THIRD
DIVISION
|
PEOPLE OF THE
Plaintiff-appellee, - versus
- NARCISO AGULAY y LOPEZ, Accused-Appellant. |
|
G.R. No. 181747 Present: TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO, Acting
Chairperson, VELASCO,* REYES
and BRION,** JJ. Promulgated: September 26, 2008 |
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D
E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
For Review
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the Decision[1]
dated
On
That on or about the 24th day of August, 2002 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point twenty five (0.25) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride a dangerous drug.[3]
When
arraigned on
During
the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Police Officer (PO) 2
Raul Herrera, the poseur-buyer, PO2 Reyno Riparip (member of the
buy-bust team), and Forensic Analyst Leonard M. Jabonillo.
The
prosecution’s version of the events are narrated as follows:
On
A
police entrapment team was formed. PO2 Herrera was assigned as poseur-buyer and
was given a P100.00 bill, which he marked “RH,” his initials. A
pre-operation report bearing control No. 24-SDEU-02 was made and signed by Police
Inspector (P/Insp.) Palaleo Adag dated
The
buy-bust team rode in two vehicles, a Space Wagon and a Besta van, with a group
of police officers inside. They stopped
along
PO2
Herrera and his informant stepped down from their vehicle and walked. The informant pointed the target pusher to PO2
Herrera. They approached and after being introduced to Sing, PO2 Herrera bought
shabu using the marked P100.00
bill. Sing gave a small plastic sachet
to PO2 Herrera who, thereafter, scratched his head as a signal. The other
police companions of PO2 Herrera, who were deployed nearby, then rushed to the
crime scene. PO2 Herrera grabbed Sing and then frisked him. PO2 Herrera
recovered two (2) plastic sachets from Sing’s pocket. He also got the marked
money from Sing.
The
following specimens were submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory of the Central Police District in
Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white crystalline substance having the following markings and recorded net weights:
(A) (RH1-RG1) = 0.07 gm
(B) (RH2-RG2) = 0.09 gm
(C)
(RH3-RG3) = 0.09 gm[5]
Chemistry
Report No. D-1020-2002 dated
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. x x x.
CONCLUSION:
Specimen A, B and C contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug.[6]
The
defense, on the other hand, had an entirely different version of what
transpired that night. It presented three
witnesses: accused-appellant Narciso Agulay, Benjamin Agulay (brother of
Narciso), and Bayani de Leon.
Accused-appellant
Narciso Agulay narrated that at around P50,000.00, they would file a case against him, to
which he answered, “I could not do anything because I do not have money.”[7]
Benjamin
Agulay, brother of accused-appellant, testified that at around
On
the other hand, the testimony of Bayani de Leon (a police asset of SPO1 Valdez
of the buy-bust team) narrated that he, together with P/Insp. Suha, PO1
Herrera, PO2 Riparip, PO2 Gulferic and an arrested individual were on board a
car while conducting a follow-up operation regarding a hold-up incident. When the car they were riding reached
On
Accordingly, judgment is rendered
finding the accused NARCISO AGULAY Y LOPEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165 as charged (for drug pushing)
and he is hereby sentenced to suffer a jail term of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay
a fine of P500,000.00.
The methylamphetamine hydrochloride (in 3 sachets) involved in this case is ordered transmitted to the PDEA thru DDB for proper disposition.[8]
Accused-appellant
filed his Notice of Appeal with Motion to Litigate as Pauper Litigant on
Accused-appellant
filed his appellant’s brief[9] with
the Court of Appeals on
On
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible
error in the Decision appealed from, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the
RTC dated
Petitioner
elevated the case to this Court via Notice
of Appeal[11] dated
(3) Notify the parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within thirty (30) days from notice.
To
avoid a repetition of the arguments, accused-appellant opted to adopt his
appellant’s brief dated
The
issues raised are the following:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGALLY ARRESTED AND AS SUCH, THE SACHETS OF SHABU ALLEGEDLY RECOVERED FROM HIM ARE INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
III.
ACCUSED-APPELLANT CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE
FOR THE CONSUMMATED CRIME OF ILLEGAL
Accused-appellant maintains that his
arrest was illegal, and that the subsequent seizure of shabu allegedly taken from him is inadmissible as evidence against
him. He also claims that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, since the prosecution failed
to show all the essential elements of an illegal sale of shabu.
From the foregoing issues raised by
accused-appellant, the basic issue to be resolved hinges on whether accused-appellant
was arrested in a legitimate “buy-bust” operation.
