THE
PEOPLE OF THE
Appellee, [Formerly
G.R. No. 135972]
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING,
J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO,
JR., and
LEO
BARRIGA (at large), BRION, JJ.
REYNALDO
BARRIGA alias
“Baho-baho,”
PETER DOE, PAUL
DOE
and RICHARD DOE, Promulgated:
Appellants.
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Tinga, J.:
The
prosecution charged appellant Reynaldo Barriga and
four others with murder for the killing
of Eduardo Villabrille (Eduardo).[1] Only
appellant was arrested and tried
before the trial court[2] after
pleading not guilty upon arraignment.[3]
The
prosecution, on the other hand, presented Helen Casuya
(Helen), Rogelio Sucuaji (Rogelio), Felixberta Villabrille (Felixberta) and Crisanta Magallano (Crisanta) as
witnesses. Rogelio, Crisanta and Felixberta
testified on the facts prior to and
after the killing of Eduardo, which showed that appellant actively participated
in planning the murder and in addition,
they corroborated Helen’s account of the incident. Felixberta
also testified on the matter of damages. On the other hand, the defense introduced
appellant himself, Natividad Barriga
(Natividad), Efinito Wahing (Efinito) and SPO2 Henry Bustamante as witnesses.
The
prosecution’s evidence established the following facts:
On
On
On
Helen
approached Eduardo, and saw that he was barely alive so she shouted for help. Eduardo’s
relatives came and brought him to the hospital. Eduardo died the next day.[11]
In
the early morning of the same day, Crisanta saw three
of the assailants near the Civilian
Voluntary Organization (CVO) outpost looking
at Eduardo’s house some 200 meters
away.[12] The
three persons then left the CVO outpost. Rogelio saw appellant driving the
motorcycle which carried the other four assailants. They passed by his house
which was only about 100 meters from the crime scene. He saw appellant drop
three of his passengers in a place about 50 meters from his house, while one
passenger stayed on in the motorcycle with appellant.[13]
Rogelio witnessed how Eduardo was
gunned down by the three assailants, who were later picked up by appellant on
the same motorcycle.[14]
He approached Eduardo while Helen was cradling him, and he saw that Eduardo was
then barely alive. Afterward, he went to the police station and reported the
incident.[15]
After hearing the gunshots, Crisanta ran from her house to the house of Barangay
Captain Roberto Lansaderas to report the incident.
However, she did not proceed anymore for she saw him talking with appellant and
the latter’s companion.[16]
She returned to her house, and sometime thereafter she saw appellant and his
companion pass behind her house on a motorcycle going to the direction of the
crime scene. Later, she saw the same motorcycle carrying appellant and his
companion pass by her house again, this time carrying the three
persons she saw earlier in the CVO outpost.[17] The three
persons were carrying
firearms, and she heard one of them shout “finish, patay
na, mobalik pa mi naa pa mi kohaon.”[18]
Felixberta, the mother of Eduardo, also saw the motorcycle
pass by her house in the morning of
Appellant,
in his defense, denied his participation and that of his brother Leo in the
killing of Eduardo. In the same breath, he claimed that he was only forced at
gunpoint to drive the four assailants to and from the crime scene. He also belied
the participation of Leo in the crime by setting up an alibi that the latter
was in Barangay Mahayag, Alicia,
According
to appellant, he was waiting for passengers at the
Appellant
denied that his brother Leo was one of the assailants in the killing of Eduardo.[23] And
that the last time he saw his brother was in 1989.[24]
Appellant’s
mother, Natividad, testified that in the early morning
of
The
defense attempted to cast doubt on the credibility of Helen’s testimony. They
presented Efinito, the Barangay Captain of Mahayag, Alicia,
SPO2
Bustamante testified that he learned about the
killing of Eduardo through the police blotter when he reported to work at
around
The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) found appellant guilty of the crime of murder[32] and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua in a decision dated 13
February 1998.[33] The RTC held that two eyewitnesses pointed to
appellant as a co-conspirator who guided the other four accused to the scene of
the crime. Appellant went back to the crime scene after the shooting of Eduardo
to pick up his three companions and brought them to a safe place. It further
found credence in the prosecution’s evidence that showed appellant spying or
monitoring Eduardo even prior to
The RTC denied appellant’s motion for reconsideration
in an order dated
The
Court of Appeals[39]
affirmed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court gave credence to the
testimony of Helen when she explained that she did not immediately report the
incident and identify Leo as one of the assailants because she was still in
shock. Further, it found that the alleged inconsistencies in Helen’s testimony
are minor and inconsequential. It noted that the conviction of appellant did
not rest on Helen’s testimony alone. There was substantial corroboration on
material points by prosecution witnesses Rogelio, Crisanta,
and Felixberta. No ill motive was ascribed to the
