NEW REGENT SOURCES, INC., Petitioner, - versus - TEOFILO VICTOR TANJUATCO, JR., and VICENTE CUEVAS,* Respondents. |
G.R. No. 168800
Present: Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio
MORALES, TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and BRION, JJ. Promulgated: April 16, 2009 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner
through counsel prays for the reversal of the Orders dated
The facts, as
culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner
New Regent Sources, Inc. (NRSI) filed a Complaint[3] for
Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance and Damages against
respondent Tanjuatco and the Register of Deeds of Calamba before the RTC of
Calamba, Laguna, Branch 37. NRSI alleged
that in 1994, it authorized Vicente P. Cuevas III, its Chairman and President,
to apply on its behalf, for the acquisition of two parcels of land by virtue of
its right of accretion. Cuevas
purportedly applied for the lots in his name by paying P82,400.38 to the
Bureau of Lands. On P85,000.[5] On
In his Answer
with Counterclaim,[9] Tanjuatco advanced
the affirmative defense that the complaint stated no cause of action against
him. According to Tanjuatco, it was
Cuevas who was alleged to have defrauded the corporation. He averred further that the complaint did not
charge him with knowledge of the agreement between Cuevas and NRSI.
Upon
Tanjuatco’s motion, the trial court conducted a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defense, but denied the motion to dismiss, and ordered petitioner
to amend its complaint and implead Cuevas as a defendant.[10]
Summons was
served on respondent Cuevas through publication,[11] but he was later
declared in default for failure to file an answer.[12]
After NRSI
completed presenting evidence, Tanjuatco filed a Demurrer to Evidence,[13] which the RTC
granted in an Order dated
NRSI moved
for reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court in an Order dated
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
plaintiff on
SO ORDERED.[15]
Hence,
NRSI filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT MAY BE USED AS A BASIS TO
DISMISS THE SAME BY WAY OF A DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT A COMPLAINT
MAY BE DISMISSED ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE BASED ON A DOCUMENT NOT PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED, MARKED AND OFFERED IN EVIDENCE.[16]
In a
nutshell, the issue for our determination is whether the trial court erred in
dismissing the case on demurrer to evidence.
NRSI argues
that the supposed insufficiency of allegations in the complaint did not justify
its dismissal on demurrer to evidence.
It contends that a dismissal on demurrer to evidence should be grounded
on insufficiency of evidence presented at trial. NRSI contends that the sufficiency of its
allegations was affirmed when the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss. It likewise asserts that the RTC
erred in declaring Tanjuatco a buyer in good faith. It stressed that the Order of the Director of
Lands, as the basis for such finding, was not formally offered in
evidence. Hence, it should not have been
considered by the trial court in accordance with Section 34,[17] Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court.
Tanjuatco,
for his part, maintains that NRSI failed to make a case for reconveyance
against him. He insists that the
complaint stated no cause of action, and the evidence presented established,
rather than refuted, that he was an innocent purchaser. Tanjuatco adds that the RTC’s denial of the
motion to dismiss, and admission of evidence negated NRSI’s claim that it
relied on the complaint alone to decide the case. Lastly, Tanjuatco argues that the Order of
the Director of Lands was a matter of judicial notice. Thus, under Section 1,[18] Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, there was no need to identify, mark, and offer it in evidence.
After serious
consideration, we find the instant petition utterly without merit.
In its
petition, NRSI questions the trial court’s dismissal of its complaint upon a
demurrer to evidence and invites a calibration
of the evidence on record to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis
for the trial court’s order. This
factual analysis, however, would involve questions of fact which are improper
in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is well established that in an appeal by
certiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed.[19] A question of law exists when there is doubt
or difference as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. A question of fact exists if the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.[20] There is a question of law when the issue
does not call for an examination of the probative value of evidence presented,
the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.[21] Otherwise, there is a question of fact. Since it raises essentially questions of
fact, the instant petition must be denied.
In any event,
we find that based on the examination of the evidence at hand, we are in
agreement that the trial court correctly dismissed NRSI’s complaint on demurrer
to evidence.
Petitioner
filed a complaint for rescission/declaration of nullity of contract,
reconveyance and damages against respondents.
An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property,
wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.[22] In an action for reconveyance, the
certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the
property, specifically the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful and legal
owner, or to one with a better right.[23]
To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming
ownership or dominical right over the land registered in the name of the
defendant; (2) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was
procured through fraud[24]
or other illegal means;[25]
(3) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value;[26]
and (4) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become
final and incontrovertible[27]
but within four years
from the discovery of the fraud,[28] or not later than
10 years in the case of an implied trust.[29] Petitioner failed to show the presence of
these requisites.