The law presumes that an accused in a
criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is proved. The
presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic
constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the
prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense
charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has
been met is largely left for the trial courts to determine. Consistent with the rulings of this Court, it
is a fundamental and settled rule that factual findings of the trial court and
its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its conclusions
anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if
not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in
this case. The exception is when it is
established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change
the outcome of the case. Considering
that what is at stake here is the liberty of accused-appellant, we have carefully
reviewed and evaluated the records of the RTC and the Court of Appeals. On
evaluation of the records, this Court finds no justification to deviate from
the lower court’s findings and conclusion that accused-appellant was arrested in flagrante
delicto selling shabu.
In order to successfully prosecute an
accused for illegal sale of drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove the
following elements:
(1)
identities of the buyer and seller, the
object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[12]
The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses proved that all the elements of the crime have been established: that
the buy-bust operation took place, and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought to and identified in court.
Moreover, PO2 Herrera, the poseur-buyer, positively identified
accused-appellant as the person who sold to him the sachet containing the
crystalline substance which was confirmed to be shabu.[13] He narrated the events which took place the
night accused-appellant was apprehended:
FIS. JURADO:
You said that you are stationed at Police Station 5, what were your duties there?
WITNESS:
As an operative sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What was your tour of duty on
WITNESS:
Broken hour sir.
FIS. JURADO:
But at around
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
FIS. JURADO:
While you are on duty at that time
and place, will you please inform this Honorable Court if there was an
operation?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
FIS JURADO:
What is that operation all about?
WITNESS:
Buy bust operation sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Regarding what?
WITNESS:
Narcotic sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What is this all about?
WITNESS:
Alias Sing at Sta. Lucia sir.
FIS. JURADO:
How did you prepare for that
buy-bust operation?
WITNESS:
An informant arrived and we reported
to our Chief of SDEU and the Chief gave us P100.00 and I acted as poseur-buyer
sir.
FIS. MJURADO:
Aside from that what else?
WITNESS:
I put my markings sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What is that markings (sic)?
WITNESS:
R.H. sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What is the significance of this
R.H.?
WITNESS:
That mean(sic) Raul Herrera sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Do you have said money with you?
WITNESS:
Yes sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Will you please show that to this Honorable Court?
WITNESS:
Here sir.
x x x x
FIS. JURADO:
After you prepared the buy bust
money, what else did you do?
WITNESS:
We proceeded to the target location,
sir.
FIS. JURADO:
You said “we” who were with you?
WITNESS:
P/Insp. Addag, Rosario, SPO1 El
Valdez, SPO2 Rey Valdez, Nogoy, Riparip and the confidential informant sir.
FIS. JURADO:
How did you proceed to the place of
Sta. Lucia?
WITNESS:
We rode in a tinted vehicles (sic) one
space wagon and Besta van, sir.
FIS. JURADO:
When you arrived in that place, what
happened there?
WITNESS:
We asked our confidential informant
to look for Sing, sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Did the confidential informant
locate the said Sing?
WITNESS:
Yes sir along the street sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Where?
WITNESS:
FIS. JURADO:
After your confidential informant found
this Sing, what happened next?
WITNESS:
Our confidential informant asked me
to go with him to see Sing to buy drug(s) sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Where is (sic) the transaction took
(sic) place?
WITNESS:
Along the street sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What happened there?
WITNESS:
I was introduced by the confidential informant to Sing as buyer sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What happened next?
WITNESS:
I bought from him worth one hundred peso (sic) of shabu, sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What (sic) Sing do, if any?
WITNESS:
Sing gave me one small plastic sachet sir.
FIS JURADO:
After that what did you do next?
WITNESS:
I executed our pre-arranged signal sir.
FIS. JURADO:
For whom you executed this pre-arranged signal?
WITNESS:
To my companions sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Where are (sic) your companions at that time?
WITNESS:
On board at (sic) Besta and Space Wagon sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What was the pre-arranged signal?
WITNESS:
I scratched my head sir.
FIS. JURADO:
After scratching your head, what happened next?
WITNESS:
My back-up rushed to our place, sir.
FIS. JURADO:
After that what did you do next?
WITNESS:
I grabbed Sing and arrested him sir.
FIS. JURADO:
How about the money?
WITNESS:
I recovered the buy bust money from Sing, sir.
FIS. JURADO:
You mentioned plastic sachet, I am showing to you three (3) plastic sachets, which of these three was taken or sold to you?
