SECOND DIVISION
MARJORIE
B. CADIMAS, G.R.
No. 180394
by
her Attorney-In-Fact,
VENANCIO
Z. ROSALES,
Petitioner, Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO,
JR., and
BRION, JJ.
MARITES
CARRION and
GEMMA
HUGO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September
29, 2008
x
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D E C I S I O N
Tinga,
J.:
This
is a petition for review on certiorari[1]
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision[2]
and Resolution[3] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98572. The appellate court set aside two orders[4] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 85,
The
instant petition stemmed from the complaint[5]
for accion reivindicatoria
and damages filed by petitioner Marjorie B. Cadimas,
through her attorney-in-fact, Venancio Z. Rosales,
against respondents Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 and
raffled to Branch 85 of the RTC of
In the complaint, petitioner averred
that she and respondent Carrion were parties to a Contract To Sell dated P330,000.00 to be paid in installments. According to petitioner, Carrion had violated
paragraph 8 of said contract when she transferred ownership of the property to
respondent Hugo under the guise of a special power of attorney, which
authorized the latter to manage and administer the property for and in behalf
of respondent Carrion. Allegedly, petitioner asked respondent Carrion in
writing to explain the alleged violation but the latter ignored petitioner’s
letter, prompting petitioner to demand in writing that Carrion and Hugo vacate
the property and to cancel the contract.[6]
On
Respondent Hugo filed a Motion To Dismiss[8] on
her behalf and on behalf of respondent Carrion on
In the same motion, respondent Hugo
averred that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent
Carrion for not complying with Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on the
proper service of summons on a non-resident defendant. However, attached to the
motion was a special power of attorney, whereby respondent Carrion had authorized
respondent Hugo, among others, to manage and administer the subject property
and to prosecute and defend all suits to protect her rights and interest in
said property.[9]
After petitioner filed a comment on
the motion to dismiss, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order[10] on
In the same omnibus order, the RTC
ruled that summons was served properly, thus, the court had acquired
jurisdiction over respondent Carrion. The RTC noted that respondent Hugo’s
failure to disclose at the outset that she was equipped with a special power of
attorney was an act constitutive of misleading the court. Thus, the RTC declared
respondent Carrion in default, directed petitioner to present evidence ex-parte against respondent Carrion, and respondent Hugo
to file an answer.
On
On
However,
respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil
action for certiorari, praying that the Omnibus Order dated 21 March 2005 and
Order dated 17 January 2007 issued by Judge Teodoro
T. Riel be reversed and set aside and that the complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-04-53581 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
On
Hence, the instant petition, raising
the following arguments: (1) based on the allegations in the complaint, the RTC
has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-04-53581; (2) in any case, respondents
have expressly submitted to or recognized the jurisdiction of the RTC by filing
an answer with counterclaim; and (3) respondents erroneously availed of a Rule
65 petition instead of filing a timely appeal from the order denying their
motion to dismiss.[14]
Essentially, petitioner argues that based
on the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs
sought, the RTC has jurisdiction over the matter. In any case, the compulsory
counterclaim pleaded in the answer of respondents was an express recognition on
their part of the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for accion reivindicatoria,
petitioner adds.
The petition is meritorious.
The nature of an action and the
jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the
subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the
consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of an action.[15]
An examination of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1344,[16] which enumerates
the regulatory functions of the
HLURB,[17]
readily shows that its quasi-judicial
function is limited to hearing only the following specific cases:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real
estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman.