prosecution witnesses who testified as to the participation of appellant and
his brother Leo to the murder of Eduardo.[40]
The appellate court, however, held
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not clearly established as no
witness was presented to show how the shooting was done. But it found that
evident premeditation attended the killing of Eduardo, as shown by the
following circumstances: (1) the appellant’s act of assessing, that is, asking
where the house of the deceased is located and in surreptitiously peeping
through the deceased’s house days before the incident; (2) the fact that the
incident happened at
The case is again before us for our
final disposition. Appellant had assigned three (3) errors in his appeal initially
passed upon by the Court of Appeals, to wit: whether the RTC erred in declaring
him as a co-conspirator of his brother Leo; whether the RTC erred in finding
him guilty of murder just because he drove the vehicle carrying the other
assailants, and; assuming arguendo that he is
guilty, he is only guilty of homicide.[42]
The Court affirms the appellant’s
conviction. There is no cogent reason to disturb the finding of guilt made by
the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Jurisprudence is settled that findings
of fact of the trial court command great weight and respect unless patent
inconsistencies are ignored or where the conclusions reached are clearly
unsupported by evidence.[43] But
these exceptions are unavailing in this case.
As support for the first and second
issues, appellant attempted to impeach the credibility of Helen’s testimony by
pointing to alleged inconsistencies.[44] Moreover, appellant tried to put in issue the
fact that it took Helen two weeks or until
It is a well-settled rule that the
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the trial court is received on
appeal with the highest respect because such court has the direct opportunity
to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine if they are telling the
truth or not.[46] We see
no reason to deviate from this rule.
A review of the records of this case
shows that the RTC did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses. The testimony of Helen does not suffer from any serious and
material contradictions that can detract her credibility. The Court finds Helen’s
testimony credible as it is replete with details and corroborated on material
points by the other prosecution witnesses, who were equally credible. Helen, who saw the shooting of Eduardo, was very
categorical and frank in her testimony. She identified Leo as the man who
shot Eduardo, and appellant as the one who drove the get away vehicle of the
four assailants. The Court has held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in
the testimony referring to minor details,
and not on the basic aspects of the crime, do not impair the witness’
credibility.[47] These inconsistencies even tend to strengthen,
rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses as they negate any suspicion
of a rehearsed testimony.[48]
The defense also failed to impute any
ill-motive on the prosecution’s witnesses which would discredit their testimony
on the events leading to Eduardo’s killing. Absent any reason or motive
for a prosecution witness to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such
motive exists and his testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credit.[49]
The RTC and the Court of Appeals
correctly gave credence to Helen’s explanation on the two-week delay in
reporting the identity of the assailants in the killing of Eduardo. It is understandable that she was still reeling from extreme
shock and grief due to the unexpected and gruesome death of Eduardo. In People v. Lapay,[50]
we held that “delay in revealing the names of the malefactors
does not, by itself, impair the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and
their testimonies.” Time and again, this Court has ruled that “the
nondisclosure by the witness to the police officers of [accused-appellant’s]
identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against
human experience.”[51] It
is already of judicial notice that family members of victims of violent crimes
react to an unnatural occurrence in diverse ways. Some, if they have any information about the
incident, would waste no time in telling the police everything they know. Others would rather choose, or are forced, to
clam up and refuse to divulge any information they may possess. And then, there are the majority of family
members who would first hesitate before they reveal what they know. [52]
The
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly held that the existence of
conspiracy between appellant and the four other assailants was established
beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.[53] Appellant
took a direct part in the killing of Eduardo. His guilt is not merely based on
circumstantial evidence. There is no question that he acted as the driver of
the vehicle that took the four assailants to and from the crime scene. He even
conducted reconnaissance on Eduardo prior to
All told, the Court finds no reason
to reverse the ruling of the RTC and the Court of Appeals insofar as the
crime was committed by the accused. What remains to be determined is the
propriety of the penalty imposed on appellant in relation to the third issue
raised.