WITNESS:
This one sir.
FIS. JURADO:
How did you come to know that this is the one?
WITNESS:
I have my initial(sic) R.H. sir.
x x x x
FIS. JURADO:
Aside from that, what happened next?
WITNESS:
When I frisked Sing, I was able to recover from him two (2) more plastic sachets sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Where did you get that plastic sachet?
WITNESS:
Right side pocket sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Short or pant?
WITNESS:
Short sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Where are these two plastic sachets that you are mentioning?
WITNESS:
Here sir.
FIS. JURADO:
How did you come to know that these are the two plastic sachets?
WITNESS:
I put my markings sir RH.
x x x x
COURT:
After that what happened next?
WITNESS:
We brought him to our Police Station, sir.
FIS. JURADO:
You mentioned Sing if this Sing is inside this courtroom, will you be able to identify him?
WITNESS:
Yes sir that man.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a man who identified himself as Narciso Agulay and his nickname is “Sing.”[14]
His testimony was corroborated on
material points by PO1 Riparip, one of the back-up operatives in the buy-bust
operation that night, to wit:
FIS. JURADO:
You said that you are a police
officer, where were you assigned on
WITNESS:
I was assigned at Police
Station 5 for drug(sic) sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What was your tour of duty at that
time?
WITNESS:
Broken hour sir.
FIS. JURADO:
You were on duty on
WITNESS:
Yes sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What was your functions(sic) as
such?
WITNESS:
To conduct follow up operation on
drugs and other crimes sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Did you conduct operation on that
day?
WITNESS:
Yes sir we conducted Narcotic
operation sir.
FIS. JURADO:
You said you conducted narcotic
operation, where?
WITNESS:
Sta. Lucia, particularly at
FIS. JURADO:
To whom this Narcotic operation
conducted?
WITNESS:
To certain Alias Sing, sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Who were with you at that time?
WITNESS:
FIS. JURADO:
What was your participation in the said operation?
WITNESS:
I acted as back up sir.
FIS. JURADO:
As back up, what did you do?
WITNESS:
We position ourselves to a certain distance and where we can see the poseur-buyer sir.
FIS. JURADO:
Who was the poseur-buyer?
WITNESS:
Herrera sir.
FIS. JURADO:
What did you see?
WITNESS:
The poseur buyer executed the pre-arranged signal and we rushed to his position and arrested the target person Sing sir.
FIS. JURADO:
When we (sic) rushed to the target place what happened next?
WITNESS:
Herrera frisked Sing and we brought him to the police station sir.[15]
Accused-appellant contends his arrest
was illegal, making the sachets of shabu
allegedly recovered from him inadmissible in evidence. Accused-appellant’s claim is devoid of merit
for it is a well-established rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a
warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid “warrantless arrest,” in line with
the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective mode
of apprehending drug pushers. In a
buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.[16] If carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial
sanction.[17]
There are eight (8) instances when a
warrantless search and seizure is valid, to wit:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4) searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in “plain view;” (7) searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building regulations; and (8) “stop and frisk” operations.
Considering that the legitimacy of
the buy-bust operation is beyond question, the subsequent warrantless arrest and
warrantless search and seizure, were permissible. The search, clearly being incident to a
lawful arrest, needed no warrant for its validity. Thus, contrary to accused-appellant's
contention, the contraband seized from him, having been obtained as a result of
the buy-bust operation to which the defense failed to impute any irregularity,
was correctly admitted in evidence.
Noteworthy is the fact that prior to the dispatch of the entrapment
team, a pre-operation report[18]
was made bearing Control No. 24-SDEU-02 dated
The defense contends there is a clear
doubt on whether the specimens examined by the chemist and eventually presented
in court were the same specimens recovered from accused-appellant. The prosecution’s failure to submit in
evidence the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence
confiscated pursuant to Section 21,[19]
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 will not discharge accused-appellant from
his crime. Non-compliance with said section is not fatal and will not render an
accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
In People
v. Del Monte,[20] this Court held that what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the
guilt or innocence of the accused. In
the instant case, we find the integrity of the drugs seized intact, and there
is no doubt that the three sachets of drugs seized from accused-appellant were
the same ones examined for chemical analysis, and that the crystalline
substance contained therein was later on determined to be positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
The defense, in fact, admitted the
existence and authenticity of the request for chemical analysis and the
subsequent result thereof:
FIS. JURADO:
Chemist
Engr. Jabonillo is present your honor.