Primarily,
NRSI anchors its claim over the lands subjects of this case on the right of
accretion. It submitted in evidence,
titles[30] to four parcels
of land, which allegedly adjoin the lots in the name of Tanjuatco.
But it must
be stressed that accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457[31] of the Civil Code
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the deposition
of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.[32] Thus, it is not enough to be a riparian owner
in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion.
One who claims the right of accretion must show by preponderant evidence
that he has met all the conditions provided by law. Petitioner has notably failed in this regard
as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it has satisfied the foregoing
requisites.
Further, it
is undisputed that Tanjuatco derived his title to the lands from Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the
Next,
petitioner sought to establish fraudulent registration of the land in the name
of Tanjuatco. NRSI presented before the
trial court a copy of the Voting Trust Agreement which the spouses Cuevas
executed in favor of Pauline Co.
However, nothing in said agreement indicates that NRSI empowered Cuevas
to apply for the registration of the subject lots on its behalf.
Neither did
petitioner adduce evidence to prove that Cuevas was its President and
Chairman. Even assuming that Cuevas was
the president of NRSI, his powers are confined only to those vested upon him by
the board of directors or fixed in the by-laws.[36] In truth, petitioner could have easily
presented its by-laws or a corporate resolution[37] to show Cuevas’s
authority to buy the lands on its behalf.
But it did not.
Petitioner
disagrees with the trial court’s finding that Tanjuatco was a buyer in good
faith. It contends that the
We note that
Tanjuatco filed a demurrer to evidence before the RTC. By its nature, a demurrer to evidence is
filed after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence but
before the defendant offers evidence in his defense. Thus, the Rules provide that if the
defendant’s motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. However, if the defendant’s motion is granted
but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, he shall be deemed to have waived
the right to present evidence.[38] It is understandable, therefore, why the
respondent was unable to formally offer in evidence the Order of the Director
of Lands, or any evidence for that matter.
More
importantly, petitioner introduced in evidence TCT Nos. T-369406 and T-369407
in the name of respondent Tanjuatco.
These titles bear a certification that Tanjuatco’s titles were derived
from OCT No. 245 in the name of no less than the Republic of the
As regards
the consideration which Tanjuatco paid Cuevas for the assignment of rights to
the lands, suffice it to state that the assignment merely vested upon Tanjuatco
all of Cuevas’s intangible claims, rights and interests over the properties and
not the properties themselves. At the
time of the assignment, the lots were still the subjects of a pending sales
application before the Bureau of Lands.
For, it was not until P85,000
for the transfer of rights.
From all the
foregoing, it is plain and apparent that NRSI failed to substantiate its claim
of entitlement to ownership of the lands in Tanjuatco’s name. The trial court, therefore, correctly
dismissed petitioner’s complaint for reconveyance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Orders dated
SO ORDERED.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice |
* Also known as Vicente P. Cuevas III.
[1] Rollo, pp. 26-27. Penned by Judge Antonio T. Manzano.
[2]
[3] Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-5.
[4] Rollo, pp. 31-33.
[5]
[6] Records, Vol. I, p. 41.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo, p. 27.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Motion To Dismiss by way of Demurrer To Evidence filed by defendant Tanjuatco is granted. The complaint for Rescission/Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Reconveyance, and Damages filed by plaintiff New Regent Sources, Inc. is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
[15]
[16]
[17] SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. − The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
[18] SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. − A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis supplied.)
[19] Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Santamaria,
G.R. No. 139885,
[20] Morales v. Skills International Company, G.R. No. 149285, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 186, 194, citing Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., G.R. No. 140946, 438 SCRA 224, 230-231.
[21] Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111324, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 186, 199.
[22] Heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo v. Heirs of
Manuel Y. Quijano, G.R. No. 140457,
[23] Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No.
38387,
[24]
[25] Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of
Honorio Dacut, G.R. No. 147379,
[26] Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., supra at 440.
[27] A. Noblejas and E. Noblejas, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds 247 (2007 Revised ed.).
[28] Balbin v. Medalla, No. L-46410,
[29] Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala v. Heirs of Honorio Dacut, supra at 219.
[30] Records, Vol. I, pp. 298-305. TCT No. T-312462, TCT No. T-312463, TCT No. T-312464, TCT No. T-312465.
[31] Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
[32] Meneses v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 82220, 82251 and 83059, July 14, 1995, 246 SCRA 162, 172.
[33] Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[35] Records, Vol. I, p. 35.
[36] H.
[37] black’s law dictionary 1311 (6th ed.).
Corporation resolution. − Formal documentation of action taken by board of directors of corporation.
[38] SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. – After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
[39] Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No.
146222,
[40]