The Court of Appeals correctly
appreciated the testimonies of the prosecution’s
witnesses which showed the existence of evident premeditation in Eduardo’s
killing.[54] The essence of evident premeditation is that
the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection
upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[55]
The Court of Appeals correctly held
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not clearly established since
none of the witnesses saw how the shooting was
started. For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the
witness right at the inception of the attack.[56] Where
no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with
treachery cannot merely be supposed.[57]
Abuse of superior strength cannot
likewise be appreciated for it was not alleged in the information.[58]. Even
if alleged, it cannot qualify the killing of Eduardo. In People v. Flores,[59]
this Court pointed out that this aggravating circumstance necessitates the
showing of the relative disparity in physical characteristics, usually
translating into the age, gender, the physical size and the strength of the
aggressor and the victim. There is no proof that assailants utilized any
notorious inequality to their advantage. In other words, mere superiority
in number is not enough to constitute superior strength.[60]
However, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
failed to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of the commission of the crime
with the aid of armed men. The information alleged that the accused were “armed
with short firearms.” There is ample evidence on record establishing the
presence of this circumstance. Under paragraph 1, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, “the aid of
armed men” qualifies a killing to murder. Since treachery was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the qualifying circumstance of killing “with the aid of armed
men” could not be absorbed in treachery.[61]
The
RTC erred in considering voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance[62]
in favor of appellant. Appellant
did not surrender to the police; he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of
arrest as testified to by defense witness SPO2 Bustamante.[63]
The rule is that when more than one qualifying
circumstances is proven, the others must be considered as generic aggravating.[64]
The qualifying circumstance of “with the aid of armed men” serves in this case as
a generic aggravating circumstance, meriting the imposition of the penalty of
death in the absence of any mitigating circumstance.[65] However,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346[66]
which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court can only impose reclusion
perpetua, which will be in lieu of the death
penalty.
As to damages, the Court finds that
the civil indemnity should be increased to P75,000.00.[67] The
award of civil indemnity may be granted without any need of proof other than
the death of the victim.[68]
The award of P13,700.00 actual
damages for funeral and medical expenses was properly supported by receipts and
documents evidencing the same, which were presented before the RTC, as required
by Article 2199 of the Civil Code.[69]
However, in accordance with
jurisprudence, the Court has to award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00
in lieu of the actual damages of a lesser amount.[70]
As explained in People v. Werba,[71]
to rule otherwise would be anomalous and unfair because the victim’s heirs who
tried but succeeded in proving actual damages of an amount less than P25,000.00
would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no receipts
at all but would now be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages.
Though not awarded by the RTC, the
victim’s heirs are entitled to moral damages amounting to P50,000.00, pursuant to existing jurisprudence.[72]
An award of moral damages is fair and just even though the prosecution did not
present any proof, apart from the fact of death of the victim and the
culpability of the accused. On the other hand, the Court has no basis to award
damages for the loss of earning capacity of Eduardo because the prosecution
failed to introduce any evidence on this matter.
In addition, exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 should be awarded
considering the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation that qualified the killing to murder, and the qualifying
circumstance of “with the aid of armed men” that serves as generic aggravating
circumstance.[73]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 95-81 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATIONS that the civil indemnity be increased to P75,000.00 and that appellant shall pay the heirs of Eduardo Villabrille moral damages of P50,000.00, temperate
damages of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]CA rollo, p. 4. The information reads:
That on or about March 23,1995, in the Municipality of Samal, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Reynaldo Barriga, in conspiracy with Leo Barriga, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Richard Doe, who are at large, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill and armed with short firearms, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Eduardo G. Villabrille, thereby inflicting upon him wounds which caused his death and further causing actual, moral and compensatory damages to the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[32]ART. 248. Murder.—Any person who, not falling
within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua
to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking
advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
2. In consideration of a price,
reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire,
poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon
a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use
of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the
calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption
of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With
evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at
his person or corpse. (Emphasis supplied)
[33]CA rollo, pp. 38-39. Branch 34, Panabo,
WHEREFORE, the Court finds, REYNALDO BARRIGA guilty with having committed the crime of MURDER, beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
He is further ordered to pay the
heirs of EDUARDO VILLABRILLE the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED (P13,700.00) PESOS as damages, plus FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00)
PESOS as indemnity of [sic] the victim’s death.
SO ORDERED.
[37]Pursuant
to the case of People v. Efren Mateo, G.R.
Nos. 147678-87,
[39]
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[43]People v. Quinevista Jr., 314 Phil. 540, 547 (1995), citing People v. Gumahin, No. L-22357,
[46]People v. Baccay, 348 Phil. 322, 330 (1998). See also People
v. Bolivar, et al., 405 Phil. 55, 70 (2001), citing People v. Rosario,
G.R. No. 122769, 3 August 2000, 337 SCRA 169; People v.
Baltazar, 405 Phil. 340 (2001);
and People v. Mayor
Sanchez, 419 Phil. 808 (2001)..