The aforequoted
provision must be read in the light of the statute’s preamble or the
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for its enactment
or the contextual basis for its interpretation. The scope of the regulatory
authority thus lodged in the National Housing Authority (NHA) [now HLURB] is indicated
in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the
statute which provide:
“WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged
on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly
subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems and
other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of
home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases
of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver
titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay
real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to
different innocent purchasers for value .”[18]
The boom in the real estate business
all over the country resulted in more litigation between subdivision
owners/developers and lot buyers with the issue of the jurisdiction of the NHA
or the HLURB over such controversies as against that of regular courts. In the
cases that reached this Court, the ruling has consistently been that the NHA or
the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the
subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations
to make the subdivision a better place to live in.[19]
We agree with the ruling of the RTC
that it has jurisdiction over the case based on the allegations of the
complaint. Nothing in the complaint or in the contract to sell suggests that
petitioner is the proper party to invoke the jurisdiction of the HLURB. There
is nothing in the allegations in the complaint or in the terms and conditions
of the contract to sell that would suggest that the nature of the controversy
calls for the application of either P.D. No. 957 or P.D. No. 1344 insofar as
the extent of the powers and duties of the HLURB is concerned.
Note particularly paragraphs (b) and
(c) of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1344 as worded, where the HLURB’s
jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by subdivision lot or condominium
unit buyers. As to paragraph (a), concerning “unsound real estate practices,”
the logical complainants would be the buyers and customers against the sellers
(subdivision owners and developers or condominium builders and realtors), and
not vice versa.[20]
The complaint does not allege that
petitioner is a subdivision lot buyer. The contract to sell does not contain clauses
which would indicate that petitioner has obligations in the capacity of a
subdivision lot developer, owner or broker or salesman or a person engaged in
real estate business. From the face of the complaint and the contract to sell,
petitioner is an ordinary seller of an interest in the subject property who is
seeking redress for the alleged violation of the terms of the contract to sell.
Petitioner’s complaint alleged that a contract to sell over a townhouse was
entered into by and between petitioner and respondent Carrion and that the
latter breached the contract when Carrion transferred the same to respondent Hugo without
petitioner’s consent.[21]
Thus, petitioner sought
the cancellation of the contract and the
recovery of possession and ownership of the town house. Clearly, the complaint
is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In Javellana
v. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30,
In their comment, respondents cite Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing
Authority,[24] to
bolster the argument that the HLURB has jurisdiction over controversies
involving the determination of the rights of the parties under a contract to
sell a subdivision lot. Antipolo Realty
is not squarely applicable to the instant controversy. The issue in said case called
for the determination of whether the developer complied with its obligations to
complete certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified
period of time, a case that clearly falls under Section 1, paragraph (c) of
P.D. No. 1344.
In the instances where the
jurisdiction of the HLURB was upheld, the allegations in the complaint clearly
showed that the case involved the determination of the rights and obligations
of the parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957,[25]
or the complaint for specific performance sought to compel the subdivision
developer to comply with its undertaking under the contract to sell,[26]
or the claim by the subdivision developer would have been properly pleaded as a
counterclaim in the HLURB case filed by the buyer against the developer to
avoid splitting causes of action.[27]
The statement in Suntay
v. Gocolay[28] to
the effect that P.D. No. 957 encompasses all questions regarding subdivisions
and condominiums, which was cited by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
decision, is a mere obiter dictum. As a matter of fact, the Court in Suntay nullified the orders issued by the HLURB over
the action for the annulment of an auction sale, cancellation of notice of levy
and damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. P.D. No. 957 and P.D. No.
1344 were not the applicable laws because the action was brought against a
condominium buyer and not against the developer, seller, or broker contemplated
under P.D. No. 1344. The action likewise involved the determination of
ownership over the disputed condominium unit, which by its nature does not fall
under the classes of disputes cognizable by the HLURB under Section 1 of P.D. No.
1344.
The Court of Appeals held that the
provision in the contract to sell mandating membership of the buyer of the
housing unit in a housing corporation was a strong indication that the property
purchased by respondent Carrion from petitioner was part of a tract of land
subdivided primarily for residential purposes. Thus, the appellate court
concluded that the HLURB has jurisdiction over the controversy because the property
subject thereof was part of a subdivision project.
Not every controversy involving a
subdivision or condominium unit falls under the competence of the HLURB[29]
in the same way that the mere allegation of relationship between
the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and
subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB.