COURT:
Any
proposal for stipulation?
FIS. JURADO:
That
there is letter request for examination of white crystalline substance marked
as follows: A (pH1); B (pH2) and C (pH3)?
ATTY. QUILAS:
Admitted
your honor.
FIS. JURADO:
As
a result of the said qualitative examination chemist issued a chemistry report
No. D-1020-2002?
ATTY. QUILAS:
Admitted
your honor.
FIS. JURADO:
In
view of the admission your honor, may we request that Letter request dated
COURT:
Mark it.
In view of the presence of the Chemist, Engr. Jabonillo, He is being called to the witness stand for cross examination of the defense counsel.[21]
On
cross-examination by the defense, Forensic Analyst Jabonillo stated that the
drugs presented in court were the same drugs examined by him and submitted to
him on
ATTY.
QUILAS:
In this particular case, you received three plastic sachets?
WITNESS:
Yes
sir.
ATTY.
QUILAS:
When you receive these three plastic sachets were these already segregated or in one plastic container?
WITNESS:
I
received it as is sir.
x x
x x
ATTY.
QUILAS:
How
sure you were (sic) that three plastic sachet (sic) containing
methylamphetamine hydrochloride were the same drug (sic) submitted to you on
WITNESS:
I
personally place (sic) my marking sir.
ATTY. QUILAS:
You
want to impress before this Honorable Court these were the same items that you
received on
WITNESS:
Yes sir.[22]
On
cross-examination by the defense, the same witness testified, to wit:
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
I understand you are Chemical
Engineer, am I correct?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
And that you have been (sic) worked
as a Chemist in the PNP for several years?
WITNESS:
Since March, 200 (sic), sir.
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
What would be your practice when specimen
submitted for you to examine, was it already pre-marked by the person who
submit for examination?
WITNESS:
Normally, sir.
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
What do you mean normally, you also
put the marking?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
So everything has pre-mark?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
And then when pre-mark specimen is
submitted to you, you merely analyze the same is that correct?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
And you do not change any marking
there?
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
Now in the marking that we have it
appearing that Exhibits A, B, and C are PH, am I correct?
WITNESS:
RH sir, not PH.
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
Because it shows in the zerox (sic)
copy that it is RH because of that slant. Now when this specimen was submitted
to you was it three specimens submitted to you or only one specimen A, B, C
were ranking to one?
WITNESS:
No sir, three (3) specimens.[23]
It is significant to note that
accused-appellant stated in his demurrer to evidence that the specimens
submitted for laboratory examination were not the three plastic sachets that
were allegedly recovered by the poseur-buyer PO2 Raul Herrera, which may thus be
construed to be an implied admission.[24]
Accused-appellant’s allegation that
he is a victim of a frame-up, which has been held as a shop-worn defense of
those accused in drug-related cases, is viewed by the Court with disfavor. Like the defense of alibi, frame-up is an
allegation that can easily be concocted.[25] For this claim to prosper, the defense must
adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity
of official acts of government officials.[26] Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse
him of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the
credibility of witnesses shall prevail over that of the accused-appellant.[27]
Apart from his defense that he is a
victim of a frame-up and extortion by the police officers, accused-appellant could
not present any other viable defense. Again,
while the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law
enforcement agents should not by itself prevail over the presumption of
innocence, for the claim of frame-up to prosper, the defense must be able to
present clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption of
regularity. This, it failed to do.
Bayani
de Leon’s testimony that the accused was being taken as a carnapping suspect
only further weakened the defense, considering it was totally out of sync with
the testimony of accused-appellant vis-à-vis
the positive testimonies of the police officers on the events that transpired on
the night of 24 August 2002 when the buy-bust operation was conducted. It is also highly suspect and unusual that
accused-appellant never mentioned that he was taken as a carnapping suspect if
indeed this were the case, considering it would have been his ticket to
freedom.
To
recall, on direct examination by the defense counsel, Bayani de Leon testified
as follows:
ATTY.
Mr. Witness, were you able to talk
to Narciso Agulay that time he was arrested?
WITNESS:
Yes ma’am, when Narciso Agulay was
put inside a room at Station 5 and in that room, I, Riparip and Herrera
entered.
ATTY.
What was the conversation all about?
WITNESS:
He was being asked if he was one of
those who held up a taxi ma’am.
ATTY.
What was the response of Narciso
Agulay?
