Villanueva, Rolando Villanueva, Ernesto
Villanueva, Artemio Villanueva and Ester Villanueva, as well as the children of
his deceased children Antonio Villanueva, Jose Villanueva and Mario Villanueva,
who were named as Arnel Villanueva, Rodel Villanueva, Rodel Villanueva,
Redentor Villanueva, Arthur Villanueva, Arlene Villanueva, Noralyn Villanueva,
Dante Villanueva, Joselito Villanueva, Ferdinand Villanueva, Morris Villanueva,
Marian Arena, and Marilou Pabiz. Records, Vol. 6, p. 1.
[7] The
Heirs of Hilarion Garcia are Basilisa Garcia, Salvador Villablanca, Jr and
Celso Villablanca. Records, Vol. 7, p. 1.
[8] Plaintiff
Serafina SP Argana is represented in this suit by her daughter Victoria
Marcelo. Her co-plaintiffs are Remedios
P. San Pedro, Rodolfo San Pedro, Nora San Pedro, Avelina San Pedro, Caridad San
Pedro, Solidad San Pedro, Tomas San Pedro, Nicasio San Pedro II, Alfredo San
Pedro, Jesus San Pedro, Adorado San Pedro, Dolores San Pedro, Francisca San
Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Renato San Pedro, Rea San Pedro, Jemenes Placido,
Vivian Placido, Constancia Placido, Flordeliza Placido, Lorna Placido, Myrna
Placido, Teresa Placido and Edgar Placido. Records, Vol. 8, p. 1.
[9] The
heirs of Mariano Villanueva are composed of the children of their deceased
children Gonzalo Villanueva and Julia Uneta,
and the children of Rodolfo Uneta, Julia Uneta’s deceased son, namely:
Ofelia Rodriguez, Yolanda Rivera, Loida Lacson, Sonny Villanueva, Emerita V.
Savado, Restituto Villanueva, Adelaida Villanueva, Ernesto Villanueva, Alberto
Villanueva, Marites Villanueva, Jaime Uneta, Amor Reyes, Irenea Santos, Emelita
Santos, Rolly Uneta, Teresita De Vera, Carina Uneta, Leonila Domingo, Marita
Uneta, Jesusa Uneta, Ronaldo Uneta, Peter Uneta, and Rodolfo Uneta Jr. Records,
Vol. 9, p. 1.
[10] Although
they were individually named in the eight complaints filed before the RTC, respondents
Fil-Estate Management Inc., Spouses Arturo E. Dy and Susan Dy, and Megatop
Realty Development, Inc. were referred to as “Fil-Estate Management Inc, et al”
in the pleadings before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. It should be noted, however, that the
certificates of title, covering the parcels of land subject of the present
Petition, are registered under the names of Fil-Estate Management Inc., Spouses
Arturo E. Dy and Susan Dy, Megatop Realty Development, Inc., together with Peaksun
Enterprises and Export Corporation and Elena Jao, who all formed a consortium.
[11] Records,
Vol. 1, pp. 1-9; Vol. 3, pp. 1-10; Vol. 4, pp. 1-9; Vol. 5, pp. 1-9; Vol. 6,
pp. 1-9; Vol. 7, pp. 1-8; Vol. 8, pp. 1-9; and Vol. 9, pp. 1-9.
[12] Rollo, pp. 293-316. Of the seven titles named in the petitioners’
complaints, only three titles, TCTs No. T-9177, No. T-9178, and No. T-9179,
actually refer to the parcel of land referred to as
[13] G.R.
No. 30859,
[14] G.R.
Nos. 99338-40,
[15] Records,
Vol. 1, p. 8; Vol. 3, p. 9; Vol. 4, pp. 8-9; Vol. 5, p. 8; Vol. 6, p. 8; Vol.
7, pp. 7-8; Vol. 8, p. 8; and Vol. 9, p. 8.
[16] Records,
Vol. 1, pp. 83-123.
[17]
[18] SEC
32. Review of decree of registration;
Innocent purchaser for value. The
decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence,
minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by
any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the
right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of
First Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of
registration not later than one year from and after date of the entry of such
decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by
the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent purchaser for
value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to
include an innocent lessee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration
of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of
title issued shall become incontrovertible.
Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may
pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud.
[19] Article
1144. The following actions must be
brought within ten year from the time the right of action accrues:
(1)
Upon a written
contract;
(2)
Upon an
obligation created by law; and
(3)
Upon a judgment.
Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistakes or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
[20] Records, Vol. 1, pp. 91-94.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25] Civil
Case No. 3271 for Forcible Entry was filed by the Heirs of Benito Navarro, the
Heirs of Florencio Malaca, the Heirs of Tomas Dolleton, the Heirs of Hilarion
Garcia, the Heirs of Marcos Soligam, the Heirs of Mariano Villanueva, the Heirs
of Basilio Miranda, the heirs of Regino Dullas, the Heirs of Teodoro Malaca,
and Bernardo Millama. Civil Case No. 3271 was consolidated with Civil Case No.
323, filed by the Heirs of Francisco Alma, et al., Civil Case No. 3174, filed
by the Heirs of Nicasio San Pedro, et al., and Civil Case No. 3295, filed by
the Heirs of Teodora Bunyi, et al.
[26]
[27] Rollo, pp. 111-114.
[28]
[29] Records, Vol. 9, pp. 692-695.
[30] Rollo, pp. 117-118.
[31] Records, Vol. 2, pp. 707-708.
[32] Rollo, pp. 55-57.
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36] Universal Aquarius, Inc. v. Q.C. Human
Resources Management Corporation, G.R. No.155990, 12 September 2007, 533
SCRA 38, 45-46; Vergara v. Court of
Appeals, 377 Phil. 336, 341 (1999).
[37] Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,
Limited v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159590,
[38] Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro,
G.R. No. 154830, 8 June 2007, 524 SCRA 153, 162; Vergara v. Court of Appeals, supra note 36 at 341.
[39] Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha v. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, 12 December 2007, 540 SCRA 1, 13-14; Santos v. Lumbao, G.R. No. 169129, 28 March 2007, 519 SCRA 408, 429.
[40] Cutanda v. Heirs of Cutanda, 390 Phil.
740, 748 (2000).
[41] National Irrigation Administration v. Court
of Appeals, 376 Phil. 362, 376 (1999).
[42] Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo Guevarra, G.R.
No. 143188,
[43] Placewell International Services Corporation
v. Camote, G.R. No. 169973, 26 June 2006, 492 SCRA 761,769; Philippine National Construction Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 366 Phil. 678, 686 (1999).
[44] Pineda v. Heirs of Eliseo Guevarra, supra note 42 at 634-635; Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation v. Heirs of Raymundo Baba, 456 Phil. 569, 579-580 (2003); National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, supra note 41 at 362.
[45] Republic v. Yu, G.R. No. 157557, 10
March 2006, 484 SCRA 416, 422; Francisco
v. Co, G.R. No. 151339, 31 January 2006, 481 SCRA 241, 249-250.
[46] Records,
Vol. 1, pp. 156-158.