For an action to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the
decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1344.[30]
Notably, in Spouses Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[31]
the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for
cancellation of the contract to sell of a subdivision house and lot because the
case did not fall under any of the cases mentioned in Section 1, P.D. No. 1344.
In interpreting said provision, the Court explained, thus:
On this matter, we have consistently held that the
concerned administrative agency, the National Housing Authority (NHA) before
and now the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the
subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.
For their part, respondents claim
that the resolution of the case ultimately calls for the interpretation of the
contract to sell and the determination of whether petitioner is guilty of
committing unsound real estate business practices, thus, the proper forum to
hear and decide the matter is the HLURB. The argument does not impress.
It is an elementary rule of
procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is
determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. As a necessary consequence, the
jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of
jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines
the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing
from the allegations in the complaint.
The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
are the matters to be consulted.[32] Thus,
the allegations in respondents’ motion to dismiss on the unsound real estate
business practices allegedly committed by petitioner, even if proved to be
true, cannot serve to oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over actions for breach
of contract and damages which has been conferred to it by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED and the Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE
O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Chief
Justice
[2]Dated 27 September 2007 and penned by J. Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and concurred in by JJ. Jose C. Reyes, Jr., Acting Chairperson of the Special 8th Division, and Japar B. Dimaampao; id. at 53-62.
[16]P.D. No. 1344, Section 1. In the exercise of its business functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
[17]Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., 389 Phil. 318, 329 (2000) traces the antecedent laws creating and transferring the regulatory functions of the HLURB, to wit:
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers’ Protective Decree) was issued on
x x x
Section 3 of P.D. No. 957 empowered the National Housing Authority
(NHA) with the “exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and
business.” On
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Thereafter,
the regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA were transferred to the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) by virtue of Executive Order No.
648 dated
[18]Antipolo
Realty Corp. v. National Housing Authority, No. L-50444,
[21]The essential averments in the complaint read:
III. Plaintiff is an owner of a parcel of
land with existing improvements consisting of several residential units located
at
IV. Sometime in August 2003, the defendant
MARITES CARRION (defendant CARRION, for brevity) offered to buy one of the
plaintiff’s residential units located at #23 Aster St., West Fairview Park
Subdivision, Fairview, Quezon City designated as, Lot
4-F-1-12 and covered by said TCT No. 251570, copy of the Contract to Sell which
the plaintiff and defendant CARRION entered into on August 4, 2003 is hereto
attached and made part hereof, as Annex “C”;
V. Under paragraph 8 of the Contract to
Sell[,] Annex “C” hereof, it is expressly provided that defendant CARRION cannot
sell, mortgage, cede and/or transfer the rights conferred upon her in the
contract unless with the written consent of the plaintiff, thus,
x x x x
Despite the express provision of paragraph
8 of the Contract to Sell[,] Annex “C” hereof, defendant CARRION without the
knowledge and/or consent (in writing) of the plaintiff, alienated/transferred
the ownership of the property subject hereof, in favor of defendant GEMMA HUGO
(defendant HUGO for brevity) under the guise of allegedly being defendant
CARRION’S attorney-in-fact when in truth and in fact, the latter is not;
x x x x
X. Despite the plaintiff’s [advice] and demands,
defendant CARRION failed and refused to vacate and surrender the possession and
ownership of the subject premises thus, the plaintiff through Rosales (again)
addressed defendant CARRION a letter under date April 26, 2004 reiterating her
previous demand to vacate and surrender the possession of the premises, failing
which, she has no other alternative but to resort to the remedies provided by
law¸ copy of said letter is hereto attached and made part hereof, as Annex “F”,
however despite demand(s), defendant CARRION and all persons claiming rights
under her, particularly defendant HUGO failed and refused to vacate and
surrender the possession and ownership of the subject property which lawfully
belonged to the plaintiff by reason of the cancellation of the contract to sell
Annex “C” hereof.
[23]Lacson Hermanas, Inc.
v. Heirs of Cenon Ignacio, G.R. No. 165973,