WITNESS:
Narciso Agulay was crying and at the same time denying that he was with that person. When we told him that the person we arrested with the firearm was pointing to him, he said that he does not know about that incident and he does not know also that person who pointed him ma’am.[28]
Witness
Bayani de Leon’s testimony is dubious and lacks credence. From the testimony of
Bayani de Leon, it is apparent that accused-appellant would necessarily have
known what he was being arrested for, which was entirely inconsistent with
accused-appellant’s previous testimony. Such inconsistency further diminished
the credibility of the defense witness. It would seem that Bayani de Leon’s
testimony was but a mere afterthought.
Moreover,
Bayani de Leon testified that he allegedly came to know of the fact that
accused-appellant was being charged under Republic Act No. 9165 when he (Bayani
de Leon) was also detained at the city jail for robbery with homicide,
testifying as follows:
FIS. ARAULA:
And you only knew that Narciso
Agulay was charged of Section 5, R.A. 9165 when you were detained at the City
Jail?
WITNESS:
Yes sir.
FIS. ARAULLA:
In fact, you were talking with each
other?
WITNESS:
Yes sir, and I asked what is the
case filed against him.
FIS. ARAULLA:
And that is the time you know that
Narciso Agulay was charged of (sic) Section 5?
WITNESS:
Yes sir.[29]
This
Court, thus, is in agreement with the trial court in finding that:
Bayani himself appears to be a shady character. By his admission he is a bata or agent of PO Vasquez. As far as the court knows, such characters are used by the police because they are underworld character (sic).[30]
Finally,
the testimony of accused-appellant’s brother, Benjamin Agulay, is not
convincing. Benjamin, being
accused-appellant’s brother, we find him to be unreliable. Suffice it to say
that, having been given by a relative of the accused-appellant, his testimony
should be received with caution.
On this premise, this Court has laid
down the “objective” test in scrutinizing buy-bust operations. In People
v. Doria,[31] we
said:
We therefore stress that the “objective” test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the “buy-bust” money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. x x x.
It bears to point out that
prosecutions of cases for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act arising from
buy-bust operations largely depend on the credibility of the police officers
who conducted the same, and unless clear and convincing evidence is proffered
showing that the members of the buy-bust team were driven by any improper
motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the
operation deserve full faith and credit.[32]
The law presumes that an accused in a
criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is proved.[33]
This presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is consistent
with a most fundamental constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules
which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty
of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. This
constitutional guarantee is so essential that the framers of the constitution
found it imperative to keep the provision from the old constitution to
emphasize the primacy of rights that no person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.[34]
In
his dissent, Justice Brion focused on the conviction that the buy-bust
operation and the consequent seizure of the prohibited substance either did not
take place or has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because of a gap in
the prosecution’s evidence. Convinced
that under the proven facts of the present case, the dissent maintains that the
prosecution has not proven that a crime had been committed through proof beyond
reasonable doubt -- that the three plastic sachets that were admitted into
evidence during the trial were in fact the same items seized from the
accused-appellant when he was arrested.
The
guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. Contrary to
the dissent’s claim, the totality of the evidence would indicate that the sale
of the prohibited drug had taken place, and that the sale was adequately established
and the prosecution witnesses clearly identified accused-appellant as the
offender. Moreover, the seized items,
proven positive to be shabu, were properly
identified and presented before the court.
To reiterate, in prosecutions for
illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, conviction is proper if the
following elements are present: (1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of the prohibited or regulated drug.[35] The term corpus delicti means the
actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.
The procedure for the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among
others, is provided under Section 21 (a), paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, to wit:
(a)
The apprehending team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Section 21 (a), Article II of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements
said provision, reads:
(a)
The apprehending team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
The above provision further states
that non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items,
for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers. The evident purpose of the procedure provided
for is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or
innocence of the accused.
On the chain of custody of the seized
drugs
The dissent agreed with
accused-appellant’s assertion that the police operatives failed to comply with
the proper procedure in the chain of custody of the seized drugs. It premised that non-compliance with the
procedure in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 creates an irregularity and overcomes the
presumption of regularity accorded police authorities in the performance of
their official duties. This
assumption is without merit.
First, it must be made clear that in
several cases[36]
decided by the Court, failure by the buy-bust team to comply with said section
did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty from
applying.
Second, even prior to the enactment
of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section 21(a) were already there
per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the presence of such regulation and
its non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such
presumption.[37]
We held:
The
failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No.
3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and
the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the
criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale
of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is
established and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the
arresting officers to comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs
Board.