[47]People v. Salamat, G.R. No. 103295,
[48]People v. Utinas, G.R. No. 105832, 22 December 1994, 239 SCRA 362,
370, citing People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 102618, 12 October 1993, 227
SCRA 182; People v. Custodio, G.R. No. 96230,
27 May 1991, 197 SCRA 538.
[49]People v.
Mendoza, 388 Phil. 279, 288 (2000), citing People v. Acaya, G.R. No. 108381, 7 March 2000, citing People
v. Rada, G.R. No. 128181, 10 June 1999, p. 15 and
People v. Aguinas, G.R. No. 121993, 12
September 1997, 279 SCRA 52, 65. See also People v.
Benito, 363 Phil. 90, 98 (1999).
[50]358 Phil. 541, 558 (1998), citing People v. Rosario,
246 SCRA 658, 667,
[51]People v. Malimit, 332
Phil. 190, 199 (1996), citing People v. Pacabes,
137 SCRA 158 (1985); See also People v. Danico,
208 SCRA 472 (1992), and People v. Caraig, 202
SCRA 357 (1991).
[53]CA rollo, p. 38. See Fernandez v. People
, 395 Phil. 478, 502 (2000), citing People v. Gomez, 270 SCRA 432, 443 (1997); People v. Viernes, 262 SCRA 655, 657 (1996). See also People v. Medina, 354 Phil. 447, 458 (1998); People v. Ponce, 395 Phil. 563, 572 (2000), citing Pecho v. People, 262 SCRA 518, 531 (1996), citing People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 (1995); People v. Tami, 244 SCRA 1, 22 (1995) citing People v. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369 (1995), People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 (1968).[55]People v. Uganap, et al., 411 Phil. 320, 335 (2001); citing People v. Bibat, 290 SCRA 27 (1998). See also People v. Reyes,
350 Phil. 683, 696, 697 (1998); People v. Galvez,
407 Phil. 541, 560 (2001), citing People v. Orculla,
G.R. No. 132350,
[56]People v. Leal,
411 Phil. 465, 479 (2001), citing People v. Sambulan,
G.R. No. 112972,
[57]People v. Leal,
supra, citing People v. Borreros, 306 SCRA
680, 693, May 5, 1999; People v. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68; 89-90, May 12,
1999.
[58]Rules of Court, Rule110 Section 8.
[60]People v. Galapin, 355 Phil. 212, 231 (1998), citing People v.
Castor, 216 SCRA 410, 421 (1992). See also People v. Nicholas, 422 Phil.
53, 69-70 (2001). See also People v. Samudio, et
al., 406 Phil. 318, citing People v. Buluran,
G.R. No. 113940, 15 February 2000, 325 SCRA 476, 487-488, citing People v. Plantilla, 304 SCRA 339 (1999).
[61]People v. Torrefiel, 326 Phil. 388, 399-400 (1996); People v. Amondina,
G.R. No. 75295,
[62]Article 13(7), Revised Penal Code. See People v. Lee,
G.R. No. 66848, 20 December 1991, 204 SCRA 900, 911, citing People v. Lingatong, 181 SCRA 424; People v. Ablao, 183 SCRA 658. See also People v. Tismo, G.R. No. 44773, 4 December 1991, 204 SCRA 535,
558-559; People v. Devaras, G.R. No. 48009, 3
February 1992, 205 SCRA 676, 694; People
v. Gomez, G.R. No. 10914, 17 August 1994, 235 SCRA 444.
[65]ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.― x x x x In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.
x x x x
[66]SEC. 2. In lieu of the death
penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b)
the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law
violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code.
Pursuant to the
same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
[67]People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, 31 August 2006, 500 SCRA 727,
742-743; People v. Bangcado, 399 Phil. 768,
792 (2000). See also People v. Amion, 405 Phil. 917, 934 (2001), People v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil.
247, 269 (2001), citing People v.
Ariel Pedroso y Ciabo, G.R.
No. 125120, July 19, 2000; People v. Go-od, 387
Phil. 628 (2000); People v. Rosalino Flores, 385 Phil. 159 (2000); People v.
Mindanao, 390 Phil. 510 (2000); People v. Quijon,
382 Phil. 339 (2000); People v. Buluran, 382
Phil. 364 (2000).
[69]ART. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.
[70]People
v. Werba, G.R. No. 144599, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA
482; citing People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 139177,
[72]People v. Cortez, 401 Phil. 886, 905 (2000). See
also People v. Ortiz, 413 Phil. 592, 617 (2001); People v. Dela Cruz, 402 Phil. 138, 151, (2001).