While accused-appellant contends in his
appellant’s brief that the police operatives did not submit the required
inventory of the seized items pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 (a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165,
the records belie this claim. On cross-examination by the defense, Police
Officer (PO) 2 Herrera testified on making an inventory of the seized
items. PO2 Herrera testified as follows:
Q: When you arrested the suspect in this
case, you confiscated two (2) items from him?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And you said that it is part of your
procedure when you confiscated items from the suspect you made an inventory of
the item confiscated?
A:
Yes sir.
Q: Did you make inventory of the
confiscated items?
A: Yes sir it is with the police investigator.[38]
Moreover, non-compliance with the
procedure outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers.
Consistent with this Court’s
pronouncements in People v. Bano[39]and
in People v. Miranda,[40] contrary
to appellant’s claim, there is no showing of a broken chain in the custody of
the seized items, later on determined to be shabu,
from the moment of its seizure by the entrapment team, to the investigating
officer, to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime
Laboratory for laboratory examination. It
was duly established by documentary, testimonial, and object evidence,
including the markings on the plastic sachets containing the shabu that the substance tested by the
forensic chemist, whose laboratory tests were well-documented, was the same as
that taken from accused-appellant.
The records of the case indicate that
after his arrest, accused-appellant was taken to the police station and turned
over to the police investigator. PO2
Herrera testified that he personally[41]
made the markings “RH” (representing his initials) on the three sachets, the
inventory[42] of
which was delivered to the police investigator.
After the arrest, the seized items which had the markings “RH” alleged
to contain shabu were brought to the
crime laboratory for examination.[43] The request for laboratory examination and
transfer of the confiscated sachets to the PNP crime laboratory was prepared by
another officer, PO2 Gulferic, the designated officer-on-case.[44] It was signed as well by the Chief of
Office/Agency (SDEU/SIIB) Police Chief Inspector Leslie Castillo Castillo. The request indicated that the seized items
were delivered by PO2 Gulferic and received by Forensic Chemist Jabonillo.[45] The three heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets each containing white crystalline substance were later on determined to
be positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
When the prosecution presented the
marked sachets in court, PO2 Herrera positively identified the plastic sachets
containing shabu which he bought from
accused-appellant in the buy-bust operation.
The sachets containing shabu
had the markings “RH” as testified by Forensic Chemist Jabonillo. PO2 Herrera positively identified in court that
he put his initials “RH” on the sachets. Thus, the identity of the drugs has been duly
preserved and established by the prosecution. Besides, the integrity of the
evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith,
ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. The accused-appellant in this case bears the
burden to make some showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to
overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public
officers and a presumption that public officers properly discharged their
duties.[46]
PO2 Herrera identified the sachets in
court, and more importantly, accused-appellant had the opportunity to
cross-examine him on this point.
This
Court, thus, sees no doubt that the sachets marked “RH” submitted for
laboratory examination and which were later on found to be positive for shabu, were the same ones sold by
accused-appellant to the poseur-buyer PO2 Herrera during the buy-bust
operation. There is no question,
therefore, that the identity of the prohibited drug in this case was certainly
safeguarded.
The dissent maintains that the chain of custody rule “would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence x x x.”
This means that all persons who came into contact with the seized drugs
should testify in court; otherwise, the unbroken chain of custody would not be
established.
We disagree. Not all people who came into contact with the
seized drugs are required to testify in court.
There is nothing in the New Drugs Law or in any rule implementing the
same that imposes such a requirement. As
long as the chain of custody of the seized substance was clearly established
not to have been broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify
properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every person
who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand. In People v.
Zeng Hua Dian,[47] we held:
After a thorough
review of the records of this case, we find that the chain of custody of the
seized substance was not broken and that the prosecution did not fail to
identify properly the drugs seized in this case. The non-presentation of witnesses of other
persons such as SPO1 Grafia, the evidence custodian, and PO3 Alamia, the officer
on duty, is not a crucial point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witneses by the
prosecution is not for the court to decide.
The prosecution has the discretion as to how to present its case and it
has the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.
In connection with this,
it must not be forgotten that entries in official records made by a public
officer in the performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.[48] If it is now a requirement that all persons
who came into contact with the seized drugs should testify in court, what will
now happen to those public officers (e.g., person who issued request for
examination of drugs or those who tested the drugs) who issued documents
regarding the seized drugs? Shall they
be obligated to testify despite the fact the entries in the documents they
issued are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated?
We do not think so. Unless there
is proof to the contrary, the entries in the documents are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated and they need not testify thereon.
The dissenting opinion
likewise faults the prosecution for failing to disclose the identity of the
person who submitted the item that was examined. The answer to this question can easily be
seen from the stamp made in the request for drug analysis. There being no question by the accused on
this matter, the entry thereon made by the public officer is definitely
sufficient, same being an entry in official records.
On the credibility of the witnesses
Prosecutions involving illegal drugs
depend largely on the credibility of the police officers who conduct the
“buy-bust” operation.[49] In cases involving violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Law, appellate courts tend to heavily rely upon the trial court
in assessing the credibility of witnesses, as it had the unique opportunity,
denied to the appellate courts, to observe the witnesses and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under direct and cross-examination.[50] This Court, not being a trier of facts
itself, relies in good part on the assessment and evaluation by the trial court
of the evidence, particularly the attestations of the witnesses, presented to
it.[51] Thus, this Court will not interfere with the
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses considering there is
nothing on record that shows some fact or circumstance of weight and influence
which the trial court has overlooked, misappreciated, or misinterpreted. Unless compelling reasons are shown
otherwise, this Court, not being a trier of facts itself, relies in good part
on the assessment and evaluation by the trial court of the evidence,
particularly the attestations of witnesses, presented to it. As this Court has held in a long line of
cases, the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.
Accused-appellant casts suspicion on
the means or methods by which the police officers conducted the operation and
claims to be the victim of a frame-up. According
to accused-appellant, the trial court relied heavily on the police officers’
testimonies that what had actually transpired was a buy-bust operation, which
resulted in his arrest.
In
almost every case involving a buy-bust operation, the accused put up the
defense of frame-up. Such claim is
viewed with disfavor, because it can easily be feigned and fabricated. In People
v. Uy, the Court reiterated its position on the matter, to wit:
We are not unaware that in some instances law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. However, like alibi, frame-up is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can easily be concocted [and] hence commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well being of society, if the courts x x x accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed exists. x x x [52]
In
the case at bar, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are positive and
convincing, sufficient to sustain the finding of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that accused-appellant’s guilt had been established beyond
reasonable doubt. First, the testimony
of PO2 Raul Herrera was spontaneous, straightforward and categorical. Second,
PO1 Reyno Riparip, the back-up police operative of PO2 Herrera, corroborated
the latter’s testimony on material points.
Appellant’s defense of frame-up and
self-serving assertion that he was mistakenly picked up by the police
operatives for a carnapping case cannot prevail over the positive and
straight-forward testimonies of the police operatives who have performed their
duties regularly and in accordance with law, and have not been shown to have
been inspired by any improper motive or to have improperly performed their
duty.[53]
To
reiterate, Bayani de Leon’s testimony that the accused was being taken as a
carnapping suspect only further weakened the defense, considering it was
totally out of sync with the testimony of accused-appellant vis-à-vis the positive testimonies of
the police officers on the events that transpired on the night of 24 August
2002 when the buy-bust operation was conducted.
The arrest of accused-appellant was
made in the course of an entrapment, following a surveillance operation,
normally performed by police officers in the apprehension of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
The Court so holds that in the
absence of proof of any odious intent on the part of the police operatives to
falsely impute such a serious crime, as the one imputed against
accused-appellant, it will not allow their testimonies to be overcome by the
self-serving claim of frame-up.
Even assuming arguendo that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
has been overcome because of failure to comply with Section 21(a), same will
not automatically lead to the exoneration of the accused. Said presumption is not the sole basis for
the conviction of the accused. His
conviction was based not solely on said presumption but on the documentary and
real evidence, and more importantly, on the oral evidence by prosecution witnesses
whom we found to be credible. It is to
noted that one witness is sufficient to prove the corpus delicti – that there was a
consummated sale between the poseur buyer and the accused -- there being no
quantum of proof as to the number of witnesses to prove the same. In the case at bar, the selling of drugs by
accused was established.
The dissent likewise argues that the ponencia
cannot impose on the defense the burden of proving that the police had an
improper motive in charging him because of the absence of the presumption of
regularity.
We find this untenable. It is settled that if the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are not impugned, full faith and credit shall be accorded
them. One impugns the testimony of
witness during cross-examination. Did
the defense satisfactorily impugn the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
when he said that he was a victim of hulidap and that the policemen were
extorting money from him? Said
declaration is definitely not sufficient to impugn the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. His mere say so
that he was victimized without clear and convincing evidence to support such
claim does not suffice. If what he
claims was indeed committed by the policemen, he should have sued or charged
them. This, he did not do. Such inaction runs counter to the normal
human conduct and behavior of one who feels truly aggrieved by the act
complained of.[54]
From the foregoing, We are fully convinced that the accused is guilty
as charged.
We thus hold that accused-appellant’s
guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. This Court shall now determine the proper
penalties to be imposed on him.
An
examination of the Information reveals that accused-appellant was charged with the
unauthorized sale and delivery of dangerous drugs consisting of twenty-five hundredths
(0.25) gram of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, only one
sachet[55]
was sold and delivered to the poseur-buyer, PO2 Herrera. The two other sachets[56] were
not sold or delivered, but were found by PO2 Herrera inside the right pocket of
accused-appellant’s pair of shorts upon frisking, after the latter was caught in flagrante
delicto during the buy-bust operation.
Accused-appellant could have been
charged with the possession of dangerous drugs[57]
on account of the second and third sachets. This was not done. He cannot then be convicted
of possession of dangerous drugs, without being properly charged therewith,
even if proved. Accused-appellant, however, is still guilty, as charged in the
Information, of selling and delivering one sachet to the poseur-buyer.
Under Republic Act No. 9165, the unauthorized sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).
Pursuant, however, to the enactment
of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, “An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the
We, therefore, find the penalty
imposed by the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals – life
imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 – to be proper.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 01994 dated
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice Acting
Chairperson |
WE CONCUR:
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
* Per
Special Order No. 517, dated
** Justice Arturo D. Brion was designated to sit as
additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per Raffle dated
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Portia-Alino-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Lucas P.
Bersamin and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, concurring. Rollo, pp. 2-13.
[2] Penned
by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.; CA rollo,
pp. 20-23.
[3] Records,
p. 1.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] TSN,
[8] Records,
p. 23.
[9]
[10] Rollo, p. 12.
[11] Pursuant
to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.
[12] People v. Lee Hoi Ming, 459 Phil. 187,
193 (2003).
[13] Chemistry
Report No. D-1020-2002; Records, p. 14.
[14] TSN,
[15] TSN,
[16] People v.
[17] People v. Abbu, 317 Phil. 518, 525 (1995).
[18] Pre-Operation
Report; Records, p. 6.
[19] SEC.
21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in
the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
[20] G.R.
No. 179940,
[21] TSN,
[22]
[23] TSN,
[24] Records,
p. 94.
[25] People v. De Leon, 440 Phil. 368, 388 (2002);
People v. Lee Hoi Ming, supra note 12
at 195.
[26] People v. De Leon, id., citing People v. Zheng Bai Hui, 393 Phil. 68,
135 (2000), People v. Boco, 368 Phil.
341, 366-367 (1999); Teodosio v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 124346, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 194, 204.
[27] People v. Bongalon, 425 Phil. 96, 116
(2002).
[28] TSN,
[29]
[30] CA rollo, p. 23.
[31] 361
Phil. 595, 621 (1999).
[32] People v. Casolocan, G.R. No. 156890,
[33] PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, Article III,
Section 14, Paragraph 1.
[34]
[35] People
v. Hajili, 447 Phil. 283; People v.
[36] People v. Naquita, G.R. No. 180511, 28 July 2008; People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 178876, 27 June 2008; People v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, 23 April 2008.
[37] People
v. De los Reyes, G.R. No. 106874,
[38] TSN,
[39] 419 SCRA 677,
[40] 534 SCRA 552,
[41] TSN,
[42] TSN,
[43]
[44] Records, Exhibit D, p. 12.
[45]
[46] People
v. Miranda, 534 SCRA 553,
[47]
[48] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 44.
[49] People
v. Sy, G.R. No. 147348,
[50] People
v. Mala, 411 SCRA 327, 18 September 2003;
People v. Julian-Fernandez,
372 SCRA 608, 18 December 2001; People v.
Corpuz, G.R. No. 148919, 17 December 2002.
[51] People
v. Cueno, 298 SCRA 626,
[52] G.R. No.129019,
[53] People v. Saludes, 403 SCRA 590 [2003]; Arcilla v. Court of Appeals, 418 SCRA 497; People v. Mala, 411 SCRA 327 [2003].
[54] People
v. Ahmad, G.R. No. 148048,
[55] TSN,
[56]
[57] Republic Act No. 9165, Article II, Section 11.